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Anti-TookE: 



ANALYSIS 



THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE 



LANGUAGE, 



EXEMPLIFIED IN THE 



ENGLISH TONGUE. 



By JOHN FEARN. 



And all the people, the nations, and the languages, tell down 
and worshipped the golden image that nebuchadnezzar the 
king had set up." 



LONDON: X^5?wKsg 

PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY, RED LION COURT, FLEET-STREET. 

AND SOLD BY 

LONGMAN, HURST, REES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN, 

PATERNOSTER ROW; KINGSBURY, PARBURY, AND 

ALLEN, LEADENHALL STREET j AND ROLAND 

HUNTER, ST. PAUL'S CHURCHYARD, 

1824. 



^^ ^^ 



^<i> 



ointed " 

TO 

MY CRITICS 

AND THE OTHER GENTLEMEN CONCERNED IN 
THE MONTHLY REVIEW, 

AND IN THE LATE 

NEW EDINBURGH REVIEW. 

Gentlemen, 

Unquestionably, the General Subject in which I 
have been many years deeply engaged is bound to you, 
by an obligation of no ordinary occurrence. At an 
epoch when, in general, owing to the state of the prevail- 
ing taste, the most intense and painful researches into 
Intellectual Philosophy, cannot, unless from some 
adventitious oiroiims;ffiT»r.p!, find the time and the la- 
bor of the popular critic ; and can still less find 
admission into the pages of a periodical Review ; you 
have exhibited an instance of a very remarkable ex- 
ception to this fatuity. It would be much worse 
than impertinent in me to advert to this liberal con- 
duct, if I could not along with it declare, as I now 
do in the presence of those who know me, that I not 
only have not the smallest connexion, or even ac- 
quaintance, with any of the persons whom I have the 
honor to address; but, beyond this, that, after assu- 
rances received from such friends as I could in the least 
degree suspect of being adequate to the task, I firmly 
believe the office in question has been discharged by in- 
dividuals who have no personal knowledge of me. * Af- 
ter such a declaration, however, it cannot be improper 
to own, that I am much gratified to find the Literary 
History of the Age exhibiting such an instance of jus- 

I deem it fit that this statement should be duly accompanied 
by the intimation, that once, and once onlxfy at a comideraUe time 
after the appearance of the critiques in question, I accidentally met, 
in a mixed party, with a Gentleman whom I tmderstood to be con- 
nected with the Monthly Review; and, certainly, spoke to him un- 
der this impression. 



IV 

tice toward that neglected walk of study to I 

have devoted my time. 

As you have, respectively, perused and commented 
upon, my printed Letter of remonstrance to Professor 
Stewart, prefixed to my '' First Lines of the Human 
Mind ;" you will naturally anticipate, that, although I 
have much indeed to acknowledge of your attention to 
the general tenor of that work, the primary cause of my 
offering this tribute of obligation and respect to you, is 
the fearless and decided sentence you have not he- 
sitated severally to pronounce, upon the merits of my 
claim on that Gentleman, that he should publicly ren- 
der up to me his admission of my priority to him, in the 
position which he has asserted in the First Fart of his 
^'Dissertation" in the Encyclopedia Britan- 
NICA, that "a variety of color is necessary to the 
perception of Visible Figure or Outline" 

You are at the same time aware, that I have urged 
this of Mr. Stewart, not only inasmuch as it is very se- 
riously prejudicial to my views and progress, in the de- 
partment of research in which I have so long labored ; 
but, much more than this, that it must be believed by the 
readers of the text writings only of both of us, that 
it is /that have taken his philosophical property; and, 
that I have been setting forth to the Publiu, as my 
own matter, a pusition which I must have known to be 
his. 

Such, Gentlemen, is the double necessity which com- 
pels me to persevere in the only desire which I can have 
with regard to the point at issue ; — namely — that the real 
facts and merits of the case shall be as generally 
known, as the matter in Mr. Stewart's writings, (prejudi- 
cial to my reputation) which gave origin to the differ- 
ence between us. 

In yielding, on the present occasion, to the necessity 
which Mr. Stewart has laid me under, of not going be- 
fore the Public with any new work without accompany- 
ing it with my protest against his proceeding in refusing 
me the admission which I require ; I have particularly 
to acknowledge the correctness of quotation, and the 
explicitoess of statement, which the Monthly Re- 
view, especially,' has made of that contradiction, as 

' I am not the less sensible of the conclusive verdict which has 
been prunf>unceci by my Critic in the Metaphysical Capital of Bri- 
taiii; although he has not devoted so large a space to the analysis 
of my work, as has been afforded in the Monthly Review. 



pointed out by me, in the doctrines Of Mr. Stewart^ 
whereby, in the momentary bent to refuse acknow- 
ledging my priority in the matter in question, he has fur- 
nished to the world the spectacle of his change, from 
being, through Five Editions of his Elements, the Apos- 
tle of the IN-EXTENDED colors of Reid, to be theAssertor 
and Promulgator of the extended colors of " Mon- 
boddo" and of Locke. And here I would ask, Is there, or 
Can there exist, a man of a character so high, as that after 
such an appeal, and such an award, he should not feel 
himself bound, (if only in respect to the Public,) to come 
before that Public with some defence, or explanation ? 
Yet Professor Stewart has not only remained silent 
upon my remonstrance, and your decision ; but he has 
also suffered the Second Part of his " Dissertation" 
to go forth to the world, without adverting in the slight- 
est manner to the claim thus urged upon him. 

Upon this proceeding I shall at present only remark, 
that, under the inexplicable silence which Mr. Stewart 
has hitherto resolved to observe, it is impossible for me 
to conceive what motive could have weight enough to 
induce a man, with whose character I had always, in 
my imagination, interwoven notions of high honor and a 
towering intellectual ambition, to withhold the acknow- 
ledgment indispensably requisite to remove the evil under 
which I labor. 

For a man of an unelevated character, who would be 
content with an ephemeral fame, and for such fame 
would incur the judgment of posterity, I can certainly 
discern a motive for silence. The fact is, that, in the 
present state of public opinion, very few persons will 
read an Elementary Work on the Human Mind; — and, 
indeed, a great proportion of the^ reading public are 
wholly incapable of apprehending either its merits or 
its drift. At the same time, it was w^ell known, from the 
beginning, that there was no chance of my work 
being taken up by either of the two principal vehicles of 
periodical criticism. Hence it was manifest that my 
appeal must take a long time ; and both Professor Stew- 
art and myself might pass away ; before it could get into 
general circulation. But Mr. Stewart well knew; (and 
I leave it entirely to others to judge, whether he acted 
from this knowledge;) that the momeot he should, in 
his writings, advert, in any way, to my claim upon him, 
the eyes of Europe would be drawn upon what I am 
about, and all that I have advanced^ in my " First 



VI 

Lines," against the Metaphysics of the School of Reid, 
would be examined and adjudged. 

In fine, I observe, that, while you, as my critics, have 
borne testimony to my having evinced every proper con- 
sideration for Professor Stewart ; it is natural that his 
admirers might, from the strength of the case which 
I have stated, suppose that 1 had made it, at least, as 
particular, and as pointed, as facts would admit. I beg 
leave to assure you, however, that I am far from having 
gone this justifiable length ; my earnest wish having been 
to avoid all unnecessary particularity ; as must be evi- 
dent from my previous endeavours to obtain my object 
by private and, I trust, delicate appeals to the justice 
of Mr. Stewart. 

Gentlemen, I turn now from this Subject : and desire 
to reciprocate the independence of mind which you have 
displayed with regard to it, by inscribing to you the fol- 
lowing Volume ; concerning which I shall only say, 
that, having bestowed upon it my best endeavours to 
render it a finished labor, as far as it extends, I hope it 
will not be found altogether a discreditable offering. 
"With this, I have the honor to be. 

With unfeigned respect. 

Tour Most Obedient Servant, 

JOHN FEARN. 

Tonntigton Square, 
June 21, 1824. 

P. S. Since writing the above, I have been struck by 
a curious coincidence, which 1 had neither designed nor 
thought of; and which I deem it proper to notice, in order 
that it may not be looked upon as my intending to run a 
parallel. Upon opening the "Diversions of Pur- 
ley," for the purpose of referring to it in the Preface to 
this work, it is brought to my recollection that Mr. 
Tooke has inscribed his Second Volume to a Jury of his 
countrymen, by whose verdict he had been rescued 
from imminent danger. This was as it should be. There 
is one difference, however, between the two cases; to 
which I must advert, although not with the smallest in- 
sinuation against the political conduct of Mr. Tooke,-— 
namely — that he has expressed his gratitude to those 
who had acquitted him ; but I to those who have labored 
to bring my proceedings to t?iaL 



TO 



DUGALD STEWART, ESQ. 

F.R.SS. LOND. AND EDINB., &c. &c. &c. 

Formerly Professor of Moral Philosophy tn the 
University of Edinburgh. 

Sir, 
As I understand, from common report, that your 
health requires abstinence from intellectual exertion ; 
(although I cannot imagine it is more incapacitating, 
or forbidding, than that against which I have struggled 
through the whole labor of the following volume;) I 
shall, on the present occasion, only call your serious at- 
tention to the foregoing address to my Critics, and to my 
printed Letter to yourself prefixed to the " First Lines of 
the Human Mind." The painfiil necessity which you 
have laid me under, of not putting forth any new work 
without urging the weight of my claim upon you,^ as ex- 
plained in the papers already mentioned, renders it the 
least I can do (even in the present state of the health of 
both) to aftbrd you, by this call, an opportunity for ex- 
planation. 

To this I shall at present only add, that, from the 
growing popular interest which appears to be mani- 



Till 

fested in the subject of Language, I confess, I entertain 
considerable hope, that the circulation of " Anti-Tooke" 
will render it a matter not principally interesting to me, 
whether or not you will choose to listen to the voice of 
my repeated remonstrance ; or to the verdict of a literary 
jury, who, most certainly, cannot be supposed to have 
been biassed by friendship for me, or hostility toward 
you. 

In all charity, sincerely wishing you a complete re- 
establishment of health ; 

I am. Sir, 

Your Most Obedient Servant, 

JOHN FEARjSr. 

P. S. I shall order a copy of this volume to be care- 
fully forv^arded to your address, in order that there may 
be not a doubt in the Public mind with regard to the 
result. 

J. F. 

N. B. The Reviews referred to, above, are the 
Monthly Review for February 1822; and the New 
Edinburgh Review for October 1821. 



Preface. 



If any thing can be imagined more truly mortify- 
ing than another to the intellectual pretensions of 
our Species ; it is, that we should be doomed to 
signify our thoughts in a jargon of utterance, with 
regard to the true logical import of which we are 
profoundly ignorant. Every man of education, ■, 
when he happens to listen to the articulate effu- 
sions of a plough-boy, or untaught peasant, is 
filled with unmixed compassion, to behold a large 
number of his fellow creatures chained down, by 
their lot, to the dark necessity of expressing their 
ideas in a way that approximates, not a little, to 
the instinctive signs of brute animals. What, then, 
must be the reflections of the educated man, if it 
were had in proof, that, with regard to this sort 
of attainment, he is in a state not much elevated 
above the level of the Clown whom he pities and 
despises? 

/ ■ . J ' . f , ,- • ,r, V '. '■■ -^ ■ - 



X PREFACE. 

Assuredly, no stronger incentive than this ought 
to be requisite, to induce men to examine into any 
stated objections, which may be raised against, 
the doctrines concerning Language that now exist. 
But, in addition to this, Need it be said, that there 
are other and far more urgent reasons for such 
investigation; insomuch, that there is no human 
being, in a civilised country, of whatever rank or 
profession, who is not personally and most deeply 
affected by this Universal Medium of Commu- 
nication, of men's Thoughts, Duties, and 
Engagements ? 

It is but little to say, that the enacting and en- 
forcing of laws ; the conducting of war and of poli- 
tics ; the bequeathing of our possessions, and the 
disposition of our private affairs; are vitally interwo- 
ven with the import ascribed to Words considered 
as the Signs of our Ideas. If a familiar example 
of this truth can be requisite ; We have only to be re- 
minded of the different and often incompatible con- 
structions which are daily given, by different Law- 
yers and Magistrates, to the wording of a Will, 
the drawing of a Contract, or the intent of an Act 
of Parliament : by which construction, the Pro- 
perty, the Liberty, or the Life, of an Individual, 
or of a Number of Individuals, may be placed 
in jeopardy. 



PREFACE,. *1 

The Illustrious Pbilx)loger, to whose writings a 
very principal though unaccording reference will 
be had in the following volume, informs us("Div. 
" OF PuRLEY, Vol. I, page 75"j and dwells on the 
fact with a sensibility which vibrates throughout his 
Work, and tinges the whole color of his Philoso- 
phical views, that his own " life" was under immi- 
nent danger, and his *' civil crtinction' became 
the " co?2sequence,'' of a wrong import ascribed to 
" Two Prepositions and a Conjunction." And, 
without our here entering into the question of fact, 
Whether the matter was actually as he conceived ; 
it is quite certain that such a course and conse- 
quence MIGHT in SOME timcs cxist ; and equally 
certain, that a very near epoch might make such 
times our own. Any more stimulating example 
than this, therefore, cannot be necessary, to rouse 
men to a sense of the evils involved in the want of 
a True or Real Philosophy of Language. 

It is a curious metaphysical fact, or question, 
What it is that occasions mankind, in every rank 
and calling, to acquiesce so uniformly, as they 
certainly do, under an evil of so vast a magnitude. 
The ruler, and the ruled, are alike sensible of 
this evil ; if not alike sufferers from it. The strong 
and the weak, in civilised society, are, in a grea- 
ter or less extent, the victims of it. The timid and 



Xll PREFACE. 

the brave are equally incapable of protecting them- 
selves from its effects. The sophist and the dealer 
in obliquity are alone gainers, and thrive upon it. 
And yet, it is vain, at least in ordinary life, to 
lift a voice against an affliction that appears no 
more to be done away with than death itself. 

The truth seems to be, that the thing is acquies- 
ced in, universally, under a belief that it is a Law 
of our Intellectual Constitution and is equally irre- 
sistible and irremediable : And the operation of 
it is regarded, like that of our evil passions ; which 
are deeply to be dreaded, and as far as possible 
guarded against ; but, in great part, never to be 
prevented, or removed. 

But, What if it should come out, that the enor- 
mous mischief in question is Not a Law of our 
Nature ; but is merely the accidental and tempo- 
-t rary result of a darkness which the progress of 
cultivated reason can remove ? 

If it be here asked, Whether there is any reason- 
able probability that the desideratum last mentioned 
shall ever be attained ? The brief and the only fit 
answer in this place is, to point to what has been 
done, almost within our own time, in the various 
departments of Physical Science : And, along with 
this, to remark, how small a proportion of human 
acumen has been applied, philosophically, to 



PREFACE. Xm 

the attainment in question. For example, it may 
be asked, Who would beheve, if the fact were not on 
record, that, Two Thousand years after the Sta- 
gy rite had furnished the World with a gigantic Sys- 
tem of General Logic (no matter here how far true, 
or false,) the estimable English Philosopher Locke, 
with ingenuous simplicity, informs his readers, that 
*^ When he first began his discourse of the Under- 
" standing, and ix good while after, he had not the 
** least thought that any consideration of words 
" was at all necessary to it." 

The small number of those who have cast at all 
WITH A PHILOSOPHICAL BENT, in this dircctioH, 
must be known to those who have looked into the 
writings of Mr. Tooke : Who, in alluding to the 
subject, has bestowed the end ofhis unsparing lash 
upon those Philosophers that have not cast this 
way ; but yet, in order to excuse themselves from 
the attempt, have affected a contempt of its im- 
portance, or have pretended engagements of a 
more weighty and urgent nature. 

** The same sort of corruption," (says he, speak- 
ing of Conjunctions and Prepositions) " from the 
" same cause, has disguised both : and ignorance 
*' of their true origin has betrayed Grammarians 
" and Philosophers into the mysterious and con- 
" tradictory language which they have held con- 



XfV PREFACE. 

** cerning them. And it is really entertaining^ to 
** observe the various shifts used by those who 
"were too sharp-witted and too ingenuous to re- 
" peat the unsatisfactory accounts of these Prepo- 
" sitions handed down by others ; and yet not 
" ingenuous enough to acknowledge their own 
" total ignorance on the subject. The Gramma- 
** rian says, it is none of his business : and for that 
" reason only he omits giving an account of them. 
** Whilst the Philosopher avails himself of his 
*' dignity ; and, when he meets with a stubborn 4- 
" difficulty which he cannot unravel, {and only then,) 
" disdains to be employed about Words : although 
" they are the necessary channel through which 
" his most precious liquors must flow." 

Div. OF PuRLEY, Vol, 1, page 307. 
The last sentence, in this stricture of Mr. Tooke, 
contains a most important feature in a Preface to 
a Work on Language; upon which one might 
dwell, with proportionate interest, if the fact were 
not already too well known to Philosophers. It 
is therefore the more requisite matter, in this place, 
to insist that Speech is not only the necessary 
channel through which the most precious liquors 
of the Philosopher must flow ; but, that, at thesame 
time, it is the indispensable channel through which 
must proceed what may well be called all the 



PREFACE. XV 

issues of life. But we are here brought to a stand, 
in our reflections : For Two formidable, if not insu- 
perable barriers present themselves : One of which, 
at least, must be removed ; else, mankind must 
remain, as hitherto they ever have done, under 
the progressive operation of the imperfection of 
Language. — First, The Structure of a Real 
Language must correspond to the Structure of 
Human Thoughts : And, Secondly, All Specula- 
tion concerning the Nature of Human Ideas has, in 
this enlightened age, become stamped for a Species 
of Alchemy. — It is a Pursuit, indeed, the Nothing- 
ness of which is now so completely ascertained, 
that, among persons of a liberal education, the con- 
tempt for it, or prejudice against it, is generally 
found to be nearly in proportion to the Square of 
their Distance from all Knowledge of what has 
been done concerning it. And the natural conse- 
quence of this is, that it amounts to an imputation 
on the Understanding of all persons who still he- 
retically devote themselves to the study of it. 

Is this fatuity to last? — Or, Is the Philosophy 
of Human Thought to Continue, henceforth, to 
be classed with the Mystery of turning Lead into 
Gold ? This Preface is not the place for me to at- 
tempt to answer, or say any thing with regard to the 
question now put. The reader will use his pleasure. 



X\l PREFACE. 

in examining, and judging, whether any thing in 
the following work tends, in any degree, to the 
illucidation of it. 

With regard to my own labor or what I may 
have effected in the work ; I shall only embrace the 
professions of Mr. Harris ; (I hope the quotation 
of him, on this occasion, is not ominous ;) that, " if 
** I have failed, the failure has been my misfortune, 
** not my fault ;" — that it is *' not the hasty fruits of 
*' a few idle hours ;" — and, that " I do not wish to 
" shelter myself under any such method of anti- 
" cipating pardon for a bad performance." 

One remark remains to be offered here, with 
respect to the Language in which the following 
Analysis of Grammar is embodied. There is 
no person, who possesses any knowledge at all of 
the subject, who does not know how immeasura- 
bly the English Language has risen, of late, in the 
estimation of learned men, as a medium of investi- 
gation of the Nature of Grammar. One testimony 
alone, to this fact, I shall herein quote. And, in so 
doing, I furnish the suffrage of the most profound of 
Etymologists: who, moreover, on this occasion, only 
reiterates and confirms the assertions of Mr.Tooke. 
" It is fortunate for this inquiry," (says Dr. Murray) 
" that, of all illustrations, those drawn from old, 



PREFACE. XVll 

^' commoi), or even vulgar English, are particular- 
" ly suitable. The mysteries of language in its 
** rudest state can be explained by the vs^ords of our 
** own tongue to better purpose, than by those of 
** any other speech. By a careful study of the 
" Anglo-saxon, Visi-gothic, and the elder English 
'* writers, more knowledge may be obtained of the 
" original structure of the Greek, Latin, Celtic, or 
** Sanscrit, than the deepest erudition can possibly 
" supply," 



Ami, 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

Introductory View of the 'Nature of Signs, and An Analysis 
of the Generic Structure of the Category of Relation, as 
forming the Foundation of the Structure of Language, 

Page 

Sect. I. Introductory View of the Nature of Signs. 

Subs, I. Of the Proper Object of the Philoso- 
phical Grammarian. Comparison of Ordinary 
Language with Algebraical Notation. These Two 
apparently different Kinds of Signs generically 
and specifically identical. . . • 1 

Subs. II. Of the Doctrine of Certain Philosophers, 
that a Science is nothing but a Language well 
arranged. . . . . .19 

Subs, III. Of a Phrase and Assumption of Mo- 
dern Logicians, that Language is an Instru^ 
ment of Thought. . . . .35 

Subs, IV. Of the Different Methods which have 
been pursued by Philologists, with a view to 
solve the Problem of Language ; and, especially, 
of that which has been followed by Mr. Home 
Tooke. — Of the General Cause of past failure in 
the Subject of Language, . . .40 

Sect. II. Analysis of the Generic Structure of Re- 
latives and Relation, as forming the Primary 
Logical Structure of Things in the Universe and 
the Foundation of Language. — Collateral State- 
ment of the Structure of Relation assumed by 
Grammarians and Logicians. — Vast incompati- 
bility of those Two Structures. 
Preliminary Observations. . . .51 



XX COIs^TENTS. 

Page 
A Dialogue concerning Relation. — Part First. . 54 
A Dialogue concerning Relation. — Part Second. 75 



CHAPTER II. 

Of Verbs, 

Preliminary Observations. . . .92 

Sect. I. Of the General Nature and Office of Verbs. 

Subs. I. Of the Doctrine of Grammarians, that 
Verbs are not Copulas between a Nominative 
and an Accusative Noun. — Statement of the Fun- 
damental Principle of Language. — Suggestion of 
the Principle of Alternation of a Verb in a Sen- 
tence. . . . . .98 

Subs. II. 1. Of the Verb Substantive. — 2. Remarks 
on Dr. Murray's Etymological Account of this 
and other Neuter Verbs of Grammarians. . 123 

Sect. II. Of the Universal Neutrality of Verbs. — 
Brief Analysis of the Nature of Physical Action, 
as being the Object signified by a large proportion 
of Verbs. . . . . .136 

Sect. III. Of the Division of the Objects of Lan- 
guage into Action itself, the State of One Co- 
agent with respect to Action, and the State of the 
other Co-agent, or the Patient. — And, of the con- 
sequent Formation and Use of a Principal Class of 
Adverbs. ..... 153 

Sect. IV^ Of the Principle and the Act of Assertion. 

Subs, I. 1. Of the Doctrine of Grammarians that the 
Essence of the Verb consists in Assertion ; And, 
otherwise, that the Verb consists in an Assertion 
and an Attribute.-— 2. Suggestion that both Verbs 
and Adjectives involve a Sign of Assertion. — 3. 
Profound Error of Locke and other Grammarians, 
acquiesced in by Mr. Tooke, in Asserting that the 



CONTENTS. XXI 

Page 

Verb Substantive is the General Sign of Affirma- 
tion. . . . . . 168 

Subs, II. 1. Concerning some Strictures which have 
been offered by Professor Stewart, upon the 
Doctrine of Mr. Tooke that Every Word in Lan- 
guage belongs, in all situations, absolutely and 
unchangeably, to One and the Same Part of 
Speech.— 2. Of the United Doctrines of Mr. 
Tooke and Mr. Stewart concerning the Com- 
position and the Comparison of Ideas. Their 
Doctrine Fallacious. — 3. Fallacy of Logicians in 
supposing that the bulk of a Language is made 
up of Abstract General Terms. . .182 

Subs. III. Examination of the Assumption of Dr. 
Murray, and of Other Eminent Etymologists, 
that Verbs existed prior to Nouns. . , 213 

Sect. V. Of the Views of Some Grammarians with 
regard to the Nature of the Verb considered as a 
Copula or Connective ; involving some considera- 
tion of Juxtaposition or Grammatical Contact. . 217 
Sect. VI. Of So-called participles, and of Tense, 

Mode, Voice, Number, and Person. 
Subs. I- Of the Nominal Part of Speech above first 

mentioned. — No Participles in Language. . 230 

Subs. IL Of the Tense of Verbs. . . 239 

Subs. III. Of the So-called Modes of Verbs. . 249 

Subs. lY. Of Voice. . . . .251 

Subs.y. Of Number and Person. . . 252 

Sect. VII. Of Auxiliary Verbs. . .254 



CHAPTER III. 

Of Minor VerbSf by Grammarians called Prepositions. 

Sect. I. Of the Theory of Prepositions furnished by 
Mr. Tooke, stated here as preparatory to going 
into the Analysis of this Part of Speech. 



XXU CONTENTS- 



Page 



Subs. I. Of Mr. Tooke's Theory in general. — Incon- 
sistent in his Method. — Mistaken in asserting the 
Use of Prepositions to be that of preventing a 
Multiplicity of Complex Terms in Language ; — 
and in asserting Prepositions to be Imperatives. . 262 

Subs. II. Prepositions, if construed as Imperatives, 
invert the Relative Situations of the Subjects, 
or Objects, intended to be expressed. . 285 

Sect. II. Of the General Nature and Office of Minor 
Verbs. 

Subs. I. General Remarks on the Doctrine of Gram- 
marians with regard to the Nature and Use of 
Prepositions. — Mr. Tooke's Theory of Preposi- 
tions more prejudicial to Grammar than that ad- 
vanced by Mr. Harris. . . . 296 

Subs. II. General Definition of the Nature of Minor 
Verbs, by Grammarians called Prepositions. — 
Suggestion of the Triplicate Structure of Action ; 
Upon which Structure is founded a Principal 
Class of Minor Verbs. . . . 304 

Subs. III. The Triplicate Structure of Action not 
adverted to by Mr. Tooke, or by Other Gram- 
marians. Hence One Cause of their not having 
discerned the Real Nature of Prepositions. . 315 

Subs. IV. 1. Continuation of the Analysis of So- 
called Prepositions, as founded in Necessary 
Principles. — 2. Remarks on the View of Pre- 
positions entertained by Dr. Murray. . . 332 

Notice of the Conclusion of the first volume : And 
an intimation concerning the Contents of the 
second. ..... 362 



ANTI-TOOKE; 



ANALYSIS 



THE PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE 



LANGUAGE, 



EXEMPLIFIED IN THE 



ENGLISH TONGUE. 



ERRATA. 



P. 133. 


1.32. 


dele " here." 


135. 


2. 


for / lay myself read I lay on tnyself. 


— 


3. 


— on which latter — which latter. 


161. 


23. 


— represents — represent. 


179. 


12. 


— is — in. 


24T. 


26. 


— Ha Have Have — HaveHav£, or Ha H^yr 


320. 


33. 


— " Actors" — an Actor. 


326. 


15. 


— Tooke — Mr. Tooke. 



ANTI-TOOKE; 



AN ANALYSIS, &c. 



CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF SIGNS, 
AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERIC STRUC- 
TURE OF THE CATEGORY OF RELATION, AS 
FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF THE STRUC- 
TURE OF LANGUAGE. 



SECTION FIRST. 

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 



SUBSECTION I. 

Of the Troper Object of the Philosophical Gram- 
marian. — Comparison of Ordinary Language with 
Algebraical Notation. These Two apparently dif- 
ferent kinds of Signs generically and specifically 
identical. 

The justly celebrated grammatical speculations 
of the late Mr. Home Tooke, which, after every 
due deduction, must continue to mark a splendid 
epoch in the History of Language, have been fol- 
lowed by other very elaborate and important con- 
tributions to the public stock, from the stores of 
Etymology — works which have advanced to a 
great additional depth into the arcana of ancient 
AnaL a 



2 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

dialects: And although the farther harvest, 
which this field is capable of yielding, appears to 
be great, if not inexhaustible ; yet, in so far as 
concerns the nature of Language, considered as a 
Signature of Thought, it is unquestionably 
warrantable to anticipate the future, from the past. 
More extended researches of this nature may 
throw light upon the affinity, or the migration of 
nations; upon the origin, or original country of 
mankind, or the remote origin of speech ; or may 
solve other problems of a less dark and difficult 
nature. But, with regard to the Principles of 
Grammar, there cannot exist a hope, in the minds 
of those who have consulted the past labors on 
the subject, that Etymology can ever do more 
than it has done. Still, the Nature of Language 
— its Structure and its Elements — might well 
claim a part of that mysterious inscription which 
is said to have been found graven in a temple de- 
dicated to the Egyptian Minerva : '^ # #* *## 

" #*#» ** #** #*#** ** J AND MY VEIL HATH 

" NO mortal ever removed." 

The existing state of Philosophy, in the depart- 
ment of Language, presents, perhaps, the most 
wonderful phenomenon that has resulted from the 
whole course of human speculation. The mind 
of man expatiates in knowledge through the me- 
dium of Two remarkably distinct Systems of 
Signs: One, or Other of, which he must employ, 
to '' mark" his ideas for the purpose of recalling 
them to his own recollection, or " signify" them 
when he would communicate them to other per* 
sons. But the Scheme of Notation by which he 



SEC. 1,] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 3 

proceeds, in One of these systems, is of a nature 
the most definite and precise ; and it expresses 
the various Relations between the Subjects of his 
reasonings, with a truth that is absolutely perfect: 
Whereas the Other has at all times proved so 
vague and defective, not to say absurd or falla- 
cious, that no one ever pretends it is capable of 
expressing any thing like certainty, or precision, 
of the various Relations between its Subjects. It 
hardly needs to be explained, that, in the former 
of these Systems, I allude to the Symbols and 
Characters of Algebraical Notation ; and, in the 
latter, to Words — or the Signs by which we ex- 
press the Subjects of Ordinary Discourse. 

Can any thing, indeed, be more wonderful, 
when we reflect upon it, than to observe, upon one 
hand, a perfect model of logical signification, in 
the System of Algebraical Signs ; while, upon the 
other, of all the Ordinary or Popular Languages 
which have been invented, whether of ancient or of 
modern use, (although some of these have under- 
gone every cultivation which art and labor could 
contribute) the Philosopher has never been able 
to assign the true, or any thing like the true, gram- 
matical import of the Signs which they com- 
prise ; or, in other words, the most enlightened 
individuals of the species have nemr known what 
General Notions, or Ideas, of Relations be- 
tween Things, they had, or ought to have had, in 
their minds, when they have employed the Signs 
in question ? It is, however, at the same time, 
scarcely less wonderful, that Philosophers uniform- 
ly agree to lay the fault upon the Signs, in the 



4 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

case of Ordinary Language ; when it is a self-evi- 
dent truth, which can admit of no controversy, 
that the defect of these Signs is altogether bot- 
tomed in men's ignorance of the Relations which 
they ought to express. 

The difference of knowledge betw^een the man 
of learning and the mere mechanic, with regard to 
this subject, has always in reality been so small, 
when compared with the actual amount of darkness in 
bothy that, of itself alone, it would hardly be wor- 
thy of a commentary. And, in fact, no vanity 
could be imagined more empty, or unfounded, 
than the assumed vast superiority of the former, to 
the latter, in so far as regards the Principles and 
Structure of Language. 

The absolute truth of this statement will not be 
controverted ; especially, down to a very recent 
period. Mr. Tooke, in entering upon the course of 
his etymological speculations, has declared, and 
declared with a force of truth whiph has never been 
contradicted, that, after the mention of Names, 
** From this moment Grammar quits the day-light, 
" and plunges into an abyss of utter darkness." 
Down, therefore, until the commencement of the 
labors of this illustrious Etymologist, the igno- 
rance of the learned, with regard to the nature of 
Speech, is a matter which no one will ever pretend 
either to dispute or dissemble. And I shall de- 
pend upon the reasonings and evidences contained 
in the following pages, to justify the assertion that 
the light thrown upon the subject by Mr. Tooke, 
and by his meritorious Successors, although it is 
undeniably very great in its kind, is not of that 



SEC. I.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 5 

KIND that could illustrate the Structure of Lan- 
guage ; and, in point of fact, has not, in any material 
or consolatory degree, lessened that ignorance which 
has hitherto so nearly levelled the Scholar and 
the Clown, with regard to it. 

Nothing, indeed, I am aware, is less awakened 
in the public mind, than any suspicion that such 
an opprobrium at this moment hangs over Philoso- 
phy, in the department of Language. The very 
contrary has become a universal and a deep-rooted 
opinion with the learned. But if, in the course 
which I have been led to embrace in the prosecu- 
tion of the subject, I have not fallen into a very 
rare degree of human illusion, (concerning which, 
I confess, I feel not much anxiety) such will be 
found to be the real amount of reproach due to the 
reasoning powers of man on account of it, after 
all that has been done by Philosophers for its ad- 
vancement, that, even if there were no other utility, 
or incentive, it would form a sufficient stimulus, 
and an object of high philosophic attainment, to 
rescue the Human Understanding from a state of 
darkness so profound, as that in which the most 
successful writers have both found and left it, in 
its conceptions of the Science of Grammar. 

And here, in the contemplation and commence- 
ment of such an undertaking, inasmuch as some 
of our first-rate Philosophers have been led into a 
most egregious error with regard, even, to what 
is the Province of the Grammarian, it becomes ne- 
cessary to enter into a concise view, or explana- 
tion, of the proper Object of the latter ; — especially, 



6 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

as heitig preparatory to submitting a specific ex- 
ample, which, (for a particular purpose,) I consider 
it requisite to furnish in this place, of the nature 
and degree of that contrast, which subsists between 
the efficacy of the Language of Science and that 
of Ordinary Language, as already adverted to. 

In order to this, it may in the first place be laid 
down, as a position which will be abundantly 
supported by proof throughout the progress of 
analysis, that Each of the Systems in question is 
made up of Two, and OnhY Two, Kinds of Sig- 
nals— na^mely — Signs of Subjects or Quantities, and 
Signs of Operations between these Subjects or Quan- 
tities. Now it is to be remarked briefly, here, 
but will be noticed more particularly hereafter, that 
some very eminent writers have cherished an opi- 
nion, not only that the imperfection of Ordinary 
or Popular Language consists in both the Kinds 
of Signals which it employs ; (which indeed is 
true and is a most important truth ;) but, also, that 
it lies within the power or province of the Gramma- 
rian, by the invention of some new species of Nota- 
tion, to remove the existing defect in both kinds ! 
Contrary to this view of the subject, however, I 
shall proceed upon an assumption, the truth of 
which I apprehend will never be deliberately con- 
troverted, that the Philosopher of Grammar has 
nothing to do with those Signs of Subjects, in Or- 
dinary Language, which may be called Quantities 
and whose Signs are called Nouns, any farther 
than to ascertain and lay down their general gram^ 
matical characters and accidents : Their imperfec- 
tion as particular Signs, or, rather, the imperfection 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. f 

of the particular ideas or notions which we attach 
to them, is a defect which lies entirely beyond the 
province of the Grammarian, or the Structure of 
Language, to remove. In other words, The whole 
business of definition of particular Nouns must be 
left to the Logician, the Natural Philosopher, the 
Natural Historian, and the Philosopher of every 
department, the Philosopher of Language alone ex- 
cepted : and it is the province of the latter to deter- 
mine (together with that of the grammatical charac- 
ters and adjuncts of Nouns, as already mentioned) 
the nature of All the different Signs of 
Operations between the Nouns of Ordinary 
Language ; beyond which, his proper research, as 
a Grammarian, neither does nor can extend. 

The position, thus laid down, enables me now 
to explain, that the great disparity of efficiency be- 
tween the Two Distinct Systems under considera- 
tion ; and which, I conceive, when duly examined, 
must present to our contemplation such a wonder- 
ful enigma ; is owing to the defect of Ordinary 
Language in its Signs of Operations ; altogether 
BESIDE the acknowledged and vast defect of the par- 
ticular ideas which we attach to its various Nouns. 
And What I suggest, as being so wonderful, is the 
fact, that human reason has succeeded so perfectly 
in the invention and use of Signs of Operations in 
Algebraical Science; and, yet, has never bee?i 
able to approach to any thing like an imitation of this 
perfection, in the corresponding Signs of Ordinary 
Speech : While, from well-known causes, wholly 
foreign to Grammar, there is no wonder at all that 
we find the Signs of Subjects or Quantities^ m Or- 



g INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

dinary Language, as defective as they certainly 
are. 

Having furnished this preliminary view of the 
Nature of that defect, v^hich I suppose it should 
be the Object of the Philosophical Grammarian 
to remove from Language ; I shall now proceed 
to offer the proposed specific example of it, with a 
design to afford some immediate conception of its 
actual Degree, and thus awaken the attention of 
my readers to the existing state of what is called 
the Philosophy of Speech, compared with what is, in 
the present day, tolerated, as Knowledge, or Science, 
in any other department of human speculation. 
Such an insular example, indeed, as is here pro- 
posed, can by no means approach to convey an 
idea of any thing like the whole magnitude of 
the contrast. But I entertain little doubt, that the 
fact will at least afford matter of surprise, or asto- 
nishment, to the highest classes of readers who 
suppose that the Science of Grammar may, assured- 
ly, (since the speculations of Mr. Tooke,) be 
numbered among the branches of Human Know- 
ledge. 

In furnishing this comparison, it is evident, I 
must draw the requisite illustrations from the 
Symbols and Nature of Algebra. But the exam- 
ples necessary for this purpose will be so elemen- 
tary and obvious, that no person who is likely to 
take an interest in Universal Grammar can find any 
difficulty in apprehending them ; nor could they, 
in fact, be misunderstood by any one who is ac- 
quainted with the Notation of common Arithme- 
tic : And, as no other medium, or analogy, could 



SEc.L] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 9 

serve the desired purpose, I trust that no apo- 
logy is required for their introduction. At the 
same time I intimate, that there will, I believej 
be no occasion, of any consequence, to resort to 
this medium, in any subsequent part of the work. 

First, then, I observe, that Every Sign of an 
Opera lion, in Algebra, must have a Sign of Some 
Quantity on each side of it ; between which Two 
Signs of Quantities the Sign of an Operation 
serves as a Bridge of Logical Connection : In 
other words. Every Operation in Algebra being 
an instance of a Species of Logical Action 
between Some Two Quantities, the Sign of this 
Action must necessarily have a Sign of Some 
Quantity on Each side of it; else, it could not 
be Any Sign of an Action or Operation, 

But, contrary to this, When we turn to Ordi- 
nary Language, we find that Verbs (which are 
the acknowledged Signs of Actions, and which^ 
it will be shewn, can 7iever be a Sign of any other 
Thing than Action) are uniformly considered as 
being, in the case of a large class of them, inca- 
pable of taking a Noun or Sign of a Quantity on 
Each side. And, what is still more, it is a farther 
assumption and doctrine, in accredited Gram mar j 
that, even in the case of those Verbs which 
DO take a Noun or Quantity on Each side, the 
Verbs in question are not Bridges of Gramma- 
tical Connection between the Two Nouns 
which they divide* 

From this statement, it is perfectly manifest^ 
that no person, who has been taught in the 
Anal, B 



10 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

existing doctrines of Grammar, can believe, or 
pretend to believe, that Algebraical Notation and 
Ordinary Language are specifically One and the 
Same System of Signs ; because, in order to 
suppose this specific identicalness, the initiated 
person must obviously rebel against the most 
Fundamental Principle of his own Grammatical 
Creed, 

As an example, in illustration of what is now 
stated, I observe, that a speaker of Ordinary 
Langugige will say, " / walk" — " / sleep,''' — " / 
smile ;" — And he will suppose, that any one of 
these expressions conveys an intelligible idea, or 
meaning. But if he were to express himself in 
a way analogous to this in the Notation of Alge- 
bra, by saying, 24-, 3x, or 4-r-, it is evident he 
would, in these instances, only furnish a mark 
without meaiiing : He would not express a false- 
hood, or yet an absurdity, which, if he did, might 
nevertheless be expressed grammatically ; but he 
would violate the structure of Algebraical 
Grammar, in the last and most deplorable degree, 
and exhibit nothing but a glaring effusion of non- 
sense. 

Again. When a Grammarian, of the day, 
utters any such expression as " Peter Jights 
Richard ;" he is imperatively bound, by his 
Creed, to deny that the Word— " jF^'^^^"— is a 
Grammatical Link of Connection between the Two 
Nouns—'* Peter" and ** Richard." But, in the 
case of Any Operation whatever between Two 
Quantities in Algebra, — such as in the expression 
4 + 2, 3x6, or 5-4, — ^no one will ever deny, or 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 11 

can for a moment doubt, that the Sign of Ope- 
ration is a Link of Logical Connection between the 
Two Signs of Quantities which it divides.* 

Here, then, in the outset, is shewn an undeni- 
able and a prodigious contrast, or contrariety, 
between the Two Systems of Notation in ques- 
tion, according to the assu7ned and asserted doctrines 
of accredited Grammar, But 1 pass on to other 
features of contrast, not less remarkable and im- 
portant. 

Secondly, therefore, I observe, that, in the 
Notation of Algebra, the Signs of Addition, — Sub- 
traction, — Multiplication, — and Division, express 
Signs of Operations; While it is self evident 
that No Sign of a Quantity can ever express — 
or stand for — any one of these, or of Any Other 
Operation. But, in Ordinary Language, the Na- 
ture of those important Signs of Operations which 
Grammarians call Prepositions is at this mo- 
ment so little known, that the most successful 
grammatical writer which the world has yet seen 
hath confidently taught his contemporaries, and 
made it pass universally current with the learned, 
that Some only of these Words are Verbs, and 
Others Nouns : Which is precisely parallel to 
asserting, in the Notation of Algebra, that the 

* It is here to be particularly observed, however, that even 
Algebraists, in their view of things as General Logicians, 
have not in the least recognised that Actions or Opera- 
tions are Bridges. And, to propose and demonstrate that 
they are Such Things, will form one of the Principal Objects 
of the following work. In a word ; It is necessary to suggest 
and establish a New Logic, before it is possible to erect a 
new Structure of Grammar. 



12 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

Signs of Addition, — Snbtraction, — Multiplica^ 
tion, — and Division, — and all the Other Signs of 
a similar nature, — are, Some only of them SigJts 
of Operations, and Others Signs of Quanti- 
ties ! 

When I said, just now, "the most successful 
grammatical writer which the world has yet seen;" 
I manifestly alluded to Mr. Tooke, as being the 
acknowledged precursor of that class of Induc- 
tive Etymologists whose labors have brought the 
phraseology of ancient dialects much into light. 
At the same time, I intimate, here, that I shall in 
the present v^^ork have occasion to take frequent 
notice of the researches of a still more recent au- 
thor ; who, also, has gone far deeper into the 
arcana of ancient dialects, than Mr. Tooke has 
done; and whom I consider as having, in very 
many important derivations of Words, annulled 
the views of his illustrious predecessor ; but who, 
nevertheless, altogether sides with him in assert- 
ing, upon etymological authority, that Some only 
of our Pi^epositions are Verbs, and Others 
Nouns, — a doctrine which I must stop, in this 
place, to hold up, as exhibiting a decisive test of 
the most profound darkness in the department of 
Language. 

I am quite sensible how unwilling men of letters 
must naturally be, to be awakened from the pleas- 
ing dream that they are already in possession of 
the great desideratum of Language ; and am not 
less sensible, that it must require a very powerful 
example, indeed, to awaken their suspicion to a 
possibility of the contrary : And yet, I think, the 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 13 

case which has already been put, for their consi- 
deration, cannot fail of the desired effect, provided 
it be duly contemplated. In order, therefore, that 
it should be so, I shall afford it a brief and simple 
repetition here, in rather a different shape. 

What, then, (I ask) would be said of the know- 
ledge of any People, in the Notation (letting alone 
the Science) of Algebra, if we were to be told, 
that, after having remained, since the beginning of 
things, in a complete ignorance of even the gene- 
ral nature of its most important Signs, this People 
had, through the researches and genius of one of 
its most acute individuals, discovered certain mo- 
numents, from which it was made out, that these 
Signals consist of Two different Kinds : One of 
which was rightly concluded to represent Quan- 
tities ; but, with regard to the Other, it was 
with equal confidence assumed, that Some only 
of them signified Operations and Others 
Quantities ? What would be said of such a 
People, if we were told, that ihey plumed themselves, 
as being highly enlightened, in having become pos- 
sessed of this degree of advancement in the Phi- 
losophy OF Signs ? Yet, such is the Graven 
Image which the Philologer of Purley hath 
set up; And such the Idol which (inasmuch as it 
substituted some visible and tangible objects, for 
the nonentities of preceding Grammarians,) hath 
been worshipped by the learned of Europe, du- 
ring the last thirty years, as the New-risen Sun 
OF Language ! 

In the concise view of the subject which has 



14 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [cHAP.t. 

now been stated, it was impossible to embrace a 
variety of existing and important considerations, 
which vastly augment the contrast, and which 
will develop themselves in the progress of the 
work. But there is one of these which could not 
here be passed over in silence, without peculiar 
injustice to the actual state of the subject. The 
fact to which I allude is, that the statement which 
has just been made is, in reality, very much too 
favorable to the doctrine which it describes. For 
although Mr. Tooke has asserted, — in so many 
words, — that All Prepositions are either Nouns or 
Verbs ; and though All Grammarians, after him, 
have asserted the same thing ; yet, it will be seen 
that, by " Verbs," Mr. Tooke, and all his follow- 
ers, mean Imperatives. Now I have no hesita- 
tion in affirming, that an Imperative (being unde- 
niably an Abbreviated Whole Speech,) is a part of 
Grammar so vastly different from a Verb, that it 
exhibits no less than a very deplorable evidence 
of darkness and confusion in the Science of 
Language, when a writer of Philosophical Grammar 
employs, or a writer of Any Grammar accepts, the 
One for the Other* I am under the necessity, 
therefore, to assert, that it extinguishes what at 
first appears of partial light in Mr. Tooke's Theory, 
(in his admitting that Some Prepositions are Verbs) 
when he proceeds, in his examples, to constnie 
these Prepositions as Imperatives. And, when 
I come to discuss those examples, in their proper 
place, I anticipate being able to furnish the most 
decisive proofs of this darkness and confusion. 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 15 

What has been advanced enables me to intro- 
duce the principal object which I had in view, in 
describing that disparity of nature which exists 
between Scientific Notation and Ordinary Lan- 
guage, that is, according to the uniform interpretation 
given to the latter by Grammarians, This object 
was no other than to assert, as a general conclusion 
resulting from the whole following analysis (and 
which conclusion I deemed it of importance \q 
intimate in this introductory view of the subject,) 
that, notwithstanding all the Docirifie of Gramma" 
nans, running virtually to the contrary, there exists 
both a Generic and a Specific identicalness of the 
believed Two different kinds of Notation in ques- 
tion ; — the supposed difference between the Two 
Systems having arisen entirely from a profound 
misconception of the Real Structure and Elements 
of Ordinary Speech. 

What I here mean to assert amounts, in its con- 
sequences, to this : that I consider the Signs of 
Operations in Ordinary Language may be explain- 
ed, as expressing the Various Relations between 
the Subjects signified by its Nouns, with as much 
definiteness and precision, (allowing for the differ- 
ence of Subjects) as is effected by ihe corresponding 
Signs in Algebraical Notation: although there 
exists at present not only the most profound igno- 
rance of the Nature and Use of these Signs — 
(namely — Verbs, Prepositions Conjunctions, 
&c.) ; but, also, along with this, an equal darkness 
with regard to the Number of Some of them, 
especially of the Words called Prepositions, 

For obvious reasons, I do not stop, here, to 



16 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.L 

enlarge upon, or even to mention, the various train 
of consequences which results from the position 
now asserted. I shall only observe, that, in assert-^ 
ing the Number of Prepositions in Language to 
be much greater than is acknowledged, I differ 
most extremely from the confident assertion of 
Mr. Tooke with regard to this Part of Grammar^ 
and affirm my conviction, that the most perfect 
Language, and the most enlightened People, must 
have ihe greatest number of acknowledged Preposi- 
tions ; and thatiV^o P7^epositw72, ri^hily understood, 
is a corj^upt Word, or can ever have proceeded from 
corruption. 

I shall trust altogether to the sequel, to substan- 
tiate these suggestions ; All that I intend, in this 
place^ being merely to intimate the matter in ques- 
tion, with a view to enable a reader to iorm. some 
immediate general conception of what degree of ad- 
vancement may be expected, or rather which must 
result, in the Science of Grammar, if I should 
succeed in establishing the position thus pro- 
posed. 

In the interim, I observe the fact, that the 
identicalness of the Two Systems of Notation 
must be obvious to the Mathematician at least* 
For, although Algebraical Analysis is written 
in Symbols, it is read in Woi^ds, And the Theo- 
rems of Geometry are both read and written in 
Ordinary Language, Both which facts must have 
been impossible, if the Signs of Operations in 
Ordinary Language were not capable of admitting 
an interpretation as perfectly significant of the 
Relations to be expressed in the Sciences of Al- 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 17 

gebra and Geometry, as can be said of the Symbols 
employed in those Sciences. 

Hence it follows, that almost every Mathemati- 
cian, but more especially every Algebraist who is not 
at the same time a thorough Grammarian of the day^ 
should naturally incline to imagine that the Two 
Systems in question are only One and the Same 
Thing : And any such Algebraist therefore, might, 
in this place, be inclined to a hasty conception, that, 
in asserting the Specific identicalness of the Two, I 
have suggested nothing that has not been already, 
at least tacitly^ acknowledged. But I have already 
shewn, beyond the reach of cavil, that any person, 
who can have supposed the two Systems to be 
specifically identical, must have done so in mani- 
fest contradiction of the most important Maxim 
of accredited Grammar. Thus, If any one sup- 
poses that he had discerned the identicalness in 
question ; he must, as the Very First Principle of 
this identity, have known that Verbs are Gram- 
matical Bridges of Connection between Some 
Two Substantive Nouns ; precisely as the Signs 
of Addition, Subtraction, and Multiplication, are 
Bridges of Logical Connection between the 
Quantities of Algebra ; or, as the Sign of Equali- 
ty — (it should be called the Sign of equalling,) is 
a Logical Bridge connecting the Two Sides of an 
Equation. But it is known to every person who 
has ever looked into a Grammar, that No Verb 
is ever admitted as being a Copula, at all, with 
the sole anomaly or exception of the Verb Sub- 
stantive; which anomaly, instead of lessening, only 
augments the absurdity of accredited Grammar, 
Anal. c 



18 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

as shall be explained in its proper place : And 
even the Verb Substantive is never supposed to be a 
Copula of Any Two Agents or Signs of Quan- 
tities. 

Again. If any one imagines that he knew of the 
identicalness under consideration ; he must have 
known that All Prepositions a?^e Verbs ; and 
he must have discerned, that, to affirm A?!]/ Prepo- 
sition to be a Noun is nothing but a manifestation 
of the most deplorable darkness in the Science 
of Language. But Mr. Tooke, and Dr. Murray, 
and Every Grammatical writer since the appear- 
ance of the Diversions of Purley has shed its 
light upon the Subject, has, with one voice, affirm- 
ed, that Many of our Prepositions are Nouns : — 
Nay, their real doctrine on this head, when rightly 
distinguished from their phraseology, amounts to 
this : THAT Almost No Preposition is « Verb. 
And here I need only ask, What Algebraist, 
or What Mathematician, has ever contradicted, 
or gainsaid them ? 

In having described merely these two barriers, 
immense and manifest as they undeniably are, 
between the Nature of Scientific Notation and 
that of Ordinary Language, as the latter is inter- 
preted by consent of all Grammarians, I feel satisfied 
that it never will for a moment be pretended, by 
any one, that the identicalness of the Two Sys- 
tems is a matter at all contemplated in the Doc- 
trines of accredited Grammar. I have intimated, 
however, that the identity must, to a certain ex- 
tent, be obvious to any Mathematician who divests 
himself of the extant Creed of the Grammarian and 



SEC. I.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 19 

merely observes that Words and Symbols possess 
correspondent offices, in Ordinary Language and in 
Algebra. And, accordingly, we find, this has led 
to a very extraordinary doctrine of some eminent 
Algebraists : For, although these eminent persons 
have not discerned the identicalness herein assert- 
ed — namely — that of the Two Notations in 
question ; they have done w^hat must, after due 
consideration, be regarded as a very wonderful 
thing in such an enlightened aera as that in which 
they have flourished — that is — they have overshot 
the mark, — and this to a vast and immeasurable 
extent, by asserting that a Language or Nota- 
tion is One Same Thing as a Science ITSELF. 

The doctrine to which I now allude is so very 
remarkable, and is so momentously important in 
its bearing upon the Subject of Language, as 
well as upon that of General Logic, that I shall 
devote the following subsection to an investigation 
of its merits; especially, since it will be seen, that 
it has not been corrected by any opposition, or any 
qualification of other writei^s, except what is, if 
possible, still more discreditable to the logical 
character of the age, than the oiiginal error itself. 

SUBSECTION II. 

Of the Doctrine of Cei^tain Philosophers, that a 
Science is nothing but a Language well arranged* 

The doctrine to which it is requisite to call the 
attention of readers, in the present article, is one 
of the fruits of logical research in the eighteenth 



20 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

century, and belongs to the French Philosopher 
Condillac. It has been adopted, in a sense more 
or less qualified, by some of the most distinguished 
writers in our own and in other countries. It 
amounts to this: that ''The art of reasoning 
" is nothing but a Language well arranged,''' — and — 
** That Languages are true analytical methods, '' 

At a period antecedent to this, a project had 
been contemplated, by no less a genius than the 
German Philosopher Leibnitz, to invent a species 
of Notation, by means of which, all the Subjects 
of Dialectics should be treated with as much cer- 
tainty and precision, as those of Geometry and 
Algebra now ace. But upon this it may be ob- 
served, that it implies not, necessarily, the same 
view of the Subject as that of Condillac ; because 
it does not follow, from such a project, that its 
author must have confounded a Science with the 
Notation of that Science : it only follows that 
Leibnitz calculated upon effecting an amelioration 
of Nouns — or Signs of Quantities — which can 
never be done, except by an amelioration of the 
Ideas which we make those Signs to stand for. 
That this^ was the view entertained by Leibnitz ap- 
pears, moreover, from his avowed method of pro- 
cedure ; which was, Jirst, to invent an Alphabet 
of Human Thoughts, I merely mention this project 
of Leibnitz, because his view of the subject appears 
to have been thought altogether identical with that 
of Condillac, and because some observations of 
Mr. De Gerando, with regard to it, which I shall 
have occasion to quote, are more applicable to the 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 21 

scheme of the German, than to the conchision of 
the French Philosopher. 

As I differ, as far as possible in opinion, from 
both the original view of Condillac and the expo- 
sitions, or commentaries, which have been furnish- 
ed of it by his followers, I shall here briefly state 
what I conceive to be the general nature of the 
Subject ; Which will enable a reader the better to 
understand the objections which I propose to lay 
against those commentaries, or criticisms. In 
the end of the article, I shall add some farther ob- 
servations, with regard to it. 

1. A Science or Analytical Method consists in a 
Rule ; by the observing of which, One Truth, or 
Series of Truths, of Relation, results in the indi- 
cation of Another, as a necessary conclusion, 
drawn by the Mind, from the premises. 

2. But a Language is Not a Rule regarding 
Any Truth, or Series of Truths, or Any Deduction or 
Consequence whatever, out of its own peculiar gram- 
matical construction. It has no election for Truth, 
more than for Falsehood : Nor can it be better ar- 
ranged in the signification of either of these, than in 
the expression of the grossest absurdity, or down- 
right nonsense. To say that Color, or Sound, loves 
Virtue ; is just as good Language, as to say that 
Men, or Women, love Virtue. 

3. It is manifest, that the very same nature is 
possessed by Symbolic Notation, as that which I 
have now asserted oi Ordinary Language. Because 
the expression 2 + 2=4 + 4, is just as good Symbo- 
lic Grammar, although it asserts a glaring false- 
hood ^ as can be said of the expression 2+2=2+2, 



22 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

which represents a certain truth. In the former 
of these two examples, moreover, it is plain, the 
Science of Algebra does not exht ; although, in 
this example, the Language of Algebiia is no less 
perfect than in the latter. 

To shew the difference between the two Subjects 
in the Other branch of Mathematical Science, it 
may be observed, that many of the demonstra- 
tions in Geometry are effected through the medium 
oi false phraseology and absurd assumptions. Yet, 
when Euclid says that, " The lesser triangle is equal 
" to the greater ;" he expresses himself in Language 
as zvell arranged, as if he had said " the lesser is 
'' NOT equal to the greater,'' 

4. It follows, conclusively, from these premises, 
that a Language and a Science are Two Most 
Different Things. And I conceive it exhibits a 
very remarkable evidence of a low state of logical 
Science, when two things so extremely dissimilar, 
and so important in their respective natures, have 
been confounded into one, in the imagination of 
those who have taken the lead with regard to 
their illustration and definition. 

That Language is a most close and intimate at- 
tendant upon Science, (and in the case of Human 
Beings a necessary attendant,) is true : And, there- 
fore, there is a seinblance of a certain kind between 
the two Things. But this semblance is so gene- 
ral and loose, that nothing can be more discern- 
ible, when the attention is once called to the 
characteristic properties of each, than the difference 
between them. The former ^ I think, may, not 
unaptly, be compared to a Shadow, in its attend- 



SEcl.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. S3 

ance upon a Substance which it accompanies. The 
different Parts of the Substance are connected to- 
gether by certain laws of Organisation — Cohesion 
— Repulsion, &c. : but the Parts of the Shadow 
are not connected by any such laws ; they only pre- 
serve a me7X accidental and temporary shape and 

CONTIGUITY WITH ONE ANOTHER bccauSC they 

happen, for the moment, to he attendant upon the con- 
tiguous Parts of the Substance to which they belong. 
In a word, We might just as rationally affirm 
that a Shadow is of the same Nature with the 
most curiously Organised Substance upon which 
it waits, as that a Language is an Analytical Me- 
thod. 

In laying down this line of distinction between 
Language and Science, however, I by no means 
intend to deny, that Language is an Art founded on 
a Science of its own kind. On the contrary, 
I affirm that such is its nature: And the whole 
following Treatise will go to the confirmation of 
this assertion. It must be evident, indeed, the mo- 
ment it is suggested, that there must be the same 
kind of reciprocal dependence between the Signs of 
Quantities and the Signs of Operations in Ordi- 
nary Language, that there is between the Signs of 
Quantities and the Signs of Operations in Algebra: 
although Any Concatenation of these Signs in 
Algebra must express True Relations ; where* 
as a Concatenation of Signs, expressed in the most 
Grammatical Language, may signify either Truth, 
or Fiction, or Downright Nonsense. 

In order, here, that I may not be supposed to 



24 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

have made an erroneous statement, in what I have 
to remark with regard to the modifications with 
which the doctrine, now in question, has been 
adopted by other writers of eminence, it is requi- 
site to bring forward what has been advanced on 
the subject by some distinguished followers of 
Condillac. With this purpose, it will be compre- 
hensively illustrative of the whole proceeding, to 
quote that account of it which has been furnished 
by Professor Stewart, in the Second Volume of his 
" Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
" Mind" {Second Edit, Oct. Chap, 2. Sect, 2.) : which 
statement, although rather diffuse for a quotation, 
will not admit of being curtailed. 

'* Condillac himself falls, in no inconsiderable 
" degree, under this censure; having, upon more 
" than one occasion, expressed himself as if he 
" conceived it to be possible, by means of precise 
" and definite terms, to reduce reasoning, in all 
" the sciences, to a sort of mechanical operation, 
" analogous, in its nature, to those which are prac- 
" tised by the Algebraist, on the letters of the al- 
" phabet." — * The art of reasoning' — " he repeats 
*' over and over" — * is nothing but a Language well 
" ' arranged J 

" One of the first persons, as far as I know, 
" who objected to the vagueness and incorrectness 
" of this proposition, was Mr. De Gerando ; to 
" whom we are further indebted for a clear and 
" satisfactory exposition of the very important 
''fact to which it relates. To this fact Condillac 
" approximates nearly in various parts of his 
** works; but never, perhaps, without some degree 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. Sft 

^*of indistinctness and of exaggeration. The 
"point of view in which it is placed by his inge- 
" nious successor, strikes me as so just and happy, 
** that I cannot deny myself the pleasure of en- 
." riching my book with a few of his observations." 

* It is the distinguishing characteristic of a lively 
*and vigorous conception, to push its speculative 
•* conclusions beyond their just limits. Hence, in 

* the logical discussions of this estimable writer, 
^ these maxims (stated without any explanation or 

* restriction) That the study of a science is nothing 
^ more than the acquisition of a language; and. That 

* a science properly treated is only a language well con- 

* trived. Hence the rash assertion, That mathema- 

* tics possess no advantage over other sciences, but 

* zohat they derive from a better phraseology ; and 

* that all of these might attain the same character of 

* simplicity and of certainty, if we knew how to give 

* them signs equally perfect.' 

* The same task which must have been executed 

* by those who contributed to the first formation of 

* a language, and which is executed by every child 

* when he learns to speak it, is repeated over in the 

* mind of every adult when he makes use of his 

* mother tongue: for it is only by the decomposition 
' of his thoughts that he can learn to select the signs 

* which he ought to employ, and to dispose them in a 

* suitable order. Accordingly, those external actions 

* which we call speaking or writing, are always ac- 
*companied with a philosophical process of the 

* understanding, unless we content ourselves, as too 

* often happens, with repeating over mechanically 

* what has been said by others. It is in this respect 

Anal, D 



26 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

* that languages, with their forms and rules, con- 

* ducting (so to speak) those who use them into the 
' path of a regular analysis ; tracing out to them, 

* in a well-ordered discourse, the model of a perfect 

* decomposition, may be regarded, fw a certain sense, 

* as analytical methods. But I stop. Condillac, to 

* whom this idea belongs, has developed it too 

* well to leave any hope of improving on his state- 

* ment.' 

Before I proceed to comment upon this modifi- 
cation of Condillac's views, by M. De Gerando, it 
is due to its author that I should state an improve- 
ment of his upon the text now given. 

" In a note upon this passage," (says Pro- 
fessor Stewart) " M. De Gerando has certainly 
** improved not a little on the statement of Con- 
*'dillac." — * In asserting,' (says he) 'that Lan- 

* guages may be regarded as analytical methods, I 

* have added the qualifying phrase, in a certain sense, 

* for the word method cannot be employed here 
' with exact propriety. Languages furnish the 
^occasions and the means of analysis; that is to say, 

* they afford us assistance in follozving that method ; 

* but they are not the method itself. They resemble 

* signals or finger-posts placed on a road to enable 

* us to discern our way ; and if they help us to 

* analyse, it is because they are themselves the re- 
' suits, and as it were the monuments of an analysis 
'which has been previously made; nor do they 

* contribute to keep us in the right path, but in pro- 
' portion to the degree of judgment with which that 

* analysis has been conducted.' 

Such are the logical views, and their improve- 



SEC. 1.1 THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 27 

ments, with which Professor Stewart could not 
deny himself the pleasure of enriching his book. 
And, accordingly, in the conclusion of them, he 
says, " I was the more solicitous to introduce those 
" excellent remarks, as I suspect that I have my- 
" self indirectly contributed to propagate in this 
" country the erroneous opinion which it is their 
" object to correct." 

I wish it had not lain so unavoidably in my 
way, to object my own opinions of the subject, 
against what has here been stated with regard to 
it. But if I should fall into any error, or any un- 
due severity of criticism upon it, my own judgment 
must proportionably suffer in the opinion of all 
those who shall hereafter be competent to decide. 
With this consequence before my eyes, I cannot 
help expressing my belief, that never was eulogium 
more undeservedly bestowed, than in the high 
strain of praise, and of reciprocal compliment, 
which mark the passages in question. 

In the first place, we have M. De Gerando's 
TEXT : which, after a mass of loose verbiage and 
demonstrable contradiction, in which he talks 
about a * decomposition of thought,^ and 'philosophic 
^ cal processes of the understanding,'' (considerations 
which might well be applied to the project of Leib- 
nitz ; but which touch not the conclusion of Con- 
DiLLAC,) ends in a propagation of the gross 
ERROR OF CoNDiLLAc, in only an attenuated shape ; 
for, after all, in this text, M. De Gerando asserts, 
that, "in A CERTAIN SENSE, Languages may be 
" regarded as analytical methods." 



28 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

But I pass on, to the Note; in which the addi- 
tional and final improvement is contained. 

And here the principal feature that presents itself, 
is an express contradiction, or nullification, equally 
of itself and of the text. The Te.vt says, * It is in 
' this respect that languages, with their forms and 

* rules, conducting (so to speak) those who use 

* them into the path of a regular analysis,' — * may be 

* regarded, in a certain sense, as analytical methods.' 
But, in the Note, the real truth of the matter is 
confessed, that Languages do not conduct us in 
the path of analysis ; * nor do they contribute to 

* keep us in the right path, but in proportion to the 
' degree of judgment with which that analysis has 

* been conducted.' 

The real fact is, that both the Text and the 
Note, when duly examined, amount to one and the 
same tenor ; both contradict themselves, in the very 
same manner ; both do this by an expression of 
that species of absurdity, seldom incurred by 
Philosophers, facetiously called a Bull ; and both 
completely abandon the conclusion of Condillac, 
by the expression of that absurdity. The very 
credit of the logical character of the age appears to 
be so deeply affected by the proceeding in ques- 
tion, and by the praises with which it has been 
held up to admiration, that it becomes an indis- 
pensable duty to criticise it with proportionate 
justice. 

When the Text says, ' it is in this respect that 
f languages,' &c. ; the definitive term " this" refers j 
undeniably, to ^ philosophical processes of the under- 
standing' and to a ' decomposition of thought.' And 



SEC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 29 

the real sense of the whole text is indisputably 
this : that a Language conducts a man in the path 
of analysis, by means of his employing a philosophic 
process o/*^?* understanding and a decomposition of 
his own THOUGHTS : Which is precisely parallel to 
asserting, that One Man helps Another by the fact 
of that ot heft's helpiiig Himself 

The Note, (after some most notable confusion 
which I shall be under a necessity to criticise,) 
ends in stating the same thing as the Text, by the 
same absurdity of expression ; in acknowledging 
the truth, that a Language does not even so much 
as * CONTRIBUTE to keep us in the right path, but 
* in proportion to the degree of jvvGMEisT with which 
' an analysis has been conducted :' Which expres- 
sion, I repeat, amounts to a conclusive admission, 
that Language does not contribute to keep us in 
the right path at all. 

I am now under the necessity of adverting to 
that confusion, which, I have said, is exhibited in 
the body of M. De Gerando's Note ; and which 
is so remarkable, for the darkness and neghgence 
which it betrays, that I am almost ready to suspect 
myself of laboring under some very great defect 
of understanding, when I observe it has been the 
subject of such extraordinary panegyric. 

And First, I must assert, against the express as- 
sumption of M. De Gerando, that Languages do 
NOT "furnish ihe occasions and themeans of analysis:'' 
They furnish only the Signs or Record of analysis, 
after the Understanding or Mind has furnished 
the occasion and the means. Language, indeed, fur- 



30 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap, i; 

nisbes the means of recording the Rule which the 
Mind has discovered : but it furnishes no means of 
DISCOVERING that Rule. 

Secondly^ I observe, Languages do not " resemble 
^'finger-posts placed on a road to enable us to discern our 
^^wayT On the contrary, Every Language, or Every 
Express Speech, {while we are travelling along it,) 
resembles a Way itself, and not a way-vo^T : 
for, if we follow it, it necessarily conducts us 
SOMEWHERE ; but there is Not One Sign, or Signal, 
in Any Language, or in Any Express Speech, that 
can, by any possibility, inform us, or afford us the 
slightest suspicion, whether the way which we are 
travelling leads to Truth, or to Fiction ; to Science, 
or to Nonsense. 

As a proof of this, I need only desire, of any 
Englishman, who is ignorant of Arithmetic, to 
read the following Sentence ; Tzvice ten are equal ta 
three times sixty. And, then, I would ask him. Can 
he tell whether this proposition is true, or false ? 

Besides this fact — namely — that a Language 
IS a Road, in which Road there never is any 
Signal to tell you whether you are travelling in 
Truth, or in Falsehood, — I assert, here,— -as a 
General Principle, — that No Word, considered 
merely as a Sign, ever can point either forward or 
BACKWARD : But Evcry Word is the Sign of an 
Idea that is to be regarded as being Relatively 
Present: And we get forward, from the Idea 
signified by One Word, to that Signified by An- 
other, by an Operation of the Understanding ; — 
Every Word in a Language resembling a Step- 
ping Stone in a Road. For, when we say, 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 31 

'* Three into Three, equal Nine ;' it is certain that 
the Words " Three into Three' could never direct 
US one hair's breadth on the way to the equality 
** Nine,'' any more than it could to Nine Thou- 
sand, or to the Nine Muses : And it is self-evident 
that we get to the 7^esult — " Nine' — solely by an 
Act of the Intellect. A man who hath not 
Arithmetic in his Soul, could not tell, whether 
the Word Nine, in this case, is the Sign of a Re- 
sult, or the Sign of a Fiction. 

Thirdly, I am under the necessity of objecting, 
that Languages are not " results /' although I 
^vdiXit, when a portion of Language records a process 
in Science, it may then, in that accidental case, 
with truth be called a ' monument'' of analysis. Lan- 
guages, when they happen to record truth of any 
kind, are Monuments: but Monuments are not 
Results. A Victory, or a Conquest, is a Result ; 
but the Column, or Inscription, which records this 
Conquest, is not that Result : The same difference 
exists between an Analytical Result and the Words, 
or Symbols, in which it is recorded. Algebraical 
Results are so far from being ' Monuments,' that 
they eminently require Monuments to preserve their 
remembrance. Assuredly, therefore, never was con- 
fusion more deep, than the confounding of Ana- 
lytical Results and their Monuments, into One 
Same Object, or Subject. ' 

* In a farther note upon this subject, Professor Stewart 
says, {Second Ed, Oct. p, 142.) "The unsoundness of Condil- 
" lac's assertion, that the art of reasoning is nothing more than 
" a language well arranged, was, I believe, first pointed out 
** by M. Prevost. See some acute and decisive objections to 
" this proposition in his treatise Des Signes, &c." I have not 



32 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

Unavoidable as 1 conceive these strictures to be, 
and quite impossible as it was for me to have omit- 
ted them with justice to the subject, I must con- 
fess they appear to me to call doubly for animad- 
version on account of the terras of eulogium with 
which the exposition or views of M. De Gerando 
have been held up for the admiration of the world. 
Of course, I suppose, Professor Stewart could not 
have in the least degree suspected the egregious 
error which they propagate ; and far less the tissue 
of absurdity and contradiction which I have been 
under the necessity to point out ; otherwise, it is 
impossible to suppose he could have dwelt, in such 
terms, upon a proceeding which I take to be inef- 
fably below what ought to be the logical character 
of the age. At any rate, I have no hesitation in 
declaring, as being what I think due to Condillac, 
that I would as soon have it imputed to me that I 
had fallen into his original mistake ; as that, after 
being once awakened to a suspicion of his error, 
I had furnished such an exposition of the subject 
as that which has been thus exhibited. 

I w^ould not have it for a moment supposed I 

seen this work of M. Prevost. And in fact the state of 
health against which I have had to struggle throughout the 
whole execution of my present task, although it has given me 
time, has rendered it impossible for me to take a wider range of 
authorities than I have done. Nor do I (unless in the case of 
M. Prevost) consider this to be of much loss to the reader. 
If however the *' acute and decisive objections" of M. Prevost 
be more decisive, than the eulogised exposition of M. De Ge- 
rando,! think it was due to the subject that Mr. Stewart should 
have corrected the former, by an example of the latter. 



*EC. 1.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. ^3 

wish to dissemble the recollection, that these stric* 
tures fall heaviest upon the views of a writer, who 
has strained with perhaps unexampled pertinacity 
in affecting to refuse me all philosophical conside- 
ration ; and with whom, it has appeared, I am 
otherwise at issue, upon a claim of a special nature. 
I am fully aware that the various criticisms and ob* 
jections which I have been urged to hazard, with 
regard to the doctrines and assumptions of Mr. 
Stewart, both in my present and in my former 
work, may, on these different accounts, be very 
naturally viewed by his warm admirers as taking a 
tone from my sense of his procedure. But I aver 
that my animadversions upon his views have not 
been so critical, or far carried, as I think they 
Tery fairly might have been. And to this remark, 
indeed, I may add, that an early and a long con^ 
tinned veneration for the philosophical cast of his 
mind, and respect for his general character, have, 
throughout, precluded every feeling in the most 
distant manner allied to hostility towards him. 
In testimony of what I now assert, I may ap- 
peal to the strictures which I have felt it to be 
a duty, on different occasions, to hazard with 
regard to the speculations, respectively, of Dr. 
Reid, Mr. Tooke, and other writers : And I be-* 
lieve that whoever will take the trouble to compare 
the tone of animadversion in all of them, including 
those on Mr. Stewart's writings, will sit down con- 
vinced, that no personal consideration has actua- 
ted me with opposition to the latter. I might in- 
deed remark, that public and impartial criticism 
has borne testimony to my having observed great 
Anal, E 



m INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

consideration toward Mr. Stewart. And I certainly 
believed myself possessed of nobler means of lead* 
ing him to appreciate the course he has chosen, 
than that of any undue strain of animadversion. 

Having duly adverted to this matter; I shall 
leave it to every competent and impartial reader to 
decide, according to the real merits of the subject. 

Professor Stewart informs us, that, when he first 
gave into the view of Condillac, as propagated by 
Lavoisier, he *^ was fully aware of the looseness 
"and indistinctness of Lavoisier's expressions." 
But he " did not think it necessary, in the intro- 
duction to his Work," (i. e. in his First Volume^) 
** to point out in what manner Condillac's propo- 
" sitions were to be limited and corrected." Be 
this accorded. But I must, in this place, totally 
object to the phrase, *' limited and corrected,''' — a 
phrase which I conceive to be not more fortunate, 
or more applicable to the subject, than if he had 
employed almost any other two verbs in the lan- 
guage. 

Suppose, for a moment, that any Philosopher 
had fallen into the mistake of asserting, that a 
Man and his Shadow; Or a Road upon which a 
man travels and a Knovi^ledge in that Man's 
Mind that the Road carries him East, West, Norths 
or South, are One Same Thing : (And of this 
nature and extent I take to be precisely the mis- 
take of Condillac : In this case, I ask, What should 
we say of any Philosophical Critic, who should 
Jirst give into this assertion ; and afterwards inform 
the world, that he had at the time in view to limit 
and correct it ? 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 35 

If I have not been extremely deceived, throughout 
the foregoing view of the subject, the credit of Hu- 
man Understanding could hardly, in any case, be 
more depressed, than in any attempt to apply the 
word limit y or even that of correct, to a position, or 
doctrine, which must certainly be expwiged alto- 
gether from the face of Philosophy ; and, at the 
best, passed off, as being one of those oversights 
into which, perhaps, the best human intellect is 
sometimes liable to fall. 



SUBSECTION III. 

Of a Phrase and Assumption of modern Logicians, 
that Language is an Instrument of Thought, 

It has appeared, in what has gone before, that 
Language, in the present work, is considered as 
being the Object of two very different classes of in- 
quirers— namely — Fi7^st of the Grammarian ; and. 
Secondly, of the Logician in Some Other depart- 
ment of Philosophy. It has also been intimated, 
that the general tenor of the present treatise has 
for its object to exhibit only the Grammatical cha- 
racter of Language. In this introductory chapter, 
however, it has been necessary to touch upon, and 
somewhat to overstep, that line which separates 
the province of Grammar from that of Logic in 
General : and, in addition to what has been ad- 
vanced of this nature in the last article, it appears 
requisite to advert to the doctrine or assumption 
which is named in the title of this subsection. The 
object I have in view, in so doing, is to remove 



m INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

what has become a very fashionable, but, I must 
think, a very erroneous phrase and assumption 
with the most eminent writers of the last and pre- 
sent age. 

No phrase employed by authors of this descrip- 
tion appears more in favor, or is used with more ap- 
pearance of a refined philosophical discrimination, 
than that of " Language considered as an instru- 
ment of thought.'' Thus, among other examples, 
we find, that such is the partiality entertained for 
this phrase by Professor Stewart, (although lie is 
by no means alone in the matter) that he, by a 
device seldom adopted by him, emphatically marks 
the expression of it with small capitals ; as may 
be seen in one of the notes, in the Second Volume 
of his Elements, to which I have already referred. 

Now it has appeared, from the whole tenor of 
the foregoing article, that Language neither is, 
nor can be, in any sense, an instrument of 
Thought. And, although the phrase in question 
goes very smoothly over the tongue, and has an 
insidious influence upon the imagination, especial- 
ly as it has now acquired some root in habit and 
prejudice, I humbly conceive, it must be abandoned, 
as parcel of that fallacy which I have already 
endeavoured to explode : And I apprehend that 
even the influence of fashion will not be able to 
save it, provided the present, or future generation, 
shall advance in the scale of rationality. 

Language, it has been shewn, is both a Sign 
and a Record or Monument of Thought. But, 
if it be also, in any sense, an Instrument of 
Thought, it must help us to think, that is, it must 



3Eg.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 37 

serve Some Such Office with regard to thinking, 
as the Spade, the Plough, or the Harrow, does in 
the cultivation of our fields, or gardens ; which 
Office, I have very distinctly shewn, by particular 
examples in the foregoing article, it never does, 
nor can do. 

A Language is a Road of Signs, corresponding 
TO AND SUGGESTING a Road of Thoughts. But 
we do not consider a Road to be an Instru- 
ment of travelling ; And so, neither can we consi- 
der a Language an Instrument of Thought, 
The Real Instruments of travelling (unless we 
adopt some secondary or artificial power) are our 
LimbSy actuated by the powers of our Body : And 
the Real Instruments of Thought are the Faculties 
of our Mind, actuated by our Will. It is a Faculty 
of our Mind that sti£.v^ from Word to Word; and, 
in so doing, informs us what is the connection 
between the Two Words in question; or whether, 
indeed, there is Any Connection at all between 
them, any more than if they were two stones, 
thrown, by chance, into a contiguity, or proximity. 

The Words, in Any Speech, no more help us to 
move forward, and no more indicate atty Object he^ 
yond themselves, than can be said of the Two Banks 
of a River, with a Bridge standing between them. 
Now, when we are walking on a Bridge, we (i. e. 
the Mind) know that One Bank has been passed,-— 
and that Another Bank must folloxv : but it is not 
the passed Bank that indicates the Bridge ; nor the 
Bridge that indicates the Bank that is to come : 
The Banks and Bridge indicate nothing ; they only 
'PROCLAIM themselves, respectively, 'a^ objects of 



38 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

our contemplation ; and they leave it to our Mind 
to connect them {if we can) in idea, conformably to 
the connection that really exists between them. 

I am very sensible, that when I first suggested, 
in the foregoing article, that Language does not 
help to carry us on, in thinking ; it must have 
been viewed as a paradox and an untenable posi- 
tion. But the truth of the matter is so certainly 
demonstrable, that I cannot anticipate any future 
objection to it : and I trust that nothing more need 
be said, here, to render the proof of it complete. 

There is another phrase, or expression, to be 
noticed here, however, which, at first sight, may be 
thought something less objectionable — namely — 
that Language is a " Vehicle" of Thought, But 
the use of this phrase is an exhibition of as false 
philosophy as the other ; and it must be exploded 
along with it. If Language, indeed, were a Vehi- 
cle of Thought, it would, then, be an Instrument : 
because, although we do not, in ordinary dis- 
course, call a Stage Coach, or even a Horse, an In- 
strument , it certainly is one in the philosophical 
sense of the word. But Language never did, and 
never can, convey Any Thought: It can only 
cvcite, or suggest. Another Thought, in Another 
Mind, SIMILAR to the Thought which it expresses ; 
just as a foot-path, in a field, suggests to One Man, 
a course of action similar to that which Another 
Man has gone before him. A Speech, of any sort, 
therefore, when heard, or read, is merely a Path 
FOR Thought to travel in, traced out in an other- 
wise markless void ; which One man has trod 
doivn, and thus left Signs that enable Another man 



SEC. IJ THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 39 

to follow him : While the man who follows, as 
well as he that precedes, must travel under the 
Law of Grammar ; or, else, the Road he traces 
is NOT PURE Language : And the precursor may 
also, at the same time, travel under a collateral Law 
of Analytical Science ; though he that comes after 
may not in the least know whether he is travelling 
a Road of Analytical Science, or not. 

In order to illustrate the last remark, I observe, 
that every Sentence, Proposition, or Speech what- 
ever, must exhibit, (to those who understand both 
subjects,) an example of Two Most Distinct and 
Different Systems of Laws : that is, it must exhibit, 
first, the Laws of Mere Grammatical Connec- 
tion : And, distinctly from this, it must display the 
Laws either of. Some Rational Connection of Ideas, 
or of Some Truth, or Sojne Fiction, or Some Concate- 
nation or Other of Ideas, extra Grammatical. 

I might add to the observations of both the 
present and the past article. But I do not wish 
to augment their bulk ; and I trust that what has 
been hazarded in them is amply sufficient for the 
purpose I had in view. I shall close this article, 
therefore, by remarking, that I can anticipate that 
fashion, supported by prejudice, may strain hard 
to retain the use of the phrase " Instrument of 
** Thought ;" which expression, like a cherished 
play-thing, will not willingly be thrown aside. 
But if the claims of reason, in modern logical 
speculations should happily triumph over sound 
embodying error, I think no writer of eminence 
will, in future, deliberately stake his reputation to 



m INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.L 

a use of this phrase : And if, in violation of 
reason, the fashion should still prevail ; I observe, 
that the matter in question is not merely an inno- 
cent foppery in science ; but it is an expression 
which involves and promulgates a very serious 
error, in our conceptions of the nature both of Lan- 
guage and of Thought itself. 

I shall have occasion to shew, in the sequel, 
what fruits have been produced in the doctrines 
of Language by the error of Condillac; modified, 
as it has been, by other writers. 



SUBSECTION IV. 

Of the diffeixnt Methods which have been 'pursued by 

Philologists, with a mew to solve the Problem of 

^Language ; and, especially, of that which has been 

followed by Mr. Home Tooke, — Of the General 

Cause of past failure in the Subject of Language. 

There are two very different methods, by which 
an exposition of the nature of Language may be 
attempted ; and which have actually been put in 
practice by those who have speculated in this 
direction. One of these is, to demonstrate, or at 
least assume, Some General Principles of Relation 
between our Ideas ; and, thence, to seek out, in 
the reputed imports of the different Species of Words, 
in any Language, such Grammatical meanings as 
might reduce them to a strict conformity with this 
Structure of Relation. The Other is, without 
any consideration whatever of the nature of our 
Ideas, or their Connections, to '* dig" down, as 



SEC. I.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 41 

far as may be done, into the unknown number of 
strata which the accumulation of ages has heaped 
upon the original forms and particular imports of 
Words; and, thereby, endeavour to determine 
what their Primitive Grammatical Imports have 
been : In effecting which, it has been imagined, by 
the votaries of this method, that they should arrive 
at the real nature of the thing sought. 

The last-mentioned of these two methods is that 
which has been prosecuted by the late Mr. Tooke ; 
and, since him, by other eminent Etymologists. 
The other is the course which appears to have 
been followed, (though together with the most erro- 
neous views of Relation) by Mr. Harris and by 
other preceding writers on Philosophical Gram- 
mar ; and is now also embraced by me, in the fol- 
lowing work ; but having, for its basis, a view of the 
Category of Relation altogether incompatible with 
that heretofore uniformly entertained. 

From the real and great importance of Mr. 
Tooke's philological labors; and from the very 
opposite views of Language which I have been 
under the necessity of taking up, to those which 
he has suggested and maintained ; it is evident I 
must unavoidably have frequent occasion to ani- 
madvert upon the nature of his speculations ; and 
must, even, hazard some passing opinions with 
regard to his philosophical genius. The principal 
part of these animadversions I shall reserve for the 
Chapter of Prepositions ; in which place a 
statement of them will be the most requisite and 
indispensable : But it appears necessary that some 
Anal. F 



4fe INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

of these should be offered upon the present occa- 
sion. 

Mr. Tooke himself informs us, that he produced 
his Theory of Language from " reasoning apfiori" 
In his First Volume, page 130, he says, " If I have 
** been misled, it certainly is not by Etymology : 
" of which I confess myself to have been shame- 
" fully ignorant at the time when these my notions 
" of language were first formed. And (Not- 
" withstanding Lord Monboddo's discouraging 
" sneer) it was general reasoning a priori that led 
" me to the particular instances; not particular 
" instances to the general reasoning," 

Again, back in page 122, he says, " I protest 
" to you, that my notions of Language were formed 
" before I could account etymologically for any 
" one of the words in question, and before I was 
" in the least acquainted with the opinions of 
" others." 

In page 131, he even says, ** This Etymology, 
" against whose fascination you would have me 
" guard myself, did not occur to me till many years 
" after my system was settled.'' 

Although I consider Mr. Tooke profoundly 
mistaken, when he thinks he ever begins with a 
general 2Lnd not with a particular truth, I am glad, 
for the sake of those who have been impressed 
with a high opinion of his understanding, and of 
his excellence especially in grammatical acumen, 
that be has recorded his testimony, so unequivo- 
cally and emphatically, to the propriety of investi- 
gating the nature of Language from general reason- 
ing a priori. But, What are we to say of the Prince 



SEC. 1,] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 43 

(because the Precursor) of Inductive Etymolo- 
gists, and the man whom the most illustrious 
Linguist since himself has taken for his avowed 
leader and model as an inductive inquirer in ex- 
clusion of every thing like reasoning a priori^ thus 
declaring that Etymology had nothing to do with 
his discoveries? 

If it should be asked, in this place, What had 
Mr. Tooke, then, to do with Etymology? The 
answer, I think, he gives somewhere — namely — 
thiat he had recourse to it only in order to convince 
others ; not as the means of informing himself. 

But the real truth of Mr. Tooke's proceeding 
is, that, notwithstanding his avowals already 
quoted, his whole Work, with one or two trifling 
exceptions which will be duly noticed in the sequel, 
is void of any thing like general reasoning a pri* 
ori ; and proceeds wholly u^on inductive principles : 
In which assertion I am borne out by the express 
declaration of Dr. Murray, (whose grammatical 
labors will claim very repeated notice in this 
work) that Mr. Tooke " was the first writer who 
''applied the inductive philosophy to the history 
" of speech;" — and — that, " By applying the induc- 
" tive philosophy to language, he has been able to 
*' demonstrate the origin of all the indeclinable 
** parts of speech from the noun and the verb." 

In fact, there is a contrariety to the last degree 
between Mr. Tooke's professed method and his ac- 
tual proceeding ; which I have never been able 
either to reconcile, or to account for in any way 
that does not appear to arraign him of an incon- 
sistency of the most general extent. 



44 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap.1. 

That the Philologer of Parley possessed both a 
vigorous and a cultivated understanding, capable, 
under a right direction, of effecting much more than 
he has done toward an exposition of the Nature 
of Language, there can be no doubt. But he sub- 
jected his mind to a bias, so strong, against the 
Connections, or Compositions, oi our Thoughts^ 
as forming the Foundation of Language, that he 
commences his speculations by scouting, with the 
most unqualified contempt, any toleration of such 
Things as Operations in the Mindy or a Composition 
of Ideas. 

" Grammarians" (says he, FoL I. page 23.) '* have 
" since pursued just the same method with the 
" Mindy that they had before done with Things. 
**The different operations of the Mind, are to ac- 
** count now, for what the different things account- 
** ed before : and, when they are not sufficiently 
** numerous for the purpose, it is only supposing 
*' an imaginary operation or two, and the difficul- 
" ties are for the time shuffled over. So the very 
" same game has been played over with Ideas, 
" which was before played with Things. No sa- 
" tisfaction, no agreement has been obtained : but 
" all has been dispute, diversity, and darkness : 
" Insomuch, that many of the most learned and 
''judicious Grammarians, disgusted with obscurity 
" and contradiction, have prudently contented 
" themselves with remarking the difference between 
" Words, and have left the causes of Language to 
" shift for themselves." 

The extract, now given, forms a conclusive evi- 
dence, of what I should think certainly demanded 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 45 

proof, namely, that Mr. Tooke actually proceeded 
upon an attempt to solve the Problem of Language 
by the help of Words themselves, to the utter 
exclusion of all consideration of Ideas, I cannot 
say that I in the least comprehend what is meant 
by ** a difference between Words,'' that is not founded 
on s. difference between the Ideas vihich they signify : 
but that this is the express doctrine of Mr. Tooke 
is certain ; because, what he sarcastically means by 
the " Causes of Language" are, manifestly, our 
Ideas and their Connections. 

As it must be of material weight, in furnishing a 
preliminary view of my own undertaking, that I 
should afford the reader a just and indubitable es- 
timate of Mr.Tooke's general proceeding as a Philoso- 
pher, I would here solicit particular attention to the 
question. What could have been the assumed Frin- 
ciples or Data (for Principles or Data of some sort 
he must have had) which he could have employed 
for his reasonings «pmn; since he had so signally 
discarded Things (i. e. external Things) and Ideas : 
For these, I apprehend, with the exception of 
Words considered as their Signs, make up the 
Whole Sum of the Universe; and we have seen that 
Mr. Tooke had formed and settled his System of 
Language, many years before he meddled with 
Etymology ? 

It becomes plain, from what has been quoted, 
that Words — Mere Absol^jte Living Words — 
as they pass from mouth to mouth, — without any 
reference to Ideas, and without any reference to 
Etymology or Derivation, were the Mate- 
rials which formed the Data or Principles of 



46 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 



&» 



Mr.Tooke's goieral reasonings. And the following, 
which are to be collected from the first thirty pages 
of his work, appear to be the Sole Facts or 
Data themselves, upon which he has proposed 
to hang so mighty a fabric as the whole exposition 
of Language. 

In page 26, of his First Volume, his fellow dia- 
logist — B. — says, 

" I think I begin to comprehend you. You 
" mean to say that the views of Grammarians have 
" arisen from supposing all words to be immediately 
" either the signs of things or the signs of ideas : 
" whereas in fact many words are merely abbrevia- 
" tions employed for dispatch, and are the signs of 
" other words. And these are the artificial wings 
" of Mercury, by means of which the Argus eyes 
" of Philosophy have been cheated." 

To which Mr. Tooke, under the letter H, tersely 
replies, 

" It is my meaning." 

Now, upon these Data, I have to observe, First, 
that although they involve a true and a very impor- 
tant distinction — namely — that which must exist 
between the Signs of Ideas and the Signs of Signs ; 
and although the investigation of the consequences 
of this distinction constitutes a very wide field of 
Grammar, — a field in which, if Mr. Tooke has not 
reaped the whole crop, he has certainly reaped 
much honor for himself; — yet the whole result of 
any success that could possibly be attained therein 
could regard only a very suboi^dinate part, and that 

NOT AN ESSENTIAL p^r/, of the SciENCE OF LAN- 
GUAGE. Besides which, I remark, that both the 



SEo.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 4^ 

Kinds of Signs in question 2iYe founded on our Ideas 
and their Connections. Secondly, I observe, that 
Mr. Tooke, in the sequel of his work, has had re- 
course to the particular mention of Ideas, as being 
the Objects of which Words are the Signs ; — a 
proceeding, indeed, which it was impossible for 
him to avoid, if he wrote upon Grammar at all : 
And he has thereby, in the most decisive manner 
quashed the Assumption which he had previously 
set up, against what he calls the " Causes of Lan- 
guage." Thus, in his Chapter of Prepositions, 
VoL 1, page 319, he founds this Part of Speech (al- 
though in a most erroneous and visionary manner) 
upon Ideas, in the following assumption. " So 
*' does the necessity of the Preposition (or of 
" some equivalent invention) follow from the im- 
" possibility of having in Language a distinct cam- 
*^ plex term for each different collection of ideas 
** which we may have occasion to put together in 
" discourse." 

Without quoting Mr. Tooke farther, at present, 
(because I shall have occasion to notice this, his 
inconsistency, more particularly hereafter) I have 
here only to add, that he goes on, at some length, 
in the same place, talking thus of Ideas, individu- 
ally and collectively, as being the Objects which 
Words signify and stand for. 

After this statement, which, from the nature of 
the extracts given in proof, cannot admit of any he- 
sitation, I may venture to affirm, that a more com- 
prehensive and sweeping contradiction is not to be 
found in the general proceeding of any Writer, than 
is here manifested between Mr. Tooke's prelinai- 



48 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF [chap. 1. 

nary doctrine and the course which he has actually 
followed in the sequel of his speculations. 



After the view which I have now taken of the 
general method pursued by Mr. Tooke, I proceed 
to observe, with reference to his preliminary as* 
sumption, that it was not the taking o/" Things, or 
Ideas, for the foundation of Language ; and the 
consequent endeavour to make the Parts of Speech 
conform in their Structure to the Nature of Ideas, 
that has proved the great stumbling block to Gram- 
marians. For although it is very true, as Mr. 
Tooke has asserted^ that ** the very same game has 
** been played over again with the Mind," (or 
Ideas) " which was before played with Things ;" 
yet, the real and profound cause of failure has 
uniformly been, that, in assuming the Gene7^ic Struc- 
ture o/* Things, or the Generic Structure of Ideas, 
(for both these must have One Same Structure, 
in our apprehension) Grammarians have plunged 
themselves into a vast abyss of error, which the 
Logicians had prepared for them : which error, it 
will form a leading object of the present work to 
expose, as being the only possible means of ever 
explaining the real Structure of Language. 

The error upon the exposure of which I propose 
to lay so great a stress, is, certainly, one of the most 
extraordinary, as it is, at the same time, the most 
profound and comprehensive, of any that ever 
beguiled the imagination of Philosophers. It 
consists in the view which has, uniformly and with- 
out any contradiction or suspicion, been taken of 



SEC.l.] THE NATURE OF SIGNS. 49 

the Generic Structure of the Category of 
Relation. All that I shall say with regard to 
this fallacy at the present moment, however, is, 
that it is of such a nature, that, so long as Gram- 
marians proceeded to build upon it, as their com- 
mon foundation, it was impossible that any strength 
of genius, or any labor of research, could avail 
them : One and all were, of necessity, sunk in the 
abyss upon which they had laid their Structure ; the 
strong and the weak were equally unable to sur- 
mount the barrier in which this abyss had involved 
them ; and logical acumen was only exhausted in 
vain, in attempting to over-leap it. 

If it should, here, (especially to many readers,) 
be matter of surprise that a fallacy so vast should 
have prevailed so long, and so unsuspected, in the 
accredited System of Logic, as that which I have 
now ventured to impeach : I shall be content, for 
the present, to observe, that those who are con- 
versant with the History of Philosophy cannot be 
ignorant, that there are parallel instances ; which, 
if not so extensive in their consequences, are at 
least nearly as wonderful in their having ever ex- 
isted : One, or two, of which, I shall appeal to, 
farther on. Indeed, if I should ever be able to 
accomplish the sequel of a work, the First Part 
of which is already before the public, (although I 
have now very faint expectation of effecting it,) I 
hope to be enabled to show, that the fallacy thus 
in question, and which was first pointed out in the 
Volume to which I allude, is only a part of a far 
greater defect which obtains in the General Sys- 
AnaL g 



60 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

tem of Scholastic Logic. Upon which I may here 
merely remark, that such a result, if effected, would 
prove the Science of Universal Logic to be vastly 
more in its infancy, than our most guarded Philo- 
sophers at all imagine. 

In fine. In calling the attention of readers to 
the Generic Structure of Relation, of which I pro* 
pose to treat in the next article, I have to observe, 
that there is no Subject which has been so remark- 
ably neglected, as this one has by modern metaphysi- 
cians. The elaborate analysis of Relation furnished 
by Mr. Locke, in his Essay, is the only important 
exception I know ; and, unfortunately for Philoso- 
phy and for Language, Mr. Locke's views of the 
subject have only served to exemplify and confirm 
the profoundly erroneous theory of that Category 
which had been handed down, uncontradicted, 
from Aristotle; and which still reigns, without 
a dissentient voice. The great reputation of each 
of these geniuses, and their unhappy unanimity 
upon this subject, operating together, have con- 
tributed to lay all men asleep with regard to any 
suspicion of fallacy in the assumed Structure of 
Relation : and an error of the utmost consequence 
to Science, and especially fatal to Grammar, 
has triumphed through the supineness of philoso- 
phers. 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 51 



SECTION SECOND. 



ANALYSIS OF THE GENERIC STRUCTURE OF RELATIVES AND 
RELATION, AS FORMING THE PRIMARY LOGICAL STRUC- 
TURE OF THINGS IN THE UNIVERSE AND THE FOUNDATION 
OF LANGUAGE.— COLLATERAL STATEMENT OF THE STRUC- 
TURE OF RELATION ASSUMED BY GRAMMARIANS AND 
LOGICIANS.—VAST INCOMPATIBILITY OP THESE TWO 
STRUCTURES. 



Preliminary Observations. 

The Analysis of the Category of Relatives and 
Relation which was offered in a work already al- 
luded to, and which, in point of extent, forms a 
very considerable part of that volume, was therein 
requisitely carried to a length of particularity that 
is neither necessary nor convenient in a Treatise of 
Language. On the present occasion, therefore, I 
shall confine my view of the Subject to such a limit* 
ed and concise statement, as I conceive will be not 
more than sufficient to enable a reader to appre- 
hend, with ease, the analysis of Language which 
is founded upon it : And, if curiosity, or a philoso- 
phical interest, should stimulate any one to consult 
a more minute investigation of its nature, including 
that of its various modes, I refer to the original 
work. 

In attempting to delineate any unusual views in 
Philosophy, it is known, that we shall the more 



^ ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

effectually impress the understandings of different 
readers, by different modes of exposition. In the 
re-statement of analysis, now proposed, I shall en- 
deavour to avail myself of this fact : and, with this 
intention, I have determined to exhibit the present 
delineation in a vehicle which I shall not employ 
in any other stage of the work. Every reader, of 
Mr. Tooke's celebrated Treatise of Grammar, 
knows, that he has therein proceeded by the 
method of Dialogue. To this procedure I would, 
upon general ground, object. From various con- 
siderations, I deem it to be an improper method of 
conducting a voluminous Treatise of Language. 
At best, it must be diffuse and circumlocutory, 
and no better than a go-cart for infant Philoso- 
phers, or a jaunting-car for indolent ones. And it 
has, too often, been perverted, (as it has in a pecu- 
liar degree by Mr. Tooke) to become the vehicle 
of any thing, rather than of mere argument with re- 
gard to the subject at issue. If properly made use 
of, however. Dialogue is a method well adapted to 
the infant, or neglected state of any subject: and, 
in particular, where description alone is wanted, and 
all that is required is to impress the imagination 
with a series of lively and familiar images, this 
mode, I conceive, may be employed with as much 
fairness as effect. Now this last is precisely the 
case with regard to the Category of Relation. 
The real nature of this Category has been misap- 
prehended to a most profound and surprising de- 
gree ; and this, with an undeviating uniformity of 
opinion, which has presented no dissentient voice: 
The consequence of which is, that all men of letters 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 53 

are lulled into such a security of prejudice with 
regard to it, that it can be no easy matter to rouse 
them to a suspicion of its fallacy ; which ^can only 
be effectually done by employing the most impres- 
sive means. And yet, I venture to believe that it 
demands nothing more than description, to bring all 
parties over to a full conviction, that the past doc- 
trine of the Subject has been as seriously erroneous, 
as I have here supposed it to be. 

In a case, therefore, which I take to be so pecu- 
liarly fitted for the admission of Dialogue, I shall 
not hesitate to employ it. At the same time, I 
trust some of my readers will believe, that nothing 
is farther from my view than an attempt to rival the 
piquancy of Mr. Tooke's composition, or style of 
writing. 

In offering this explanation of my reasons for 
adopting the proceeding in question, I desire, 
among other objects, to prepare my readers to ex- 
pect nothing but simplicity in the Foundation of 
Language ; and, thereby, to prevent their distract- 
ing the attention by a continued research after sub- 
tilties which do not exist in the Subject : For the 
Foundation of Language, and Language itself 
which must strictly conform thereunto, are, in their 
generic nature^ eminently simple things: al- 
though each of them involves a very large field of 
reasoning or discursive investigation. 

I proceed, without farther preface, to the intend- 
ed discussion. 



54 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

A DIALOGUE 
CONCERNING RELATION. 

A. 

Your incredulity is natural. But it is the result 
of your having imbibed a general reverence for the 
fabrications of Philosophers, without having had 
leisure to examine into the real merits of what they 
have built up. 

Z. 

How can I choose but be incredulous, when you 
admit that there is an unbroken uniformity of au- 
thority against your views ? As, however, I cannot 
help being deeply interested in any thing that pro- 
fesses to bear with moment upon the nature of 
Language, I am disposed to listen to what you 
have to say with regard to it. 



I have already asserted, that the Problem of 
Language is to be completely solved, by tracing 
the respective imports of the several Parts of 
Speech to a strict conformity with the Necessary 
Principles of Relation between our Ideas, But the 
real Structure of Relation having been profoundly 
misapprehended by the Logician ; and the Gram- 
marians having uniformly bottomed their views of 
Language upon that misconception ; one common 
failure has been the inevitable result, and all the 
existing theories of Language, without exception, 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 55 

evince little better than a total darkness in this 
department of knowledge. 

Z 

What you tell me is very wonderful. But it 
would be still more so, if you expect that I should 
yield you my credence, unless you shall demon- 
strate the matter with a rigor not inferior to that of 
the proof of any theorem in geometry. I can easily 
conceive, indeed, that such a mistake, as you have 
supposed, might fully account for all past difficul- 
ty, and let in important light for the future ; but 
nothing short of the most incontrovertible proofs 
shall convince me that such a vast fallacy has in 
reality been tolerated, through all tiuie past. As 
the subject, however, is of such logical import- 
ance, and the credit of Philosophy is so deeply 
arraigned, I promise you my attention ; and it shall 
not be my fault, if you fail in your undertaking. 



If I entertained the least doubt on the subject, 
I would not give either you or myself the trouble 
to enter upon the discussion. And, as my confi- 
dence in it has at least been the result of much 
intense application, I trust it is not altogether un- 
warrantable in me to feel as I do with regard to it. 
I undertake, then, to prove to you, in this discus- 
sion, that the Generic Structure o/Relatmi (which, 
in other words, means the Generic Logical Struc- 
ture of Things in the Universe) as forming The Pri- 
mary Object of the Logician and The Foundation of 
Language^ has been profoundly misapprehended. 



56 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

Z. 

I am all attention. Begin. 

A. 

There is one thing, of which I must make you 
aware, beforehand ; in order that your vanity may 
not be offended. If you consent to enter upon 
this investigation with me, you must agree to be 
put into a go-cart ; and you must not think, or 
complain, that the thing is childish, or that any 
affront is offered to your dignity, as a lover of 
wisdom. For, if, in any case, Philosophers them- 
selves happen to be found stumbling, like children, 
they must deign to be treated as such ; and I am 
obliged to believe that such is their case with 
regard to the subject in question. 



O ! I understand you. You intend to proceed 
in the most simple and elementary way. I like 
this : It is the certain method to know, that the 
ground whereon we build is solid and unassailable. 
Be assured, I shall take no offence. The go-cart, 
hy all means I Let us set out ! 



If you should happen to be contemplating Any 
Couple of Objects, let them be Two Houses, or 
Two Banks of a River, with respect to the Dis- 
tance between them ; you would, if the question 
were asked, naturally say, that Either of the Two 
Houses, or Two Banks, is Distant with respect 
to the Other. 



SBC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 57 

Z 

Certainly. What then ? 

A. 

Why, then, I ask you, For what reason 
would you say, that Either of the Two Objects in 
question is distant from the other ? 

Z. 

This is putting a man into a go-cart, with a 
vengeance. Is it with such a question as this, 
which any clown could solve, and any school-boy 
would disdain to answer, that you introduce your 
vaunted scheme, of proving that all Logicians, 
through time past, have been laboring in an abyss 
of error with regard to the Category of Relation ? 
I thought the vehicle which I consented to enter 
was at least a go-cart for men, and not for chil- 
dren: although I noted, you thought proper to 
name the mistakes of philosophers and the stum- 
bling of children together. 

A. 

Nay. But be patient ; and answer my question, 
according to your promise. 



Well then, if I have consented to indulge this 
humor, as the price of getting at your meaning, I 
answer, that Each of the Two Banks is said to be 
distant from the Other, owing to a Thing that is in- 
terposed between the Two. Which thing, (if I may 
venture to speak here beyond my Primer) when it 
Anal. II 



58 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

is spoken of absolutely (i. e. without reference to 
any other thing with which it might be compared) 
is called Length, or Linear Extension ; but, 
when viewed relatively, (i. e. with regard to any 
Two Things which it divides and also logically con* 
nects) is called Distance : from which Substan- 
tive Word — Dista7ice — the Adjective — Distant— 
is derived. 

A. ... 

I understand, by this, that you consider the Two 
Banks, in the present case, to be Relatives, or ra- 
ther Correlatives, to each other, by reason of the 
Distance that is interposed between them. 

Z. 

Unquestionably, I do. 

A. 

Putting this question, however, (as I must do) 
in yet another shape ; I say. You consider the 
Two Banks, in this case, as being Two Correla- 
tives, NOT merely in virtue of any Quality or Attri- 
bute of either of these Banks ; but principally in 
virtue of a Third Thing— namely— that 
Thing that is interposed between the Two, 
and which, with respect to them, we now call 
Distance. 

Z. 

Most certainly. — The truth of the matter is so 
sira})ly self-evident, as to preclude every doubt, or 
hesitation, in the case. But, it seems, you choose 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 59 

to banter me, a little, with this trifling ; as a trial of 
my patience, before you venture to present me with 
the more distasteful cup of your serious opinions. 

A. 

Then, according to your view of the Subject, the 
Two Banks are Two Correlatives in virtue of a 
Thing foreign to both of them, and which thing 
is actually as eMernal to each, as an Arc, or Line, 
that subtends an Angle, is external to and dis- 
tinct from the Legs of that Angle. 



I tell you, again. The matter is so obviously and 
so obtrusively self-evident, that I cannot conceive 
the use of your thus reiterating the question, in 
different shapes. You, surely, are not going to 
DENY the thing. But, if you are, 1 inform you 
that my patience is exhausted, and I must get out 
here ; since reason w^ould be insulted by any far- 
ther proceeding. 



Not I, indeed ; I am not going to deny the 
matter at all : for 1 may say in this case, (as Bishop 
Berkeley said upon a very different occasion,) " / 
'^ am of a Vulgar cast i' And I suppose that my 
conception of a Relation of Distance is just like 
that of any school-boy, or clown, in the kingdom. 
What is more : I do not think that any Gramma- 
rian, or Logician, that ever existed, would deny 
your conception of the matter when the question 
is stated in any such example as that which I have 



m ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

now given : for the error, which I here impute to 
Philosophers, has not resulted after any controverted 
investigation of the subject ; but appears to be the 
fruit of mere oversight, unsuspected by any one. 
But I must now inform you, (and it will fully 
account for the seeming impertinence with which I 
have repeated the question,) that your conception 
of the nature of Relation, although it perfectly 
coincides with my own, is diametrically op- 
posite TO THAT which HAS BEEN ENTERTAINED 

OF IT BY All Grammarians, and All Logi- 
cians, /ro?w Aristotle, down to Tooke, inclusive. 

Z. 

Impossible ! I will never believe this. You 
have fallen into some miserable illusion, in ever 
imagining such a thing. 

A. 

Pardon me. But you will believe it ; and will 
be astonished at it ; and will be completely satisfied 
of the truth of all the consequences to Language, 
which I have said has flown from it. 

Z. 

You talk in a high strain, of what I shall be- 
lieve. In the interim, let me understand, at once, 
What is it you mean, when you say, that my judg- 
ment of the subject is completely in opposition to 
that of all Logicians ? 

A. 
There are occasions, on which it becomes an 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 61 

imperative duty to talk with confidence of a sub- 
ject : As, for example, when you have a thorough 
conviction of truths, which can remove deep dis- 
credit from Philosophy, and must draw the atten- 
tion and trust of literary men especially to the Phi- 
losaphy of the Mind; which now labors under so 
melancholy a neglect, but which, besides its various 
though unacknowleged utility, contains problems, 
capable of solution, that are pregnant with more good 
to human beings than all that has resulted from 
the Philosophy of Matter,^ 

Z. 

Ah ! I perceive, all mankind, alike, are traders. 

* It has been very fittingly objected to me, thai, even suppo- 
sing the Spirituality of the External World — or of All Things 
— upon which I lay so much stress, were as conclusively bad in 
evidence, as I assert it is ; still, it would be impossible to make 
the bulk of readers, (and far more the lower million) understand, 
OP believe it ; and, therefore, that it must be impossible, by this 
medium, to annihilate Atheism. 

To this, however, I reply, that such ultimate want of uni- 
versal belief could only result if Philosophers, and the higher 
classes of Philosophical readers, should fatally continue to 
be as supine with regard to the Subject as they now are. 
For it is indisputable, that, if All Metaphysicians were 
agreed upon this point, as All Astronomers now are that 
our Earth revolves about the Sun, there is no person of the 
least education but would be ashamed to disbelieve the Spiri- 
tuality of all Things, although not one man in ten thousand 
would take the trouble to learn the reason of the matter ; as is 
now the case with respect to the astronomical fact just men- 
tioned, with regard to which no educated person is an infidel, 
although the fact in question presents a most violent contradic- 
tion to the evidence of sense, and none but astronomers can 
explain why our senses are to be herein utterly discredited. 



R^^ -U^i 



62 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

It is with the abstracted metaphysician, as it is with 
dealers of every other sort : Each man cries up 
the stuff in which he happens to traffic. We all 
know, full well, that, in order to the fortifying of a 
town, there is nothing like leather. 



There is much truth in your remark. Yet, you 
urge me to reply, that it must be impossible to 
fortify a town with any thing, if those who de- 
fend it be nothing but leather. 

But, a truce with repartee. And here, in answer 
to your demand to know what I mean, by the op- 
position to which I allude; it consists, (in gross,) of 
this : That, according to your view of the matter, 
the Generic Structure of Relation or of Things in 
the Universe is made up of what may be called 
Logical Clusters, containing Three Things Each 
— namely — Two Related Subjects and a Relation 
OR Link of Connection interposed between 
them : Whereas, according to the doctrine of All 
Logicians, the Generic Structure of Relation or of 
the Universe is made up of Logical Clusters con- 
taining Only Two Things each — namely — One 
Related Subject and Another Subject its Correlate, 
Each viewed with reference to the Other, 

You will instantly discern the infinite difference 
between these two Schemes. Because it is plain, 
if you and I are right in our conception, that the 
Universe around us is made up Nearly One Half 
of these Links or Third Things which connect 
related subjects together ; and these Links, which 
must be Objects of the very first Logical 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 63 

Magnitude and importance, must be repre- 
sented in Language by a Principal Part of 
Speech exclusively appropriate to them : 
which Part of Speech can have no ejcistence in Any 
Grammar that assumes Relation as consisting only 
of Two Related Subjects referred to each other, m^th- 
ouT ANY Link or Third Object between them. 
You cannot, indeed, from such a momentary 
view as this, discern any thing like the various nature 
of the absurdity and confusion which this Scheme 
of Logicians has introduced, into the supposed Struc- 
ture of Language : but this I may observe, by the 
way, that, if our view of Relation be tenable, it 
must be just as possible to erect a Science of 
Geometry, from assuming Every Triangle to con- 
tain Only Two Angles ; as to erect a Science of 
Language, from assuming Relation to consist 
of Clusters of Two Related Subjects, void of any 
Third Thing which logically connects them. 

Z. 

What you now assert is perfectly manifest. The 
only thing, therefore, that is wanted, in order to 
satisfy me of what may be done, or at least of 
what has been left undone, on the subject, is to 
prove to me the fact, that Philosophers have actually 
entertained so vast an absurdity, for the Generic 
Structure of Relation, as that which you have here 
imputed to them. I know, indeed, that, if I look 
into any Cyclopedia, for the article Relation, 
I shall find it defined by some modified assertion, 
that it consists in Two Things ; One referred to 
'*Hhe Other : and, of course, this doctrine is taken 



m ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [ghap.I. 

from Books on General Logic. But I can never 
suppose that Logicians, or Philosophers, have 
made no provision, in their General System, for 
those Middle Things which, I plainly discern, 
are necessary in order to make Related Subjects 
be what they are. 

In the^r^^ place, however, relieve my doubt, as 
to How such a misconception, or omission, could 
at all have happened. Or, at least, show me, in- 
dubitably, that Other mistakes, of nearly equal 
magnitude, have ever taken place in Philosophy : 
Which might serve to remove the improbability, 
that the like actually exists in the present case. 



I will do both. The latter, with certainty : the 
former, with evidence, which, I think, carries some 
probability. And perhaps it may be better that I 
should point out How I conceive it may have hap- 
pened ; before I state to you the Jact, that such 
mistakes certainly have happened. 

First, then, I observe, that the doctrine of Re- 
lation which has reigned hitherto in the world, 
appears to have owed its origin, and its continua- 
tion also, to the Mathematicians; who, I shall make 
appear to you, have been led into the profound 
mistake in question by not having their attention en- 
gaged in such vulgar and obvious Relatio72s, as that 
which I have supposed in the foregoing emmple; but 
having usually to do with Relations of the 7nost 
subtle nature, and which therefore escape due obser- 
vation. And here I have to observe to you, that, 
although Relation is, in its Generid^^ime, eminently 



spc. 20 OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 65 

a simple subject; it is, in some of its Species, the most 
subtle and deceptive of any in Philosophy. In the 
mean time, I observe, it seems that the Logicians 
have founded all their views of Relation upon those 
of the Mathematicians. Now the Mathematicians 
will tell you, that their Science is the Science of 
Relations : And you will start with incredulity 
when I venture to affirm to you, that this is a grand 
error. But I do affirm, that, although Relation it- 
self between Two Quantities or Subjects, is often 
a Secondary, Subordinate, or Auxiliary Object of the 
Mathematician ; yet, his Primary or Principal 
Object is ONLY the Reciprocal Relativeness 
of One Quantity to That of Another* Thus, when 
the Geometrician is demonstrating, that One Figure 
is Double to Another ; and, consequently, that the 
latter is as Half to the former ; his Whole Object 
is the Greater and the Lesser Figure, and he 
never once thinks, he does not even in the least 
degree know, or suspect, that there is, of neces- 
sity, a Logical Partition called Difference existing 
interposed between the Two Figures : Which Par- 
tition, being the Cause that makes the Two Fi- 
gures to be in this case Relatives ; and which 
Partition, or Cause, 7iever having received Any Name, 
because it has never at all been recognised in Philo- 
sophy ; I call a Relation, in order to distinguish 
it from the Two Related Subjects which it connects. 
In giving it this Name, however, I desire you to 
observe, that I mean it only as the Abstract Name 
of the thing: Its proper Concrete Name is Re- 
lating. Thus Any Difference, between Any 
Two Things, is a Species oi Logical Action between 
Anal. I 



66 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1, 

those Two Things ; and its real Concrete Name is 
Relating, just as the real Concrete Name of 
Battle is Batling. 1 shall prove to you, here- 
after, that All Relations are Logical Actions be- 
tween Related Subjects. 

In like manner to the Geometer, When the Alge- 
braist has stated an Equation ; his Object is the 
Relativeness of the Quantity, or Quantities, on 
One Side of the Equation, to that of the Quantity, 
or Quantities, on the Other Side ; and he never 
once attends to the Link of Relation which con- 
nects the Two Sides of the Equation in a Bond of 
Comparison, although, in Algebra, this Link is 
actually signified to his sense by an express and appro ^ 
priate Sign: He thinks, indeed, of what he calls 
the Equality of the One Side to the Other ; but 
he never thinks, nor suspects^ that there is a Logi- 
cal Action of Equalling, existing between the 
Two Sides. 

Hence it happens, that the Mathematicians, 
having rarely occasion to contemplate any Thing 
except the Relativeness of Things to One another, 
have confounded Relation itself with this Relative- 
ness, and have always employed either of the Tzvo 
Terms, indiscriminately, as being perfectly synony- 
mous or convertible. 

You will understand me, however, when I say 
that the Mathematician never attends to the Link 
of Relation between Two Quantities, I mean this : 
That he attends to it, in any case, (even in such a 
palpable case as that of the Link signified by the 
Sign of equalling placed between the Two Sides of 
an Equation) only in some such way as an Architect 



S3EC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 67 

attends to the Scaffolding of a Structure which he 
is erecting ; which Scaffold he employs to enable 
him to effect his purpose, but does not regard as 
any integral part of the building: on the contrary, 
throws it away, when done with, as a thing that 
never had been. Now, to this remark I have to 
add, /or your 'particular attention : That What is, 
(for the most parti) only scaffolding in Ma- 
thematics, is ever an integral and most 

ESSENTIAL PaRT OP THE BlJILDING IN LAN- 
GUAGE. Hence the mighty difference in conse- 
quences, to the different Subjects, when we only 
confound Relation with Relativeness in Mathe- 
matics, and when we do so in the Category of Re- 
lation as forming the Foundation of Language. 
You must be sensible, that I am obliged to com- 
press this exposition of the subject. But enough, 
I trust, has been said, to awaken you to a strong 
suspicion of the means by which the mistake con- 
cerning the real nature of Relation may have crept 
into all the views of Logicians : And I can affirm, 
in particular, of the elaborate but erroneous analy- 
sis furnished by Mr. Locke, that he has afforded 
what I consider to be express, though mere acci- 
dental evidence, of his having founded his whole 
view upon what the Mathematicians call Relation ; 
of which fact I shall provide you with proof, farther 
on. 

Z 

I confess, you have opened upon me facts, 
which 1 was not prepared to expect, and which 
have much excited my curiosity. 



68 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

A. 
I may add, here, then, in order to awaken your 
curiosity the more completely, that this is not the 
only absurdity that is tolerated in Mathematics 
themselves, and that, too, upon the 77iere ground of 
convenience, or to save circumlocution. The Schism, 
for example, concerning the identicalness of equal 
quantities, is, and ever has been, an opprobrium of 
that justly boasted Science; and, stilIj, the absurd 
side of the question prevails, and has prevailed against 
all the reason and the eloquence of a Barrow, 
merely because it is an absurdity of so7ne conveni- 
ence to tolerate, and the toleration of it involves no 
absurd consequences in the reasonings of the Mathe- 
matician. But, Can you therefore suppose, that 
Eternal Truth will suffer herself to be thus violated 
in One Science, without avenging herself, in its 
consequences, in Some Other department of know- 
ledge? Be assured, She will not, or, rather. She 
HAS not; although the matter has not been dis- 
cerned in the extant System of Logic : And you 
may live to see it acknowledged. 



I am, certainly, prepared for the possibility of 
the event. But you have promised, also, to shew 
me that other mistakes, of something like equal 
magnitude in their logical consequences, have ac- 
tually happened in Philosophy. Proceed, there- 
fore, to this matter. 

A. 
Well then, I ask. Do you think there is such 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 69 

thing, either in the External Universe around us, 
or in the Conceptions of the Human Mind, as a 
General Horse^ a General Cart^ or a General Feed 
of Corn ? Or, in other words, Is it possible to con- 
ceive any other Things whatever, besides Indivi- 
duals, of Every Kind and Sort ? 



If I had not known, beforehand, that such a 
doctrine has existed, as that of General Ideas ; or, 
otherwise, of General Conceptions ; I should have 
looked upon your question with unqualified con- 
tempt, — a doctrine which, indeed, now that I 
recollect the matter, I am aware had long reigned 
triumphant with the Schoolmen ; until Roscelli" 
nus and Abelard, in the Eleventh century, first 
attacked it, — a doctrine, too, which, after suffering 
repeated defeats, revived and flourished, in all its 
pristine vigor, insomuch, that it has been sup- 
posed to be the brightest feather in the cap of 
modern philosophy, to have put this Chimera down 
in the last age : Nor are there yet wanting some 
few individuals, who, under a Scholastic bias, re- 
tain a belief in it, in defiance of all the artillery of 
reason* 

A. 

True. And since, from your own confession, 
any unbiassed man would scout the doctrine of 
General Conceptions ; and since our most enlight- 
ened Philosophers, in modern times, have been 
proud to shew, that every plain man, of the vulgar 
stamp, thinks soundly or philosophically with regard 



70 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

to the subject ; I ask, Do you think it would have 
been a fortunate event for Philosophy, if men of 
learning had refused to listen to the arguments of 
Roscellinus, upon a plea of its being improbable 
that the Schoolmen could be so far wrong, and the 
Vulgar so far right? Or, Do you think it was less 
equivalent to a discovery, in Roscellinus, thus to 
erect the Standard of revolt against the doctrine 
of the Schoolmen ; although this Standard, when 
duly appreciated, is nothing but a judgment of th& 
Vulgar ? 

Z. 

These questions, I must own, come with great 
force. They have answered the purpose you in- 
tended for them, by fully rousing my attention to 
hear what you have farther to advance upon the 
subject. 

A. 

First let me add, (as a matter of great import- 
ance,) to what has been said, that the error con- 
cerning General Conceptions is vastly different, as 
to the means there are of detecting it, from that con- 
cerning the Category of Relation. The former sub- 
ject involves very considerable subtilty ; insomuch, 
that, in some views of it, a defence of error may be, 
and has been made, which it requires great inge- 
nuity to expose, and which cannot be shewn by 
means of any direct demonstration : Hence it is 
that the Subject has been the ground of repeated, 
and of the most ardent controversies : But the lat» 
ter — namely — the Nature of Relation, has 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 71 

never been controverted at all; but has onli/ been 
overlooked: and this nature is so obviously de- 
monstrable, especially in those Standard Ex- 
amples which we must exclusively choose for its 
illustration in a treatise of Language, that, I confi- 
dently anticipate, it never will become the subject of 
a war in Logic after these Standard Examples shall 
have been once examined. It is, at the same 
time, more natural to expect that a mistake may 
have crept in and hitherto survived through over- 
sight, than that it should have outlived the repeated 
storms of controversy. 

Z. 

What you have said last has considerable 
weight ; and it seems materially to lessen the impro- 
bability that an error has in reality crept into the 
doctrine of Relation, as you have asserted. Let 
us now, if you please, proceed to the proofs you 
have to offer oi the fact itself 



I have said, you shall have proofs until you are 
satisfied. But, previously, it will be proper to fur- 
nish you with a farther brief view of the Category 
of Relation ; in order that there may be no possi- 
bility oiyoxxx wavering, hereafter, in your judgment, 
unless you choose to do so by incurring the pe- 
nalty due to the grossest absurdity. Because this 
Category contains a vast variety (j/* Species ; and, 
in many of these Species, as I have already hinted, 
the nature of Relation is so subtle, and even eva- 
nescent, {although it is nevertheless rigorously demon- 



72 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

strable), that it demands a great exertion of acu- 
men, or circumspection, to detect, or evince, the 
Link in question : Hence, alone, it has happened, 
that it has escaped the observation of Mathemati- 
cians themselves. 

Z. 

Do as you judge fit in that. And, indeed, I take 
along with me, that it is your present purpose to 
establish the reality of your own Scheme of Rela- 
tion, as well as to prove the fact that this Scheme 
has been overlooked, or never thought of. 



The first and most important observation, then, 
which I have to offer upon the subject, is to point 
out to you, as a self-evident necessary truth, that 
the Generic Principle of Relation must run 
through, or be contained in. All the Species and 
Every Individual instance of Relation in the World: 
This, you know% is an admitted and incontroverti- 
ble maxim of Logic. Hence, as, in such an Obvious 
Relation as that of Distance between the Two 
Banks of a River there is, of necessity, a Middle or 
Third Thing interposed between the Two Banks : 
So, in like manner, there must, of necessity, be an 
analogous Middle or Third Thing interposed, in a logi- 
cal sense, between Any Greater and Any Lesser Fi- 
gure in Geometry, that are compared together ; even 
although it should be very difficult, or altogether 
beyond our ability, to demonstrate distinctly this 
Middle Thing. And the same reasoning must ap- 
ply to Every instance of Relation, the most occult, 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 73 

or the most evanescent whatever. I have aheady 
said, that, in cases of Propo7iio?ial Relation, it is 
a very nice matter to demonstrate, so as to gain 
an ideal sight of, the Relation or Partition of Lo- 
gical Action between Two Related Subjects : but, 
that it can be done, I consider as certain; and, if 
curiosity stimulate you to examine the fact, I be- 
lieve you may be satisfied, in the larger analysis 
which I have offered of the subject. Supposing, 
however, that these subtle Partitions could not, in 
some cases, be demonstrated ; it would be never- 
theless certain that they must exist, since it has 
been shewn that such Partitions exist in the Ob- 
vious Species of Relation. 

From the statement now made, therefore^ it be- 
comes impossible for you, (or for any Mathematician 
who may happen to readthis Dialogue,) to go back, 
or to waver for a moment, under any bias or preju- 
dice derived from the reigning doctrine of Relation 
to be found in the writings even of Mathematicians 
themselves. 



I fully subscribe to your position, that the Ge- 
neric Principle of Relation must run through 
All the Species and Every Individual insta?ice of Re- 
lation, whatever : Nor can this be doubted, notwith- 
standing the obscurity, or evanescence, of any 
Species of Relation. I agree, moreover, that the 
Standard Example which you have given — namely 
— a Relation of Distance is undeniably 
conclusive of the Real Generic Nature of Relation, 
By these two positions I feel myself bound : And 
Anal. K 



n ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

if you shall prove that Logicians have, in any 
CASE, clearly in effect, denied that Relation is a 
Middle Ttai-so, connecting Two Related Subjects ; 
I shall, then, fully esteem them as having virtually 
denied the matter in all cases. This being con- 
clusively settled between us; Proceed, now, to 
your proofs, or authorities rather, that All Logi- 
cians have done as you say. 



To the proofs, then. But, on the way, it is 
fit I should observe to you, that there are Many 
Whole Species of Standard Examples of 
Relation, besides those of Distance ; Any One of 
which would equally serve the purpose of proving 
to you what is the Real Nature of the Subject. I 
shall here merely mention One of these Species ; in 
order to shew you how broad is the Obvious basis 
upon which we are to build. Every Action, 
either of what is called Physical Contact or of 
Collision between Any Two Bodies, is One of 
those Logical Partitions which I call a Relation 
between them : and Each of the Two Bodies is, in 
such case, a Relative Subject by reason of this Par- 
tition or Link which is interposed between the two. 
And now for the authorities. 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 75 

A DIALOGUE 
CONCERNING RELATION. 

PART SECOND. 



To begin at the fountain head of accredited 
logical authority, the definition of Relation given 
by Aristotle : and which I shall quote here in 
the words of Mr. Harris, who may be accounted 
one of the echos of the Ancients in matters of 
Philosophy ; runs thus : " Such things as these 
" are said to be Relatives — namely — as many as 
"are said to be what they are, by being 
" things belonging to some other thing, or 
" which, in any other sense, have refei'ence to 
" something else." 



Why, there now : I see your mistake already. 
That which you have just quoted is not a defini- 
tion of Relation, as you suppose : It is only a 
definition of a Relative, i. e. of Owe of Two Related 
Subjects, as viewed with reference to the Other ; 
and it appears to be a very unexceptionable defi- 
nition of the thing, according to your own shewing. 

A. 

True. But you will find, that Aristotle meant 
this as a definition of what he and all other Logi- 
cians call Relation ; although he has here called 



76 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.I. 

it a Relative, In other words, All Logicians, 
without exception, have uniformly held the terms 
Relative and Relation to be perfectly synonymous 
OR CONVERTIBLE. And, as a proof of this in the 
case of Aristotle, I now furnish you with another 
definition of Relation, quoted from him by no less 
an authority than Dr. Barrow, ^ — a Mind of the 
first order, — who, in his capacity of a Mathemati- 
cian (in which character he here speaks) must have 
been critically attentive to what he conceived to be 
the real nature of this Category. ** The essence 
" of Relations" (says he) " consists in this, that 
" they have themselves in a certain manner, or are 
" in some sort, affected to something else." Now, 
in this definition, you see, Barrow employs the 
word " Relation," where Harris uses the word 
Relative ; and there can be no doubt of the fact 
which I assert. As a farther proof of this, however, 
I observe, that Barrow has expressed himself still 
more fully upon the subject, in the following words : 
" Relation is said of things which are referred to 
*' one another, as the Son to the Father, a Friend 
" to a Friend : for these both relate to and are 
** related to one another, and therefore are termed 
" Relations:' 

Again, Barrow says, " Logicians have hitherto 
" taught that Relations are inherent to absolute 
" things." Now the fact is, that the Quality or 
Qualities, which make a Relative of any Absolute 
Subject i are, certainly, for the time being at least, 
inherent in, or belong to, that Absolute Subject: 
But it has been demonstrated, in the case of a 
Relation of Distance, that the Relation or 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 77 

Link of Connection between the Two Related 
Subjects is not any Quality in either of 
THOSE SUBJECTS. For the fidelity of my quotations, 
however, see Barrow's Mathematical Lectures, Led, 
ISth and 27th. 

Z. 

I confess, all this appears to me to amount to 
proof, unanswerable. But, What say the contem- 
poraries of Barrow, and the contemporaries of Har- 
ris, to this doctrine ? 

A. 

According to Locke, (who has furnished by 
far the most extensive elementary analysis of the 
subject of any modern writer, so far as I know,) 
" Relation is a way of comparing two things to- 
" gether." In illustrating which definition, he 
says, " the immediate signification of relative words 
" is very often other supposed relations'' In another 
place, he says, " Patron and Client are easily 
" allowed to be Relations ; but a constable, and a 
" dictator, are not so readily, at first hearing, con- 
" sidered as such." Again, he says, "These and 
** the like Relations are expressed by Relative terms, 
** that have others answering to them, as Father 
" and Son, Bigger and Lesser," &c. 

In a word ; Barrow and Locke, both, propagate 
the very same doctrine of the subject, in the very 
same words : and both these coincide with Aris- 
totle, as rendered by Harris. 

And here I shall cite the evidence from Locke, 
to which I formerly alluded, and which, I think, 



78 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap,1. 

curiously proves that he built his whole view of 
the subject upon that of the Mathematicians* In 
the 28th Chapter, of his Second Book, he has express- 
ed himself as follows : " This is so manifest in that 
" sort" (of Relation) " called proportional : for 
*^ when a man says, * Honey is sweeter than wax^ it 
" is plain that his thoughts in this relation termi- 
" nate in this simple idea, sweetness, which is eqimlly 
" true of all the rest'' 

Now, I observe, by the way, it is manifest, that, 
in the instance which Mr. Locke has thus taken 
for HIS Standard Example, (although it has 
deceived him, in common with all other Logicians) 
the idea of the Relation does not terminate in any 
idea of " sweetness" at all ; but it terminates in 
a vastly different thing — namely — a difference 

BETWEEN Two SEVERAL SwEETNESSES ; Owiug 

to WHICH Difference it is that " Honey is 
SWEETER," and Wax is less Sweet ; — the Word 
"Sweeter" being only the Relative Name of One 
OF THE Subjects compared. 

But the purpose for which I brought the quota- 
tion, is only to shew the curious evidence, that, 
although Mr. Locke has here applied the word, 
" Proportional," to a Relation of Taste, yet, his 
use of the word, in this case, is a critical indication 
that he had the reciprocal Relativeness of Mathe- 
matical Quantities in his mind at the time: be- 
cause men do not usually attempt to ascertain the 
Proportion of One Sweetness to that of An- 
other, and especially not that oi Honey to Wax ; 
and, therefore, the word Proportional cannot with 
logical propriety be applied to such a Relation of 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 79 

Taste : although One Sweetness is often spoken 
of as being Greater, or Lesser, than Another. 

I trust, therefore, you will admit, that I have 
traced Mr. Locke's analysis to its real origin, or 
starting post. 



It looks something like it, 



Perhaps I ought here to observe, as forming a 
part of the error already pointed out, that, while 
the Mathematicians suppose Relation to be nothing 
but Relativeness, they entertain this fallacy by sup- 
posing that the Excess, or Defect, of any Quantity, 
RESIDES IN that Quantity. This fallacy, as I have 
already hinted, suits perfectly well for the purpose 
of the Mathematician ; because all that he usually 
desires, is to determine the Amount of either the 
Excess or Defect of Any Quantity ; and his views 
do not demand any strict logical investigation, on 
his part, to ascertain whether or not this Excess, 
or Defect, is a thing actually intrinsic in the 
Quantity to which it is referred. But there is a 
distinction to be made, between a mere Demonstrat" 
ing Mathematician and a Mathematical Logician: 
And I must insist, here, that, for the great purpose 
of Universal Logic, and especially for that of solv- 
ing the problem of Language, it is a vast fallacy 
and one indeed that is subversive of the whole 
foundation of general reasoning, to assume that an 
Action of equalling, an Action of exceeding, 
or an Action of falling short (for these are the 



80 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

Real Concrete Names in Nature, of what in the 
Abstract are called Equality, Excess, and De- 
fect,) is a thing that resides in any Quantity, 
or Subject whatever. 

At the same time, I would strongly recommend, 
to any person who is merely inquiring into the 
nature of Language, not to waste a thought upon 
" those Relations called Proportional Because it 
is evident, from what has been said, that they in- 
volve much subtilty : and because the inquirer 
into the nature of Language has nothing at all to do 
with any Relations, except those Obvious Species 
which must always be chosen for Standard Exam- 
ples of the subject. 

In-line, I apprehend, that Proportio7ial Relations 
have proved the hidden rock, upon which the 
Mathematical or Aristotelian Logic hath struck : 
And they have riven such a hole (though unobserv- 
ed) in its bottom, that it never has floated, and 
never can float, in correspondence with the Nature 
of Things, Had the Philosophy of Relation been 
originally laid down by Soldiers, by Sailors, or by 
Post-boys ; they would have begun with such Obm- * 
ous Relations as those of Distance between Two 
Towns, or Two Sea-Ports ; and thus they would 
have presented the w^orld with a Theory true to 
nature. But, it happening that the Philosophy of 
Relation was laid down by Geometricians; these 
men, in the profundity of their speculations, began 
the Subject of Relation at the wrong end, by taking 
for their standard examples those occult species 
called Proportional, 

And thus I have endeavoured to account to you. 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 81 

for the MANNER HOW the fallacy in question has 
crept in. 

Z, 

The account you have given of the matter has, 
doubtless, some verisimilitude. One thing, at least, is 
certain — namely — that all the authorities you have 
yet quoted are in one story on the subject : And, 
contrary to their view of it, I have the most per- 
fect conviction of the EXISTENCE «/Z^ NECESSITY 
of a Third Thing, interposed between Every Two 
Related Subjects ; which Third Thing is a Logical 
Link of Connection between the Two, and is the 
Logical Cause of their being Two Relatives. Pro- 
ceed, therefore, with such other evidence as you 
deem requisite to offer upon the subject. 

A. 

There is one other authority, which I shall add, 
here, merely on account of the general estimation 
which he has gained, and justly gained, for meta- 
physical acumen and originality ; although several 
of his most important philosophical conclusions 
are remarkable for their unsoundness : I mean no 
other than the Sceptical Philosopher — Mr. Hume. 

According to this writer, as expressed in his 
'^Treatise of Human Nature' — **The word Re- 
" lation stands for that Quality by which two 
" ideas are connected together in the imagination." 
I have curtailed the passage: but these words 
indubitably contain the substance of his creed on 
the subject. 

Anal. L 



82 ANALYSIS OF THJE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

Z. 

Give me leave to interrupt you, for a moment. 
I have all along entertained some embering doubt, 
which your citation of Hume has kindled into 
avowal. Let me understand you, distinctly, then. 
Is it your meaning to deny that a Relative or JRe- 
lated Subject is a Related Subject by reason of Some 
Quality or Attribute belonging, (for the time being at 
least y) in some way or other, to that Subject itself? 



No, certainly. I never thought of denying this : 
I only assert, that Any Such Quality of a Thing 
constitutes that Thing a Relative Subject, and 
NOT A Relation. Thus, in the Standard Exam- 
ple of a Relation of Distance between Two 
Houses ; If we suppose this Distance to measure a 
Mile; Each of the Houses is then a Mile distant 
from the Other, only because Each House happens 
to occupy that Pai^ticular Spot of the Earth's Surface 
that is a Mile apart from the Spot occupied by the 
Other. And if either of the Two Houses were 
put upon wheels, and were moved to Any Other 
Spot ; this House would thus lose the Quality of 
occupying its first Site, and would acquire the 
Quality of occupying Another Site : owing to 
which, there would no longer be a Relation of a 
Mile of Distance between the Two Houses, but 
there would be a new Relation of Distance, of Some 
Other eMent, 

By a variation of this process^ it is plain, we 
might move One of the Two Houses into a situa- 
tion to touch the Other : And thus we should 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 83 

annihilate every Relation of Distance between the 
Two ; and give existence to a Relation of Con- 
tact or Contiguity between them. 

From the nature of the example now given, you 
must clearly discern, that, although Relativeness 
certainly depends upon Some Quality possessed by 
the Related Subject, yet this cannot do away with 
the Necessity, nor in the least lessen the Importance, 
of the Link of Action which connects Every 
Two Related Subjects together and is the Prin- 
cipal Cause that makes them be what they are. 

Z 

I am perfectly satisfied with regard to the doubt 
I had entertained. But all that you have yet cited 
is the authority of Logicians and Mathematicians, 
considered especially as such : and it does not fol- 
low, from this, that the Grammarians have bot- 
tomed their views, as you say they have, upon this 
fallacious Logic. I desire, therefore, to know 
what has been the actual fact with regard to the 
latter. Proceed, then, I pray you, to the Gram- 
marians. 

A. 

To the Grammarians, then. According to Mi% 
Harris (whose theory of Language stood so high 
with the learned, until it was overthrown by the 
more fortunate genius of Tooke, that 1 could not 
name an equal authority,) Relation is no other 
than that which it has been defined to be by Aris- 
totle, as already described. For Mr. Harris has 
entitled the Tenth Chapter of his " Philosophical 
Arrangements" thus: *' Concerning Relatives." 



84 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

And, in a foot note, he has deemed it proper to 
justify this Title, in the following terms. " The title 
** of this Arrangement is expressed by a plural, and 
^' nota singular, like Quantity and Quality, because 
*' All Relation is necessarily between Two." 

In quoting this passage, I have, in the first place, 
to point out to you a most important ambiguity 
OF Language, which it involves ; and against 
which, it is of the utmost consequence that every 
inquirer should be put upon his guard, when he is 
reading any Treatise, by Logicians, on the Subject 
of Relation. Mr. Harris (you see) asserts, that 
" All Relation is necessarily betwee7iTwo.'' And 
So say All the Logicians : And So say I, also. 
But I desire you to observe, how infinitely different, 
and opposite, is their meaning, from that which I 
attribute to this phrase : and, then, you will not 
much wonder, though many readers should have al- 
together misconceived theaneaning which Logicians 
have intended it to convey, when they have, at any 
time, affirmed that Relation is between Two Things. 

When I demonstrated that Every Relation 
must be between Two Things; I shewed you, 
that this means in the same sense as a Fetter is a 
Link between Two Prisoners. But, When Mr. 
Harris and the Logicians affirm that Every Rela- 
tion must be between Two Things ; they mean 
this only in the same sense as we in ordinary say 
that Two Boots, Two Spurs, or Two Coach Horses, 
make a Pair between them ; and they ground 
this phrase upon the mere fact that No Subject can 
be a Relative, except only while Some Other Subject 
Co-exists with it, as its Correlative. 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 85 



The ambiguity you have now pointed out is 
certainly calculated, in a very rare degree, to de- 
ceive : and, very probably, many readers have been 
betrayed, by it, into an acquiescence with the doc- 
trine of Logicians with regard to Relation ; when, 
if they had understood the import which was meant 
to be conveyed, they would have dissented, and 
not have left it for you to be the first to raise the 
standard of revolt. 

A. 

I go on to observe, with regard to the authority 
of Mr. Harris, that in his Work appropriated to 
Grammar — namely — his Hermes (chap. 9.) he 
expresses himself still more explicitly, in coinci-* 
dence with Aristotle and the rest, by saying, that 
*' The Attribute of Quantity passes insensibly into that 
" of Relation^'' By which assertion he, plainly, 
means, that Relation is nothing but that superin- 
duced acquired character which belongs to Any 
Quantity or Subject in virtue of its being comparable, 
or compared, with Some Other Co-existent Quantity 
or Subject : Which definition answers, precisely, to 
that given of Relation by Mr. Hume and by all 
other authorities. 



The matter is perfectly plain: The Gramma- 
rian Harris is the same as the Logician Harris : 
and, as far as this goes, your position has been 
made good. 



L^., 



86 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

A. 

I may now, then, open to you, at once, a clear 
although momentary view of the vast operation, 
or effect, of this bottomless Scheme of Relation, 
upon the General Doctrine of the Structure of 
Language. 

It is because Mr. Harris (like all other Gramma- 
rians) discerned No Middle Object between Two 
Related Subjects, that he (like them) has supposed 
a Verb (Every Verb) to be a Sign of Some Qua- 
lity or Attribute of One Only, of Any Two Related 
Subjects between which Any Relation (i. e. Ant/ 
Logical Action,) subsists. In other words, he has 
supposed Every Verb to be the Sign of Some 
Attribute of its Nominative only ; instead of 
having discerned that Every Verb is the Sign of a 
Bridge or Link of Relation between a Nomi- 
native and an Accusative Noun, which makes 
it be not the Sign of an Attribute of Any Single 
Subject whatever, but to be the Sign of a Distinct 
Third Object — namely an Action — interposed 
between Two Co- Agents. 

Here, then, is the beginning of that ^^ great 
" darkness,'' in which the Structure of Language 
hath at all times been involved ; and this darkness, 
you plainly perceive, is in consequence of Logi- 
cians having uniformly asserted that Relation is 
Nothing but One Related Subject referred to Another. 
I say this is the beginning of the obscurity. The 
ea:tent of it can only be judged from going through 
the successive stages of the analysis which I pro- 
pose to offer to you. In the mean time, Have you 
enough of Mr. Harris ? 



SEC. 2] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 87 

Z. 

Yes ; Enough of Him : But not enough of au- 
thority. You appear to think yourself ow/ o/' Me 
wood; but I am not yet satisfied. I grant, that 
the authorities you have cited are of the first rate : 
Yet, one alone of them (Mr. Harris) expresses him- 
self joro/e^^/j/ as a Grammarian : and Mr. Harris, 
in this character, was manifestly hoodwinked by 
his over deference to the notions of the Ancients ; 
which may well account for his having sailed with 
the general tide of opinion on the subject. But 
the Theory of Mr. Harris has passed away ; and a 
NEW EPOCH in the History of Language has been 
justly hailed by the world, — an epoch which has 
ushered in a splendid and, indeed, a noon- day 
light upon this department of Philosophy : up- 
on the first blush of which, the shadows of Mr. 
Harris's imagination, or, rather, those of All pre- 
ceding Grammarians, were dispelled, like sick 
fancies of the night ; and mankind became pos- 
sessed of the True Theory of Speech. Now, 
then, I desire you to observe, from what you have 
advanced concerning the true nature of Relation, 
I may confidently infer, that such a change in 
the Doctrine of Language could not have been 
effected, as that which has been happily produced, 
unless its author had departed from that doctrine 
of Relation which has certainly been entertained 
by All his predecessors. And besides this, when 
I consider the general reputation of that author for 
great logical acumen, and his unsparing severity 
with regard to the faults of Philosophers in general, 
I can never suppose that he could have been led 
into this error of the " Metaphysicians ;" The 



88 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap.1. 

LYNX-EYED Philologer OF PuRLEY (for you are 
certain it is to Him I allude) was not to be caught 
in such a trap. Mr. Tooke, then ; I demand of 
you, peremptorily, to cite Mr. Tooke upon the 
subject : And, if you can parry this thrust, I shall 
own myself content. 



Well, then, Mr. Tooke; since you will have 
it so. 

In the Seco7id Volume of the Diversions of 
Purley, (page 499,) he has expressed himself in 
the following terms. 

" Relative has indeed, within my memory, by a 
" ridiculous affectation of false and unfounded ac- 
" curacy, crept forward into improper use, to the 
" exclusion of Relation. Certain precise gentlemen 
" will no longer permit us to call our kindred our 
" Relations : No, but our Relatives. Why ? What 
" is the meaning of the termination On, and the 
" meaning of the termination Ive, which qualifies 
" the one, and disqualifies the other ? They have 
" both appropriate meanings ; without the know* 
" ledge of which, how can these gentlemen deter- 
" mine their proper use ? If they say they have 
" not appropriate meanings: by what rule do they 
" prefer the one to the other? They who do not 
" take what they find in use, but propose a change, 
'* are bound to give a reason for it. But, I believe, 
" they will be as little able to justify their innovation, 
** as Sir Thomas More would have been to explain 
" the foundation of his ridiculous distinction be- 
'' tween Nay and No, and between Yea and 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 89 

" Yes. But these petty fopperies will pass away 
" of themselves, and when the whim is over, we 
** shall all find our Relations again, as safe and 
" sound as ever." 

Such is the View of the Category of Relation, 
entertained by Mr, Tooke ! — What do you think, 
now, of AUTHORITY ; and, especially, of the autho- 
rity of Grammarians ? 

Z. 

Enough ; Enough ! All authority,— All 
CITATION — beyond this — would be worse than 
useless. I am quite satisfied. I will never, again, 
pin my opinion upon Names, or entertain any 
confidence in the fabrications of Philosophers, that 
are at all called in question, until I shall have ex- 
amined the subject for myself and drawn my own 
conclusions, 

^• 

That is the true and the only way to become 
yourself a Philosopher. But it is a way that has 
been most wofuUy neglected in time past ; as you 
now clearly discern. The fact is, that, throughout 
the different Divisions of the Superstructure of 
Science, we generally find the marks of admirable 
ratiocination, labor, and circumspection : but when 
we examine the Foundations (which have some- 
times been very properly called the First Philo- 
sophy) we may discern the most serious and most 
wonderful proofs of negligence and fallacious as- 
sumption. As a grand example of this, you have 
now before you the full and complete evidence of 
Anal. M 



90 ANALYSIS OF THE CATEGORY [chap. 1. 

the existence of that Oversight, (for an Over- 
sight, and NOT A DEFENDED error, it is) with re- 
gard to the Generic Nature of Relation which I 
ventured to impeach in the outset of this discussion. 
And, as another example of it, connected with 
that just mentioned, I ask you, What do you think, 
NOW, of Mr. Tooke's boasted assertion, " that the 
" most judicious Grammarians, disgusted with ab- 
" surdity and contradiction, have prudently con- 
" tented themselves with remarking the difference 
" of Words, and have left the Causes of Language 
" to shift for themselves ?" 

Z. 

I think, on the contrary, that the Causes of 
Language, (i. e. the Relativeness of and the 
Relations between Things) having been pro- 
foundly misapprehended by the Logicians, have 
left the Grammarians to shift for themselves. 
And a most disastrous shift, I fear, they have made 
of it. 

A. 

Here then, in passing, I observe to you, that the 
Relativeness of and the Relations between 
Things are the Cause, Foundation, or Object, not 
only of Language, but also of All Philosophy, 
including Universal Logic. I express this re- 
mark to you, only that you may judge, from it, 
what extensive effects must be produced in the 
Whole Circle of the Sciences, by the great 
Oversight with regard to the Category of Relation 
which I have thus labored to expose. 



SEC. 2.] OF RELATIVES AND RELATION. 91 

I might enlarge here, upon other baneful effects 
which have been produced by the fallacy in ques- 
tion. But it would be beside the Subject before 
us : And we will now, if you please, descend from 
this Vehicle ; and get into the ordinary foot-pace 
of analysis. 



92 



CHAPTER II. 



Of Verbs 



Prelimmary Observations. 

In an Elementary Treatise of Language, it would 
appear proper, in point of logical order, to inves- 
tigate the nature of Nouns, previously to examin- 
ing that of Verbs. But there are several reasons 
\vhich make against this disposition and demand a 
contrary arrangement. 

In the first place, I may observe, that the obscu- 
rity which hangs over the grammatical nature of 
Nouns, (under which Half of Grammar I compre- 
hend not only all Pronounsy but also all Adjectives^ 
Articles, and Si?nple Dejinitives whatever) is not of 
that kind which can deeply affect our General 
Views of the Structure of Language : For none of 
the more important arcana of Speech lie concealed 
under this Part of Grammar. 

Secondly. I deem it to be of very material con- 
sequence, not to interrupt the connection of order, 
that ought to subsist between the Chapter, or Sub- 
ject, which has gone before and that upon which I 
am now to enter ; since the matter determined in 



CHAP. 2.] OF VERBS. 93 

the former is the immediate and necessary Founda- 
tion of that contained in the latter. 

Thirdly. I believe it will be found of considera- 
ble advantage to postpone the treatment of Nouns, 
to that of Verbs and So-called Prepositions; es- 
pecially, (among other reasons) as what are called 
the Cases of Nouns involve a consideration of the 
real nature of the Words called Prepositions. 

For these and other reasons, I have given to the 
analysis of Verbs the precedence, in point of ar- 
rangement. 

In asserting that Nouns are, in point of logical 
consideration, a prior grammatical subject to that 
of Verbs, I do not overlook that I am opposed by 
very high etymological authorities. But the ground 
upon which I venture to dissent from these is of 
such a nature, as, I think, does not admit of being 
either shaken or approached by any etymological 
argument ; and I shall explain the nature of this 
ground, in its proper place. 

The principal authority which I have in view, 
in stating the last observation, is that of the late 
Dr. Murray, to whose grammatical labors I have 
already alluded in this work, and whose specula- 
tions will claim my repeated notice in it as I pro- 
ceed. 

With regard to the point now in question, how- 
ever, I shall offer no present observation : but shall 
merely risk the following general remarks on the 
views of Dr. Murray, as being introductory of the 
criticisms which I may subsequently be induced 
to hazard upon his writings. 



94 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Unlike Mr. Tooke in his professions with re- 
spect to method, this writer has taken professly and 
exclusively the matter of fact course, in his re- 
searches into the nature of Language; and has 
valued himself upon adhering with the utmost 
rigor to this procedure. And, although it should 
be thought that the ultimate ramifications of his 
research have terminated in conclusions which are 
not more bold than unfounded, I suppose there 
can be no doubt that he has, within certain limits, 
eminently fulfilled the task of the Inductive Ety- 
mologist. The treatise which I now offer to the 
reader was in substance nearly ready for the 
Press, and I had actually given instructions to 
have it announced as such, when the posthu- 
mous publication of Dr. Murray's book, which had 
just appeared, was put into my hands. My own 
views of the subject having been founded upon 
that Scheme of the Category of Relatives and Re- 
lation which has been delineated in the foregoing- 
Chapter ; and which Scheme, I knew, had never 
been proposed by any Logician, or Grammarian ; I 
felt assured that Dr. Murray could not have anti- 
cipated my general conclusions. At the same time, 
I could not fail to be deeply curious and interested 
in comparing the Speculations of so profound a 
practicalLinguist, with the conclusions to which I 
had been led by my own course of inquiry : Nor 
could I feel satisfied to let the latter pass out of 
my hands, without availing myself of the very op- 
portune appearance of Dr. Murray's Work, to af- 
ford to my own views any advantage which could 
be derived from his researches. I therefore de- 



CHAP. 2.] OF VERBS. 95 

termined to defer, for a little time, the printing of 
my book. 

Since then, a succession of interruptions from a 
state of health which admitted of no intellectual 
exertion has protracted the matter some time 
beyond my expectation; and has, at the same 
time, prevented my giving that minute attention to 
all the parts of Dr. Murray's Two Volumes, that 
perhaps they may justly claim: Which last cir- 
cumstance I deem it due to his memory to men- 
tion ; while at the same time, I venture to hope, 
that I have been able to apprehend the general 
spirit of his contributions, for every requisite pur- 
pose which I had in view. 

If I am not rash in hazarding this belief, it ap- 
pears to me that he never deviates from his induc- 
tive course, to enter into any consideration of 
what Language ought to have been, or is capable of 
being made; Far less does he seem to consider the 
Essential Structure of Language as a Fabric con- 
stituted of Necessary Principles ; but, on the con- 
trary, he views this Structure as being a thing whose 
Elements are merely instituted or conventional, and 
their Mechanism or the manner of putting their 
Principles together various or mutable. As a single 
example of the truth of this observation, I observe, 
(in his First Volume, page 50,) he expresses himself 
as follows. 

" While the Noun underwent these important 
*' changes, the Verb, the fountain of language, ac- 
" quired new and interesting properties." 

It is plain that, according to this view of the 
subject, the Noun and the Verb must, in their in- 



96 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

stitution, resemble the Canoe and the Hut of the 
savage; which have been gradually altered and 
improved into iheShip and the Citadeloi enlightened 
nations. And I concede to Dr. Murray, that such, 
in point of fact, has been what may well be called 
the GROWTH of the Speaking Art in past ages ^ and 
such is Language, as it now stands instituted, accord- 
ing to the conceptions or apprehension of those who 
speak it. But I deny that this Natural History of 
Speech exhibits any thing like the Real Principles 
and Structure of Language : and I equally deny 
that any such Phraseology is applicable to its real 
Structure, as that of the Noun, or the Verb, 
having " acquired new and interesting properties.'' 

Language consists, essentially, of Principles 
which possess a Necessary Connection and De- 
pendence, one with another, perfectly conformable 
to those General Principles of Relation which are 
at once its Foundation and its Object. As such, 
it is impossible that Any of its Essential Parts or 
Elements should ever acquire any new properties : 
although mankind might make fiew discoveries of 
the nature of these Parts. If Dr. Murray had been 
writing a History of Mathematics, he would never 
have mentioned the Square, or the Circle, as 
having acquired new properties ; he would only have 
noted upon what occasions, or by whom, the 
known Necessary and Eternal properties of these 
figures were first bi^ought to light, 

I point out the exceptionable phraseology of Dr. 
Murray with respect to the Noun and the Verb, in 
the present case, therefore, as furnishing, of itself 
alone, a conclusive evidence that this very merito- 



CHAP. 2.] OF VERBS. 97 

rioiis writer has infinitely misapprehended what I 
conceive to be the Real Nature of Language. 

After this statement, I hardly need observe, that, 
in perusing the speculations of Dr. Murray I have 
found my conjecture altogether verified, that his 
general views of the subject do not at all interfere 
*Tvith those entertained by me. I shall explain, 
hereafter, the ground upon which I differ from his 
assumption that the Verb is the ^^ Fountain of 
" Language,''' I shall, also, have to point out va- 
rious particular expressions of Language, quoted by 
him, which, although only insular and occasional, 
afford very remarkable and satisfactory coincidences 
with the general views which I propose to lay down. 
Upon the whole, the observations, or strictures, 
which I shall have occasion to make upon the labors 
of this illustrious disciple of the School of Tooke 
(who has as far outstript his master in research, as 
I think he has stood superior to him in the article of 
consistency,) will, I think, aflbrd to my own work 
a degree of completion, in the etymological parts of 
its evidence, which it could not have possessed but 
for the timely coming of the ^'History of the 
" European Languages.'^ 



Anal. N 



98 [CHAP. 2. 



SECTION FIRST. 

OF THE GENERAL NATURE AND OFFICE OP VERBS. 



SUBSECTION I. 



Of the Doctrine of Grammariam, that Verbs are 
not Copulas between a Nominative and an Accusa- 
tive Noun. — Statement of the Fundamental Prin- 
ciple of Language. — Suggestion of the Principle of 
Alternation of a Verb, in a Sentence. 

It is the Object of the Philosophical Gramma- 
rian to ascertain and deUneate the Real Principles 
and Structure of Language, as founded on the General 
Principles of Logical Connection between those Sub- 
jects, or Objects, in the Universe, of which Language 
is the Mark or Signature. 

Upon the other hand, it is the business of a 
writer of Vernacular Grammar to apply the 
Principles of Philosophical Grammar, to the ex- 
planation and improvement of the genius of 
particular Languages. 

In other words, I suggest, that the Science of 
Philosophical Grammar (zvhen once it shall be 
erected) must bear a relativeness to the Various 
Grammars of Particular Languages, in some sort 
analogous to that which Geometry holds with re- 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 99 

spect to the Art of Building, as that Art was, in 
early and ignorant ages, variously practised in 
those Countries, with more, or less, of acciden- 
tal conformity to the Science in which it ought to 
have been founded. 

It is upon this general understanding of the 
subject, that the several analyses of the Different 
Parts of Speech, and of their Different Connecting 
Principles, will be prosecuted in the present work : 
And I deem the fact to be of sufficient importance 
to demand that I should intimate it, distinctly, in 
the above precursory observations, in order the 
more particularly to impress it upon the judgment 
of a reader, as he proceeds in examining the in- 
tended details. 



There are Two Fundamental Assumptions in 
the Doctrines of accredited Philosophical Gram- 
mar, which serve virtually as the very First Maxims 
of that supposed Science, and which it is requisite 
to state, in the above precursory observations, for 
the purpose of objecting to their truth or validity. 

One of these Assumptions is, that there are 
certain Verbs which do not admit an Accusative 
Case. — ^The Other, that those Verbs which do ad- 
mit an Accusative Case are not Links of Gram- 
matical Connection between their Nominative 
and their Accusative. 

Now it is a leading object of the present Chapter 
to show, that Accredited Grammar, in these Two 
Fundamental Assumptions, takes up a position in 
a direct hostility to the First Principles of Reason ; 



mo OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

and continues to deviate from truth, throughout 
the whole supposed Structure of Language. 

In order to consolidate the objects of ray present 
dissent, the Two Assumptions in question may be 
reduced to One, and stated in terms which have 
been rendered familiar to grammatical ears by the 
speculations of Mr. Harris — namely — that Verbs 
are Attributives — and Not Connectives, — a 
Doctrine which has not only been virtually assent- 
ed to by all Grammarians who have pfxceded the 
writer above mentioned ; but have also been sanc- 
tioned by Mr. Tooke, and by all who have come 
after him. Now, owing to the necessary depend- 
ence which all the other Parts of Grammar must 
otherwise have upon this assumed fundamental 
position, it is necessary to arraign and explode it, 
here, by means of an appropriate analysis. 

Preparatory to this, however, it is requisite to 
entertain a very secondary, though indispensable 
consideration. It sometimes happens, in matters 
of Philosophy, that one, or two, ambiguous or 
<lubitable expressions, employed by an eminent 
writer, lay a foundation for cavil, or dispute ; and 
it becomes, in consequence, necessary to enter into 
proofs, or evidences, of a fact, or position, which, 
upon general ground, must appear as plainly as the 
sun at noon-day. This happens to be the case 
with respect to the import, or acceptation, of one 
of those assumptions that are impeached in the 
foregoing observations. For although it is known 
to every person, who has any acquaintance at all 
with the subject, that Every Verb in Language is 
supposed^by Grammarians to signify som6 Property 



SEC. 1.3 OP VERBS. 101 

or Attribute of its Nominative only ; and also 
known to those who have a more extensive know- 
ledge of it, that this assumption has always obtained 
without any dissentient voice ; still, there are, in 
the case of some writers, certain expressions made 
use of, which, if not duly examined, and their real 
import ascertained, might, I have no doubt, be 
made the foundation of a cavil, or pretence, that 
Verbs have been tacitly and virtually understood as 
connecting Nominatives with Accusative Nouns; 
although the express tenor of Grammar Doctrine 
has always run manifestly to the contrary. 

The truth of the matter is, and it is a truth wor- 
thy of notice here, that, as in the case of Relation, 
so in that of the Verb, the natural reason of man 
is against the Logician and the Grammarian. For, 
as Mr. Tooke has observed of " certain gentlemen,'' 
that they could not be satisfied without at least 
some vague notion of a difference existing between 
Relation and Relatives; so, I believe, it will be 
found, that any plain man, who had never been 
taught the rules of accredited Grammar, would 
naturally conceive that a Verb connects together 
Any Two Nouns between which it is placed. I 
may indeed venture to affirm this, from having met 
with several individuals of profound classical attain- 
ments and great acumen, who,obeying the dictates 
of their reason, and wholly overlooking and viola- 
ting the extant fundamental Rules of Grammar, 
have actually supposed that a tacit and virtual 
Grammatical Connection is meant in those Rules, 
between a Nominative and an Accusative Noun, 
Ihrouijh the medium of a Verb. I proceed, there- 



102 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

fore, to show, that An]/ such Grammatical Connec- 
tion is Not meant. And I deem it to be of no 
small importance to close the door, thus effectually, 
against a misunderstanding which has prevailed in 
any such instance. 

For this purpose, I shall principally select that 
View of the subject which is, at once, the most 
prevalent and most favorable, that I know, to the 
supposition of any such doctrine ; and which con- 
tains that dubiety of expression already alluded 
to. Its author is no other than the very learned 
Bishop Lowth : And its Assumptions are repeated, 
in the words of its author, in by far the most popu- 
lar or current English Grammar now extant ; more 
than Thirty Editions of which attest the present 
state of public opinion, with regard to the Logic 
OF Language. I may add, that I am aware of 
no writer who has done more justice to that Defi- 
nition of the Verb which he advocates, nor any one 
who has come nearer to discerning the real general 
nature of the Verb without discerning it at all, 
than Dr. Lowth has. There is, indeed, only one 
other writer, whose statements, with regard to the 
point at issue, I shall at all consider ; and I shall 
notice his particular opinions only upon the same 
ground as those of Dr. Lowth — namely — on ac- 
count of certain ambiguities of expression which 
the author last alluded to has employed, and which^ 
if not cleared up and explained, might leave an open- 
ing for cavil or dispute. I could certainly have 
wished, that the point in question could have been 
passed over, without this scrutiny. But, at any 
rate, I feel assured, that the opinions, or expressions. 



SEC. I.] OF VERBS. 103 

of no other writer need be investigated, on this head, 
after those now referred to have been discussed : 
And it is at least a compensation for the troublCji 
that the discussion will involve several conside- 
rations which must tend to elucidate the general 
nature of Speech. Those who know the infinite 
consequences which depend upon laying the foun- 
dations of any Science in solid Principles ; and 
also know the evils that are avoided in removing* 
from such Principles every plea for misunderstand- 
ing; will never deem the intended elucidation either 
unimportant or tedious. 

It is sufficiently recognized, by all Philosophers 
of the first order, that the Foundations of every 
Science, not excepting that of Mathematics itself, 
must be laid in the transcendental or metaphysical 
conceptions of the Mind, Now with regard to 
those which are necessary to Mathematics, they 
are so far established as to admit of the Super- 
structure's going on, without flaw, or objection. 
But, in order to erect a Science of Language, this 
foundation-work is yet to be laid : And although 
it must certainly take up some of our time, in dif- 
ferent places, to attend to it as we go along, it 
should always be recollected that this time is not 
unprofitably but very preciously bestowed, inas- 
much as any new truth which we attain in the 
First Principles of Logic, (with whatever labor it 
may be dug into light from under an accumulation 
of reverenced fallacies,) is a step of elevation gained 
by our Species — an interminable possession and a 
freehold for ever. 

In the present article, I shall confine myself to 



104 OF VERBS. [ctiAP. 2. 

the Statements of Dr. Lovvth ; involving therein 
the positions or assumptions of Mr. Harris, with 
whose sentiments on the Subject those of Lowth 
will be found altogether identified. The other 
writer to whom I have alluded, and whose views 
are stated in the article Grammar in Rees's Cyclo- 
pedia, 1 shall consider in a subsequent place. 

^* A Verb Active'' (says Dr. Lowth) "expresses 
" an action, and necessarily implies an Agent 
** and an Object acted upon." — And — " A Verb 
" Passive expresses a passion, and necessarily im- 
" plies an Object and an Agent by which it is 
" acted upon." 

Now with regard to this first statement, I ask ; 
Would not any one suppose, that, in so far as con- 
cerns those Verbs that are called Active and Passive, 
Dr. Lowth has not only clearly discerned that a 
Verb is a Link of Grammatical Connection between 
an Agent and its Object or Co-agent ; but, also, 
that this is the very Grammatical Maxim which the 
passage was meant to inculcate ? Yet I affirm, that 
nothing was farther from the thought of this writer, 
than to intend any such matter. 

As a decisive evidence of this, I need only 
appeal to the doctrine of Mr. Harris, whose view 
of this part of Grammar has neither been affected 
nor attacked by the speculations of his successful 
opponent Mr. Tooke, and whose grammatical 
decisions have received the highest approbation of 
Lowth, insomuch, that it is impossible to doubt 
that Lowth and Harris were completely identified 
in the matter in question. In making this conclu- 
sive reference to the doctrine of Harris, it is very 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 105 

material to the point in question that a reader 
should take notice, that he also deals in expres- 
sions which are perfectly in unison with those of 
Lowth: But there is this momentous difference 
between the expressions of the two writers, that 
Mr. Harris's work, in its context, carries its expla- 
nation along with it ; whereas in Lowth 's " Intro- 
duction' we have no such mark, to enable us to 
determine, critically, what was his real meaning. 
We must therefore search for the certain meaning 
of Lowth, in the ** Hermes" of Harris, 

Now Mr. Harris has entitled Two Divisions of 
his Hermes, The One by the name oi Attributives ; 
The Otker^ by that of Connectives : And he has 
treated of Verbs under the former head ; while he 
has excluded them altogether from the latter. The 
Verb Substantive, which he and all other Gram- 
marians have absurdly considered as a grammatical 
monster or anomaly, is the only exception to this doc- 
trine ; and even this Verb is never supposed to con- 
nect a Nominative with an Accusative Noun, 

Having merely mentioned this Division of 
THE Parts of Speech in Mr. Harris's work, 
as a paramount evidence, which precludes every 
possibility of a supposition that he could, in any 
subsequent expression, or any subordinate expla- 
nation, have intended to convey the meaning that 
Verbs are Grammatical Connectives between 
Nouns Substantive ; 1 now proceed to notice those 
expressions in Harris which coincide with the 
assumptions of Lowth, and which would naturally 
lead a reader to suppose, if he had not decisive 
Anal, o 



106 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

proof to the contrary, that the former really con- 
sidered Verbs as being Connectives. 

Thus it is observed by Harris, that " Every 
"Energy doth not only require an Energiser, but 
" is necessarily conversant about some Subject'' 

Upon this short passage, I am under the neces- 
sity of remarking, by the vray, that its author has 
employed the term, ** Subject^'' improperly, instead 
of the term Object : because Every Energiser or 
Nominative is, in a grammatical sense, a Subject ; 
and The Thing which it requires is not a " Subject" 
but an Object. 

Harris goes on to say, — " that Every Energy is 
** necessarily situate betw^een Tv^o Substantives, 
" an Energiser which is Active, and a Subject" 
(it should be Object) '* which is Passive.''—^' Neu- 
"ters in their Ejiergisers always discover their 
*' passive Subject,'' (Object,) " which other Verbs can- 
** not, their passive Subjects" (Objects) '* being infi- 
" nite ; hence the reason why it is superfluous in 
" these Neuters to have the Subject" (Object) " ex- 
''pressed, as in other Verbs it is necessary, and 
** cannot be omitted. And thus it is that we are 
** taught in common Grammars that Verbs Active 
" require an Accusative Case, while Neuters require 
" none."—'' Hermes," Book 1. Chap. 9. 

The reader will readily discern, that, in order to 
render this passage intelligible, it was necessary 
for me to insert the word. Object, where Mr. Harris 
has employed *^ Subject," And, together with this 
correction, the requisite commentary upon the pas- 
sage appears to be, to explain its author's meaning ; 
which I apprehend is as follows : In the case of 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 107 

Neuter Verbs, the Object, being always the Agent 
or Energiser himself, or itself, must always be 
KNOWN ; Whereas, in the case of what are called 
Active Verbs, the Object may be Any One op 
AN INFINITE VARIETY OF Things, and, there- 
fore, in order to make it known, it must be sig- 
nified. Thus, although Mr. Harris admits, 
that Every Energy must be between Two Substan- 
tives ; yet, he is so far from supposing that Verbs 
ARE Grammatical Connectives between Two 
Nouns Substantive, that he imagines the significa^ 
i'lon of an Accusative, in the instance of what are 
called Active Verbs, is merely a thing useful, or 
requisite for the information of a heareh, to let 
him know What, or Who, is the Particular Object 
of SLU Action; and not at all a thing Neces- 
sary IN THE Nature of Language, that a Verb 
should have an Accusative Case to support its far- 
ther end, upon the Same Principle that a Bridge 
must have "an off Bank to support its farther end. 
In confirmation of my being justified in this ex- 
position, I observe, Mr. Harris, in his Chapter of 
Prepositions, says, " In like manner Actions co- 
" alesce with their Agents, and Passions with their 
"Patients. Thus we say, Aleimnder conquers; 
" Darius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy is a 
" Kind of medium between its Agent and its Pa- 
*' tient, the whole ^^ree, Agent, Energy, ^nd Patient, 
" co-alesce with the same facility; as when we 
" say, Alejcander conquers Darius. And hence, that 
" is from these Modes of natural Co-alescence, arises 
" the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by its Nomi- 
'* native, and of the Accusative by its Verb,'' 



108 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

The general tenor of this passage appears to 
eome so near the truth in question, that those who 
are wholly unacquainted with the fact and the 
manner by which Philosophers have, in other sub- 
jects, done the like and have yet altogether missed 
the truth they sought, would certainly suppose 
Mr. Harris's discernment was completely open to 
it. But the passage contains particular expressions, 
which critically prove his real darkness on the sub- 
ject. Thus he says, " Energy is a Kind of medium 
" between its Agent and its Patient." And, with 
regard to this expression, I need only ask. Would 
any writer of Philosophical Grammar, who for a 
moment believed the Verb to be the Fundamen- 
tal Grammatical Link which Cojinects Nouns — the 
Principal Link which connects Subjects or Agents 
together m the Chain of Language — have ever divid- 
ed his Work into Attributives and Connec- 
tives, and have assigned Verbs to the former 
Division ; and, afterwards, in a mere incidental re- 
mark, in the sequel of his work, have spoken of the 
Sign of Action, as being a KIND of Medium be- 
tween a Nominative and an Accusative Noun ? 

Lastly, however, as a final test that I am right, 
as to what were the real views of Mr. Harris, — 
views which on this occasion he takes laudable 
pains, in his notes, to inform us he derives and ad- 
vocates from the united voices of the Ancient 
Grammarians, — ^I shall quote the following pas- 
sage from his subsequent Chapter of " Cases ;" 
which passage I distinguish by italics and capi- 
tals, precisely as Mr. Harris himself has done, 

"From what has been said, we may make the 



^Eal.J OF VERBS. 109! 

'^following observations, — that as there can be no 
" Sentence without a Substantivey so that Substantive, 
" if the Sentence be regular, is always denoted by 
** a Nominative ; — that on this occasion all the At- 
*.* trihutives, that have cases, appear as Nominatives 
** also ; — that there may be a regular and perfect 
" Sentence without any of the other Cases, but that 
^^ without 07ie Nominative at least, this is utterly im-- 
" possible. Hence therefore we form its charac- 
*^ ter and description — ^The Nominative is that 
" Case, without which there can be no regular and 
^'perfect Sentence'' — " Hermes," Book 2. Chap, 4. 
page 281. 

I have thus taken the trouble to follow the am- 
biguous language of Harris (which manifestly in- 
volves the analogous expressions of Low th) through 
€very ramification of doubt which could possibly 
have hung over it : and I cannot help feeling as- 
sured that every such doubt must be dispelled and 
annihilated by the exposition here given of his 
real vievvs, insomuch, as to preclude the possibility 
of any cavil upon the subject. It must certainly 
appear, that, of all the Grammarians, Ancient or 
Modern, who have ever speculated on the Subject, 
not one of them has ever supposed the Verb to be 
a Grammatical Link of Connection between a 
Nominative and an Accusative Noun. And I may 
here reassert, (with redoubled confidence if possi- 
ble) that their not having discerned this has been 
the primary or leading Cause why all Treatises^ 
on Grammar have equally and entirely failed of 
exhibiting the real Structure of Language. When 
Lowth, therefore, asserts. that an Action requires 



110 OF VEUBS. [CHAP. 2. 

an Agent and '* i7?ipli€s'' an Object acted upon ; it 
is manifest, he means no more than that it implies 
the EXISTENCE, or CO-EXISTENCE, of an Object ; 
and he does not mean that it implies a Gramma- 
tical Connection, by means of a Verb, be- 
tween a Nominative and an Accusative. 

I shall close these quotations of authorities, by 
citing the concurrent doctrine of Bishop Wilkins ; 
— a writer on Philosophical Grammar whose 
p^enius and eminence are acknowledged even by 
Mr. Tooke himself, fastidious as he justly w^as 
with respect to writers on this subject. 

" That Part of Speech which by our Gramma- 
** rians is styled the Verb (whether Neuter, Active, 
"or Passive) ought to have no distinct place 
** amongst integrals in a Philosophical Grammar, 
''because it is really no other th^n 201 Adjective, 
" and the Copula Sum affixed to it." — ** Essay To- 
*' WARDS a Real Character,'' page 303. 

Thus we see, that, according to Wilkins, a Co- 
pula or Connective is expressly jcontra- 
DisTiNGUisHED from a Verb, by its being asserted 
that a Ve?^b is an Adjective which requires a co- 
pula to cojinect it with its Substantive, 

But, without any appeal at all to authority, or 
to the language of particular writers, on this ques- 
tion, I might distinctly and conclusively have 
asked. Is it not self evident that Grammarians 
never could have entertained any tacit or virtual 
maxim, or any suspicion whatever, that Verbs are 
Copulas between Two Substantive Nouns ; wlien 
it has been fully demonstrated that, in their charac^ 



STEC. 1.] OF VERBS. Ill 

ter of Logicians, or Philosophers, they never have 
discerned the existence, in the Universe, of 
thai Logical Link between Any Two Related Sub- 
jects, OF WHICH Link a Verb is the Sign ? It 
may, indeed, on a first view, appear strange that 
Lowth and Harris should have used the language 
they have uttered, without their at the same time 
discerning the real nature of the SuT>ject. But T 
may here observe, that various oversights of this 
description exist in the fundamental assumptions 
of Philosophers, in different departments of know- 
ledge. And, in order to account for the present 
instance, we have only to recollect, that both the 
learned persons in question, as scholars, inherited 
an imperative bias concerning the nature of the Verb 
from the Ancient Grammarians ; and that both 
belonged to that host of School Logicians which, 
doubtless, would have joined the Philologer of 
Purley in his unsparing castigation of those "^ew- 
tlemen,'' already mentioned in a former place. I 
ought, by the way, to remark, that the Subject 
is indebted to these maltreated gentlemen ; who, 
under the guidance or suggestion of mere natu- 
ral reason, attempted to introduce into Lan- 
guage a Phraseology which, of itself alone, lets 
in some dim ray of indefinite light upon the 
matter, when they ventured, (in their expressions 
at least,) to discriminate their " Relatives' from 
^^ Relations.'' 

In closing the course of evidence, now adduced, 
that Verbs have never, in any sense, been regarded, 
either expressly or tacitly, as Grammatical Co- 
pulas, I justify the position which was expressed 



112 OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

m the Dialogue concerning Relation — namely^ — 
that, owing to Logicians never having discerned 
the existence of Relations, it was impossible for 
Grammarians to have, in their Scheme of Lan- 
guage, a Part of Speech significant of this most 
important Object of Thought. Accordingly, there- 
fore, I now remark, that in fact there is No Such 
Thing in Accredited Grammar as a Verb, ac- 
cording to the true or real definition of this Part 
of Speech. 



Besides the ambiguities of expression which have 
just now been discussed, there appears in the As- 
sumptions of Dr. Lowth, and of all Grammarians, 
another phrase, which demands a critical exami- 
nation. The matter to which I at present allude 
is the assertion, that certain Actions " pass over" 
from their Agent to their Object. The investigation 
of this question, however, must be deferred, until 
I get to treat of the Universal Neutrality of Verbs : 
and I proceed, now, to lay down the Fundamental 
Maxim of Grammar that Every Verb in Language 
must have an Accusative, as well as a Nominative 
Case. 

First, therefore, I observe, that a Noun, when 
it is considered by itself alone or absolutely, is Not 
AnySuchElement OF Language as is by Gram- 
marians denominated a Part of Speech. For, 
although any such Word is, certainly, a Part of 
Language, it is not any Special Part, but is a 
Homogeneal Element of the Whole Mass of Speech, 
since Every Word in Language, considered in it- 



SEC. 1.3 OF VERBS. 11^ 

self, is equally a Noun. Any Noun, or Word 
whatever, therefore, when it is not viewed in con- 
nection with other Words, (such for example as the 
case of Any Word in a Lexicon,) must be regarded 
like a Type distributed in the Box of the Composi- 
tor: It is No " Par^t of Speech,'' technically so called; 
but is Merely a Mass of Lingual Material, shaped 
and adapted to be employed as a Part of Speech ; just 
as any mass of stone, in the quarry, is not the key- 
stone, or any other stone, of an Arch, or Building, 
but is merely cut and adapted to serve as a key-stone, 
or any other stone, in an Arch, or Building. 

Upon the other hand, When Any Word what- 
ever is TAKEN INTO COMPOSITION, and is made to 
stand for the Sign of a Related Subject, (which 
is only another Name for an Agent) it receives, 
in that moment, and by that act, a Grammatical 
Life, and becomes a Part (i. e. .a Special Part) of 
Speech- — a Grammatical or Syntactical Noun—~m 
a word — what is called a Noun Substantive. 
From this position, it follows, that a Noun Substan- 
tive of Grainmarians is a Noun Relative in Lo- 
gic. 

Secondly. As a Noun Substantive is the Name 
or Sign of an Agent or Relative Subject ; So 
a Verb is the Sign of an Action or Relation 
between Any Two Relative Subjects, A Verb, 
therefore, is a Verbal Link which connects Some 
Two Co- Agents together, in Any Case of Action or 
Relation. 

Thirdly. It follows, from these respective Offi* 
ces of the Noun and the Verb, that Every Verb in 
Language (equally and without the possibility of an 
Anal, V 



114 OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

exception) must have both a Nominative and an 
Accusative Noun for its support or existence : be- 
cause, if it were not so, it would then be possible 
for a Related Subject or Agent to exist and to carry 
on Some Relation or Action by itself alone, without the 
aid of AiHY Co-Agent, or Correlative— a sup- 
position which exhibits one of the most crying ab- 
surdities that can be announced in words, and 
which is acknowledged as such by All Logicians 
themselves : for it is a Fundamental Maxim in 
Logic, which I may quote here in the emphatic 
words of Mr. Harris, — that *' Relatives must begin 

" TOGETHER, €.vist TOGETHER, — and CCase TO- 

''gether." 

I shall shew particularly, from examples here- 
after, that Every One of our individual or particu- 
lar conceptions of Verbs, when we are put upon 
our guard, must resolve itself strictly into a confor- 
mity with this first Axiom of Logic. 

It is collateral to the position just now laid down, 
but it is a most important consideration, to observe, 
that. Such as Language is, Such is the Nature of 
the Things of which Language is the Symbol ; in- 
somuch, that I could not, with justice to the Sub- 
ject, omit stating here the Juxtaposition of the Two 
Natures. I observe, therefore, that, in like man- 
ner as Eveiy Word, when it is contemplated ab- 
solutely, that is by itself alone, is No Special 
Part of Speech, but is a Merx Homogeneal General 
Element thereof, and must be regarded as barren 
and without any connection with the Other Elements 
of the Mass ; So, Every Subject in the Universe, 
when it is contemplated absolutely, that is by itself 



SRC. 1.] OF VERBS, H0f 

alone, is only as it were a Homogeneal Mass thereof, 
and is, in this situation, unconnected with Any Other 
Mass or Subject thereunto belonging; and, as such, 
although it is certainly an Object Signified by a 
Noun, it is not an Object of Language consi- 
dered as a Con in ected Series OF Signs represent- 
ing a Connected Series of Ideas. It is only when 
Any of the Absolute Subjects in the Universe, is 
contemplated in the Character or Office of a Re- 
lative Subject, that this Absolute Subject becomes 
a COMPONENT Part of the Universe, or an Object 
OF Language considered as a System of Special 
Signs, distinguished from t\\dX Homogeneal Part of 
Speech called a Noun. Philosophers have attempt- 
ed, without any satisfactory result hitherto, to divide 
the Things of the Universe into Categories or 
Most General Classes. Aristotle has as- 
sumed Ten of these Categories : Mr. Hume has 
enumerated Seven : Locke has adopted Three : 
And the Nature of these Divisions is as different, 
as the Number of Classes assumed in each. Never- 
theless I may venture to affirm, that the Subjects 
of the Universe, considered as forming the Ob- 
jects OF Grammar, may safely be assumed to con- 
sist of Absolute Things in themselves. Abso- 
lute Things viewed as Relative Things, and 
Relations between Every Two of the Latter. 

But, to resume the Subject ; The Principle now 
laid down, with regard to the Essential General 
Nature of the Verb, forms the First Axiom in 
Grammar. And all the rest of the Structure of 
Language is built strictly upon this First Principle. 
This Position, moreover, (we have seen) is founded 



116 OF VERBS. [CHAP 2. 

in the Necessary Structuix of Relatives ay^d Relation. 
Such is the basis of Language according to the 
views of the Different Parts of Speech which will 
be followed out in the sequel of this work. 

As it has been shewn, that No Such Principle 
has been admitted, or suspected by Grammarians, 
as that which has just been laid down, especially 
in the case of either what are called Passive or 
Active Verbs ; I pass on to examine what has been 
the accredited doctrine in Grammar, and, in par- 
ticular, what has been advanced by Bishop Lowth, 
with regard to those Verbs which are acknowledged 
to be Neuter. And here, when we come to discern 
the real merits of the subject, we shall find our 
wonder and astonishment excited in a vast addi- 
tional degree, at the glaring violations of reason 
which have passed current in the assumptions of 
Philosophers, under the character of Grammarians. 

According to Dr. Lowth, — " A Neuter Verb 
*' expresses being, or a State of being, when the 
*' Agent and the Object acted on coincide, and the 
** event is neither Action nor Passion, but some- 
*' thing between both : as * I sleep,' ' I walk''' 

In this passage we have a striking example of 
the illogicalness of attempting to write at all 
upon Grammar, without previously consulting, 
and constantly adhering to, the Ge?2eric Struc- 
ture of the Categoj^y of Relation; which Struc- 
ture is herein violated, in the most egregious man- 
ner. 

First. We are called upon to conceive, and 
contemplate, a State of being; of which, its 



SEG.l.] OF VERBS. lit 

Agent and its Object (i, e. its Agent and its Co- 
Agent) COINCIDE. 

Secondly, Although the Subject of the Verb is 
expressly said to be therein an Agent ; yet, we 
are told, that the Event is neither Action nor 
Passion, but is Something between both. 

Thirdly. The e^vamples, given to illustrate this 
doctrine, are * I sleep,' and ^ I walk' 

The first objection to be stated against this 
Scheme is, that, in the case of any such Verbs as 
those in question, it is a great fallacy to assume 
that the Agent and its Object coincide. Because 
it will be shewn that they do not coincide, even in a 
physical sense. And, even in the case of Reflecting 
Verbs, of which the Agent and the Object do in 
reality physically coincide, (such as when we say, 
** He respects Himself,") it is a monstrous fallacy 
and violation of reason to assume, for a moment, 
that they coincide in a logical or grammatical sense. 
Both these considerations it is necessary to insist 
upon. 

With regard to the first one, I observe, that, if a 
person sleep, or walk, he must sleep, or walk, at 
Some Time, and upon Some Thing ; which Time, or 
Thing, may, either of them, be put as the real Ob- 
jective Case to the Verb : And, most certainly, the 
Sleeper, or the Walker, cannot, without the gross- 
est absurdity, be considered as his own Object. 

In like manner. When a person laughs, smiles, or 
sighs ; he must laugh, smile, or sigh, at Something, 
and thus the Agent and the Object are physically 
different. 

It has, indeed, been observed, by some writers. 



lis OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

and especially by Dr. Campbell, that the Verbs 
now in question take an Accusative Case through 
the medium of a Preposition, But we are to recollect, 
that the taking of an Accusative Case does not^ 
according to Grammarians, constitute Any Verb a 
Copula between its Nominative and its Accusative. 
And I have also to observe, that Dr. Campbell 
supposes the taking of an Accusative through a 
Preposition to constitute a Distinct Soi^t of Verb, 
which he has called Compound Active Verbs : 
Whereas, I shall, upon the most imperative neces- 
sary ground, throughout deny that there is Any 
Such Thing in Language as a Compound Verb : and 
I propose to shew, that Every Major Verb, in lo- 
gical Strictness, demands a So-called Pi^eposition 
between it and the Noun to which it is annexed ; 
insomuch, that, whenever it is not so expressed, 
the Sentence is elliptical and Some Preposition 
ought to be understood. In the mean time, I may 
here appeal to the fact of actual usage, to prove, 
that, in the case of what are called Active Transi- 
tive Verbs, we very often either express, or omit, a 
Preposition, between a Verb and its Accusative 
Case, just as it suits our pleasure : As, for example, 
we say, " He struck the Table," — or—** He struck 
''upon the Table," — " His Head struck the Ground," 
— Or — " His Head struck against the Ground." 
And hereupon I affirm, that, in any such expression 
the Verb is perfectly Simple : for it will be demon- 
strated, hereafter, that a Compound Verb is abso- 
lutely an impossible thing. 

Perhaps, indeed, it may be better, in this place, 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. im 

to suggest to a reader the Principle upon which 
the perfect simplicity of all Verbs depends; since 
it may be of service to him to bear it in mind, 
as he proceeds : Although it will be requisite to 
recur to it, in the sequel, with more appropriate 
consideration. The truth, then, is, that the matter 
in question depends, (like all the other Principles 
of Grammar,) upon the Necessary Generic Structure 
of Relatives and Relation ; and it consists in this : 
That, As it is impossible for there to be More than 
One Simple Link of Relation to connect together 
Any Two Related Subjects, taken m Any One View 
of them ; So, therefore, it is impossible for Any 
Verb to be Double or Compound, between Any Two 
Nouns, (considered at that moment as Syntactical 
Nouns) in a Sentence. This truth, which is self-m- 
dent, necessary, and paramount to every consideration, 
gives rise to the following curiou's Principle and 
peculiarity in the Structure of Language ; to which 
it will be requisite, at a future stage of the work, 
to call the attention of readers in a very particular 
manner ; but which, notwithstanding its great and 
momentous importance in that Structure, has been 
entirely overlooked by Grammarians — namely — 
that Every Verb, in a Sentence in which there 
are more Verbs than One intervening between Any 
Two Primary Nouns Substantive ; whether such 
Verb be reputed as a Principal, an Auiviliary, or a 
So-called Preposition ; must serve, in that Sentence, 

ALTERNATELY, AS VeRB and AS NoUN. 

Although it was impossible that Grammarians 
should have discerned this Principle of Alter- 
nation OF A Verb in a Sentence, since they 



120 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

never had discerned the Structure of the Category 
of Relation upon which it necessarily depends ; yet, 
it has, through the force of natural reason, found 
an opening, in one, or two, solitary and anomalous 
instances, in the assumptions of accredited Gram- 
mar: For it is admitted, that what is called the 
Infinitive Mode can serve, in a Sentence, in the 
alternate office of Noun and of Verb; and, that 
Verbals in ing serve as a Noun, and at the same 
time have a Regimen like a Verb. Thus the Prin- 
ciple in question is, in these anomalous instances, 
already virtually acknowledged by Grammarians : 
And it is nothing but a most profound darkness, 
with regard to the Ileal Cause or Foundation of this 
Principle, that has prevented writers on Language 
from converting what in their Scheme appears 
as a 7nere anomaly and absurd ea^crescence, into a 
General Rule grounded not only in reason, but 
in an Absolute Necessity, and forming no less than 
a Modification of the Fundamental Axiom of Gram- 
mar, 

The Principle of Alternation of a Verb in a Sen- 
tence is, indeed, of so high and important a Nature, 
that it might well be called the Axis upon which 
All Language turns : For it operates throughout 
the whole of Speech, almost continually ; and can 
submit to no exception. 

I resume, here, the consideration of Bishop 
Lowth's statement, with regard to the Nature of 
Neuter Verbs. There seems no doubt that he was 
led into the supposition that the Agent and the 
Object of a Neuter Verb coincide, by the fact, that 



SKC. 1.] OF VERBS. 121 

in other Languages, these Verbs take what is called 
an Active Form, wherein the Agent is assumed to 
act upon himself, and thus is supposed to be his own 
Object, This, however, (although I have shewn it 
is a great mistake, since every such Action, as that 
of sleeping, or walking, demands an Object very 
different and foreign from the Agent,) is of minor 
importance when compared with the grand absur- 
dity and violation of Logic involved in the assump- 
tion that an Agent and his Object are the Same 
Logical Man, in the case of an Action wherein 
Any Agent in reality acts upon himself, strictly 
speaking, such as when we say, — " He respects 
" Himself," — ** He loves Himself," — " He hates 
'' Himself." 

It is manifest that when Bishop Lowth, or any 
other Grammarian, talks of an Agent and an Object 
«5 coinciding, he talks as a Grammarian: and, 
if he does not mean to assert that these Two 
Things coincide logically and grammatically, he 
can, in this case, have no rational meaning what- 
ever. But it is a self-evident necessary truth, ac- 
knowledged by all Logicians and Philosophers, 
and it lies at the very basis of the Category 
of Relation, that Nothing can ever be re- 
lated TO itself ; and, therefore, the moment 
we talk of Any Subject as acting upon itself, we, 
by a necessary logical fiction, assume that Subject as 
being divided, or duplicated rather, into Two Logi- 
cal Subjects, or Agents, which must, for the time 
being, be regarded as distinct and different from one 
another as if they had been Hector and Achilles, 
or any other Two contending Parties. This truth 
AnaL q 



122 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

forms a Principle in Grammar which can never for 
a moment be overlooked, or violated, without 
plunging the subject into a bottomless abyss of ab- 
surdity. It is collateral indeed, to the subject, to 
suggest the remark which immediately follows : 
but I may observe that this Principle extends 
to a department of Knowledge far beyond either 
Grammar or Logic ; and it is, in that department, 
no fiction : For it exists in Morals also, since he 
can hardly be regarded as the Same Moral Agent, 
who condemns himself and who stands thus 

SELF CONDEMNED. But (tO COufiue OUrSclvCS tO 

the subject in hand,) the supposition or assumption 
of Any Agent acting upon itself, in aGRAMMATiCAL 
SENSE, is an absurdity so palpable and revolting, 
that it never can be tolerated, for a moment, after 
it has been duly exposed. 

The consequence, to Dr. Lowth, of neglecting 
and violating this Fundamental Axiom of Relation, 
has been that of betraying him to assert, that an 
" Eve^t'' produced by an " Agent," is ** Not an 
"Action," but *^ Something between Action 
" and Passion ;" — than which assertion nothing, 
assuredly, could be more deplorable in the mouth 
of a Logician, 

It is in such sort, and with such force, that the 
Necessary Structure of Relatives and Relation 
will be found to re-act, and to assert its own reality, 
against all those who shall attempt to treat it as if 
it were a house of cards, erected by children and 
to be blown down by the breath of every fancy 
that is alien to reason, or that happens to be a 
minion of fashion in any particular language. 



SEC. l] OF VERBS, M 

In fine. I repeat, here, as forming the First 
Maxim in Grammar, that Every Verb whatever 
must have both a Nominative and an Accusative 
Noun ; and Every Verb is a Copula or Link of 
Grammatical Connection between its Nominative 
and its Accusative Case. And the Simple and 
necessary Reason of the thing is, that Every Verb 
is the Sign of Some Relation between Two Re- 
lated Subjects ; while Every Nominative and Ac- 
cusative Noun are the Signs of Two Related Sub- 
jects. 

There is only One Verb in Language that can 
for a moment appear to present an exception to 
this rule : And this appearance is merely in conse- 
quence of the erroneous understanding of the Na- 
ture of this Verb which universally obtains. It is 
the Verb Substantive, And, as a right understand- 
ing of the nature of this Verb involves very impor- 
tant grammatical consequences and demands a par- 
ticular consideration, it is requisite I should treat of 
its analysis in a distinct appropriate article. 



SUBSECTION II. 

1. Of the Verb Substantive. — 2. Remarks on Dr. 
Murray's Etymological Account of this and other 
Neuter Verbs of Grammarians. 

The Doctrine which has been uniformly enter- 
tained concerning that Verb, whose particular 
analysis I am now going to state, exhibits one of 
the most remarkable masses of that ofeneral dark- 



124 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

ness which still rests over the Nature of Language, 
after all that has been done by Philologists with a 
view ^to its elucidation. This Verb has been con- 
sidered, by all Grammarians, as an anomaly — or 
of a nature extremely different from that of all 
other Signs belonging to the Same Part of Speech. 
It is assumed to be a Copula, indeed; but not to 
be a Copula of a Nominative with an Accusative 
Noun^ — a doctrine which is precisely parallel to 
assuming, that there exists in the Universe a cer- 
tain Relation which serves to connect Any Related 
Subject, but not to connect it with Any Cor-related 
Subject. This gross absurdity has arisen, mani- 
festly, from the fact, that, in the Case of the Verb 
Substantive, the real Accusative is by no means 
obvious to ordinary remark. Nothing, however, 
can be more self evident or certain, than the true 
nature of the thing, the moment our attention is 
drawn toward it. 

In ordinary, when a person affirms, of any thing, 
that it ovists ; he imagines that he asserts some 
predicate or attribute of that thing itself alone ; 
and he has no thought of connecting it, by a Species 
of Action, with Any Other Thing serving the First 
in the Office of a Correlate ; far less does he sup- 
pose, that the Word — exist — is the Sign of a 
Species of Action between the Two Subjects in ques- 
tion. Thus the Thing that is asserted to exist is 
considered to be, like an Island in the midst of a 
boundless Ocean, without any other Land, or Ob- 
ject, with which it can be supposed to support Any 
Bridge or Link of Relation, Nor is this exclusively 
the vulgar or popular view of the subject : for it is 



SEC.l.] OF VERBS. 125 

precisely that of the Grammarian also. According 
to the latter, the Verb Substantive is assumed to 
signify, Not Any Action between Two Subjects ; 
but merely a quiescent State of the Single Subject 
called its Nominative. Such is, at one and the 
same time, the Conception of the Mechanic and 
the Maxim of the Scholar, with regard to the Verb 
in question. 

But the absurdity of this assumption is so glar- 
ing, that it can only demand to be pointed out, 
in order to be exploded. For, in the case of an 
Island in the midst of an Ocean, if there be sup- 
posed no other Land, or Object of any obvious simi- 
litude, with which it must support some Bridge of 
Relation ; it is still self evident, that this Island 
must be related to the Ocean itself. It must, in- 
deed, support its own end of an infinite number 
of Relations between itself and the Infinite Parts 
of the Ocean : It must support Relations oi Distance 
with all the Parts which it is neither actually in, nor 
at: It must maintain a Relation of Contiguity 
with those Parts which it is at, but not in : And 
it must uphold the Relation of Congruity or Coinci- 
dence with those Parts which it actually occupies 
or fills with its Volume. Now, analogous to this. 
Every Individual Subject in the Universe, of which 
we do, or can, predicate existence, occupies Some 
Part of those Infinite Absolute Oceans called Space 
andHiu^ : And it is self evident, that Every Such 
Subject does thus maintain its own side, or end, 
of an Action or Relation of Conipenetration with 
Space and Time : Which Action or Relation is 
the Thing that we, speaking in Concrete, call ex- 



W$ OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

isTiNG ; and, when we name it in Abstract and 
General, we call existence. 

As for the manner in which things actually pene- 
trate and are at the same time penetrated by Space, 
and Time; it is a metaphysical question, with 
which Grammar has nothing at all to do : And, I 
may here freely add, it is a thing altogether incom- 
prehensible to man. But it is a difficulty not 
greater than some that exist even in the Science of 
Mathematics itself: And, as it is certain that we 
always must contradistinguish Space and Time, from 
the Thinc/S that occupy Space and Time ; we 
MUST ASSUME this mutual penetration, not only 
in Grammar, but also in Philosophy. And nobody 
will dispute, that both Penetration and CompenC' 
tration are, certainly, Species of Logical Actions. 
It is plain, therefore, that, so long as we continue 
to distinguish between Space and Time and the 
Subjects, or Objects, of discourse contained there- 
in, the Verb to exist must signify an Action be- 
tween Any of those Subjects and One or Other of 
these Infinite Matrices of Things. 

It is curious to remark, that, in the view of the 
Substantive Verb now stated, I am borne out by 
the Definition of Existence furnished by the 
Logicians themselves : Although, at the same time, 
the matter is altogether and in the most wonderful 
manner virtually denied, or overlooked, in the 
doctrine of the Grammarians. Thus, according 
to our English Lexicographer — Johnson — after 
Dr. Watts, " Essence is but the very nature of 
" any Being, whether it be actually existing or 



SEC.l.] OF VERBS. 127 

** no ; a rose in winter has an Essence ; in sum- 
" mer it has an existence also'' 

From this Definition of Existence, given by the 
Logicians, it is manifest, that what constitutes it, 
is the occupation of Time and Space. And, accord- 
ingly, it is always affirmed of All Universals, or 
Generals, that they do not exist; and this mere- 
ly upon the ground that they are things which do 
not, and cannot, occupy Time or Space. Now it 
is manifest that occupying (like penetrating) is, in 
a strict logical sense, acting ; and occupying 
Space is acting fw, or with Space, 

Here it is plain, that Space (for we may leave 
out the continual mention of Time, in order to save 
circumlocution) is the Universal Accusative 
Noun to the Verb Substantive, wheresoever this 
Verb is either expressed or understood. It follows, 
also, that wheresoever Any Subject is mentioned 
as being an Agent of Any Action, the Verb Sub- 
stantive (i, e, the Sign of the Action of Occupying 
Space,) must be either expressed or understood as 
being prefixed to the Verb expressive of the Special 
Action in question. And, as for the fact that the 
Substantive Verb is, in this office, much more fre- 
quently understood than expressed, (as, for exam- 
ple, when we say " Peter strikes James," instead 
of '* Peter IS striking James,'*) it is very satisfacto- 
rily accounted for from the intolerable tediousness 
which would attend its continual repetition. 

Having thus shewn, from a strict analysis, what 
is the real Nature and Office of the Verb Substan- 
tive ; it remains to be pointed out, in its proper 



128 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

place, in what manner Any Quality of a Subject can 
be grammatically signified along with the Name of 
that Subject, since it has become manifest that 
the Office of connecting an Attribute with its 

Subject DOES NOT BELONG TO THE VeRB IN QUES- 
TION, nor to Any Verb whatever. But our business, 
at present, is entirely with the Substantive Verb 
itself; and our present object has been to bring its 
true Nature to light. By the exposition now 
furnished, therefore, I trust, that not only is the 
Verb Substantive itself rescued from the profound 
obscurity and error which had all along attended 
it; but, that, in addition to this, Grammar in general 
is cleared of that egregious fallacy which assumes, 
that Every Adjective Verb signifies both the Action 
expressed by itself and the Verb Substantive together; 
while the office of the implied Substantive Verb, in 
such case, is not supposed to be that of being a 
Sign of the E.vistence of the Agent y but to be that of 
ASSERTING THE ADJECTIVE AcT, — than which, it 
is not easy to imagine a more deplorable perver- 
sion of reason, or a confusion in Grammar more 
discreditable to philosophy. 



As the account which I have now given of the 
Nature of the Verb Substantive is, in substance, 
the same as that which I had hazarded in my 
previous work, which appeared I believe nearly 
three years antecedent to the publication of Dr. 
Murray's ** History of the European Languages;' 



SEC. l\] OF VERBS. 129 

and as I certainly had no knowledge of the spe- 
culations of this eminent Etymologist, until the 
posthumous appearance of these his labors ; it is 
impossible that my judgment, or imagination, could 
have been biassed by any thing he has advanced 
therein. It must therefore, I apprehend, be matter 
of satisfaction, especially to those who may, on 
this subject, be more inclined to confide in etymo^ 
logical evidence than in reasoning a priori, to find 
that the Principles which I have here laid down, 
prove to be in a very remarkable unison with the 
grammatical conceptions of those early Teutonic 
Tribes of men, whose Speech has been recognise^d 
as forming the Source or Original, not only of our 
own and of other kindred Tongues, but also of the 
Latin, and Greek, and other learned Languages of 
antiquity. In the appeal to this etymological con- 
sent, moreover, it will appear, that the learned Lan- 
guages, with all their just pretensions, have not, any 
more than other and meaner dialects, improved upon, 
but on the contrary have remarkably sunk below, the 
natural reason or Grammar of those early Tribes. 
At the same time, it will come out, that, although 
the conception entertained of the Verb Substantive, 
and of other So-called Neuter Verbs, by these Pri- 
mitive Tribes, was Gmerically right ; it was, how- 
ever, marred by a Specific error, which will be ex-r 
plained farther on : And thus it will appear, as 
might well have been expected, that the rationality 
which guided those Hordes, in their understanding 
,of Language, was neither certain nor uniform. 
In the " Facts and Illustrations,'' annexed to the 
Anal, n 



130 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

First Volume of Dr. Murray's History, {page 340,) 
he expresses himself in the following terms. 

** All Verbs which express a fixed, immoveable, 
** or settled state, arise from Verbs which signified 
'* the contrary." 

He, then, enumerates some examples of this 
fact ; and proceeds, in page 342, to add the fol- 
lowing observations. 

" I have given the above illustration of neuter 
" verbs to shew, that, by the original construction 
**of language they are all active. I stand, I sit, 
" I am, may be expressive of states, unconnected 
"in idea with action; but I stand, literally signi- 
" fied, in old times, Ic stagenda-a, / am setting 
" wj/ feet, not I remain in the state of having set 
** them ; Ic sig-ta, I perform the act of sitting, or 
" I sit down voluntarily and actively. Ic am, for 
** Ic siGM or Sum, denoted 1 move, I actively 
** live in a place, a word analogous to Ic big, I 
" dwell, I cultivate, I stir, I lie." 

Thus we have the fact put indubitably in evi- 
dence, that mere natural unassisted reason had very 
early led mankind to understand, that the Verb 
TO EXIST does not signify a Quiescent State, but an 
Action. And, precisely according to what I have 
myself asserted from Principles a priori, they 
classed '* I am," " I be," along with all those Verbs 
which in any xvay connect Subjects with Space, as 
" I move,'' — " I actively live in a place,''- — " I stir," — 
*' I cultivate." 

In fact, it may be laid down, as a Principle in 
Language, that Every Action which in any way 
connects a Subject^ with Place is a Modification 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 131 

of the Action of ejcisting : And, hence ^ Every Verb 
expressive of such Action (as, for example, the 
Verb to live, to stand, to sit, to walk, to move, or any 
other such) is a Modification of the Verb Substantive, 
It is not a little to be admired, therefore, that the 
primitive men of nature should have viewed this 
grammatical fact with a rationality which places 
the Logic of the Latins and the Greeks in a truly 
unenviable light. 

The only fault of the natural reason of those 
untaught men was, that, after having rightly con- 
ceived the general nature of the Verb Substantive, 
and of Other Analogous Verbs, as being significant 
o/" Action, they, at least in some cases, mistook 
the Real and Universal Accusative to these Verbs ; 
and, instead of discerning that it was necessarily 
no other than Some Mode of Space, (or of Time) 
they erroneously assumed \he Agent to be, by a 
certain fiction, his own Object : Thus, instead of 
*^ I sit," or ** I sit upon the Ground," they said, " / 
**am setting my feet :" Which expression, although 
it exhibits no violation of grammatical rule, asserts 
a gross fallacy in fact and partakes of the illogical- 
ness, or sheer nonsense rather, of those Languages 
which affect to say, " Thou sleepest Thee,'' — 
" Thou WALKEST Thee^ 

Here, I think, I might safely invoke every Phi- 
losopher, who was ever intentionally true to the 
standard of reason; and ask him. Would he con- 
sent, for a moment, to desert that standard, by ad- 
mitting that we can suffer Grammar (Universal or 
Philosophical Grammar) to be debased into any 
Conventional Structure, or System, which glaringly 



132 OF VERBS. [c^hap. 2. 

violates, or contradicts, the Necessary Principles 
of Reason thus demonstrated ? Yet such is the 
despotism of Scholastic prejudice — such our im- 
plicit subjugation to the Assumptions of a System 
which we have been early taught to venerate, — 
that, we find, the genius of Dr. Murray himself 
was not awakened, even by all the etymological 
light of his own researches, to a discernment of the 
gross absurdity of that Grammatical Structure, 
which I am now laboring to explode. On the 
contrary, he appears to have considered the depri- 
vation of the Verb Substantive of its Real and Ra- 
tional Office of expressing an Action, and the 
assumption of it to express a State, as being an 
IMPROVEMENT in Language; and thus he, in an- 
other instance (besides the one to which I have al- 
ready alluded,) virtually advocates the conven- 
tional POWER OR option of man, to make Lan- 
guage take on whatever Structure any particular 
People may contrive, or conjure up. 

'* All Verbs" (says this author. Vol. ^, page 55.) 
*'• were naturally actives; no provision had been 
" made for designating a passive State. I bear, 
" I suffer, I tolerate, I stand, sit, sleep, die, and 
** every other word pertaining to a fixed, passive, 
** or inanimate condition, were active in form, and, 
"as it should seem, to a certain degree, in idea. 
" Besides the neuter sense, which such Verbs, as 
" are now mentioned, gradually acquired, a new 
" voice was invented in every verb, to be called 
" the Middle, Reciprocal, or Proper, at the plea- 
" sure of Grammarians." 

I trust it will be admitted, by every one who 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 133 

pretends to take rationality for his guide, that it 
presents a lucid spot in the Grammar of our early 
Teutonic Ancestors, that, by them, *' no provision 
** had been made" (among Verbs) **for designat- 
** ing a Passive State." And, as for the " in- 
** VENTioN OF A NEW VOICE," by those learned 
nations which came after them ; to be called the 
** Middle, Reciprocal, or Proper;'' I apprehend, that 
such an instance of sinking in the scale of reason, 
from the standard example set them by the " Bar- 
" harianf in question, cannot readily be paralleled 
in the history of the Human Mind. 

I propose to shew, hereafter, by what sort of 
Sign Any State can logically be signified ; and, 
that this Sign can consist. Not in a Verb at all, but 
in an Adverb signifying the Subject as actively 
POSSESSING OR OCCUPYING the State meant to be 
expressed. 

It will not have escaped the notice of the reader, 
that, in a passage already quoted. Dr. Murray 
asserts, that the Verbs now in question expressed 
an active state only " in old times/' and, that, at 
present J the Verbs " / stand, I sit, I am, may be 
" expressive of states unconnected in idea with ac- 
" tion." It is against this violation of rationality 
that I direct the principal force of the observations 
which have now been stated, and which I hope 
must appear sufficiently effectual. 

Here I remark, that the So-called Middle, Re- 
ciprocal, or Proper Voice, unworthy though it is in 
itself of a logical commentary, may claim a few ob- 
servations here, on account of the manner in which 
it has been advocated. Dr. Murray observes, 



134 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

that " it literally described the Verb to be perform- 
" ed upon the actor." And he adds, that it " was 
" transferred in Greece, India, and Germany, to 
" the passive." — He again says, that " this voice, 
" being formed in a manner too intricate for conti- 
" nual imitation, was corrupted by the Visigoths, 
" and relinquished by the later Germans, for the 
" easier method of circumlocution." And, upon 
this, he adds, "I venture to restore the Visigothic 
" passive, from a comparison of its parts with the 
" Greek and Sanscrit." 

Here I refer the reader to Dr. Murray's work, 
for the restoration of the Visigothic : But I insert a 
quotation of the English which he has given of it, 
in order that the competent reader may judge, 
how far such a Structure of Language is logical, 
or worthy of resuscitation. 

** I lay on, or to, myself." 

" I speak to myself." 

" I cling to myself," 
Now every person is doubtless aware that a 
man may, certainly, lai/ on, or to, himself; — may 
speak to himself; — or may cling to himself. But the 
reader will take notice, that these are Not the 
Sort of Actions, or Things, meant by Dr. Mur- 
ray to be signified in the expressions now quoted : 
On the contrary, the Things meant to be signified 
are, what are called States, or, at least, '* In- 
" TRANSITIVE AcTs" — I He, I speak, I cling. 

In order to stamp the manifest irrationality of 
this restored Visigothic, it is only necessary to ob- 
serve, that, according to it, (besides the fallacy of 
fact involved,) we must make use of the same e.v- 



SEC. 1.] OF VERBS. 135 

pression to signify, generally, I lay, I speak, or I 
cling; and to signify I lay my self, I speak to 
myself J or I cling to my self: ow which latter Actions 
are real and specific acts, of which Myself \^ the pro- 
per Grammatical Object or Accusative, 

In fine. From what has been advanced in the 
present subsection, in addition to what had been 
laid down in the preceding one, it follows, that 
All Verbs whatever are of One Same Ge- 
neral Nature ; and, that all pretended differ- 
ences, in Sorts of Verbs, are wholly void of any 
foundation in reason. It will be shewn, in its 
proper place, that this Rule holds good, as well 
wdth respect to Auxiliary or what are called In- 
cipient Verbs, as in the case of any other Verbs in 
Language. 

I have asserted, in a former part of this work, 
that the real Structure of Speech is a thing emi- 
nently simple. And the Grammatical General 
Principle which has resulted from the analysis just 
now concluded, affords a striking example of the 
truth of this remark. 



136 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 



SECTION SECOND. 

OF THE UNIVERSAL NEUTRALITY OF VERBS.-^BRIEF ANALY- 
SIS OF THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL ACTION, AS BEING THE 
OBJECT SIGNIFIED BY A LARGE PROPORTION OF VERBS. 

The error, which it is the object of the present 
Section to remove from the doctrines of Philoso- 
phical Grammar, exhibits another conspicuous 
example of the result of overlooking and violating 
the Structure of Relatives and Relation, in at- 
tempting to erect the Structure of Language. The 
brevity requisite, in order to admit a consideration 
of the different topics to be entertained in this 
work, demands that I proceed to the subject 
without farther preface. 

Verbs are the Signs of Actions. This is a 
Principle of Grammar settled by universal consent. 
But Actions are not Active : and, consequently, 
the Signs of Actions cannot be Active. How% 
then, has it happened, that all Grammarians, with- 
out exception, have entertained a doctrine of Ac- 
tive Verbs? 

As it is a self-evident truth, of the most obvious 
kind, that an Action, considered in itself, cannot 
be Active, (that is to say. Unless we consider it in 
a Secondary Character wherein it becomes an 
Agent of Some Other Action, as when we say, 
" Watching exhausts,'' or " Sleeping restores, 
" a man,") it would be a waste of time to add any 



SEC. 2.] OF VERBS. 137 

thing farther with a view to render this truth 
more manifest than it stands in its own primitive 
aspect. It remains, therefore, only to examine, 
Whether the sense^ in which Grammarians have uni- 
formly entertained this doctrine of Active Verbs, 
can be so understood, or modified, as to do away 
the apparent gross absurdity of the assumption. > I 
have already given notice, in a foregoing Section, 
that I should entertain this question, as bearing 
upon that concerning Verbs considered as Con- 
nectives. * 

According to Dr. Lowth, "The Verb Active is 
*' called also Transitive ; because the Action pass- 
" eth over to the Object, or hath an effect upon 
" some other thing : and the Verb Neuter is called 
" Intransitive ; because the effect is confined within 
" the Agent, and doth not pass over." 

Now with regard to the phrase — " passeth 
" over" — as contained in this passage, although it 
could not, with the least propriety, be employed 
in any loose or ambiguous sense in a Treatise of 
Language ; or be used in any sense, except that in 
which a Man, or a Boat, is said to pass over a ri- 
ve)^ ; yet, there certainly is a loose or popular ac- 
ceptation, by which the expression of Bishop 
Lowth might be supposed to import that a Verb 
EXTENDS OVER from a Nominative to an Accusa- 
tive Noun, just as a Bridge extends over a river 
from Bank to Bank, Let us, therefore, critically 
examine, W^hether it is possible that the phrase in 
question was meant by Dr. Lowth in this sense. 

We may popularly assert of the Girth of a 
Anal, s 



138 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Horse, when it is buckled round the animal, that it 
PASSES under his body : Or, of the Belt of a Sol- 
dier, that it PASSES over his shoulder. At the same 
time, it is manifest, that the Girth, or Belt, does not 
MOVE or PASS at all ; and the expression thus em- 
ployed, although it is perfectly intelligible, is indis- 
putably the assertion of a fiction or untruth, 
arising very naturally from our speaking with re- 
ference to the opei^ation or motion which usually 
takes place when the Bandage in question is fast- 
ened upon its wearer. But I hardly need observe, 
that it is not possible Dr. Lowth could have meant 
the phrase in that quiescent sense in which we ap- 
ply it to a Girth, or Belt; and which, (if he did,) 
would agree with the passing or ext eliding of a 
Bridge from Bank to Bank : because he and all 
other Grammarians have manifested their real 
meaning, with critical precision, by the use of the 
word '' Transitive." 

The Belt of a Soldier, like the Subject that wears 
it, is a Transitory being ; it passes away in Time. 
But no person — not even any of those who would 
say that a man s Belt passes over his shoulder — 
would also say that his Belt is *' Transitive," 
which would mean, that, in its station and office of a 
Belt, it PASSES over or actually moves in 
Space. 

But even the critical expression — Transitive — 
was not requisite to prove, beyond all question, 
what is the real sense in which the phrase passeth 
OVER is meant by Grammarians ; since it has al- 
ready been insisted upon, that Grammarians admit 
of No Verb as being a Copula or Bridge from a 
Nominative to an Accusative Noun. 



SEC. 2.] VERBS. 139 

From these conisiderations, therefore, it is per- 
fectly conclusive, that Bishop Lowth and All Other 
writers on the Subject have supposed an Action 
to pass over, from its Agent to its Object, in the 
same sense that a Boat crosses a ferry and arrives 
at the opposite side. 

Besides the manifest certainty of this fact, more- 
over, we are enabled to assign the cause of it. This 
cause I apprehend to be, evidently, the uniform 
assumption of Logicians, that an Action is No- 
thing but an Energy of that Single Subject 
which they call the Agent. Now this assumption I 
must impeach, here, as being a fallacy of vast mag- 
nitude and moment, in its logical and grammatical 
consequences; insomuch, that I had intended to 
enter into a full exposition of it in the work which 
has already been repeatedly referred to, and which 
treats of various First Truths, analogous to that in 
question. But 1 was then under a necessity to 
postpone the matter: And, even on the present 
occasion, the Subject can only be entertained 
in such a compressed view of it as appears to 
be sufficient for the purpose of a Treatise of 
Grammar. 

In strictness, indeed, the question concerning 
the Activity, or Neutrality, of Verbs does not de- 
pend upon the question whether, or not, we ought 
to call an Accusative or Suffering Subject by the 
Name of a Patient, or by that of a Co-Agent ; 
but it depends merely upon thefacty whether an Ac- 
cusative or Suffering Subject must be concerned, 
before an Action can exist. But I suppose 
that the General Nature of Language will be 



140 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

placed in a much clearer light, by my stating here 
a brief analysis of the Nature of Action, in opposi- 
tion to the existing doctrine entertained by Lo- 
gicians on the Subject. To the Philosopher of 
Language the matter cannot be unimportant, if the 
Principles laid down be found vahd. And those 
who may be only interested in Grammar to a li- 
mited extent, may confine their attention to the 
example of Action which I propose to state in the 
close of this article, and which, I conceive, involves 
the only fact upon which the Universal Neutrality 
of Verbs depends. 

The investigation, I conceive, independent of its 
immediate purpose, will furnish a very impressive 
example of the existing state of General Logic, in 
its doctrine concerning Action. 

In proceeding to this analysis, it is proper in 
the first place to observe, that it is the nature of 
Physical Action alone that is to be considered in it. 
At the same time, it is to be held in mind, as was 
formerly shewn in treating of Relation, that All 
Relations whatever are Actions ; and that All Ac- 
tions are of One Same General Nature, 

According both to Locke and to Harris — 
(Names little given to agree in Philosophical dis- 
quisition, though both were writers on Logic and 
on Grammar) — -Action is assumed to be Nothing 
but an Energy of Some Single Subject : And the 
Two Words— Action and Energy — ^are employ- 
ed as being strictly synonymous or convertible. 
The doctrine of these two writers, moreover, 
might serve, if necessary, as the Creed of all other 
authors on the Subject. 



SEC. 2.] OF VERBS. 141 

According to Dr. Button, in his Mathematical 
Dictionary, ** Action, in Mechanics or Physics, is 
" a term used to denote, sometimes the effort which 
** some body or power exerts against another body 
'* or power, sometimes it denotes the effects re- 
" suiting from such effort." — *' Agent is that by 
" which a thing is done or effected, or any thing 
*' having a power by which it acts upon another 
"called the Patient, or by its Actioh induces 
" some change in it." 

According to Dr. Reid, who, as a Metaphysi- 
cian, has written very particularly on the nature of 
Power, and who opposes one of the views of 
Locke upon this subject, ** The name of a Cause, 
*' and of an Agent, is properly given to that being 
" only, whicU, by its active power, produces some 
" change in itself, or in some other being. The 
" change, whether it be of thought, of will, or° of 
"motion, is the effect. Active power, therefore, is 
" a quality in the Cause, which enables it to 
** produce the effect. And the exertion of that 
" active power, in producing the effect, is called 
" Action, Agency, Efficiency p' 

Here, then, we have it, unequivocally, accord- 
ing to Dr. Reid, in perfect concurrence with all the 
other authorities herein cited, First, that Active 
Power is a Quality ; which is true, indeed : 
And, Next, that the Exertion of this Quality is 
called Action. According to this doctrine, there- 
fore, it is plain, that the Object or Accusative Noun 
to Any Verb is excluded from having any concern 
in the existence of the Action signified by that 
Verb. 



142 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Hence, according to the Logic and Grammar 
which now prevails, when a Cannon propels a 
Ball toward the wall of a besieged Place ; the Ac- 
tion of battering that Place is complete the mo- 
ment the Gun, or the Powder, has exerted its 
intended energy. This doctrine, however, I confi- 
dently deny. And I aiBrm, that, not only must 
the Wall be Struck before the Action can exist ; but 
also that, in a strict Logical and Grammatical 
sense, the Place, so struck, is as much an Agent, 
as is the Cannon, or Instrument by which it is as- 
saulted. 

In order that the general principle, upon which 
I propose to argue the nature of Action, may be at 
once apprehended, so as to enable a reader very 
readily to understand all that is to follow, I ob- 
serve in this place, that there are Three Different 
Views in which any Physical Action may be con- 
templated : 

First, As a Physical Action. 

Secondly, As a Moral Action. 
Thirdly, As a Logical Action. 

Now Universal Grammar, if it can be erected 
into a Science; (and, that it can, I hold to be 
most certain ;) must undeniably belong to the De- 
partment of Logic And it is the business, there- 
fore, of THIS KIND of Grammar, to view the Nature 
of Action only in so far as it is exclusively a Logical 
Subject. This consideration, which I must insist 
upon as being paramount and imperative, will pre- 
sent to us Action under an aspect vastly different 



SEC. 2.] OF VERBS. 143 

from that which it usually displays, either in its 
Moral or its Physical exhibition. While it is cer- 
tain, that Grammarians and Philosophers have 
been accustomed to contemplate it only in its two 
last mentioned characters ; or, rather, chiefly, if not 
altogether, in its Moral aspect. 

This being premised ; I proceed to shew by 
what means Grammarians, viewing the subject in 
the light just mentioned, have introduced the ut- 
most degree of confusion into the reputed Struc- 
ture of Language. 

It is quite manifest, from the evidence of Logi- 
cal writers already cited, that not only the Gram- 
marians, but the Logicians also, have founded 
their doctrine of Action upon the contemplation of 
its Moral Nature. Now, in the Moral contem- 
plation of Action, it is of primary importance to 
distinguish only the Voluntary Agent or Aggressor ; 
because the Moral Quality of the Action must be 
ascribed to him alone. And it is merely in analo- 
gy with this fact, that, in any case of Physical 
Action between Two Inanimate Subjects, we as- 
cribe Agency exclusively to the Subject that Moves 
io Another, i. e. that is supposed to be an Assailant. 
Hence it is, that either the Voluntary or the Lead- 
ing Co- Agent, of Any Action, has uniformly been 
assumed, by Philosophers, to be the Sole Agent: 
While the following Co- Agent has, as constantly, 
received the denomination of a Patient. 

But, in the face of this doctrine, it is a self-evi- 
dent necessary truth, which will not admit of a 
moment's denial, or hesitation, that a So-called Pa- 
tient of an Action, (inasmuch as it must co-operate 



144 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

BEFORE the Action can exist,) is, in a strict logical 
sense, as much an Agent or Cause of that 
Action, as the Subject usually called the Agent. 
And this truth forms a Fundamental Principle 
IN THE Nature of a Verb; because a Verb is 
always, of necessity, the sign of an Action or Link 
of Connection between Two Co-Agents. 

At the same time that I assert the Principle of 
Action now laid down, it is to be observed, that 
Either, or Both, the Co-Agents of an Action 
MAY ALSO be Patients or Sufferers from that 
Same Action, But, along with this, it is to be 
widely distinguished, that the being a Sufferer is 
a vastly different Thing from being a Following 
Co-Agent, of Any Action; insomuch, that the 
fact of Suffering, although it may be, to all human 
observation, strictly contemporaiieous with the Ac- 
tion in question, is in reality subsequent to it, and is 
a fact altogether eMrinsic to the Action. Thus if a 
man happen to fall upon a child, or upon any 
small animal ; he may kill, or hurt, this animal, and 
may remain himself unhurt : But, if he fall upon a 
stone ; himself may be killed, or hurt, and the 
ston% to appearance, remain unaltered. Now, in 
both these cases alike, the Action in question is 
that of Collision between Two Bodies ; and, in the 
one case, the Two Co- Agents are the man and the 
child ; while, on the other, they are the man and 
the stone. But in neither of these Actions, 
strictly considered, is there Any Sufferer : for the 
child in the first case, and the man in the second, 
has become a Patient or Sufferer only in 



SEC. 2.3 OF VEftBS. 145 

RESULT OR CONSEQUENCE of that Actiou in which 
he had, as a Co-Agent, performed his part. 

It could not in the least degree tend to invali- 
date this argument, if any one were to observe 
here, that there is in reality no interval of 
time between a Cause and its Effect: Nor, even, 
could it avail, if it were contended, (which how- 
ever I deem to be a fallacy) that a Cause and its 
Effect are things strictly contemporaneous. It is 
enough that, in the Necessary Structure of our 
Ideas, we must distinguish a Cause from an Effect, 
as being Two Different Things, and Not Parts of 
the Same Thing. And, quite independent of this, 
there is no Axiom in Philosophy that can stand 
higher than that which connects Every Related 
Subject with its Correlate Subject, by a Link of Ac- 
tion which makes Each of the Subjects equally a 
Co-Agent. 

In the example just now given it hab'bien seen, 
that a Physical Assailant may be the sufferer from 
his own assault. And I have observed, that 
EoTH the Co- Agents of Any Such Action may be 
Sufferers from their mutual Energies. I now add, 
that they may, in such case, be Equal Sufferers: 
and, hereupon, I would ask. What becomes of the 
doctnne of " Agent and Patient," in any event 
df this description ? 

Thus, for example, if Two Billiard Balls, or 
Two Bodies of Any Similar Size and Shape, come, 
with equal arid opposite velocities, into collision ; 
i^OTH the Bodies might be equally indented^ and 
berth might move with preci^ly opposite and 
AnaL t 



146 . . OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

equal forces. Such a fact, indeed, may never hap- 
pen, in a strict philosophical sense; but it is a fact 
as possible, and as fit f 07^ our present argument, as if 
it were an every-day occurrence. In such case, 
then, the Grammarian, (and the Logician also,) 
would be utterly puzzled to resolve the Two Sub- 
jects engaged in the Action, into an Agent and a 
Patient. 

I suppose this last example exhibits the doc- 
trine of Agent and Patient, or of Single 
Agency, in a light so strikingly absurd, that it 
cannot be requisite to take up farther time in 
exploding it. 

Upon this ground, therefore, I venture to remark, 
that the Phraseology (for it is the Phraseology alone) 
of the Newtonian Doctrine of Action participates 
in the common error of the Logicians. In that 
doctrine it is affirmed, that Action is equalled 
by Re- Action : And this phraseology answers 
perfectly well for the purpose of the Mechanical 
Philosopher : But, if it be employed as a Phrase in 
General Logic, I must insist that it is erroneous : 
for it implies, that, in a Single Fact of Collision be- 
tween Any Two Bodies, there exist Two Different 
Actions heiween the One Pair of Related Subjects- 
It is to be granted, indeed, that Two Bodies, in 
apparent Collision, may be supposed to perform Two 
Distinct Actions; and, if this were the meaning 
of the Newtonian Phrase, it would then be strict- 
ly a logical one. But I must conclusively assert, 
that Every One Action demands the Energies of 
Two Co-Agents : And I humbly conceive, there- 
fore, that the real fact of the Newtonian doctrine 



SEC. 2.] OF VERBS. 147 

is, that, in Every Action, Energy is equalled bt/ 
Re-Energy. 

These observations lead me to a final considera- 
tion of the Nature of Action. And here, therefore, 
I observe, that we must not suffer the Newtonian 
theory, or Ani/ Physical Theory whatever^ how high 
soever may be its claims to truth of fact, to inter- 
vene, or obtrude itself, into Any Course of Reason- 
ing from the Necessary Structure of our Ideas ; Be- 
cause, if we did so, it must inevitably prove a stum- 
bling block to our conclusions. In point of fact, 
we do not know whether Action is carried on by 
what w^e call Energies : Neither do we know what 
the term Energies precisely means. But this we do 
know — namely — that Action is Some Link of 
Connection between Two Related Subjects ; and 
is the Thing that makes Two Relative Subjects, of 
the Otherwise Absolute Subjects in question. 

From this view of the Nature of Action, there 
certainly are Some Actions of which we can give the 
LOGICAL REASON, ^Tidi xvMch are, in fact, Physical 
Actio7is; although we can demonstrate their Na- 
ture, as Actiofis, only because they happen to be 
not merely Physical Results, but also at the same 
tiine Necessary Results. This identification of 
the Objects of Physical Science with Those of 
Demonstrative Science, is a matter so entirely 
foreign to the notions of Philosophers on the Sub- 
ject, that I should not have ventured to touch upon 
it, here, if I had not previously suggested and treat- 
ed the matter at large in another work. But, upon 
the strength of what is advanced in that work, I 
may now observe, as an illustration of the present 



148 OF VERBS. [chap.^- 

argument, that Every Visible Line which we 
perceive is a Physical Action of the Meeting 
of Two contrasted Colors : although, in such case, 
No EXERTION OF ENERGIES between the Two Colors 
is to be supposed; but the Result is merely a Necessary 
Product of the Contiguity of Tv^o of OurOwn Sen- 
sations. And, while we never can confound a per-? 
ceived Line, with the Two Colors between which 
it is thus necessarily produced ; we never can be in 
the least doubt as to the truth and 7iecessity of the 
Line's being the Link or Cause which connects 
the Two Colors, as Two Related Subjects, in the 
case in question. 

Such, I apprehend, is a logical example of Ac- 
tion, complete in its evidence, and divested of 
every extraneous fact or circumstance. 

To this example may be added, that Every Hy- 
pothetical Line of Co7itiguity between Two Defined 
Mathematical Subjects, is a Hypothetical Action 
of TOUCHING, or MEETING, precisely of the Sarm^ 
General Nature as that of a Visible Line between 
Two Colors. 

It may be proper, in this place, (in order to cor* 
rect or guide the imagination of a reader,) to ob-? 
serve, that An Action, as it has been defined, pif 
demonstrated, in this work, is a Thing which may 
not, on a first view of it, appear to coincide altogcr 
ther with the Structure of a Bridge; to which last- 
mentioned fixed and neutral Object I have all 
along uniformly likened both Action and its Sign-— 
a Verb, An Action, (as has already appeared) 
is a Meeting ; and it is, therefore, a Connection 
of Contiguity between Si^p\^^ Two Things. On 



|Eq. 33 OF VERBS. 149 

the other hand, a Bridge, in the ordinary sense 
of this term, is a Connection Not of Contiguity, 
but of Separation, between Some Two Things. 
The Modification of each of these Two Sorts of 
Bridge is such, that Objects may pass over, or under, 
an Ordinary Bridge, but Objects cannot pass over, 
or under, an Action. This difference being explain^ 
ed ; I now observe, that an Action is nevertheless, 
in a true Generic sense, a Bridge : because, Every 
Action is a Logical Link of Connection between 
Some Two Things; and the mere fact of the con- 
tiguity, or the ACTUAL separation, of the Two 
Things, thus connected, is merely a specific differ- 
ence, and a subordinate consideration. This truth 
being manifest and indisputable ; all that remains 
to be said upon this distinction, is to remind a 
reader, that when in the sequel of the work I come 
to supply a Diagram of the Structure of Speech, 
and shall therein depict P^erbs as being of that 
sdrt of Bridge which separates their Piers or 
Supporters J I shall do this only for the sake of 
illustration, and allowance will have to be made, 
in the imagination, for the necessity of this ex^ 
pedient. 

After the exposition now given of the subject, 
I trust it is altogether out of the question to sup- 
pose Action to be a thing of a Double or Two^ 
FOLD Nature. At the same time, if allowance be 
made for the Newtonian Phrase, the Newtonian 
Doctrine manifestly agrees with the view of the 
sqbj^ct which is herein laid down, against that of 
the Logicians, Thus, When we press a seal upon 
yielding wax; ; a Logician would tell us, that the 



m OF VERBS. [chap. 3. 

Seal is an Agent, and the fVa.v a Patient, of this 
Action : But a Newtonian would affirm, that both 
the Seal and the Wa.v are, in this case, equally 
Agents ; and he would justly argue, that, if the 
Wax did not Act, as well as the Seal, the latter 
would not impress, but would pass through and dis- 
sipate, the former. 



I return, now, to the consideration of the Gram- 
matical Doctrine of Bishop Lowth and of all other 
writers on the subject; It is very manifest, that it 
is the supposition of Logicians that an Action is 
merely an Energy or Emanation, as it were 
shot OUT OR ejected from Some Single Sub- 
ject called The Agent, (which Energy is sup- 
posed, and perhaps justly supposed, to be Ac- 
tive, or Motive,) that has led to the Uniform 
Doctrine of Active Verbs ; since a Verb, being 
the Grammatical Sign of Action, must partake of 
the Nature of the Thing which it represents. But 
it has been rigorously demonstrated, that Action 
is a Thing infinitely different from Energy, or 
from Any Attribute of One Single Subject; 
because it is a Meeting between Two Energies, 
' — or Some Two Things : And, unless the analysis 
now stated shall be invalidated, it would be as 
grossly illogical to confound Action with Ener- 
gy, as it would be to confound two Mathematical 
Surfaces, or Solids, with their Common Line of 
Contiguity ; than which, no Two Objects in Geome- 
try are more distinct, or different, in the logical 
conceptions we form of them^ respectively. 



SEC. 2.] OF VERBS. 151 

In fine. — If we take a case in which Agency can 
be supposed more than in any other to belong to 
One only of the Two Related Subjects engaged in 
an Action, we shall find, that this case, as much as 
any other, falls under One Same Universal Law. 
Thus, If we suppose a Ball discharged from the 
Mouth of a Cannon, and propelled to Any Dis- 
tance (let it be Fifty Yards,) in Void Space. This 
Motion of the Ball is a Species of Action; although, 
in an ordinary physical sense, it would not be 
called an Action, since there is no Subject that di- 
rectly or obviously resists it : for it is an Action of 
the Ball with Space. And here, if in any case, 
the Ball might be assumed to be the Sole Agent 
of the Action. But I affirm, that, in a strict logical 
sense, Space is as much a Co- Agent of this Action, 
as the Ball is : For an Action of Moving Fifty 
Yards, is an Action which takes place only the 
MOMENT AFTER the farthest edge of the Ball has 
arrived at and met that Part of Space which is 
Fifty Yards beyond the Part from which it started. 
We may, indeed, suppose the Ball to move from 
Some Energy : but its Action, in the present case, 
consists in Nothing but its changing of Relations 
with the Parts of Space ; and Space is a necessary 
and manifest Co- Agent, in Every Change of this 
kind which Any Object makes. 

I hardly need observe, that if we here bring in 
the power of gravitation, the resistance of the air, 
or any other cause, for stopping the Ball ; we shall 
thus give a character to the Action which I had 
excluded by the previous terms. And any such 
new Subject, even if introduced, could only serve, 



152 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

(instead of Space,) as a Second Co- Agent of the 
Action. The object, here, is merely to illustrate 
the nature of Action as being necessarily Some- 
thing — Some Meeting — between Two Sub- 
jects. 

The result of the analysis now stated, is, that 
Activity (and Passivity also) does not and can- 
not belong to Verbs. Activity and Passivity are 
Attributes of Nouns only : And it would be a 
deplorable perseverance in absurdity if the force 
of prejudice, or habit, should be able to uphold 
the doctrine of Active Verbs in Philosophical 
Grammar/ 

' The doctrine of Active Verbs has been acquiesced io, or ra- 
ther advocated, by Mr. Tooke ; and is entered into with zeal 
by Dr. Murray : Which, indeed, might naturally be expected, 
from the Logic they respectively entertained with regard to the 
Category of Relatives and Relation, 



153 



SECTION THIRD. 

OF THE DIVISION OF THE OBJECTS OF LANGUAGE, INTO AC- 
TION ITSELF, THE STATE OF ONE CO-AGENT WITH RESPECT 
TO ACTION, THE STATE OF THE OTHER CO-AGENT, OR PA- 
TIENT.— AND OF THE CONSEQUENT FORMATION AND USE 
OF A PRINCIPAL CLASS OF ADVERBS. 

In the foregoing Section I have asserted, that Phi- 
losophical Grammar is, or rather must be, founded 
strictly upon the Logical Nature of Action or Re- 
lation ; and that, consequently, Verbs must con- 
form to the Necessary Structure of this Category, 
in exclusion of any limited or partial views into 
which we might be led by a mere Moral conside- 
ration of Actions. But I may be told, that Lan- 
guage was not made for Logicians; but was 
invented, in great part, for the purpose of marking^ 
and signifying the Moral intercourse between 
human beings. Hence, perhaps, it may be said, 
that we are not to make Yerbs conform to the Ab- 
stract Nature of Relation; but, ought to leave 
Relations (i. e. the Causes of Language) to shift for 
themselves, and to continue to uphold the sup- 
posed Nature of Verbs in the existing absurdity of 
their doctrine, since it is convenient for the pur- 
poses of life or of mankind. 

To this reasoning, I reply ; It is true, that Lan- 
guage was not made for Logicians ; but, in great 
part, for the Moral intercourse of the Species. And, 

AnaL u 



154 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

to this I add, that Speech ought still, and always, 
to be eminently (and as its main object) adapted 
to express this intercourse. But at the same time 
I affirm, that, as for the existing doctrine of Verbs, 
it could never have found a toleration, or an ori- 
gin, except owing to the profound ignorance of 
mankind with regard to the real nature of the 
Thing of which Every Verb is a Sign. And it 
would now be a darkness no less deplorable, in 
any Grammarian of the present day, to stand up 
and defend the doctrine in question, upon a plea 
that Language was not made for Logicians ; than 
it would have been in one of our early Saxon or 
Gothic Ancestors to have stood up, in his native 
hovel, and scouted every improvement in the Art 
of Building, upon a plea that Houses, or Ships, 
are not made for Mathematicians. 

The real truth of the matter is, that the logical 
proofs which have been in the foregoing articles 
laid down, that Verbs are Signs which are neither 
formed to represent, nor are capable of represent- 
ing. Actions in that particular view of them called 
Moral, but are necessarily constructed to signify 
Action in its complete nature and aspect, present 
no objection, nor obstacle whatever, to our signi- 
fying a Moral, or Any Other Partial View of Ac- 
tion : Which we can signify, most simply and 
beautifully, by a Logical Sign belonging to a very 
different Part of Speech ; and to which, I appre- 
hend, we must resort, unless we resolve to become 
martyrs to a strange generosity, and be content to 
wear a cap and bells of Reason, merely because 
the oversight, or the negligence, of Logicians has 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. 155 

hitherto chanced to fix it upon us. I shall there- 
fore appropriate the present article to a suggestion 
of what appears to be indicated as being requisite 
in this case. 

First, then, I observe, that the Whole purpose 
and business of Language is to signify the Related 
Objects in the Universe and the Relations between 
them. Multitudinous, or Infinite, as may appear 
the Number and the Variety of Things which 
Speech is capable of expressing ; they are all com- 
prehended under this one single proposition. 

Secondly, In consequence of the truth just now 
laid down, we have need to divide the Objects of 
Speech into Three Great and Primary Classes^ 
which I shall enumerate as follows. 

1. It is frequently necessary to signify Action 
itself, properly so called. And the expression of 
this demands, at the same time, the signification of 
both the Co- Agents of that Action. 

2. It is frequently necessary to signify the pecu- 
liar State of the Leading Co- Agent of an Action, 
without introducing any expression of the state of 
the Following Co-Agent. And this demand^ the 
signification of One Only of the Co' Agents of that 
Action. 

3. It is frequently necessary to signify ihe pecu- 
liar State of the Following; Co-Ao;ent of an Action, 
without introducing any expression of the Leading 
Co- A gent. And this, also, demands the significa- 
tion of One Only of the Co-Agents of that Action, 

Such are All the Varieties of Object 
which it is possible for Language to express; 
always excepting the consideration of Limited 



156 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Silence, which must be admitted and entertained 
as an Element of Language, and of which Element 
due notice will be had hereafter. 

Agreeably with this, it has already been laid 
down, that a Mere Noun belongs to No Part of 
Speech until it be made the Sign of Some Co- Agent. 
And it will be shewn, in its proper place, that 
an Article, a Definitive, and an Adjective, are Nothijig 
to Constituent Elements of a Noun Substan- 
tive or Name of a Co- Agent : From which, and 
from other considerations, it will be found to fol- 
low, that there is No Other Object ever signified, or 
possible to be signified by Language, beside those 
three which I have here enumerated and described. 
These Three Yiewsoi Action and its Agents, there- 
fore, stand, in this work, for the " Different Sorts of 
Thi72gs,'' and " Different Sorts of Ideas,'' into 
which, we have seen. Grammarians and Philoso- 
phers have (according to the sarcastic remark of 
Mr. Tooke) all along labored to divide the Objects 
or Prototypes of Words : And it remanis here to 
shew, in what manner, or by what Signs, these 
three General Objects can be rationally signified. 

With the purpose just expressed, it is to be ob- 
served, in the first place, that, of the Objects in 
question, One Only of the three is a Natural 
Object or such as can exist in that form and com- 
plexion which we ever signify by Words. This 
Object is an Action, considered together with its 
Two Co-Agents, as alrea^dy described : And the 
signification oithis Object has been fully provided 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. Jt57 

for by the Verb and by what has herein been as- 
serted concerning it. 

Each of the Other Two Objects in question is 
what may be called Artificial ; it being formed, or 
completed, by the Abstractive Faculty of the Mind, 
parting off, in idea, a certain portion of the Natural 
Object first described. Thus, although in the con- 
templation of Any Action it is necessary to contem- 
plate Each of its Co-Agents along with itself, since 
No Action can ever exist without Two Co-Agents 
to serve as its supporters ; yet, by the Abstractive 
Power of the Mind, we can divide this Natural 
Object into departments, and can contemplate 
Either of the Co- A gents as being in a certain 
State with respect to the Action, without taking 
into this Complex Idea the Other Co- A gent, or yet 
taking in a complete view of the Action in question, 
which last cannot be had without introducing the 
Idea of the Other Co-Agent. 

From the description now given, it will appear, 
that, whereas Every Action is a Species of 
Bridge between Two Piers or Supporters; So 
Every Leading, and likewise Every Following Co* 
Agent of an Action, when it is thus viewed as ab- 
stracted, and is contemplated as annexed only to 
its Own peculiar State with respect to this 
Action, may be compared to the Arm of a Sign-post, 
which projects out from One Only Supporte7\ 
Thus, for example, if we say " Peter strikes 
Richard;" we have herein a Bridge of Action; 
and this Bridge of Action is rationally signified 
by placing a Noun of Action as a Bridge between 
Two Nouns Substantive or Piers of Lanoruaije. 



158 OF VERBS. [ghap.2. 

But if we only say, " Pder strikes," or " Peter 
is STRICKEN ;" we have, herein, No Action ex- 
pressed ; but only an Energy or State of Peter, 
with respect to an Action ; and here, therefore, we 
have No Bridge between Two Co-Agents; but 
have only Some Energy or Quality, which may be 
compared to an Arm or Gibbet, projecting out 
from Peter, and signified as belonging to, or sup- 
ported by, Him alone. 

Now if we distinctly consider the construction 
of a Bridge and that of a Gibbet respectively, 
as being two Different Objects of the contempla- 
tion of the Logician, we shall unquestionably dis- 
cern that they are vastly dissimilar things ; and 
we shall readily grant, that nothing could be more 
illogical, than to confound these two Things, or 
Structures, together, as being of One Same Nature 
or Composition. The same reasoning, also, of 
course, must hold good with regard to Any two 
Words which we may choose to adopt to serve 
as the Signs of these Dissimilar Structures. But 
this confusion has actually been admitted and 
cherished by all Grammarians: for they have 
adopted what they call Verbs, to serve as the Signs 
not only of All Actions, but also of All States 
as contradistinguished from Actions. 

In order that no one may here for a moment 
mistake, by supposing that the matter in question 
is only a mere verbal distinction, I may remark, 
(although I think it can hardly be necessary,) that, 
abstractly taken, it could not make the smallest 
difference, whether we should call a Bridge of 
Language by the Name of a Verb, or by any 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. 159 

other Name. But the Name of Verb having been 
all along assigned to this Part of Speech : and it 
being here demonstrated, that the Objects which it 
properly signifies are Logical Bridges : while, also, 
there are Other Classes of Logical Objects, of a 
vastly different nature from Bridges, which have 
most erroneously been supposed to 'be signified by 
the Same Sign : it follows, beyond a doubt, that 
the Name of Verb must be continued to the Signs of 
Bridges; and, that Some Other Appellation must be 
found for those Signs of Gibbets which have just 
now been suggested. The Two Objects in question 
being immeasurably different ; the denominations 
of their Signs must certainly be as different: And 
it will be found, moreover, that the respective De- 
nominations must have regard to the difference of 
the Structures represented. 

Now it is a Principle in Speech, well known ; 
and it appears in fact to have been practised from 
the very earliest ages of Language, that Almost 
Any Word may, by a certain expedient, be em- 
ployed to serve as an Abbreviated Sign of Several 
Words: And the Expedient or Principle hy ^hich 
this very useful end has been effected, has been 
merely that of Associated Position, with re- 
spect to some Other Word to which it is annexed. 
These abbreviations, moreover, owing to one of 
their supposed principal uses, have been denomi- 
nated Adverbs : And, on the present occasion, 
they claim our particular regard; although we shall 
have to consider them with more appropriate atten- 
tion, in the sequel of this work. Thus, either a 
Preposition^ an Adjective, or a So-called Substantive 



160 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Noun, (as these Wof^ds are rated by Grammajians) 
may become an Adverb by Position: As, for 
example, when we say, " He went in," — " He 
looked PALE," " He stood Father ;" which expres- 
sions mean, " He went to an inner place," — 
" He was of a Pale Color,'' i. e. " in a Pale 
State,' — " He stood in the Office or Relative State of 
Father." 

From what has been just said of the nature of 
Adverbs, two facts will be immediately evident — • 
namely — that, by analogy of this Expedient or 
Principle, Words called Verbs may serve as Ad- 
verbs BY Position ; and, that, by thus employing 
them, we shall (as I before hinted,) most simply 
and beautifully express or signify the peculiar 
State of either a Leading or a Following Co-Ageiit, 
with respect to Any Action. Thus, from the 
Whole Analogy of the conversion of Words into 
Adverbs by Position, when we say " Peter strikes;'^ 
the Word " Strikes" becomes an Adverb by Posi- 
tion, and it means *' Peter exists in a Striking 
State, while it excludes the Sign and Significa- 
tion of the Object which he strikes, and thereby 
excludes a proper or complete signification of the 
Action itself of striking. 

By a rational and absolutely requisite extension, 
therefore, of the simple, natural, and already pre- 
cedented and established method of conversion 
now described, we shall be able to signify the 
peculiar state of Any Co- Agent, or of Any Patient 
strictly so called, in the most logical manner ; and 
shall thus, by the Sign employed, rationally contra- 
distinguish Any Co- Agent when viewed by itself, from 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. 161 

the Same Co-Agent xvhen it is viewed together with 
the Action itself and the Other Co- Agent concerned. 

From this View of the subject, it results, as a 
Necessary and Universal Principle of Grammar, 
that, whenever the Name of an Action is annexed 
or apposited to a Nominative, without Any Accu- 
sative Noun being annexed to the farther side of 
the former ; the Name of Action so situated is Not 
A Verb, but an Adverb. 

According to the Principle now laid down, as 
well as to that other and Fundamental Principle 
which was asserted in the First Section of this 
chapter, a very remarkable but at the same time 
harmonious change will be made in that Part of 
Speech by Grammarians called the Verb. For it 
will follow, That Every One of our So-called 
Verbs, as it stands marshalled in its So-called Pa- 
radigm^ in our Grammars, being Only a Name of 
Action annexed to a Nominative, without any Ac- 
cusative Noun annexed to it, although according 
to the Fundamental Principle above referred to it 
cannot be a Verb, becomes a legitimate Adverb 
or Abbreviation ; which represent, at least, a So- 
called Preposition and a Noun in the Objective 
Case with its Article taken together. 

And here we are to observe, that a Name of 
Action employed thus Adverbially becomes More 
(Much More) ihQ.n a Verb: because it will be 
shewn at large that Everi/ So-called Preposition is a 
Verb; and it has been just now said, that an 
Adverb involves, at least, the import of both a Pre- 
position and an Objective Noun annexed to it. 
Anal. X 



162 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

These considerations bring me to a delineation 
of the 7nore particular Mechanism of that Great 
and Primary Class of Adverbs, which I have thus 
proposed to introduce into the Structure of Speech. 
And, first, it is to be observed that, in adopting the 
expedient under consideration, although it consti- 
tutes a Part of Speech very different from the Sign 
of either a Related Subject or a Relation, yet, in its 
construction, the Generic Structure of the Category 
of Relatives and Relation can never be defeated, 
or violated : As, for example, when we say, ** I 
write," — " Thou writest," — " He writes;" — although 
the Word — Write — in any one of these three modi- 
fied sentences is Not a Verb, but is a Sign of the 
Words — in or inning a Writing State ; yet, the 
Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation is not 
violated, because the Word — in or inning — being 
the Name of an Action — becomes a Verb by being 
placed between the cvpress Nominative *' /" and 
the involved Accusative " a Writing State." In 
this manner, therefore, a New Sentence is formed : 
Or, in other words. Every conjugated expression 
of a So-called Verb, in our Grammars, is an Abbre- 
viation of a Complete Speech or Sentence, made up of 
a Nominative, a Verb, and an Accusative; but 
which Sentence is of a very Different Import 
from the Sentence usually supposed to be expressed. 
It is plain, from what has been said of the nature 
of Adverbs, that Every Adverb is a Sign, Not of 
Any Natural Object, but of Words only ; that is to 
say, it is Not an immediate Sign of a Thought or 
Thoughts; but is an immediate Sign of a Parcei> 
OF Signs. An Adverb, therefore, is, in a twofold 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. iGSr 

sense, an Artificial Part of Speech ; first, because 
it is only a Sign of Signs; and, secondly, because 
the Abstracted Parcel of Objects signified by Any 
One of these Signs cannot exist in nature, unattach- 
ed to an Action and a Following Co- Agent. 

The Grammatical Mechanism of Adverbs being 
thus delineated ; I proceed to offer some general 
observations with regard to it. 

And First I observe, that, from the View of the 
Subject which has been suggested, there follows a 
very remarkable and useful result — namely — that 
Whensoever Any One of the Essential Parts of 
Speech is found to be Out of its Natural Position 
in its association with other Words, that is out of 
the Natural Structure of Language, as demonstrated 
in these analyses; it is a mark of its being employed 
Adverbially, Thus in the expressions, 

" He stalks on," 

" He rehearses,'' 

" He plays Richard," 

'' He looks FAINT," 

the So-called Preposition, Vei^h, Noun, and Adjec- 
tive (being out of their Natural Association and 
Position with respect to the Other Words in the 
Sentence) become Adverbs. 

Secondly, I remark, that, although the Adverb is 
not in fact an Essential Part of Speech ; yet, it is 
so eminently useful, and almost necessary, that it 
has a full and a very high claim to be entertained 
in the. Structure of Philosophical Grammar : Espe- 



I^ OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

daily has that Principal Class of Adverbs, which I 
have proposed to introduce, such a claim. 

Thirdly, I observe, that the establishment of this 
Class of Adverbs involves Two Grammatical 
Principles which will appear novel and strange to 
those who have imbibed the doctrines of Accre- 
dited Grammar — namely — First, that an Adverb 
can agree with a Noun ; and. Secondly, that we as- 
sert OR AFFIRM in what is called the Participial 
Form. With regard to the reality or solidity of 
these two Principles, however, there cannot re- 
main a doubt ; For the Fii^st is established by the 
fact already shewn — namely — that a Name of 
Action, when annexed to a Noun, becomes an 
Adverb to that Noun : And the Second, also, is 
established by its having been shewn that the Verb 
Substantive has no Office of enabling a So-called Par- 
ticiple to assert. Thus, in the expressions, ** I 
write,'' and " / writing,'" the Words — " icritef and 
** writing" — are both of them Adverbs anncved to 
a Noun, or Pronoun: And both the expressions are 
Abbreviated Assertions; because the One 
means, "/ inning A Writing State;" and the 
Other means the Same in yet a fuller manner, since 
the Word — Write — is, in fact, only an Abbreviated 
Modification of the Word Writing, But, with re- 
gard to this last mentioned Principle, of our assert- 
ing in the Participial Form, farther notice will be 
had in its proper place. 

Fourthly. It is to be observed, that, from the 
whole of the foregoing reasonings it appears, con- 
clusively, that there can be No Such Thing in 
Philosophical Grammar as a Passive Voice. 



SEC. 3.] OF VERBS. 1G5 

Because Voice is an Attribute of an Agent, and 
Not of an Action ; since Voice is an Attribute 
of the Mind ; and No Agent, or Nominative, can 
ever be expressed as being Passive, in Philosophi- 
cal Language. The Whole doctrine of Passive 
Verbs and Voice, therefore, as well as that of Ac- 
tive Verbs, falls for ever to the ground, unless it 
be upheld by a most manifest perverseness against 
reason. Any State, either of Activity or Passivity, 
must be expressed by signifying the Subject in 
question to be Actively inhering or occupy- 
ing that State. 

It only remains to remark, that the Principle 
now asserted must not be confounded with the 
very illogical and absurd expedient of those Lan- 
guages which express the Subject of Any Mere 
State as being Active upon itself, in possessing that 
State. And here it may be particularly observed, 
that Any State of a Subject is a most logical Co- 
Age?it to that Subject, during the Action of its 
occupying that State ; and is, therefore, the Neces- 
sary Accusative Noun to the Verb or Sign of Action 
v/hich connects this Subject with the State in 
question. Accordingly, we say, with the strictest 
propriety of Language, " He is in Pain," " He 
" is in Fear," " He is in Hope," — in Anger, — in 
Grief, — in Love, — in Health, — in Sickness, — 
in Death, — in Despair, — and so on, throughout 
all the changes of supposed State which any Man, 
or any Subject, can possess : And it will be proved, 
at large, that the Word in, (i. e. inning) is a 
legitimate and efficient Verb, as is Every So-called 
Preposition whatever. In fine^ it becomes plain 



16G OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

afresh in this place, that when, instead of express- 
ing the State of Hope, or Fear, of a Man by means 
of the Preposition and the Noun of that State, 
we express it by turning this Noun into a Noun of 
Action by saying " He Hopes," — " He Fears," — 
the Noun of Action here becomes an Adverb signi- 
fying the very Same thing — namely — in or inning 
a State of Hope, or of Fear, 

If a metaphysical question should be started, 
here, As to the manner in which Aiiy Subject 
occupies or possesses Any Slate? I would reply. 
First, that the Mere Speaker of Language has 
nothing at all to do with it: And, Secondly, that, 
nevertheless. Every One can answer it very rea- 
dily. For, in the conceptions of the human mind, 
we MUST suppose a Man to possess Health, or 
Sickness, in some xvay ai^alogous to that in which 
we suppose him to possess, measure, or take up. 
Space, (or Time). And it is altogether certain that 
Health, or Sickness, or Any Other State, is 
as distinct a Grammatical Subject from the Man 
who possesses it, and is connected with that JMan 
by an Action (signified by a Verb) as perfect and 
efficient, as can be said of Any Subject that occu- 
pies OR EXISTS IN Space. In its proper place, 
moreover, I shall produce the curious and complete 
etymological evidence, that the Word — inn- — was 
once a current Verb in our Language, — a fact 
of which, I can assure my readers, I was wholly 
ignorant, until long after I had laid it down (in a 
former work) that All Prepositions «re of the 
nature o/*Verbs. This inductive proof, coming 
in collaterally with the foreg-oing: Reasonings a 



i^Ec.3.] OF VERBS. 167^ 

priori, (I cannot help trusting,) mnst establish the 
present argument with a strength which may look 
with tranquillity upon any attempt to invalidate 
it : And the mere mention of it, here, may serve 
as a specimen of the method by which I propose 
to prosecute the general subject of Language, in 
grounding my views of it upon the two-fold basis 
of Reasoning and of Induction. 

In closing this article, it may not be improper 
to remind my readers, that in it I have not been 
treating of Adverbs appropriately, or in full ; but, 
on the contrary, have only been suggesting the 
necessity for the introduction of a New Class of 
Words into Grammar, under this denomination: 
Which Class, however, must form the Veri^ First, 
and Vastly the Most Numerous, Order of Words 
comprehended under this Part of Speech ; since it 
will be much more numerous, and of more frequent 
use or recurrence, than even that of Verbs them- 
selves. 



168 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 



SECTION FOURTH. 

OF THE PRINCIPLE AND THE ACT OF ASSERTION. 



SUBSECTION I. 



1. Of the Doctrine of Grammarians that the Essence 
' of the Verb consists in Assertion ; And, otherwise, 
that the Verb consists in an Assertion and an Attri- 
butive, — 2. Suggestion that both Verbs and Adjec- 
tives iyivolve a Sign of Assertion, — 3. Profound 
Error of Locke and other Grammarians, acqui- 
esced in by Mr, Tooke, in asserting that the Verb 
Substantive is the General Sign of Affirmation, 

In the Second Volume of the Diversions of 
PuRLEY, at the very close of that Work, Mr. 
Tooke's fellow Dialogist addresses him in the 
following terms. 

*' If yon finish thus, you will leave me much 
" unsatisfied : nor shall I think myself fairly treat- 
** ed by you. 

" You have told me that a Verb is (as every 
" word must be) a Noun ; but you added, that it is 
" also something more : and that the title Verb was 
" given to it, on account of that distinguishing 
** something more than the mere Nouns convey. 
** You have then proceeded to the simple Verb 
** adjectived, and to the different adjectived Moods, 
" and to the different adjectived Tenses of the Verb. 



SEC. 4.] VERBS. 169 

** But you have not all the while explained to me 
*' what you mean by the naked simple Verb unad" 
*'jectived. Nor have you uttered a single syllable 
" concerning that something which the naked Verb 
" unattended by Mood, Tense y Number, Person, and 
** Gender (which last some languages add to it) 
" signifies More or Besides the mere Noun. 

*' What is the Verb? What is that peculiar dif- 
" ferential circumstance, which, added to the de- 
" finition of a Noun, constitutes the Verb?" 

Having put this most important of all gramma- 
tical questions ; the Dialogist here proposes about 
a dozen of diflferent definitions of the Verb, for Mr. 
Tookes acceptance, or rejection. Upon which, 
the latter cries out, " A truce, A truce. — I know 
'* you are not serious in laying this trash before 
" me." The Philologer of Purley then concludes 
his very meritorious labors, by pathetically observ- 
ing, that his " evening is come,'' and his " night 
^' fast approaching f' but that, *' if he should have 
" a tolerably lengthened twilight, he may still find 
" time enough for a farther conversation on this 
" subject." 

It certainly would be impossible for words to 
convey a more complete or explicit acknowledg- 
ment, (than is comprised in these concluding 
passages of Mr. Tooke's Work,) that he left the 
exposition of the Essential Nature of the Verb in 
the very same state of total darkness as that in 
which he had found it. And his merit, in this 
case, consists in his not having added to the 
'* TRASH," which preceding Grammarians had ac- 
cumulated upon the subject: While it is altogether 
Anal, Y 



176 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

manifest, that he had not himself formed any con- 
ception with regard to it, which he could deem iii 
the least degree satisfactory. It is at the same 
time evident, that Mr. Tooke fondly meditated, 
(as might well have been expected,) a future attempt 
of this grammatical desideratum. 

It is a known and a just observation in Philoso- 
phy, that the most primary and simple truths are fre- 
quently the most difficult of demonstration, or de- 
tection. Notwithstanding the very wonderful man- 
ner in which that ^^ peculiar differential circumstance 
" which, added to the definition of the Noun, 
" constitutes the Verb/' has eluded or defeated all 
the attempts of Grammarians and Philosophers 
to detect it, I venture to believe, that it is, in reality, 
a very simple matter, and a matter in the strictest 
manner demonstrable ; or rather, I must conclude 
it has already, in the course of the foregoing ana- 
lyses, been strictly demonstrated. A Verb is just 
as Much More than a Noun; as a Bridge which 
connects the Two Banks of a River, is More than 
the Same Mass of Material, (retaining the Same 
Figure,) would be if it lay along upon One Only 
(f those Banks, and thus did Not connect Ani/ 
Two Things xvhaiever. 

From this simple account of the Verb, which is 
manifestly the result of all the preceding reason- 
ings with regard to it, it is plain that the dif- 
ferential circumstance in question is merely and 
purely the External Mechanical Fact of Insertion 
— that is the Fact of the Inter-Position of 
a Noun of Action between Two Other Nouns. 
And hereupon I observe, that Insertion is the 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. m 

Sign of Assertion : Because it is a self-evident 
and indisputable truth, that Words are Nothing 
hut the Signs of our Thoughts, and that Assert- 
ing is a Voluntary Act of the Mind itself, 
of which Act any Grammatical Principle, or Sig- 
nature, can be only an External Type or SymhoL 

From this statement, which I apprehend carries 
its own evidence most conclusively along with it, 
and which would only be clouded by any addi- 
tional argument with a view to its farther illustra- 
tion, we are led clearly to discern the merits of 
the various Assumptions, or Doctrines, which have 
been advanced concerning the Essence of the 
Verb. The only definitions, or doctrines, of the 
subject which I deem worthy of consideration 
here, however, are the following two — namely — 
One which consists in supposing. That the Essence 
of the Verb lies in Assertion; And Another 
which assumes. That the Essence in question con- 
sists in an Assertion and an Attribute, The last 
mentioned of these two is the well-known doctrine 
of Mr. Harris. The former has been assumed by 
Mr. Tooke, in one place at least, in his writings ; 
and has found its advocates among later Gramma- 
rians. 

With regard to the First of these definitions, 
therefore, I observe, that it is plainly and vastly 
defective; Since a Verb is so far from being 
Merely Assertion, that it is a Compound 
Subject made up of Two different Elements— 
namely — a Noun of Action and the Associated 
Position of that Noun between Two Other Nouns. 



17^ OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

And here it is to be acknowledged, undeniably, 
that the Verb asserts : Because the insertion, 
(or INSERTING,) Hccessary to convert the Noun 
into a Verb, is the Sign of the Mind's assert- 
ing. In this manner the Vei^b asserts derivedly 
or by i^epresentation, as having for One of its Two 
Elements the External Type or Symbol of that 
Volition of the Mind which ^ve call Affirmation. 
At the same time, it is altogether conclusive, that 
a Verb consists of Two Elements — namely— a 
Noun of Action and an Associated Position 
thereof with respect to Two Other Nouns. 

With regard to the Second of the Definitions, 
now in question, I observe, that it also is defective, 
or fallacious, in a vast actual degree ; althougli not 
in a degree so extensive as the former one. For, 
notwithstanding it is virtually accorded, in this 
Second Definition, that the Verb consists of Two 
Different Elements, since it is said to contain an 
Assertion aiid an Attribute; Yet, it is a vast fallacy 
to assume that the Second Element which the Verb 
contains is an Attribute, in the sense meant by 
Grammarians ; because the Element in question 
is Not a Thing that can be attributed to Any Sin- 
gle Subject, but is the Sign of an Action or Link 
of Conjiection interposed between Two Subjects, and 
is proper to neither of them. 

These defects being thus briefly pointed out in 
the two definitions in question, respectively ; The 
whole mystery of that differential circumstance, or 
Specijic Difference, which, when added to a Noun, 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 173 

constitutes a Verb, consists manifestly, 1 appre- 
hend, in the following Element — namely — the As- 
sociated Inter-Position of that Noun between 
Two Other Nouns, this Inter-Position being 
the Signature of the Mind's Assertion ; it 
being duly provided, along with this, that No 
Noun can be so inserted, or converted, except 
Some Noun of Action. 

It is requisite here to remark, that writers upon 
this head, besides their missing the object of their 
search, have fallen into ^vedX oscitancy or contradic- 
tion of themselves with regard to it. I shall notice 
only that of Mr. Tooke, however, as a specimen 
of a proceeding by no means singular in this re- 
spect. 

He says, in One place, where he has offered a 
sort of passing definition of the Verb and the only 
definition of it which I think he attempts at all, 
that " the Verb must be accounted for from the 
** necessary use ofit in communication." To which 
he immediately adds : " It is the communication 
" ITSELF." Now, to COMMUNICATE a thing, is to 
ASSERT that thing. And there can be no doubt 
that J by the word " Communication y' Mr. Tooke 
here meant Assertion. Accordingly, it has been 
ascribed to him by other writers, that he affirmed 
Assertion to be the Essence of the Verb. Yet, in 
Another place, (Vol. 2, page 432) he denies that 
the Verb even so much as *' implies" Assertion. 
He says, ** For the Verb does not denote Time ; 
" nor does it imply any Assertion, No Single Word 
" can. Till one thing can be found to be a couple, 
*' one single word cannot make an adsertion or 



174 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

" adfirmation; for there is joining in that operation, 
*' and there can be no joining of one thing." 

In this last observation of Mr. Tooke, in my 
opinion, he evinces more of that sort of acumen 
which is adapted to the elucidation of Philoso- 
phical Grammar, than perhaps in any other part of 
his book. But he, at the same time, manifestly 
splits (as so many other Grammarians had done 
before him) upon the rock of supposing, that a 
Verb is a " Word :" Whereas I have shewn at 
large that a Verb is Not a Word, but it is a 
Word inserted or Associated between Two 
Other Words; just as a Bridge is Not an 
Arch, but it is an Arch inserted between Two 
Piers, or Abutments, 

In this place, perhaps, some explanation is re- 
quisite, in order to prevent a possible misconcep- 
tion of the Subject: For which reason I observe, 
that, in one sense, a Verb is indeed " a Word" 
— a " S1NGJ.E Word" — as it has been called by 
Mr. Tooke, Thus a Verb is a Single Word as 
contradistinguished from A Verb and its Nomi- 
native BLENDED INTO OnE APPARENT WoRD, 

which is the practice of the Latin Language, If 
therefore Mr. Tooke had beeji directing his reason- 
ing against the gross absurdity of this Latin con- 
fusion, it is certain he would, in this case, have 
been right in affirming a Verb to be a Single 
Word. And in this sense I have myself, upon a 
former occasion, asserted that a Verb is a Word 
and a Single Word. But it is in express evidence, 
in his text already quoted, that, when Mr. Tooke 
affirms tlrat a Verb is a Word — and a Single Word 



SKC. 4.3 OF VERBS. 175 

— he means that it is in its Whole Essence and 
PURITY a Wordy to the eocclusion of all co7isideration 
of its Associated Position between Txvo Other 
Nouns. His error, therefore, consists in not admit- 
ting that Associated Position (the Ej:^ternalSiGN 
of Assertion) is a Constituent Element of the 
Verb: for he deliberately and ultimately affirms 
that the Verb does not imply any assertion. 

It is to be adverted to, here, that an assumption 
of the Absoluteness of Words in their Grammatical 
Character^ or of their Never changing their Part of 
Speech in Any situation whatever ^ is one of the most 
remarkable doctrines, (and, I must add, One of 
the most sweeping absurdities,) that is to be found 
in the whole compass of the Diversions of 
PuRLEY : Concerning which, I shall have occasion 
to take farther notice in the sequel of this section ; 
and, probably, still farther in treating appropriately 
of Adverbs. At present I observe upon this head, 
in opposition to the opinion of Mr. Tooke, that 
Associated Position is a Principle of Language 
of the greatest power and comprehensiveness : It 
is the General Converting Cause of Verbs, 
as well as of Adverbs: It comprehends the 
Principle of the Alternation of a Verb in a Sentence : 
It turns Substantives into Adjectives; and Adjectives 
^ into Substantives: And it may be said to be Almost 
every thing in the Mechanism of Language, It is, 
certainly, one of the most important and most 
comprehensive of all Grammatical Principles. The 
reason of the thing, moreover, is perfectly and most 
simply explicable. In the case of Verbs, it depends 



176 OF VERBS. [cUap.2». 

upon the Generic Structure of Relatives and Rela- 
tion ; according to which Structure Every Relation 
must have a Relative Subject on Each side of it : 
and, in this case, it is a Necessary Principle. In the 
case of Adverbs, it is indeed merely a conventional 
matter : but it is a truly logical device ; and it has 
been established by the practice of all ages. In 
the case of Adjectives and of Substajitives, it has 
its foundation in the Natural order of the Associa- 
tion of our ideas ; and is, in fact, a Necessary Prin- 
ciple, since, when any Two Names of Objects 
come together, not meaning the Same Thing, One 
of these Names must be construed as a Substantive^ 
and the Other as an Adjective ; and there is nothing 
optional in the matter, except merely as to which 
Name, the frst one, or the last, Any Nation shall 
choose to account the Adjective, An example 
of this truth is afforded in the expressions, Horse- 
Chesnut and Chesnut- Horse, 

Mr. Tooke, we are to observe, grounds his view 
of the Subject upon a distinction which he makes 
between '^ i\\Q Manner of Signification of Words" 
and the " Abbreviation of their Construction," — a 
real and a most important distinction, certainly, 
in Language; — and, upon a consequent assump- 
tion, that an Abbreviation is not a Word or Sign of 
an Idea, or Ideas, but is only a Sign of Signs. 
This assumption, also, I observe, is a just one : 
and from this last it follows, for example, that a 
Noun put adverbially, or an Adjective put substan- 
tively, is not a Word ; and, when resolved into its 
primary grammatical import, it can become only a 
Noun, or an Adjective. But, after admitting this 



I8EC.40 OF VERBS. 177 

special doctrine, as I do, to be valid so far ; I ob- 
serve, that it cannot in the least degree tend to 
save Mr. Tooke's general doctrine, when it is ap- 
plied to the Verb, — which is the most important 
of all the Parts of Speech and a Necessary Part. 
Neither, indeed, can it save his doctrine when 
applied to Substantives and Adjectives ; which 
Words necessarily convert each other by Position : for 
each of these Words is a Sign of an Idea, or Parcel 
of Ideas ; and each, (I affirm,) is a Necessary Part 
of Speech, although Mr. Tooke tells us of a tribe 
of American Savages, who, he was informed, con- v ^ 

trived to do without Adjectives. 

I shall resume this topic in the next subsection, 
after having adverted to what remains to be ad- 
vanced here with regard to Assertion. 



2. 



So true is it, that the Associated Position 
of a Word is the External Sign of the Mind's as- 
serting, that I have here to suggest the Principle, 
that Adjectives contain a Sign of the Mind's 
asserting, as well as Verbs. An Adjective (any 
more than a Verb,) is Not a Mere Word or Name 
of a Thing : but it is a Name of a Thing Appo- 
sited to Another iV<2»2e o/'^ Thing. An Ad- 
jective, therefore, as well as a Verb, is a Thing 
composed of Two Different Elements. 

I repeat, therefore, that an Adjective involves a 
Sign of the Mind's Assertion. When, (for exam- 
ple,) we speak of King Alfred ; this means the 
Anal. z 



178 OF VERBS. fcHAP.S. 

Alfred Who was Khig : And", in like manner, when 
we talk of The Black Man ; this means The Man 
Who IS Black. 

And here the reader will recollect, it has been 
already shewn at large, that, in the last mentioned 
expressions of these two examples, the Verb Sub- 
stantive has No part in asser^ting that Alfred was 
King ; or that the Man is Black. This Verb only 
serves as the Necessary Link of Connection be- 
tween Each of these Nominatives and Space 
(or Time); and the real Sign of asserting that Al- 
fred was King, is the Appositing of the Name — 
King, to the Name — Alfred. Yet the Two differ- 
ent Forms of the Verb Substantive, as expressed 
here, determine that the Evetit is past in the case 
of the King, but present in that of the Black 
Man, 

I. shall prosecute this topic no farther, on the 
present occasion : Because it properly belongs to 
the Chapter of Nouns; in which place I shall ap- 
propriately resume it. 



It is necessary, in this place, to animadvert brief- 
ly upon the doctrine of Locke, and of those Phi- 
losophical Grammarians who have taken up the 
same view of the Subject with him — namely 
— that " Is and Is not are the general marks 
** of the Mind's affirming or denying." 

Mr. Tooke, although he pays a general venera- 
tion, little short of idolatry, to the genius of 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 179 

Locke, nevertheless, upon this head, blames him 
for having " too hastily adopted the opinions of 
" Aristotle, and Scaliger, and the Messrs. De Port 
" Royal, that affirming arid denying are operations 
" of the Mind." Now it is very important in this 
case to observe, that both Locke and Tooke were 
equally and egregiously wrong, in their respective 
views of the subject. 

First, therefore, I remark, that, although Locke 
was certainly right in assuming that affirmation and 
denial are Act ^ of the Mind, of which Act, a 
Verb is One of its Two Elements, in the External 
or Grammatical Sign ; yet it is equally certain that 
he was wrong in asserting the Verb Substantive 
to be the Sign in question. This mistake of 
Locke, it must be added, as well as of Aristotle 
and his other associates in the subject, is, indeed, 
one of the greatest reproaches to the human under- 
standing that is to be found in accredited Gram- 
mar : but I trust it will be found sufficiently ex- 
posed in the various places in which there will be 
occasion to touch upon it, in the course of this 
work. 

Secondly, Upon the other hand I remark, that 
Mr. Tooke finds no fault with the Grammarians in 
question, for assuming that *' Is" is the "General" 
mark of assertion : He only blames that party for 
assuming that affirming and denying are " Ope- 
" RATIONS OF THE MiND :" and this he does 
merely in consequence of his having previously 
declared a general and an exterminating war 
against All Operations of the Mind what- 
ever. 



180 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Thirdly. But it has been shewn, in the strict- 
est manner, that the Assertive Elemerd, in Every 
Verb, is only a derived Principle — namely — • 
an External Sign of an Act of the Intellect and Will, 
in consent. And it has been also shewn, as a 
thing founded in Necessity itself that the conversion 
of a Mere Noun into a Verb depends upon the 
Volition of the Mind ; which Volition is signi- 
fied by the Mouth, or by the Hand, placing this 
Noun in an Associated Position between Two 
Other Nouns, 

To return, now, to the error of Locke and his 
associates ; in which error Mr. Tooke has altoge- 
ther acquiesced ; I observe, that the Word — *' Is, 
" Am, or Was" — when it is placed between Any 
Nominative and the Noun Space, or Time, (and 
7iot before) becomes a Verb : and, as a Verb, it cer- 
tainly contains a Derived Principle of Asserting 
— ^namely^ — it Asserts Its Own Nominative to 
exist in Space, or m Time. But the grand mistake 
of the Grammarians in question consists in their 
assuming, that this Verb (whether expressed, or 
only implied, or understood,) Forms the As- 
serting Principle IN EVERY VERB : And 
hence they called it the GENERAL Copula — 
the GENERAL mark of the Mind's affirmation. 
Whereas I confidently and finally here assert, that 
it is No mark of affirmation at all, except only ofaf 
firming the existence (i. e. the Act of existing) 
of Its Own Nominative, as already said. And 
to this I add, that there is no Principle in Lan- 
guage which 1 deem it more necessary to intro- 
duce to its proper place, and to assert with the 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. J81 

utmost rigor, in order to rescue Grammar from the 
most merited contempt, than this one. 



In a Chapter concerning the Principle and the 
Act of Assertion, it appears appropriate to intro- 
duce a consideration of the corresponding Princi- 
ple and Act of Negation, This latter consideration, 
however, requires very little to be said with regard 
to it. It seems to be made out, conclusively, not 
only from the Etymological speculations of Mr. 
Tooke, but also from the concurrent report and 
much more extensive researches of Dr. Murray, 
that Negation consists, purely, in Asserting our 
Dissent from a Proposition previously put, J f this 
be admitted ; it follows, that All Denial or Nega- 
tion is Nothing but Assertion. And I not only 
adopt this Principle: but I also suppose that the 
etymological evidence concerning it has been car- 
ried to a sufficient length to justify a belief, that 
this Part of Grammar is conclusively settled. This 
conclusion, moreover, if it be solid, affords another 
instance of the necessity which mankind are laid 
under, to speak of Nothing, and in No Manner, 
except in strict conformity to the Generic Structure 
of Relatives and Relation : Which Structure, I here 
again observe, forms the Whole Grammatical 
Object, and limits the possible extent, of 
our expressions in Language. 



182 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 



SUBSECTION II. 

1. Concerning some Stinctures which have been offered 
by Professor Stewart, upon the Doctrine of Mr, 
Tooke that Every Word in Language belongs, in 
all situations, absolutely and unchangeably, to One 
and the Same Part of Speech, — 2. Of the United 
Doctrine of Mr, Tooke and Mr, Stewart conceit' 
ing the Composition a7id the Comparison of Ideas, 
Their doctrine fallacious,—^. Fallacy of Logicians, 
in supposing that the bulk of a Language is made 
up of Abstract General Terms, 



In entering upon the present article, I deem it 
proper to intimate, that the matter of it, as well as 
that of one or two of the subsequent articles of this 
chapter, will necessarily detain me, some time, 
from the more immediate work of analysis of the 
Parts of Speech ; although it is by no means 
foreign, but, on the contrary, is essentially moment- 
ous to the Nature of Language, It is certain that 
we might in vain present the completest analysis 
to the eye, if existing prejudices were not previous- 
ly removed by a clear exposition of errors which 
have crept into credit in consequence of having 
issued from high authorities. I proceed therefore 
to the matters in question ; with this only remark, 
that I think our progress, in the sequel of the 
work, will not be interrupted by any such consi- 
deration. 



SEC. 4.1 OF VERBS. 183 

In having shewn, in the foregoing article, how 
profoundly Mr. Tooke has misapprehended the 
Real Nature of Language, in asserting that Words 
possess an Absolute and Invariable Part of Speech 
in all situations ; and, how vastly he speculated 
in the dark, with respect to the Real Grammati- 
cal Objects which alone the Parts of Speech can 
signify — namely— Relatives and Relation ; 
owing to the Nature of which last it is, that the 
Same Word which is the Sign of an Absolute 
Thing in One situation, becomes that of a Relative 
Thing in Another, and of a Relation in a Third ; 
I say, in consequence of refuting this doctrine, it 
becomes necessary to provide against a confound- 
ing of the Principles which I have thus advanced 
against Mr. Tooke's opinions, with certain other 
Principles expressed in some animadversions 
which have been stated against Mr. Tooke's views 
by Professor Stewart, in his '^ Philosophical Es- 
'* saysT 

With this purpose, it is requisite, in the outset, 
to state, what I have yet omitted to do — namely — 
the doctrine of Mr. Tooke, in his own express 
words. In the First Volume of the Diversions of 
Purley, page 82, he expresses himself, to his fellow 
Pialogist, in the following terms. 

** Let them give the rule who thus confound 
*Mogether the Manner oi Signification oi words, 
" and the Abbreviations of their Coiistr action : than 
" which no two things in language can be more 
*' distinct or ought to be more carefully distin- 
*^ guished. I do not allow that any words change 
** their nature in this manner, so as to belong some 



184 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

** times to one Part of Speech, and sometimes to 
" another. I never could perceive any such flue- 
" tuation in words." 

If Mr. Tooke never did perceive this sort of 
fluctuation, at all ; it is, then, no wonder he never 
perceived, that what is a Mere Noun in One situa- 
tion, becomes a Verb in Another, But Mr. Tooke 
certainly knew, full well, that the Same Subject 
which is an Absolute Thing when considered 
merely as a Man, becomes a Relative Thing when 
it is viewed as a Lawyer, or Client : And, if he 
had known that Every Noun Absolute in Lan- 
guage, before it can be employed as a Noun Substan- 
tive, MUST OF Necessity be viewed as a Noun 
Relative ; and, if he had also known the dis- 
tinction between a Relative and a Relation ; 
he might then have easily discerned that a certain 
class of Nouns must serve as the Sign of a Rela- 
tive in One Associated Position, and as that of a 
Relation in Another, 

I shall only farther observe, upon this head, 
that it is quite plain Mr. Tooke, in the declara- 
tion just quoted, has fallen into precisely the same 
Kind and degree of the violation of Reason or 
Logic, as if he had affirmed that the Same Absolute 
Mass of Material which is merely an Arch or 
Curve in One situation, is in this situation as 
MUCH A Bridge as it is when it connects the Two 
Banks of a River. Mr. Tooke would have looked 
with pity upon an uneducated person, who should 
have fallen into so egregious an error with regard 
to the various Positive and Relative objects 
around him: What, then, are we to say to the 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 189 

same egregious error when we find it making up 
part of the boasted Fabric of the Philosophical 
Grammarian ? But I pass on, to the Strictures 
which have been offered upon this part of Mr. 
Tooke's doctrine by Professor Stewart, as men- 
tioned. And, in so doing, I observe, that the 
brevity,, which I am under the necessity of observ- 
ing, will prevent my animadverting upon more of 
the Views of Mr. Stewart than what regards the 
points immediately in question; but that I must 
not be understood as thereby implying an acquies- 
cence with the residue. 

In the Philosophical Essays of Mr. Stewart, 
and in the Fifth of those Essays (page 156), which 
is devoted to a Criticism upon the Philological 
speculations of Mr. Tooke, the former has express- 
ed himself in the following manner. 

" When I consult Johnson's Dictionary, I find 
" many words of which he has enumerated forty, 
** fifty, or even sixty different significations ; and, 
" after all the pains he has taken to distin- 
** guish them from each other, I am frequently at 
** a loss how to avail myself of his definitions. 
" Yet, when a word of this kind occurs to me in a 
" book, or even where I hear it pronounced in the 
** rapidity of viva voce discourse, I at once select^^ 
" without the slightest effort of conscious thought, 
" the precise meaning it was intended to convey. 
** How is this to be explained but by the light 
" thrown upon the problematical term by the ge- 
" neral import of the sentence ?" 

Upon this passage, and upon the conclusion 
implied in its final question, I have in the first 

Anal, 2 a 



186 OF VERBS. [chap. 2, 

place to remark, that the view of Language which 
it indicates is unquestionably just. But to this 
view I am under the necessity of objecting, that it 
does not bear either upon the STRUCTURE of 
Language considered as a System of Signs 
made up by a Disposition of the Parts of 
Speech, or upon the speculations of Mr. Tooke. 
The purpose, however, for which the passage, or 
example, was brought, by its author, was to illus- 
trate a preceding suggestion, or doctrine, con- 
cerning the STRUCTURE of Language : Which 
doctrine I must state here, in order to elucidate 
the whole matter. 

" Language, it is commonly said, is the express 
" image of thought, — and that it may be said with 
'* apparent propriety to be so, I do not dispute, 
^' when the meaning of the proposition is fully ex- 
" plained. The mode of the expression, however, 
" it ought to be remarked, is figurative ; and there- 
** fore, when the proposition is assumed as a prin- 
" ciple of reasoning, it must not be literally or 
" rigorously interpreted. This has too often been 
" overlooked by writers on the human mind. 
" Even Dr. Reid himself, cautious as he is in 
" general, with respect to the ground on which he 
"is to build, has repeatedly appealed to this 
" maxim, without any qualification whatever ; and, 
" by thus adopting it, agreeably to its letter, ra- 
" ther than to its spirit, has been led, in various 
" instances, to lay greater stress on the structure 
** of speech than (in my opinion) it can always 
" bear in a philosophical argument. As a neces- 
" sary consequence of this assumption, it has been 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 187 

" not unnaturally inferred by Logicians, that every 
" word which is not wholly useless in the vocabu- 
" lary, is the sign of an Idea ; and that these ideas 
" (which the common systems lead us to consider 
'* as the representatives of things) are the imme- 
" diate instruments, or (if I may be allowed such 
" a phrase) the intellectual tools with which the 
** mind carries on the operation of thinking. In 
" reading, for example, the enunciation of a pro- 
** position, we are apt to fancy, that for every 
" word contained in it, there is an idea presented 
"to the understanding, from the combination and 
" comparison of which Ideas, results that act of 
" the Mind called judgment. So different is all 
" this from the fact, that our words, when examin- 
" ed separately, are often as completely insignifi- 
" cant as the letters of which they are composed ; 
" deriving their meaning solely from the connec- 
" tion, or relation, in which they stand to others." 

Such is the doctrine of the Structure of Lan- 
guage laid down by Professor Stewart. And it 
is immediately after this passage that he proceeds 
to illustrate the same by an example, in which he 
says, " When I consult Johnson's Dictionary," 
&c. 

In order that I may not suffer the smallest in- 
justice to be done, in these observations, to the 
passages already quoted ; I observe, that the 
Essay which contains them forms a mixture of 
statements, which I view as being of two very 
different kinds — namely — of some that are of a na- 
ture properly Grammatical,— ^nd of others that are 
of a character Philological, indeed, but not Gram" 



188 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

matical in the strict technical sense of that term ; the 
difference between both which, I shall fully ex-^ 
plain. At the same time, I freely accord, that, in 
such an Essay, each of the subjects, although inter- 
mixed, might still be kept altogether distinct from 
the other. 

This being premised, I am now under the ne- 
cessity of observing, that, while the long passage 
last quoted has for its object Language considered 
as a System of Sig?is made up of the Grammatical 
Parts of Speech (since Mr. Stewart talks therein of 
the *' Structure of Speech'') the example given from 
Johnson's Dictionary in illustration of it, has no- 
thing TO DO with Language considered as a Struc- 
ture made up of any dispositions of the Parts of 
Speech ; but regards only the peculiar import of 
Any Single Word, considered as a Sign oi Some 
Individual object, or set of Objects* Thus the doc- 
trine in question, and the exam.ple in which it is 
supposed to be illustrated, exhibit together a com- 
plete confusion of Two Very Different Depart- 
ments in Science. The matter in question is so 
remarkable, in itself; and so important in the 
erroneous consequences which its influence must 
otherwise produce, in the minds of philosophical 
or logical students, especially in these countries ; 
that it is indispensable I should insist upon a con- 
tinuation of the subject. 

When Mr. Stewart was giving his example in 
general terms, it is pity, for the sake of the general 
reader, that he did not specify some single Word, 
as his instance. But, in default of this, he has 
furnished to the Philosopher a clue to his mean- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 189 

ing : For he says, that, in Johnson, he finds, some- 
times, forty ^ fifty ^ ^^^ even sixty different mean- 
ings under the same word : And here, therefore, 
we are certified, that he does not allude to so 
many Parts of Speech: because the English 
Language, or Any Other Language in the world, 
has not any thing like the Number of Parts of 
Speech in question. It follows, manifestly, that, 
in his said example, he does not allude to the 
Grammatical import of Any Word, but refers 

ONLY to its PECULIAR AND MeRE DiALECTICAL 
IMPORT. 

As I conceive it is impossible to shew more 
clearly than is hereby done, that his said example 
does not belong to the Grammatical Structure 
of Language; I proceed to shew, that neither does 
it apply to that Doctrine of Mr, Tooke which I have 
combated in the last subsection. At the same 
time, I observe, that the whole scope of Mr. Stew- 
art's criticism, now in question, is certainly levelled 
at Tooke's doctrine concerning the Parts of 
Speech ; because it is its aim to deny that Every 
intelligible or proper Woi^d is the Absolute Sign of 
Any Idea, or Object ; while the Absolute or Intrin- 
sic Power or Signification of Words considered as 
Parts of Speech is the very ground upon which 
Mr. Tooke supposed himself and has been supposed, 
to have effected his grand triumph over Mr. Harris 
and all preceding Grammarians. 

By the way I remark, that I cannot help being 
surprised at Mr. Stewards ascribing to *' Logicians" 
in, general, and to Dr. Reid in particular, the doc- 
trine that Every Word is the Sign of an Idea ; 



190 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

because it is certain that Mr. Tooke is the father 
of this doctrine, and that No Grammarian antece- 
dent to Tooke ever could consistently have sup- 
posed Language to be an express image of thought, 
otherwise than in ^figurative and very loose sense, 
since it never was admitted that Prepositions, or 
Conjunctions, are the Signs of Objects. 

With regard, then, to the Grammatical doctrine 
of Mr. Tooke ; I affirm my conviction, that he cer- 
tainly never meant to deny that Words change their 
individual peculiar dialectical signification according 
to their association or relative situation with Other 
Words. As, for example, if we take the Word 
Place ; No man knew better than Mr. Tooke, 
that a Place under a government, — a Place over 
subordiriates, — a Place at table, and a Place in our 
esteem, or out of it, are all very different Things : 
Nor do I suppose that any man knew better, than 
he did, that the peculiar import or signification of 
the Word — Place — in each of these examples, 
depends entirely upon the Relative situation the 
Word possesses, with respect to the Words that 
accompany it. The Grammatical Doctrine which 
Mr. Tooke labored to inculcate, when applied to 
this Word — PLACE^—amounts to this — namely — 
that the Word Place is a Noun Substantive ; 
and, therefore, that, in whatever Association it may- 
be placed with respect to Other Words, it never 
CAN CHANGE SO as to belong to Any Part of 
Speech except the Noun Substantive: And, he 
intended the same reasoning to apply to Every 
Word in Language, considered as belonging to 
one, or other, oi what are called the PARTS OF 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 191 

SPEECH. His words admit of neither doubt nor 
hesitation. ** I do not allow" (says he) ** that any 
" Words change their nature in this manner, so as 
" to belong sometimes to One Part of Speech, 

" AND sometimes TO ANOTHER." I trUSt it is 

conclusively manifest, therefore, that the present 
view of Mr. Stewart does not bear, in the least de- 
gree, upon the doctrine of Tooke. 

But the doctrine of Mr. Tooke, although not 
affected by the view in question, explodes itself in 
a moment, whenever we handle it. For (not to 
repeat how signally it is refuted by the formation 
of Verbs out of Mere Nouns,) the moment we pro- 
nounce the word Place-man — the Noun Sub- 
stantive — Place — becomes a Noun Adjective. 

The matter intended for the next division of this 
article renders it proper to postpone any conclud- 
ing observations upon the present topic. 



2. 



The criticisms which have been offered by Pro- 
fessor Stewart upon the writings of Mr. Tooke, in 
the Essay already mentioned, are, as before ob- 
served, of two very different kinds : The One being 
of a nature in a general way Philosophical, or 
Philological : The Other, strictly or technically 
Grammatical, 

That the speculations of Mr. Stewart, of the 
first mentioned kind, have their merits, I have no 
wish to deny : Although, whatever these may be, 
is a matter entirely foreign to my present object to 



192 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

discuss. With regard, on the other hand, to his 
Grammatical Strictures, I am laid under an un- 
avoidable necessity to examine them, from the in- 
fluence they are otherwise likely to possess, owing 
to the general literary reputation of their author. 
The Criticisms of this kind, which Mr. Stewart 
has deemed fit to offer, are very few in number : 
And I am constrained to believe that they will 
not add to his future literary fame. If I am in an 
error, upon this head, the Criticism which I have 
already discussed, and the discussion of that 
which is now immediately to follow, must form the 
evidences against me : and I shall be content to 
be sentenced by their evidence, if the same be 
duly investigated by competent judges. 

The Stricture to which I find it necessary, in 
the present instance, to solicit the particular atten- 
tion of readers, is one in which Professor Stewart 
desists from his general opposition to the views of 
Mr. Tooke ; and exhibits to us the wonderful 
phenomenon of his uniting with that extraordinary 
metaphysician, in denying that Language is found- 
ed upon Operatimis of the Mind ; or, in effect, 
that there are Such Things in the Mind, at all, as 
Operations upon which Speech could be founded. 
The doctrine thus promulgated, by two writers 
eminently distinguished in this country, by their 
different departments of philosophical literature, 
is so vastly fallacious in itself, so destructive of 
the possible erection of a Science of Language, 
and so perniciously erroneous in the Nature which 
it ascribes to the Human Mind, that it cannot be 
too rigorously examined. The portion of Met a- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 193 

physical History, moreover, which it is necessary to 
state, in order to its due exposition, will furnish a 
most instructive lesson to the rising Philosopher : 
with which portion of history, therefore, I shall 
commence its investigation. 

In Dr. Reid's " Essays on the Intellectual 
" Powers,'' (Essay 4. Chap. 4.) he lays down the 
following assumptions. ** Every man is conscious 
" of a succession of thoughts which pass in his 
" mind while he is awake, even when they are not 
" excited by external objects." 

" The mind on this account may be compared 

" to liquor in the state of fermentation" " in 

'* the state of fermentation, it has some cause of 
" motion in itself, which, even when there is no 
" cause of motion from without, suffers it not to ' 
*' be at rest for a moment, but produces a constant 
'* motion and ebullition, while it continues to fer- 
" ment." — — " From the constitution of the mind 
" itself there is a constant ebullition of thought, a 
** constant intestine motion; not only of thoughts 
** barely speculative, but of sentiments, passions 
'* and affections, which attend them."— — " It is 
" often called the train of ideas. This may lead 
** one to think, that it is a train of bare concep- 
*' tions ; but this would surely be a mistake. It is 
" made up of many other operations of mind, as 
" well as of conceptions, or Ideas." 

Now, taking the words " motion, fermentation, 
*' ebullition,''' &c. in a figurative sense, as was in- 
tended by Dr. Reid, I altogether concur with 
him in the view expressed in the passages 
above quoted. But, in his case, they have been 
Anal, 2 b 



194 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

accompanied by his usual fortune, of exhibiting 
an astonishing inconsistency with himself. For 
it was the fixed intention of Dr. Reid, at the same 
time, to DENY that there are in the Mind any such 
things as Ideas in the sense of Locke : (Which last 
mean occasional Ideal Formations in the Mind 
in the likeness of EMernal Objects, and which Ideal 
Formations the Intellect compai^es together and 
thereupon forms Judgments of their agreements, or 
disagreements, — a doctrine which Locke taught 
with a philosophic purity divested of the errors of 
the Aristotelian Scheme ; and which I have, on 
various occasions, labored to assert with peculiar 
evidence:) And any clown could have suggested 
to Dr. Reid, that, in order to the boiling of a pot, 
there must be something in the pot, to be boiled. 
The inconsistency of Reid in this case, however, 
appears not to have been overlooked by his Dis- 
ciple ; who, at least by the time that he thought 
of giving his Philosophical Essays to the world, 
discovered the necessity of either sinking as much 
as possible these xvorkings of the Mind, or else 
admitting that there must be something therein to 
be agitated. Accordingly, therefore, in his stric- 
tures against Mr. Tooke's Grammatical doctrine, 
Mr. Stewart (although he sometimes and unavoid- 
ably mentions intellectual processes and Opera- 
tions) exhibits to us the spectacle of appearing to 
turn suddenly round upon the doctrine of his 
Master, and to strike with one blow at the root of 
All his " motions like liquor in the state offermen- 
** tation,'' and All his " ebullitions,'" and All his 
** trains of Ideas,'' and all his ^^ many other opera- 



S12C.4.] OF VERBS. 195 

" tions,^' as well as conceptions or ideas ;" — thus 
taking up his philosophical ground with Mr. Tooke, 
by expressing himself as if there were No Such 
Things r/^ THESE Operations in the mind. 

Those who are well acquainted with the zeal, 
and the unqualified totality, with which Mr. Stew- 
art, in the First Volume of his Elements, has 
maintained Dr. Reid's Theory of Ideas and of 
the Mind ; especially, if they should at the same 
time not have attended to what he has advanced 
in his Philosophical Essays with regard to Mr. 
Tooke's speculations ; must, doubtless, think that I 
have egregiously misconceived, or mistated, the 
meaning of the former. It is proper, therefore, 
that they should judge of this, from his own ex- 
pressions ; which, for this purpose, I shall now 
quote. In his Fifth Essay (already referred to,) 
page 157, he continues his observations thus : 

" In instances of this sort, it will be generally 
*' found, upon an accurate examination, that the 
** intellectual act, as far as we are able to trace it, 
" is altogether simple, and incapable of analysis ; 
" and that the elements into which we flatter our- 
'* selves we have resolved it are nothing more than 

** the grammatical elements of Speech ; the logi- 

** cal doctrine about the comparison of ideas bearing 
'* a much closer affinity to the task of a school-boy 
" in parsing his lesson, than to the researches of 
** philosophers, able to form a just conception of 
" the mystery to be explained." 

If it were granted here for argument's sake (al- 
though it is very far from being true even in the 
case to which this passage directly refers— namely 



196 OJF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

— that of the peculiar dialectical import of a Word 
uttered amongst other Words in a sentence) — that 
the apprehension of it is by an act ** altogether sim- 
** pie ;" I should nevertheless deny, most decidedly, 
that the elements into which we flatter ourselves we 
have resolved our Ideas in the case of Intel- 
lectual Operations in general are nothing 
more than the *' grammatical elements of Speech''' 
And, if Mr. Stewart did not mean to assert his 
position as a General Principle, it was plainly 
nugatory and beside the subject to assert it ar all., 
But it is certain that he did intend to assert it as a 
General Principle ; because he, in general terms, 
adds, that "the logical doctrine about the compari- 
" SON OF Ideas bears an affinity to the task of a 
" schooUboy in parsing his lesson,'' And, indeed, 
he immediately afterwards says, " These" obser- 
'* vations are general, and apply to every case in 
" which language is employed." 

NoWj therefore, at the risk of the consequences, 
I altogether deny that the doctrine of the compa- 
rison OF ideas bears the smallest affinity to the 
task of a School-boy in parsing his lesson : And 
I deem it to be of the last importance to confute 
this assumption, as a fallacy destructive alike of the 
true Theory of the Mind and of the Philosophy of 
Language. But first, I must repeat, as already 
observed, that this doctrine of Mr. Stewart chimes 
in, with a wonderful and ominous coincidence, 
with that of Mr. Tooke, concerning the Mind and 

its Operations ; a doctrine which the latter has 

stated in the First Volume of the Diversions of 
Purley ; and to which the general lustre of his ety- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 197 

mological speculations has probably lent a most 
undeserved credit with the greater part of his 
readers. This Creed, which I have already no- 
ticed with decided dissent in the Jirst section of 
the^r^^ chapter of this work, I deem fit to cite 
here in the words of Mr. Tooke, as expressed in 
pages 36 and 37, of the Volume referred to. It 
casts blame upon Locke for having " talked of 
** the composition of ideas'' And asserts, that he 
ought " to have seen that it was merely a contriv- 
" ance of Language, and that the only composition 
"was in the terms ; and, consequently, that it was 
** as improper to speak of a comple:v idea, as it 
*' would be to call a constellation a complex 
" star." But this same doctrine is more fearlessly 
and fully expressed in page 51, in the following- 
terms. 

The Dialogist, JB, says, " Those" (words) " which 
" you call necessary, I suppose you allow to be the 
" signs of different sorts of Ideas, or of different 
*' Operations of the mind ?" 

To which Mr. Tooke replies, ** Indeed I do 
** not. The business of the mind, as far as it con- 
" cerns Language, appears to me to be very 
" simple. It extends no farther than to receive 
** impressions, that is, to have Sensations or Feel- 
** ings. What are called its operations are merely 
** the operations of Language. A consideration 
*' of Ideas, or of the Mind, or of Things, (relative to 
" the Parts of Speech) will lead us no farther than 
" to Nouns : i. e. the Signs of those impressions or 
*' names of ideas." 

It is difficult to pronounce, here, whether it is 



198 OF VERBS. [chap. 2, 

more melancholy, to see any writer of consideration 
capable of uttering this account of the Operations 
of the Human Mind, or deplorable to find a wri- 
ter of Professor Stewart's general tone of Specula- 
tion for a moment associated with him in a posi- 
tion so humiliating ; And yet, I think, one of the 
passages which I have quoted from Mr. Stewart 
does certainly associate him with Home Tooke, 
in this doctrine, beyond a possibility of its being 
explained away. At any rate, I feel it necessary 
to oppugn the Assumptions of both these writers, 
jointly and distinctly ; which I cannot adequately 
designate, in a manner demanded by the interests 
of Philosophy to prevent the mischievous conse- 
quence to which they would lead, unless by an 
appearance of declamation foreign to my wish, by 
calling the one a sounding brass, and the other a 
tinkling cymbal^ alike a discredit to the logical cha- 
racter of the age which gave them birth. By these 
designations, therefore, I deem it proper to inti- 
mate, 1 intend no personal disrespect; but only 
design to mark the depth to which I here stake 
my judgment to an opposition to these doctrines. 

First, therefore, I observe, with regard to the 
position of Mr. Tooke, that it has been so fully 
demonstrated, in the foregoing pages, that Words 
are nothing but things analogous to the Shadows 
of our Thoughts, that, it is altogether certain and 
indisputable, the Structure or Compositioti of Lan^ 
guage must strictly resemble the Structure or Com- 
position of our Ideas : In other words, the Parts of 
Speech, in Any Portion of Language, when duly 
PARSED, must be disposed in a perfectly similar 



SKC. 4.] OF VERBS. 199 

Arrangement to that of the Relative Association of 
the Thoughts which this Portion of Language ex- 
presses. What, then, becomes of Mr. Tooke's 
assertion that " the business of the mind, as far as 
" it concerns Language, extends no farther than to 
" receive impressions, that is to have Sensations or 
" Feelings ;" and that what " are called the opera- 
** tions of the mind, are only the operations of 
" Language ?" I would here merely ask, Is the 
Operation of Arranging or Composing Ob- 
jects, (by the Mind) into Relatives and interposed 
Relations, nothing but a Sensation or Feel- 
ing? And, having asked this question, I should 
deem it an insult to common sense to bestow any 
farther time upon this doctrine of Mr. Tooke. 

Secondly, therefore, with regard to the position of 
Mr. Stewart, I observe, in the first place, that, 
if the Comparison of Ideas be, indeed, as he as- 
sumes, a '' mystery f it follows, that a demonstration 
of the connection of the steps of a Geometrical 
Theorem and that of the connection of equivalency 
between the Sums of the Quantities on the Two 
Sides of an Algebraical Equation are mysteries : 
Which things, above all others in the world, the 
human mind is believed most clearly and complete- 
ly to apprehend. But I humbly conceive that the 
comparison of our ideas, and the formation of 
judgments in result, form together the least mys- 
terious and most certain department of all our 
knowledge. 

But, to let alone general assertion, and to place 
the present question in a most conclusive light, 
I here propose a certain test of the validity of 



200 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Mr. Stewart's assumed affinity between the Com- 
pa?ison of ideas and the parsing of a Lesson : And 
the test which I propose, is a lesson to be parsed; 
while the lesson, to be so parsed, shall be, at the 
same time, a Scientific Proposition. This expedient, 
I think, cannot fail to convince the dullest under- 
standing, whether, or not, there is any affinity be- 
tween the Two Things in question. 1 therefore 
propose the following Sentence. 

Two into Three into Four adding One, 
equal Three into Two into Three adding Nine 
subtracting Two. 

Now, in this grammatical lesson, such Words as 
Two, Three, Four, One, must be parsed as Nouns ; 
the Word — into — as a F reposition ; the Words 
adding and subtracting as Participles ; and the 
Word EQUAL as a Verb, whose Nominative is the 
Sum of the expressions on One side of the Equation, 
and whose Accusative is the Sum of the e:vpressions on 
the Other Side. 

Here, then, to use the phrase of Mr. Stewart, 
we have resolved this sentence into its " Gram" 
" matical Flements of Speech!' 

But I ask. Is there any person who can con- 
found this Grammatical resolution, with that of 
the Process, or Seines of Processes, o/* Arithmeti- 
cal Science which is signified in the Sentence 
thus parsed ? It is perfectly self evident, that the 
Grammatical Resolution is One Thing ; and the 
Arithmetical Solution (if it were here made,) would 
be infinitely Another : Although both the Sciences 
in question are signified by the same identical 
train of Signs. 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 201 

And here, in order to do full justice to my argu- 
ment, it is requisite that we should go through the 
process last alluded to. The Sentence already 
given for our example, whether it be considered 
as 2l Grammatical or as an Arithmetical Sentence, is 
a Synthesis — that is, it is a Chain of Elevients 
connected together and forming One Whole, And 
we have seen that it has been resolved into a 
Grammatical analysis by the process called parsing. 
In order to complete the argument, therefore, we 
must now resolve this Sentence into an Arithme- 
tical analysis ; and then compare the two results 
together. Now the Arithmetical or Algebraical 
analysis, here proposed, will consist in the follow- 
ing Arithmetical Elements, each taken as uncon- 
nected with another. 

2x3x4+1 = 3x2x3 + 9 — 2 
And here, in fine, I would ask, Does the Arith- 
metical Idea of the Number 2, resolve itself into 
the Grammatical Idea of a Noun? Does the 
Arithmetical /^o'efif of the Action of multiplying, 
or of adding, or of subtracting, resolve itself into 
the Grammatical Idea of a Preposition, or a 
Participle ? Or, Does our Idea of the Action 
OF equalling (which now exists between the 
Sums of the Quantities on Each Side of the Equa- 
tion) resolve itself into our Notion of a Verb ; 
which last, we know, is Nothing but the exter- 
nal Signature or Record of that Action ; just 
as the Noun Two, or Three, is Nothing but 
an Ejcteriial Sign or Record of the Arithmetical Idea 
of2, or3? 

In a word, I may ask, Could not any boy, who 
AnaL 2 c 



202 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

had learned Arithmetic but liad never learned 
Grammar, comprehend that truth of the Science of 
Arithmetic which the Sentence contains, without in 
the least being able to resolve the Sentence into 
its Grammatical Elements, or so much as knowing 
a Noun, from a Verb? And, upon the other 
band, Could not any one, who had learned Gram- 
mar but had never learned Arithmetic, resolve the 
the Sentence into its Grammatical Elements, with- 
out having the least conception whether the Arith- 
metical Relations which it expresses are true, or 
false? 

What, then, becomes of that Doctrine which 
would introduce so deplorable a confusion into 
General Logic, as the confounding of the Laws of 
the Composition of the Operations of the 
Mind, — and of the Scientific and Dialecti- 
cal Comparison of our Ideas, — with the Mere 
Syntactical Laws of Grammar ? 

In a Subsection in the Introductory Chapter of 
this work, in the course of pointing out the egre- 
gious mistake of Condillac and, of those who 
have in any extent adopted his views with 
regard to the Nature of Language, I intimated, 
that it would appear, in the sequel, what fruits 
had flowed from that fallacious doctrine. The 
mistake of Professor Stewart with regard to 
Grammar, which I have labored to shew in the 
present article, is the fruit to which I then imme- 
diately alluded : And it will here become mani- 
fest to the reader, that his confounding the Laws 
of Gra7nmar, with the Laws of the Connection of our 
Ideas in Ally or in A n y, oUhe Various Other Depart- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 203 

vients of knowledge, is, in fact, no other thing than 
a new and special instance of the General mis- 
take of confounding Language with Science, which 
was exposed in the article above referred to. Any 
brief commentary, which could be offered upon 
this result, could hardly be adequate to express 
the extent of confusion which has flowed, and 
may flow, from the Original mistake in question. 
The only remark 1 shall offer with regard to it, 
therefore, is, that we find it has produced the 
portentous event, that, in order to enable the Gram- 
marian Stew^art to coincide with the Graminarian 
Tooke, the Metaphysician of Edinburgh has 
coalesced with the Metaphysician ofPurley!!! 

Finally, I observe, Mr. Stewart calls the doc- 
trine with which I have sided, in the present argu- 
ment, by the name of the " logical doctrine of the 
'' compainson of ideas,'' 1 notice this for the sake of 
explaining, that, although the doctrine thus deno- 
minated is that of Locke and his followers, I 
have not, in my exposition of it, had the senti- 
ments of any logical writer in view, except merely 
a general recollection of the ground occupied with 
regard to it by Locke himself At the same time, 
T remark, that the view and illustration of the sub- 
ject which I have herein submitted, is nothing but 
what may be fairly and obviously deduced from 
Locke's Principles : Which Principles I have 
merely exemplified, here, according to my own 
uniform conceptions of the subject, as expressed 
at large in the Chapter of Judgment and Relations, 
in the " First Lines of the Human Mind." 



204 OF VERBS. [chap. 2, 



If I have been justified by the foregoing reason- 
ings, in the opposition which is now offered to the 
united doctrines of Mr. Tooke and Professor 
Stewart with regard to the Nature of Ideas and to 
the Objects of Language, I cannot think that the 
result can be viewed as being other than of the 
highest importance to the Science of Logic in 
general, and to that of Language in particular. But 
I must now^ close these animadversions, owing to 
the press of other matter which leaves me no room 
to prosecute them farther. And, indeed, what are 
now before the reader comprehend those views of 
Mr. Stewart which it was most material to the 
subject to examine : although they embrace not 
all those Grammatical views of that writer which I 
cannot help considering as being other than fortu- 
nate. I shall conclude this article, therefore, by 
soliciting the attention of my readers to an addi- 
tional consideration ; which, I trust, will afford a 
very satisfactory completion of what has been ad- 
vanced. 

In a matter which admits of clear and determin- 
ate proof, such as that of the vast distinction which 
has been shewn to exist between the Laws of either 
the Scientific or the Dialectical Connections of our 
Ideas and the Laws of the Grammatical Connections of 
Words, it would be altogether sufficient to demon- 
strate the error of those who have confounded the 
Two Systems, although we should not in the least 
be able to gain a sight of the stumbling block, or 
cause, which had betrayed the party into such a 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 2(^ 

fallacy. But, still, it must be a matter highly sa- 
tisfactory to scientific curiosity, when, to a de- 
monstration of the error, we can add an exposition 
of the way in which it originated. Now it fortu- 
nately happens that we have, if I mistake not, in 
the case in question, a certain clue to the cause 
which betrayed Mr. Tooke into his error. And, 
if this prove true, it may probably tend to account 
for the coincidence of opinion which Professor 
Stewart has given into, in the present case. In the 
exposition of this cause, moreover, I shall have to 
suggest a Principle in Language, which will ap- 
pear strangely to contradict a universal maxim of 
Logicians with regard to its general nature ; and 
to which, therefore, I would particularly solicit 
attention in this place : Although the Principle in 
question cannot be treated in full, until we arrive 
at the chapter of Nouns. 1 proceed to the fact 
which is our immediate object. 

When I first perused the assertion of Mr. Tooke 
(Vol. 1, pages 36, 37 of his work) that Locke ought 
not to " have talked o{ ihe composition of ideas, but 
" would have seen that it was merely a contrivance 
** of Language : and that the only composition 
*' was in the terms ; and that consequently it was 
** as improper to speak of a comple.v idea, as it 
" would have been to call a constellation a com- 
" plex star;" I never was more surprised at the 
certain and palpable untruth of any doctrine; nor 
could I in the least conceive from what cause such 
a view of the subject could possibly have arisen. 
At the same time, I noticed that Mr. Tooke, in 
his context, immediately adds, that " they are not 



206 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

'' ideas, but merely terms, which are general and 
*' ahstractr It was plain, however, from this last 
expression, that the writer had grounded his doc- 
trine of Composition upon the assumption that 

it is NOT IDEAS, but MERELY TERMS, that are GE- 
NERAL and abstract: though, (like Mr. Stewart 
on various occasions,) Mr. Tooke, in the present 
case, does not furnish his readers with a train of 
reasoning ; but is satisfied with uttering a mere 
dictum, which leaves much to conjecture, or re- 
flection. 

And hereupon I remark, in the first place, that 
Mr. Tooke's above-mentioned assumption (which 
is also that of all sound Philosophers) is true : it 
certainly is not ideas, but merely terms, that 
are general and abstract. This position being 
conceded ; We are now to search for the Cause or 
Reason why Mr. Tooke makes this assumption 
a ground for denying the Composition of ideas : 
aiid why Mr. Stewart degrades and denies the 
doctrine of the Comparison of Ideas: For both 
these doctrines must stand, or fall, together. 

This Cause, I confess, did not strike me until 
after some time and reflection. But I now think 
it must be found to consist in the following 
consideration ; although I can only derive it from 
conjecture, as neither Mr. Tooke nor Mr. Stewart 
expresses any such matter, along with his views of 
the subject. It is a Maxim of Logicians and 
Grammarians, which I believe no one has ever 
thought of calling in question, iXmiihe great bulk 
of Words in a Language are Abstract General 
Terms. Now this Maxim being assumed, toge- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 207 

ther with the Truth that it is not ideas, but 
MERELY TERMS, that are general and abstract ; these 
two premises lead syliogistically to the inevi- 
table conclusion, that, in all the Concatenations 
signified by Language, there is signified No Conca- 
tenation or Composition o/* Ideas, but '' Only a Cojn- 
* ' position o/* T E R M s . " 

The argument is so manifestly complete in its 
Form, that (" as Logicians love to speak") if both 
the Major and the Minor Proposition be true, 
the Conclusion cannot be false. Thus it is : Ab- 
stract General Terms are Nothing but Names : 
But the bulk of the Words in a Language is made 
of Abstract General Terms : Therefore, the Com- 
positions expressed by Language are Nothing but 
Coni'positions q/" T e r m s . 

I trust the reader will be of opinion with me in 
concluding, that this is the very and the only 
argument upon which Mr. Tooke could have built 
his astonishing doctrine of Composition. 

But what will be said, here, ifive can strike at the 
root of this argument by denying the Minor Propo- 
sition which it contains ? What will be said, by 
Logicians, if we may, with demonstrable truth, 
DENY that there is Any Such Thing in Lan- 
guage as an Abstract General Term ; pro- 
vided, always, that the word Term be taken to 
mean, as it certainly does mean in the sense of 
Mr. Tooke and of all other Writers, ax Abstract 
Noun Substantive? But I do here expressly 
and altogether deny this: and I have not the 
smallest fear concerning the proofs which must 
support this denial. Nor do I think a greater 



208 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

service could be rendered to the subject, in this 
part of my work, than by pointing out the real and 
great fallacy of the prevailing Maxim, that the 
bulk of Nouns Substantive in Lansfuag-e are Ab- 
STRACT General Terms. 

In the First place, therefore, I affirm, that Any 
Such Word as Thing, Animal, or Man, is not a 
Noun Substantive. Secondly; Neither, with 
the addition of an Adjective, does the complex 
Term become a Noun Substantive ; such as when 
we say, White Mail, Strong Man, or Wise Man, 
Thirdly ; But if, to the term Man, or White Man, 
we add, or prefix, Any Numeral or Distribu- 
tive Definitive, such as when we say — A Man, 
Tke White Man, Any Man, Some White Men, 
All Men ; This Distributive Dejinitive is an In- 
dividuating Principle ; it possesses the Gram- 
matical Virtue of leavening the whole mass of 
Terms with which it is connected, a7id thus 
converts the Abstract General Term Man, 
or White Man, into a Concrete : And thus Every 
Noun Substantive in Language is, and must be, a 
Concrete Term. As, for example, when it is 
said that Man is mortal ; this expression must be 
resolved into All Men are Mortal ; because the 
Word — Man — until it is converted into a Con- 
crete term by virtue of the word All, (or Some 
Such Individuating Term) is Not a Sign of any Thing 
in the Universe, and in fact means Nothing 
whatever. 

It is hardly worth while to remark, here, that 
the few solitary persons who still cherish the doc- 
trine of Abstract General Ideas, will, of course, 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS, 209 

contend that the Word Man is the Sign of a 
General Man, and is therefore the Sign of an Ob- 
ject, even ivhen it is not converted into a Sign of One 
or More Individual Men. Those persons must 
be left to their own opinion. It is enough to ob- 
serve, that both Mr. Tooke and Mr. Stewart, and 
the great bulk of Philosophers downward from 
Hobbes and Locke, (together with Aristotle him- 
self,) are unanimous in the conviction that General 
Terms are the Signs of Nothing except of Any Num- 
ber of Individual Objects, Hence, therefore, my 
present argument against Mr. Tooke's doctrine 
must be admitted, as being finally conclusive. 

It is now to be pointed out and remarked by 
what kind of mistake Logicians and Grammarians 
have always supposed, that the great bulk of Words 
in a Language consists of Abstract General Terms. 
The truth is, that the great bulk of Words in a 
Lexicon is certainly made up of Abstract Gene- 
ral Terms. But I have to suggest here, as was 
hinted in the First Section of this Chapter, and is 
a distinction of very primary importance, that the 
Words in a Lexicon are Not Language. On 
the contrary, those Words, or Terms, are Mere- 
ly Materials adapted to be composed into 
Language. No Word in a Lexicon either affirms 
or denies or compresses Any Thing exxept an Insular 
Noun without Relativeness to Any Thing Else in the 
U7iiverse, The Words in a Lexicon bear the Very 
Same Relativeness to Language, that Letters in 
the Box of the Compositor bear to Any Portion 
of Speech which the; Compositor afterwards 
Anal I 2 d 



210 OF VERBS, [chap. 2. 

SETS UP xvith those Letters, And the Necessajy 
consequence of drawing Words from a Lexicon and 
setting them up in a Book, or Speech of Any Sort, is 
the CONVERSION of these Words from being Ab- 
stract General Terms, to being Concrete 
Individuating Terms: While the Sign of Con- 
version is, necessarily, either the expressing 
or the understanding of Some Distributive 
Definitive annexed to the Abstract Terms in 
question. For the Things called Words cannot be 
made Language at all, except by making them the 
Signs of our Ideas of the INDIVIDUAL Objects 
that are, or have been, or shall be, in the Universe. 

What may be farther proper to advance, upon 
the present head, belongs appropriately to the 
Chapter of Nouns: And, therefore, I shall not 
enlarge upon the subject at present. Enough, I 
trust, has been advanced, in this place, to disprove 
demonstratively the assumption that the bulk of 
Words in a Language (as those Words must be 
construed) are Abstract General Terms. And, 
with this exposition, it is manifest that the whole 
doctrine of Mr. Tooke that Compositioii is not in 
Ideas, but only in Terms^ falls completely to the 
ground. 

What, indeed, could be more deplorable, even 
considered apart from the proofs now furnished, 
than an assumption that Words should have Com- 
position, and that the Things of which Words 
ARE THE Signs should not have a Composition, 
distinct from though collateral with the former. 
But let us listen, here, to the Language of Mr. 
Tooke himself, when he comes to treat of Preposi- 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 1^.1 

tions; where he forgets his Principal Doctrine, 
and indulges in such Language as follows. And, 
in so doing, let us draw the proper conclusion 
with regard to the consistency of the two distin- 
guished Writers now in question, from the fact that 
both Mr. Tooke and Professor Stewart frequently 
mention the Ideas and Operations of the Mind, al- 
though they so wonderfully deny to the Mind any 
Such Functions as the Comparison or Composition 
of Ideas. 

** For having occasion" (says Mr. Tooke) " in 
** communication, to mention ^. collection of Ideas 
** for which there is no one simple complex term m 
** the Language, we take that term which includes 
" the greatest number though not All of the Ideas 
*' we would communicate." — " Diversions of Pur- 
*'ley,'' Vol. 1. page 320. 

It must be in the recollection of the reader, that 
I have already pointed out this glaring contradic- 
tion in the Doctrine of Mr. Tooke, in the first chap- 
ter of this work. And here again I would ask. What 
becomes of the Doctrine that '* the only Composi- 
" tion is in the terms ;" When *^ collections of 
" ideas" are herein expressly mentioned as being 
the Objects of which Terms are Nothing but the 
Signs? 

After what has been advanced in the introduc- 
tory chapter and in the present article, with regard 
to the fallacy now under consideration, I trust I 
may pass on, with a hope that the real merits of 
the Subject are sufficiently exposed, to arrest the 
progress of those consequences which must other- 



212 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

wise have continued to flow from it, in perverting 
the logical views of those whose Office it may be to 
teach the Principles of Reason, in time to come. 
-But, in quitting this topic, there is one remark 
which I would particularly suggest for the atten- 
tion of every reader of what has gone before. It 
has appeared that Mr. Stewart, in his view of the 
Subject, makes use of the phrase — " closer affinity T 
Now this phrase, if not qualified by any limitation, 
is extremely loose or indefinite : for there are no 
Two Objects in the Universe between which there 
is not, in a Philosophical sense, some affinity or 
analogy. But Mr. Stewart (very properly) has 
qualified this expression ; or, rather, has preceded 
it with a definite and precise assumption : And 
the purpose of my present remark is to caution 
any reader, not to take the word " affinity y' in 
this case, for the ground of his judgment, inasmuch 
as this expression might be explained to a very 
great latitude. It is upon the definite assertion of 
Mr. Stewart, that " the Elements into which we 
*' flatter ourselves we have resolved" the Compo- 
nent Ideas signified by any Concatenation of Lan- 
guage " are nothing more than the Grammatical 
^^ Elements of Speech,'' ihdX we are to reason and 
draw our conclusion. And here I expressly say, 
Any Concatenation or Portion of Language ; be- 
cause we have seen, Mr. Stewart has affirmed that 
his " observations are general, and apply to every 
" case in which language is employed." 

The question to be considered by future writers 
on Logic, therefore, is, Whether they will conclude 
that the Train of Component Ideas signified by Any 



SEC. 4.] OF VERBS. 213 

Proposition or Portion of Speech (let it, for exam* 
pie, be the Train of co-operating Ideas of Quanti- 
ties signified by the verbal expression of an Alge- 
braical Equation, although a Train of Any Other 
Ideas would do as well) can be resolved into No 
Elements except Those Elements contended for 
by Mr. Tooke and Mr. Stewart — namely — ^The 
" Grammatical Elements of Speech T 

SUBSECTION III. 

Examination of the Assumption of Dr. Murray and 
Other Eminent Etymologists, that Verbs existed 
prior to Nouns. 

I HAVE given to the topic, which forms the Sub- 
ject of the present article, the distinction of a se- 
parate head, chiefly in order to shew the unsafety 
of grounding our views of Language upon mere 
etymological evidence; and, more especially, in 
forming conclusions the actual evidences of which 
cannot certainly be traced back to that epoch of 
Speech to which the conclusion in question is re- 
ferred. I proceed, at once, to state the Assump- 
tion which the following observations with regard 
to it are intended to confute. 

*' Many philological inquirers" (says Dr. Mur- 
ray, in his First Volume, page 236) " have main- 
*' tained, in a plausible but inconsiderate manner, 
** that nouns, or names of objects, must have been 

*' invented before verbs or names of actions." 

*' When the father of men gave names to the ani- 
** mals in Eden, he certainly obtained time to 
" learn their qualities; at least, if the obvious ety. 



SU OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

" mologies, some of which are g'ven by Moses 
** himself, may be admitted as evidence, the matter 
*' is placed beyond any doubt. It is certain that 
" the verb was invented before the noun in all the 
" Languages of which a tolerable account has been 
" procured either in ancient or in modern times," 

It must be evident to every reader, who is at all 
in the subject, that the place to offer a full or pro- 
per objection to the assumption expressed by Dr. 
Murray in the leading proposition of the passage 
above quoted, was not until after I had strictly 
demonstrated that the Name of an Action, 
when taken alone, f^ Not a Verb ; and shewn, that 
it furnishes a striking test of the deplorable state 
of the Philosophy of Language, when a writer of 
eminence, in treating guardedly of the matter in 
question, deliberately talks of " Verbs or Names 
*' of Actions" as being Synonymous Terms or One 
Same Thing. The time however is now come, 
when it appears proper to state this objection : 
And, in so doing, I have only to point out the con- 
fusion in Grammar which it causes ; as furnishing 
an indisputable proof that Dr. Murray, when he 
asserted the prior existence of Verbs to Nouns, 
did not mean, or contemplate, Verbs at all, but 
had in his imagination Merely Nouns of Action. 

After this exposition, it must be altogether un- 
necessary to take up much time with any farther 
discussion of the subject. For it appears, from all 
testimonies, to be a fact, which I suppose no one 
will ever attempt to deny, that Subjects or 
Agents, in the very origin of Speech, (as far as 
that origin can be traced,) were usually, or perhaps 



SEC, 4] OF VERBS. 215 

universally, denominated by the Name of Some 
Action which they most naturally performed. Mr. 
Tooke (long before Dr. Murray) pointed out both 
the truth and the manner of this designation : and 
I never saw any reason to question his explanation 
of the matter. 

In the very beginning of Speech, indeed, those 
Names of Actions which have since been taken to 
signify the Performers of those Actions may be 
supposed to have been Only Adjective Names. A 
Tree or Grower, (for example) might possibly have 
been called a Growing Thing ; A River, a Run- 
ning Thing ; A Father, a Begetting Tui'mG, And, 
if this was the fact, the Substantive — ^Thing — or 
Whatever Other Word was employed in this office — 
Would soon be sunk for ever, for the sake of dis- 
patch in utterance. If this be supposed to have 
been the case ; then, the fact which Mr. Tooke has 
asserted becomes highly natural and probable. 

" The terms you speak of (says he) ** however 
*' denominated in construction, are generally (I say 
" generally) Participles or Adjectives used without 
" any Substantive to which they can be joined ; 
** and are therefore, in construction, considered as 
" Substantives." — " Diversions of Purley,'' Vol. 2, 
page 17. 

I conceive, that this account of Adjectives em- 
ployed as Substantives holds true of the great 
bulk, or nearly the totality, of most Languages con- 
nected with the origin of our own Tongue. And 
I farther suppose, that the great bulk of these Ad- 
jectives are what are called Participles, and are 
Merely Names of Actions. 



216 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

To conclude, however, with regard to the Ori- 
gin of Words ; It is quite undeniable that both 
Mr. Tooke and Dr. Murray, from the evidence of 
their own express Language, lived and died in the 
firm belief that a Verb is Merely a Word, taken 
BY itself; and, that it is a Verb purely in virtue 
of its being the Name of an Actio?i» A Verb, says 
Mr. Tooke, " does not imply assertion ; for No 
** Si7igle Word can.'' And, in the same tenor. Dr. 
Murray tells us of *' Nouns, or Names of Objects;" 
' — and of " Verbs, or Names of Actions.'' The Fun- 
damental Grammatical Truth demonstrated in the 
foregoing reasonings — namely — that a Verb is not 
a Mere detached Mass of Lingual Stuff taken by it- 
self alone, but is a Lingual Mass forming a Bridge 
between Two Other Such Masses, never was suspect- 
ed by either of these eminent Etymologists. 

In fine ; it is decisively manifest, that, in assert- 
ing a priority of existence of Verbs to Nouns, Dr. 
Murray has fallen into the very same sort of ab- 
surdity, as if he had asserted that Bridges existed 
prior to the existence of the Banks which support 
them, and which (in order to be Bridges) they 
MUST connect. 



217 



SECTION FIFTH. 

Of the views of some grammarians with regard to 

THE nature of THE VERB CONSIDERED AS A COPULA OR 
CONNECTIVE; INVOLVING SOME CONSIDERATION OF JUX- 
TAPOSITION OR GRAMMATICAL CONTACT. 

Such is the nature and importance of that Consti- 
tuent Principle of Language which, in its various 
modification, demands the different Names of Li- 
mited Silence, Apposition, Juxtaposition, 
and Grammatical Contact, that I apprehend 
its analysis demands the rank and distinction of 
an appropriate Chapter, in a work on Philosophi- 
cal Grammar. Accordingly, therefore, I shall, in 
the sequel, duly admit it to this distinction. But, 
owing to the Principle in question's being one 
which is interwoven with every other Element of 
Speech, it is altogether unavoidable that some no- 
tice should be had of it in this place, and perhaps 
at some other intermediate stages of the work. 

The leading topic proposed for the present Sub- 
section, is an examination of that view of the sub- 
ject which has been taken by a learned and ingeni- 
ous writer, whose opinions I am led to consider on 
account of certain expressions which he has em- 
ployed, which admit of two very different inter- 
pretations : insomuch, that, if the matter were not 
explained, it might naturally lead to a supposition 

AnaL 2 e 



2t$ OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

that I have, in some most material points, been 
hitherto suggesting the very same Principles which 
had been laid dovrn by this writer. Whereas, in 
reality, no two expositions of the Nature of Lan- 
guage could be more different, than our respective 
opinions of the subject. 

The investigation itself, besides its more imme- 
diate purpose, will lead to the notice of some im- 
portant considerations in Language ; a due ap- 
prehension of which will be found requisite for a 
thorough understanding of Grammar : owing to 
which, the intended explanation, I trust, will not be 
found in any respect undesired by the grammatical 
reader. 

The view of the subject which I thus propose to 
examine, is that furnished by the writer of the ar- 
ticle " Grammar," in Dr. Rees's Cyclopedia. It 
is the same to which I alluded in a former section, 
in adverting to the ambiguous phraseology of 
Bishop Lowth. I proceed to the consideration of 
it, without farther preface. 

" A Verb" (says the author in question) " isbor- 
" rowed from a thing, to express the action of that 
*' thing. It implies connection of an agent and its 
" object, or more generally the connection of a 
" cause with its effect. But this connection is not 
" expressed by an independent word, but by the 
'^judiaposltion, or the combination into one word, 
" of the Agent and its object." 

In perusing this definition of a Verb, I suppose, 
any one would naturally imagine it intends to e^:- 
press, that a Verb connects an Agent or Nominative 
with an Objective Noun Substantive: because no 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 2ld 

other grammatical import can be annexed to the 
word Object, except that of the Accusative or Objec- 
tiveio a Verb, or Preposition. And, if the writer in 
question had meant this, he would in this point 
have coincided altogether with a Fundamental 
Principle of Grammar which I have advanced. 
But it is sufficiently manifest that this writer, in 
the expression above quoted, did not mean any 
Objective Case ; but, on the contrary, by the word 
— ** Object — he meant to assert that a Verb con- 
nects an Agent with its own Action or Energy. 
In proof of this, I quote the following passage. 

** Verbs express the operations or active qualities 
** of things ; and as the growth of words corre- 
" sponds with the growth of our ideas, it follows 
" that verbs originally were the names of things ; 
" but, by combining them with the personal pro- 
** nouns, they became, in consequence of the asso- 
" ciation of ideas, to express not things, but their 
" operations." 

In this passage it is conclusively manifest, that 
its author, instead of ever supposing a Verb to be 
a Connector of an Agent with the Objector Co- 
Agent of its Action, asserts a Verb to be nothing 
but the Sign of an Active Quality of an Agent, 
and affirms, that What constitutes a Verb is a combi- 
nation INTO one word of the Name of an Action 
and the Name of its supposed Sole Actor, to the 
utter exclusion of any thought of an Accusative 
Noun as having any part or co-operation in the 
matter. 

Upon this passage, therefore, I observe, in tlie 
First place, that it has been shewn at large, in the 



^0 OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

First Section of this Chapter, that Not Verbs, 
but Adverbs, are the Signs which must gramma- 
tically or rationally signify the Active Qualities 
of things : Which Active Qualities it is of 
the utmost grammatical importance to contra- 
distinguish from Actions between Things. 
Secondly. I observe, there is another objection to 
be laid against the account of the Verb given by 
this writer ; of a logical magnitude equal to the one 
just adverted to. What I now allude to, is his as- 
sumption, (an assumption, indeed, by no means 
peculiar to him, but which he manifestly and 
fairly derives from the genius of what are called 
the learned languages) — namely — that a Verb is 
constituted by a combination into One Word 
OF Two Different Words. In this assumption, 
it is necessary to point out, that there is a vast and 
infinite logical distinction altogether confounded 
and annihilated : I mean that which of necessity 
exists between Combination and Connection. 
Owing to the very momentous grammatical conse- 
quences of this distinction, it is requisite to dvi^ell 
for a little time upon the merits of the subject. 

We have seen, that " Juxtaposition" is con- 
sidered, by the writer in question, as being One 
Same Thing with " Combination." Contrary 
to this, however, I must assert them, here, in all 
the distinction of their two different natures. Jux- 
taposition in Grammar, (like Juxtaposition in 
Euilding, or in Any Thing Else,) Links any Txco 
Different Objects together, without annihilating or 
destroying their distinct individualities or 
plurality ; which last is necessary to their very ex- 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 221 

isfence. But the Term Combination in Grammar, 
as in Building or in Any Other Subject, is the pro- 
per term employed when we intend to assume that 
Ani/ Number of Objects is formed into One Object 
wherein all logical distinction of Component Individ- 
duals is designedly destroyed. A Bridge, for 
example, is connected bi/ Juxtaposition with each 
of the Abutments which this Bridge connects : 
but no intelligent person can ever confound two 
Objects so officially and logically different, as a 
Bridge and either of the Abutments by which it 
is supported and which it connects. 

Any farther occupying of time with a view to 
illustrate the real nature of this subject must, I 
conceive, be unnecessary : since it becomes in the 
clearest manner evident that no confusion could 
be more absurd^ or intolerable, than a confounding 
of Different Words in the manner which has been 
herein objected to. I shall conclude this topic, 
therefore, by observing that the genius of those 
Languages which admit the confusion in question 
is to the last degree at war with reason. Nay, 
beyond this, it is necessary to suggest, that, 
While Connection is a most important and Prin- 
cipal Element in Language ; the Principle of Com- 
bination, (except only in the case of the Letters, 
as Elements of Words,) has No Part at all in 
Language : The very existence of Speech de- 
pends upon NOT admitting it. 

At the same time, it may be conceded, that, 
provided the Principle be tacitly understood and ad- 
mitted in all Languages y it may certainly be allowable 
to yield to convenience, to taste, or even to mere 



222 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

pre-established habit, in tolerating an appearance of 
the blending of a Verb with its Nominative, or any 
other such apparent coalescence. For there is an 
infinite difference, between a toleration of such illo- 
gical Forms and an ignorance of the absurdity 
which attends construing them according to their 
absurd aspect. The Whole System of Elision, 
in Language, proceeds upon this Principle ; and is 
to be justified by it. The Immediate Object of 
Philosophical Grammar is not to produce any ge- 
neral or violent change in the Express Face of 
any Language; but to change the erroneous Gram- 
matical Ideas which have hitherto been annexed 
to Language, in the minds of those who speak, 
or hear it. It may, for argument's sake, be supposed 
to be tolerable, if there existed as much difference 
between the Express Aspect of a Language and 
its understood Structure, as between the Picture 
or Image of a Man and a Real Man with all his 
Animal Construction : Yet, What should we say of 
the Rationality, or Pretensions, of a People, who, 
in their Ideas, should confound these Two Ob- 
jects as being One and the Same ? 



Besides the considerations already discussed, 
there is a difference to which I deem it requisite 
to advert, between the views of the writer in ques- 
tion and those which I entertam ; which difference 
is of a three-fold nature. It consists in a.n assump- 
tion of this writer, that " the Verb — Is — is the 
" Essential Idea of Every Verb ;" that " the pri- 
*' mary idea of is denotes Connection;" and, that 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 223 

Juxtaposition can supply the place of the Verb Sub'^ 
stantive. 

Thus, He says, " If then is be the characteris- 
" tic or essential idea of every Verb ; and if farther, 
^* as appears from facts, the primary idea of is de- 
" notes connection ; it follows that not assertion, 
** as grammarians have supposed, but connection 
" is that which constitutes every Verb. But the 
*^ connecting Verb itself will not appear necessaiy^ 
** if we judge of its use in the ancient languages, 
" the juxtaposition of the Subject and the Predicate 
" being sufficient to supply its place." 

Now with regard to this passage, in the First 
place, I observe, it is true, that the Verb — is — like 
every other Verb, denotes Connection ; but not 
a Connection of a Subject xvith its Predicate or 
Energy as this writer supposes ; but, on the con- 
trary, a Connection of a Subject with an Objec- 
tive Case. This is a Principle sufficiently de- 
monstrated and settled ; and, therefore, I shall not 
add any thing with respect to it, in this place. 

Secondly y I observe, It has been shewn, by proofs 
altogether analytical, that the Verb Substantive — 
IS — is NOT the characteristic or essential idea of 
every Verb ; nor yet that of Any Verb, itself alone 
excepted. 

Thirdly. It only remains, therefore, to consi- 
der the assumption of this writer — that the Juxta- 
position of a Subject and a Predicate is sufficient 
to supply the place of the Verb Substantive. 

Now with regard to this, I have already shewn, 
at length, that such is the nature and force of Jux- 
taposition, that it forms, of itself alone, the Prin- 



224 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

ciPLE OF Assertion, both of Verbs and of Ad- 
jectives. But, along with this, it was equally 
shewn, that the General Principle of Assertion 
and the Verb Substantive are Two Things which 
have nothing to do with one another ; the former 
being a Principle involved in a Juxtaposition 
OF Any Two Words ; and the latter possessing 
the Soles,nd Limited Office of coupling Any Sub- 
ject with Space, or with Time. 

Juxtaposition, although it cannot supply the 
place of the Verb Substantive, and is a Thing en- 
tirely foreign to the peculiar Office of this Verb, is, 
certainly, so far of the Generic Nature of a Verb, 
that it is a Bridge of Connection between Some 
Two Words, just as a Verb is a Bridge of Connec- 
tion between Two Syntactical Nouns. And the 
Principal Specific difference between the Two 
Things in question is, that a Verb is a Bridge 
f or JTied of a W ORB ; whereas a Grammatical Con- 
tact is a Bridge formed of Nothing but the Action 
OF Contacting. Accordingly, therefore, when 
this Principle is appropriately expressed, it must 
be done by the fact of 0?2e Word acting with 
Another, that is, as I have already said. One Word, 
GRAMMATICALLY CONTACTING Another. Now all 
this is at an infinite distance from giving to the 
Principle of Contacting the Office of the 
Substantive Verb; which office is nothing but 
that of connecting Any Particular Individual Sub- 
ject with One Primary Universal Accusative 
Noun — namely — Space, or Time ; with which, 
Every Subject must be supposed connected, in the 
Primary Action of existing, before such subject can 



sue. 5.] OF VERBS. 225 

be expressed as being engaged in Any Adjective 
Act ; as has been justly asserted by Harris, al- 
though rashly ridiculed by Tooke. 

In the prosecution of his own view of the subject, 
the writer in the Cyclopedia expresses himself 
thus. " Mr. Harris and other Grammarians over- 
" looking the force of Juxtaposition, and judging 
" of the importance of the Substantive Verb from 
" its frequent use in modern Speech, have supposed 
" that it was absolutely necessary to the existence 
" of language, and that no proposition can be com- 
" municated without it." In opposition to this 
assumption of Harris, the writer under consider- 
ation cites examples from the Hebrew Language, 
importing in English — " And Moses said, * Who I ;' " 
— " And Moses said, * I not eloquent.' " Now 
this Idiom of the Hebrew Language corresponds, 
precisely and very remarkably, with the statement 
which I have already laid down, in opposition to 
the opinion of Mr. Locke and other writers, con- 
cerning the Office of the Word Is, — when this 
Word is viewed by itself alone — namely — that it 
has Nothing to do with asserting, at all; but that 
Assertion, whether it be of an Action or a Quality, 
is effected purely by the Apposition or JuMaposition 
of Two Words. And here also it is to be observed, 
that this mode of assertion is so far from being pe- 
culiar to the Hebrew, or to any Dead or Mere 
Ancient Language, that it exists in Modern Lan- 
guages of great prevalency ; As, for example, in- 
the Hindostanee and the Malayan Tongues; 
which are spoken by perhaps above a hundred 
millions of persons. Besides which, it has been 
Anal, 2 f 



2^ OF VERBS. [CHAP. 2. 

strictly demonstrated, in the foregoing pages, that 
Englishmen themselves assert by this Principle 
and by what is called the Participial Form. 

Thus in the Hindostanee, the ordinary vernacu- 
lar Idiom is, " / coming" " I going ;" — not " I 
" come,'" " I go." It is true, also, that the Verb 
Substantive may in such case be expressed ; as 
** I going AM :" And when it is not expressed, it is, 
doubtless, to be understood. But we are never to 
lose sight of the demonstrated truth — that the Verb 
Substantive, whether expressed or merely under- 
stood, has No Office in asserting that I go : it only 
asserts that I exist in Space. 

And here it is due to the Structure of the Hin- 
dostanee Language to observe, that, admirable as 
the English Tongue certainly is in its approxima- 
tion to, and its capability of becoming, a strictly 
Philosophical Structure, yet it is excelled by that 
of Hindostan in the point in question. For, in 
the latter, when a speaker, in his ordinary Idiom, 
drops the Verb Substantive, he does not alter the 
Form of the Name of an Adjective Act, as is 
done in English ; that is, he does not, instead of 
" I am going," say " I go ;" but he merely substi- 
tutes '' I going," for ^' I going am ;" and thus, he 
always asserts in what we call the Participial 
Form. In the Malayan Language, according to 
Mr. Marsden, there are two Substantive Verbs, — 
namely, "Ada, — to be, is; — Jabi, to become,— 
" wa.v; — answering to the Latin Sum and Fio." And 
this author says of the Substantive Verb — Ada 
— that it is much more frequently understood than 
expressed ; as in the sentence *' your counsel 7'ight''' 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. f^ 

It would appear, therefore, that the Hebrew 
expressions, *' / who'' — and ** / not eloquent,'' as 
quoted above, are to be confidently regarded as 
elliptical expressions; and, that the Verb Substan- 
tive is to be understood along with them. 

At the same time, I observe, it seems very pro- 
bable that all those who have ever spoken any of 
the Languages in question, have labored under the 
same mistake that has hitherto prevailed in the 
case of the English, in supposing that the Use of 
the Verb Substantive, whether this Verb be implied 
or expressed, is to assei^t Some Adjective Act. 
This mistake, at any rate, naturally leads the way 
to that of the writer in the Cyclopedia ; who sup- 
poses that Juxtaposition, because it proves effectual 
in asserting, supplies the place of the Substantive 
Verb. For, if -wejirst assume that the Substantive 
Verb serves to assert an Adjective Act ; and then 
find that the Adjective Act can be asserted by 
mere Juxtaposition, without the Verb Substantive; 
the matter becomes established to a demonstration. 
But I trust that the real Nature and Office of the 
Verb Substantive has been placed in a light which 
will never admit of a repetition of the doctrine in 
question. 

It is by the true exposition of the Office of the 
Verb Substantive, that we are enabled to solve 
that enigma in the doctrines of accredited Gram- 
mar — namely — that the Substantive Verb has always 
the Same Case after it that it has before it: By 
which anomaly and absurdity a Verb is placed be- 
tween Two Nominative Cases ; which is precise- 



228 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

ly parallel to supposing O^e Bank of a River to 
exist under both ends of a Bindge, Writers of 
Grammars are content, in this case, to state the 
Rule, without stating, or attempting to state, the 
Reason of it : which, indeed, would be an attempt 
altogether vain within the pale of accredited Gram- 
mar ; because the reason of it is utterly excluded 
from the accredited system. The fact is, that the 
Second Nominative, in any such case, is the Nomi- 
native NOT to the Verb Substantive, but to Some Ad- 
jective Verb, either expressed or implied. Thus the 
expression " Thou art He that did it," means 
" Thou existing in Space — He that did it," 
And here we are to observe, that we never say 
" Thou art He ;" without, at the same time, mean- 
ing to refer to Some Adjective Act which ** He" 
performed, or suffered ; as He who stood by ; He 
whom we spoke of. 

Here, in fact, it is to be observed, that, as often 
as we signify any Adjective Act in the fullest man- 
ner that the existing or ordinary scope of Lan- 
guage admits, and which, indeed, the Real Structure 
of Language in strictness would always demand ; 
— as, for example, when we say, " Peter is fight- 
** ing James;'' — this expression is still an ellipti- 
cal eocpression, for it involves the import of Two 
Distinct and Complete Sentences or Assertions : Thus 
it imports " Peter existing in Space, fighting 
^* James:' And, owing to this, it follows, in any 
such case, that the Nominative — " Peter" — ought 
in strictness to be expressed, and must always be 
understood, as being repeated after the Word 
. Space, or Time. In order to illustrnte this Principle 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 229 

I observe, that the full and complete expression of 
the fact or event in question would be, ** Peter 
'^ ejcisting in Space, Veter Jighting James/' Or, 
" Peter existing in Space, He Jighting James." 
Such, I say, would be the Ea^press Form or Aspect 
of Language, if we were strictly to signify Every 
Idea and Connection of Ideas according to the 
Generic Structure of Relatives and Relation. But, 
if the Principles, thus pointed out, be clearly 
though only tacitly understood, the circumlocution 
of expression may doubtless, with much advan- 
tage, be saved : For no two things can be more 
different in Language, or Philosophy, than abbre- 
viation and ignorance or confusion. 

If any strength could be lent, by the fact of 
Actual Usage or what is called Etymology, to 
a Principle which I have thus deduced from the 
Necessary Structure of Relatives and Relation, 
and from no other source ; I might appeal, here, 
to those Languages in which the Nominative 
Pronoun is repeated. And as, doubtless, this ap- 
peal will have great weight with many readers, I 
advert to it, as a matter which I suppose must to 
them amount to a very powerful corroboration of 
the Principle in question ; although to myself, I 
must own, it affords no additional confidence in 
the thing, whatever. 



230 



SECTION SIXTH. 



OF SO-CALLED PARTICIPLES. AND OF TENSE, MODE, VOICE, 
NUMBER, AND PERSON. 



SUBSECTION I. 



Of the Nominal Part of Speech above first mentioned. 
— No Participles in Language. 

After what has been advanced in the foregoing 
pages, with regard to the nature of Verbs, I con- 
ceive, we may come to a very conclusive judgment 
with respect to what have been, by Grammarians, 
called Participles. In treating of the Subject, 
in that work in which ray views of it were first 
broached, I asserted, that the So-called Progressive 
Participle is the Pure Simple Form of the Vei^b : 
And this assertion stands confirmed by all that 
has been stated in the present Volume concerning 
it ; always providing, that the Form in question; 
or any other Form, can be that of a Verb at no 
time except so long as it is actually interposed be- 
tween Two Substantive Nouns. 

The whole of the reasonings, which establish this 
Principle, result, in the fullest manner, in exclud- 
ing the Name of Pa7^ticiple ivom among the Parts 
of Speech : Because this So-called Part of Speech 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 231 

does not in reality possess any one of the several 
Attributes, or Offices, which Grammarians have 
assigned to it. 

A Participle is defined to be, a Part of Speech 
derived from ^Verb; partaking of the nature of its 
Primitive in denoting Action, Being, or Suffering ; 
and of that of an Adjective in agreeing with a 
Noun : but differing from a Verb in this, that a 
Participle does not imply assertion. 

Now with regard to the Fi7^st part of this defi- 
nition, I observe, that a Word called a Participle 
is NOT DERIVED from a Verb ; because such a 
Word is either a Mere Noun of Action, and then it 
is No Participle ; Or, else, when it is interposed be- 
tween Two Nouns, or, otherwise, is annexed to 
One Noun only, it becomes, respectively, a Yerb, or 
an Adverb, In a Word ; a Participle, of the 
Grammarians, is a Grammatical Nonentity, or Chi- 
mera in Language. 

With regard to the Second Part of the Definition, 
I observe, that a So-called Participle is 7iot of the 
nature of an Adjective, although it is indeed a 
Sign which, in a certain manner, indicates a cer- 
tain Sort of Quality : Because it has been shewn, 
that, when a So-called Participle is annexed to a 
Nominative only, it becomes an Adverb ; and 
here it is to be observed, that, although an Adverb 
itself is, certainly, an Adjected Sign, it is a' vastly 
different Element of Speech from that of an Adjec- 
tive, technically so-called. 

It is customary, in Grammars, to lay down rules 
in order to shew in what cases a Participle is to be 
considered as a Participle, and in what other cases 



232 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

it is to be considered as an Adjective : And these 
rules, if they were duly applied to their proper 
Part of Speech, would have a corresponding uti- 
lity. But this application cannot tend in the least 
to preserve the assumption that a So-called Parti- 
ciple is in any case an Adjective. When for ex- 
ample we say, " I saw a man fighting :' this, indeed, 
conveys a very different meaning from that of say- 
ing '' \ ^?i\N 2i fighting man:'' and it is certainly 
very often useful to distinguish the two cases, or 
characters, in question. But,' nevertheless, not- 
withstanding any conventional fiction which we 
can invent to distinguish the two cases, it is certain, 
when considered with strict logical accuracy, that 
^fighting man can be m fighting man only during 

THE TIME THAT HE IS FIGHTING, jUSt aS a Bridge 

can be a Bridge only during the time it stands be- 
tween Two Abutments ; and therefore, ^fighting 
man, is a man inning a fighting State, and the ex- 
pression, strictly speaking, is the Same as that of a 
manfiighting. In each of these expressions, alike, 
the Word — '^ fighting'' — serves as an Adverb : but, 
in order to mark the distinction between the Two 
Characters — namely — a man whose vocation is 
fighting, and the same, or any other man, who is 
merely in the presejit act itself of fighting, we may 
make a correspondent variation in the import of the 
Adverb, in each case : Thus a " man fighting" 
means a man inning a fighting State ; but a 
^^ fighting man' means a man inning a fighting 
Habit or Calling ; and, in each case alike, the 
W ovd— fighting — is employed adverbially. 
Here we are to recollect, that Adverbs are not 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 233 

Essential Part of Speech ; they are not immediate 
Signs of Ideas, but are Signs of a Parcel of Words: 
and the highly useful device of Adverbs is only 
carried a step farther, when w^e conventionally 
make the V^ or d— fighting — signify a present 
EXERTED active Quality by placing it after a 
Nominative, and a Habit of this Quality by 
placing it before a Nominative. I hardly need 
add, that an Adverb may^ by an ordinary or esta- 
blished idiom, come before a Nominative ; as it does 
in the expression—** early man," — or " late man." 

Farther I observe, that when there is occasion 
to employ a So-called Participle with a compara- 
tive term annexed ; it does not, on this account, 
become an Adjective, or cease to be an Adverb : 
Because a more learned maji, means only a man in- 
ning a more learned State. 

Finally, with regard to the Third and Last part 
of the definition, now in question ; it has been con- 
clusively shewn, that the So-called Participial 
Form, whenever it is placed between Two Nouns 
Substantive, does assert, and asserts more prima- 
rily, purely, or legitimately, than any other Form of 
the Verb : Or, rather, the So-called Progressive 
Participle, when so interposed, is the Pure Essen- 
tial Form of the Verb itself, as I have all along af- 
firmed. Thus, in the ordinary full English expres- 
sion—** 7am going to London,'' — the Verb— am — 
connects the Nominative — **/" — with Space only : 
And, in order to make the Structure of the Speech 
conform philosophically to the Necessary Generic 
Structure of Relatives and Relation, the Nomina- 
tive — ** /" — must be understood as repeated; in 
AnaL 2 g 



234 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

consequence of which, the Speech must run thus : 
" I EXISTING in Space, I going to London,'' A 
Speaker of Hindostannee, in its ordinary idiom, 
would say " I going to London ;" and, in this 
idiom, he would express himself with a philosophi- 
calness which the English Language, as it is under* 
stood or interpreted, does not possess ; hut which, 
in reality, demonstrably belongs to its structure, 
as has, I trust, by this time been rendered suffi- 
ciently manifest. 

"What has now been advanced, with a view to 
exclude the Name of Participle from the page of 
Grammar, is all that I conceive to be requisite in 
this place ; especially as I propose, in a future 
chapter, to shew the former Identicalness of the 
So-called Progressive Participle with the So-called 
Infinitive Mode of our English Verbs, as a fact 
which indubitably existed about the time of Chau- 
cer: and shall, at the same time, insist farther 
upon the nonreality of any such Element of 
Speech as a Participle. In removing this supposed 
Element from the Structure of Language, I appre- 
hend, we shall remove much complicated absurdi- 
ty from the Subject, and save future writers from 
that embarrassment, confusion, and obscurity, 
which has in time past befallen those who have 
attempted to entertain it. Without, however, going 
into any examination of what has been advanced 
by other writers upon this part of Grammar, I shall 
occupy the remainder of the present article with 
adverting to the views which have been entertained 
of it by Mr. Tooke. 



SBC. 5.] OF VERBS. 2^ 

In treating of Participles, Mr. Tooke has ex- 
pressed himself in the following terms. 

*' As for the term Participle, I would very will- 
" ingly get rid of it." 

Accordingly, he says, *' I desire, therefore, in- 
*' stead of Participle, to be permitted to call this 
" Word generally a Verb-adjectwer 

With regard to these expressions, I must object, 
and must rigorously insist, that No '' Word," 
considered as a Mere Word by Itself, is, or can 
be, a Verb of Any Sort. But, in the present case, 
I have more especially to object, that the term 
Verb-adjective is altogether inapplicable to the 
Words in question, in whatever situation they may 
be placed, that is, with whatever other Words they 
may be associated. In order to justify this objec- 
tion I shall, in the first place, quote the following 
passage from Mr. Tooke's context. 

" We had formerly but two" (Participles). *' But 
" so great is the convenience and importance of 
" this useful Abbreviation, that our authors 
" have borrowed from other Languages, and in- 
" corporated with our own, Four other Participles 
" of equal value." 

Upon this passage, it could be only necessary 
to observe, that Verbs, certainly, are Not Abbre- 
viations; and, according, therefore, to this test, 
offered by Mr. Tooke himself, No Abbreviation can 
be a Verb. 

In the next place, however, I observe, that, by 
admitting our Two Original So-called Participles 
into the Class of Abbreviations, (which he mani- 
festly does in the passage last quoted,) Mr. Tooke 



236 OF VERBS. [chap. 2, 

virtually acknowledges these Participles to be Ad- 
verbs. And, as for the Four New Ones which he 
has added, and to which he has assigned the 
Name of ^^Verbs-adjective f the import of Every 
One of them is that of a Cluster of Several 
Words, involving a String of Distinct Verbs in con- 
catenation; in which concatenation Each Verb 
MUST serve, alternately AS Verb and as 
Noun Substantive, according to the Fundamen- 
tal Rule which I have already laid down on this 
subject. 

These Four New Terms he has denominated as 
follows : Which 1 note here, for the purpose of 
observing upon them. 

" The Potential Mood Active^ Adjective,'' 
" The Potential Mood Passive, Adjective'' 
" The Official Mood Passive, Adjective." 
** The Future Tense Active, Adjective," 

To these Denominations, I shall add some of 
Mr. Tooke s Examples : which are here transcribed 
without order from his text, merely to exhibit their 
general nature. 

" Unenarrable ; or, that may not be told," 
** SwADiBLE, that is, esi for totrete and to be 
" treted" 

" Reverend, — i. e. Which ought to be revered," 
*^ Memorandum, — That which ought to be re- 
" membered." 

** Legend. — That which ought to be read," 
In these examples, it is perfectly manifest, that 
Every One of the Words in question — namely — 
U7ienarrable,Sivadible,— Reverend— Memorandunh 



SEC. 5.] OF VERBS. 237 

• — and Legend,— As 201 Adverb according to Mr. Tooke's 
own very just definition of an Adverb, or, in other 
words, a Sign of a complication of Signs : For 
None of these Words is a Sign of an Idea or Ob- 
ject OF Thought itself immediately ; hut 
Every One of them stands as the Sign of a String 
OF Several Words. A Verb, on the contrary, is 
not the Sign of a Sign; but it is the Immediate 
Sign of an Idea or Object, ^xid it is never the Sign 
of more than One Simple Object — namely — 
that of a Bridge consisting of One Simple Aixh be- 
tween two Piers or Abutments. Not only is such 
a Word as '* Legend" not a Verb ; but it is not 
even the Sign of a Verb : For this Word — Le- 
gend — stands as the Sign of a Concatenation of 
Three Different Verbs — namely — ought — to be — ■ 
READ : And I have already shewn, from the Gene- 
ric Structure of Relatives and Relation, that a 
Compound Vei^b is an impossible Thing ; although it 
is true that Simple Verbs may be, and very usually 
are, expressed in Strings, consecutively : Each of 
which Verbs, however, must always be understood 
as operating in the Office of Noun and of Verb, 
under the Law of Alternation ; the Logical Prin- 
ciple and Manner of which will be farther and 
fully illustrated in the sequel. 

To these considerations I shall only add, that 
any person, who is in the least informed on the sub- 
ject, will not fall into the mistake of supposing 
that it is a mere verbal difference, whether we call 
such a Word as Legend, or Memorandum, an Ad- 
verb, or a Verb-adjective. For, it being an 
established and unalterable definition of a Verb, 



23S OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

that it is the Full and Proper Sign of an Idea or 
Simple Object ; and that of an Adverb, that it is 
the Abbreviated Sign of a String of Words; 
it would be introducing a deplorable confusion 
into Language to call One of these Abbreviated 
Signs of a String of JVords by the Same Specific 
Denomination, as that which is given to the Sign 
of an Idea or Primary Simple Object. I trust, 
therefore, that the evidence is fully conclusive 
against admitting these Four New Participles of 
Mr. Tooke into the Class of Verbs, under the 
name of Verbs-adjective. 

At the same time, it is to be observed, that no- 
thing advanced hereiii is intended to deny the fit- 
ness, or utility, of the Kind of Abbreviation now 
in question. Their accession to our Language 
was manifestly a vast improvement of it : Although 
it ought not to pass unobserved, here, that these 
terms have been suffered to fall into a loose, vague, 
and often most contradictory or absurd use. 

Upon this occasion it may not be improper to 
observe, what has been already remarked — namely 
— that Adverbs are a Species of Sign which may 
well be divided into Different Classes. The First 
and most legitimate, or most regular Class, I have 
already shewn, consists of All Words vrhich stand 
for a Preposition and a Noun taken together : And 
in this I am fully borne out by the etymological 
testimony of Dr. Murray. The present article 
shews that Another Class consists of All Words 
which stand for a Concatenation of Verbal Terras 
of a certain length. I need not stop, in this place, 
to consider what other Sorts of Adverbs there may 



SEC. 5.3 OF VERBS. 289 

be in Language; but 1 may merely add, that 
various Signs called Adverbs are Signs of a 
Whole Sentence, and not of an incomplete phrase. 



SUBSECTION II. 

Of the Tense of Verbs. 

The Point of Grammar which I am now proceed- 
ing to consider, affords a remarkable proof of the 
rigorous and unceasing government which the 
Structure of Relatives and Relation holds over the 
Structure of Language. It is a Fundamental Prin- 
ciple in the Category of Relatives and Relation, 
that nothing can be affirmed with regard to it, ex- 
cept while Some Relation, together with the Two 
Correlated Subjects which support it, exists, either 
in reality or by supposition. Accordingly, therefore, 
we find that, in Grammar, it is impossible to sig- 
nify Either Future or Past Action directly, by any 
Term that could logically express it: And, for 
want of any such term, we are forced to have re- 
course to Other Signs, which, from their import, 
serve merely to put the understanding upon con* 
jecturing that Future, or Past Action, is implied. 

In offering this remark, I, of course, do not con^ 
template the genius of those Languages which ef- 
fect the purpose in question by inflexions of the 
Noun of Action ; which Noun of Action inflected 
they call a Verb : But confine my view entirely 
to our own Tongue, wherein this operation is per- 



240 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

formed in a philosophical manner, especially with 
regard to Future Action at least. 

Thus the Verbs (i. e. Verbs when duly interposed) 
May and Can, Shall and Will, serve to indicate 
the Futurity of Any Action whose Name we affix 
to them : but the Action itself so Named must be 
expressed as Presently existing : And, also, each of 
these So-called Auxiliaries, themselves, is a Sign of 
Action Presently e.visting : and, hence, the only 
cause of their indicating that the Principal Action 
in question belongs to futurity, is, that the Auxi- 
liary Actions are Actions of Choice, Knowledge, 
Duty, or Volition, respecting the Action that 
IS TO HAPPEN, and, as such, must precede the 
latter. 

Such is the Logical device by which a Future 
Action is expressed in Present Time ; and by 
which alone it can be expressed. And the nature 
of this logical mechanism seems to be understood, 
generally, by grammatical writers, and readers. But 
a very different prospect presents itself, when we 
turn to the expression of Past Action: For, in 
this direction, all that has hitherto appeared in 
Grammar is nothing but profound darkness. We 
have, indeed, an understood conventional Sign of 
Past Action : But no person (unless very lately) 
has ever been able to assign its real nature. 

Analogy would lead us, at first sight, to suppose, 
that, since Future Action cannot be indicated by 
any other means than by a Sign of Present Accessa- 
ry Actions, the like ought to take place with regard 
to Past Action. But this by no means appears to 
be the case, in practice at least : For the actual 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 241 

Sign of Past Action, according to all usage, even 
in the English Language, is not an Auxiliary Verb ; 
but is a certain Termination given to the Principal 
Verb itself^ by which it is made to differ from the 
Termination of the Same Verb in Present Action : 
Thus, in Regular English Verbs, the Form of the 
Present being *' love,'' or " loving ;" that of the Past 
is " /W-ED." 

Since the speculations of Mr. Tooke it has been 
generally agreed, by our most enlightened Etymo- 
logists, that the Termination — d — or ed — ex- 
presses Some Sign, or Word, distinct from the Form 
of the Present: but the difficulty has been to deter- 
mine, upon any certain ground, what actually/ is, 
or what ought to be, the real import of this Termi- 
nation. 

Mr. Tooke himself, and other writers after him, 
have supposed, that " Iovet>'' means love-DiD. 
But this hypothesis, even if admitted for a moment, 
does not remove nor lessen the difficulty ; because 
DID is itself a Past Form, and it demands to 
be accounted for as much as Every Other Past 
Form. 

The account given by Dr. Murray, of the nature 
of this contrivance, seems to be much more lumi- 
nous, in appearing to have explained at least the ac- 
tual/act or history of its origin and import ; although 
it has not led to any Philosophical or Logical 
advancement of the Subject. As an Etymological 
light, therefore, I conceive it is to be regarded as 
a very valuable acquisition : but the exhibition of 
it only serves to shew how unphilosophical were 
many of the devices, or contrivances, of our fore- 
Anal, 2 H 



242 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

fathers, with regard to the Structure of Language. 
This writer shews, very extensively, that Past Ac- 
tion was originally signified by a Mere Duplica- 
tion of the Islame of Present Action, Thus, in 
Vol, 1, page 50, he expresses himself in the follow- 
ing terms. " While the Noun underwent these 
" important changes, the Verb, the fountain of 
** language, acquired new and interesting proper- 
" ties. It has been shewn that it was monosylla- 
*' bic, expressive only of action, and general in 
" its sense; because it was a rapid articulation, 
" framed to communicate to others the presence 
" of some remarkable operation in nature or in the 
*' mind. The word used was that which the sa- 
" vage speaker had been taught, or accustomed 
" to articulate on former occasions, when actions, 
*' similar to that immediately at the time affecting 
" his senses, had taken place. The monosyllabic 
" word, therefore, expressed a great class of actions, 
** not an individual event. Though this word 
" might be repeated after the action had termina- 
" ted, it was properly an affirmative Verb in the 
^'present tense. The first effort to mark preterite 
'' action consisted in doubling the Verb ; of which, 
" traces, more or less evident, are found in all the 
" dialects from Britain to China. For example, 
" Lag, strike. Lag Lag, struck ; Bag, beat. Bag 
" Bag, beaten ; Mag, press, Mag Mag, pressed ; 
** and so on throughout the whole language. These 
** forms, which served for a preterite tense in any 
" person, according to the view of the speaker, soon 
" underwent contraction, and became Lelog, Be- 
" BOG, and Menog ;" &c. 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 243 

From the passage now quoted, the reader will 
clearly discern the nature of Dr. Murray's theory 
of the Past Form ; and will consequently be led 
to conclude, that, if the fact was actually as he 
has stated, we are to look for the Sign of the Past 
Tense, in most languages, as being no other than 
some disguised Form, or relic, of the Verb in 
Present Time, including some terminal addition. 

But if we admit the fact to be made out, (and I 
see no reason to dispute it,) that those Nations, in 
the early stages of their Language, did actually 
employ a Duplication of the Name of an Action, 
as the Form of the Past Tense; it will certainly 
be granted that this contrivance has no claim to 
be called a Philosophical or Logical ^vocedinxei It 
was merely the device, or perhaps in the first in- 
stance the sudden ajid accidental impulse, of uncul- 
tivated reason : It was a device founded in neces- 
sity ; and, although it demanded a certain exercise 
of reason to discern and to supply this necessity, 
it is certain that no mechanism could have been 
less Philosophical for the purpose, than that in 
question. If, then, any other means can be found, 
which can effect the same end in a Logical man- 
ner ; the Philosophical Grammarian is bound to 
adopt it, even although it should not appear that 
any Nation had ever employed, or thought of the 
same before. 

This consideration leads me to observe, that 
there certainly is a medium, by which the desired 
purpose may be effected in a manner at least not 
less logical than that by which we indicate Future 
Action ; because the medium in question is precisely 



244 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

analogous to that just mentioned. The fact is, that 
the Auxiliary Verb To Have, is the proper and 
PECULIAR Sign wherewith to indicate Past Action ; 
precisely upon analogous ground to that by which 
the Auxiliaries May and Can^— Shall and Willy — 
indicate Future Action. And, when I suggest 
this, I do not advert to it as any thing new in it- 
self; since it is already a 'part of the usual Sign of 
Past Time : I only mean to suggest that the Auxi- 
liary — To Have — ought to do away entirely with the 
Termination d, — or ed, — and with Every Other Va- 
riation OR Inflexion of the Name of Action 
that is called a Verb ; insomuch, as to leave only 
One Form of the Verb — namely — a Form analogous 
to that which is called the Present, as love^ 
— or loving; hate, — or hating. I shall, therefore, in- 
dulge this view of the Subject through the remain- 
der of the present article. 

Before I quit this topic, I may perhaps find room 
to shew some etymological evidence, to render it 
at least probable that the termination of the Past 
Tense in English is actually derived from the 
Word Have. And, collaterally with this, it is to be 
observed, that, at any rate, this English Termina- 
tion is not a Duplication of the Name of Present 
Action. But chiefly, and in the first place, I propose 
tp shew that, when the Word Have is used along 
with the Past Form of the Verb, (as is the existing 
custom with regard to it, such as when we say 
" / have loved j") it produces a demonstrable ab- 
surdity ; and, as such, it cannot be tolerated in Phi- 
losophical Grammar, although usage has, so far, 
sanctioned it. First therefore I assert, that, in the 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 2^ 

case of any such expression as ^* I have loved him,'' 
the Sign — d — of the Past is in fact an absurd ex- 
pression; because the Verb loved, coming after 
Have, ought to be in the Form of the Present. In 
order to shew this, it must be granted to me, here 
in the outset, that Every Thing that we have, must 
be a thing complete ; i. e. it must be a thing ex- 
istent at the time of our having it, and No Part 
of it can be supposed as being yet in the matrix 
of futurity. As such, therefore, it is opposed to the 
Nature, both of Future and of Progressive Action, 
and it must be an Action whose existence is per- 
fect. But the Word Have — itself — ^expresses 
this perfection of the Action ; and, therefore, 
the Word loved ought not to express it. Hence, 
the expression, — " / have loved him,'' — ought, 
indisputably, to be "I have love himJ" 

I am sensible that this last expression will strike 
an English reader as being a gross vulgarism. But 
every reader, who is at all in the subject, is aware, 
that many of the most vulgar expressions of the 
present day are good English, and were the proper 
Idioms of our Language in the days of Chaucer. 
Mr. Tooke has deemed it necessary to warn his 
fellow Dialogist, against a rash rejection of terms 
from their strange or awkward appearance, or, ra- 
ther, from a distaste at their mere novelty : And 
this warning ought to be addressed, generally, once 
and for all, to every reader who would either im- 
prove or examine the nature of Language. Indeed, 
it is impossible to travel into the regions of Ety- 
mology without meeting with it, on every hand ; 
and this in very objectionable shaj^es. I shall con- 



246 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

tent myself, therefore, by observing, that, through- 
out the present treatise there will, I believe, 
appear neither novelty nor awkw^ardness of phra- 
seology, that is not very much surpassed in the 
expositions given by every general writer on Ety- 
mology. But, to return to the subject ; It is to 
be observed, here, that (although the Word— Have 
— indicates that the annexed Action is Perfect, 
and therefore is in reality Past,) we cannot have a 
Past Thing, of any sort, any more than we can 
HAVE a Future Thing; for we cannot have a Thing 
that does not now e.vist. Hence we cannot, in reality, 
have a Past Action; and therefore we can be 
said to have it, only by a grammatical fiction ; 
and, any Action we are expressed as having 
must be expressed as Present Action. It is the 
Word Have (although this Word is the Name of 
a Present Action) that has the virtue of indicating 
that the Word love, although it is the Name of a 
Present iVction, is made the Sign of an Action 
that is Past: And this it does in 3. way precisely 
analogous to that in which the Word Shall, or 
Will, although it is a Name of Present Action, 
indicates that the Word love, although it also is 
the Name of a Present Action, is the Sign of a Fu- 
ture Action. 

According to this view^ of the Subject, when we 
would resolve the phrase — " / have loved him,'' — 
into its real import, we find it means — ** / am in 
" possession o/* OR have the Act o/* loving him/' 
and not, " / am in possession of the act of Iov-eb 
" him.'' And I suppose it to be conclusive, here, 
that the Form — " /have love him"-— is the proper 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 247 

philosophical form of what is called the Past or 
Perfect Tense. 

Upon the SamePrmciple may be philosophically 
expressed the Preter-plu-perfect, Because, for ex- 
ample, when it is said " He had killed him;''' it is 
only requisite to substitute the expression " He 
HAVE HAVE (or ha-have) kill him,'' and the desired 
purpose will be effected in the most logical manner. 

The General Grammatical Principle into which 
this truth ultimately resolves itself is, that in Any 
Speech, Sentence, or Expression whatever, it is il- 
logical to use a Past Form, or to mix the times 
of the Several Actions therein designed to be sig?iified 
as being concatenated. And it follows, from this, 
thatNo Verb has ever Any Time or Tense e^i'cept 
the Relatively Present : which, also, cannot 
perhaps, with strict propriety, be called a Tense ; 
because it is nothing but the consequence of a 
Verb's being the Sign of an Action ; the Necessary 
Condition of which is, that it can be an Action 

ONLY while it ACTUALLY EXISTS. 

When the Principle now under consideration 
is employed in the case of the Verb To Have, 
considered as a Principal Verb ; this, of course, 
must produce a Duplication of the Verb. As, for 
example, instead of saying " I have had the Book," 
we shall be obliged to say " /ha-have have 
" the Book," But this case of Duplication must not 
be mistaken for an instance of that Duplication, (to 
form the Past,) which Dr. Murray has brought to 
light; because, if we attend to it, we shall find that 
it arises from a virtue residing in the Peculiar Ac- 
tion OF Having or Possessing, and not from any 



248 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

virtue in the Mere Duplication of its Name, 
that the two-fold mention or repetition of it be- 
comes, in this case, the Philosophical Sign of 
Past Action. A similar Duplication of Any Other 
Verb in Language would bear no analogy to it. 
To indicate the Past by saying *' Hove love him ;" 
— " I fight fight him;' — could be no better than 
mere Jargon, although all mankind were to agree 
in making it a Sign of Past Action. To indicate 
a Second Past or Freter-'plu-'perfect upon this 
Jargonal Principle, it must be done by saying " / 
LOVE LOVE LOVE him;' a procedure which adds 
outrage to outrage against reason. But to indicate 
the Same Second Past by saying ^' / ha have 
" love him^'' which means " / possess the Two 
" Actions of having loving him^' is a logical ex- 
pression meaning I hold, distinctly, Each of 
the Three Concatenated Actions in question. 
The philosophical simplicity and truth which it 
would introduce into Language, to admit no Form 
of the Verb except the Present, must be manifest 
to all. While it is certain, also, (although it would 
certainly require a Modification of Terms, which 
I shall not at present stop to consider, and the 
DESIRABLE practicability of which I do not here 
vouch for,) that the signification of the Past by 
the use of the Word Have as I have above sug- 
gested, would, in avery striking degree, soften and 
harmonise the General Tone of our Language. 
But, supposing the thing thus practicable ; still, 
I ought to recollect, that Simplicity and Truth 
are the progeny of Reason; and it is too well 
known, that Taste, or even long-fixed Habit, will 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 849 

not readily adopt them. I do not overlook that 
the Principle in question would make exterminat- 
ing work with our " couldsts" and " wouldsts,'' and 
*' shouldsts^" and " mighistsr And it is not to be 
expected that these old grammatical favorites are 
to be meddled with, or disturbed, with any chance 
of success. 

In the early part of this article, I thought of 
shewing some ground for believing, that the Termi- 
nation of the Fast Form, in the English Language, 
is actually no other than a relic of the Word 
Have : Which, I here observe, I suppose, may be 
traced to have formerly meant Haud or Hold ; 
and, consequently, to have thus given origin to 
our regular Terminations of the Past — d, or ed. 
As, however, I find this evidence consists in a 
considerable detail of etymological matter, which I 
do not wish to mix up with this part of the work; 
and as the end of producing it could be little other 
than that of raising the credit of the English Lan- 
guage, as being in this respect much more philoso- 
phical in its Structure, than any of those kindred 
Tongues which effect a signification of the Past by 
a mere jargonal Duplication of the Fresent; I shall 
postpone it, at least until the conclusion of the 
work : when it may appear in an appendix. 

SUBSECTION III. 

Of the So-called Modes of Verbs. 

For the same reason that Verbs cannot be said 
to have any Tense, they cannot be affirmed to 
Anal, 2 I 



250 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

have any Mode : And this reason is, that there 
can be no Variety in the Signification of an Action, 
The Mind, which is the Agent that asserts or de- 
clares, and of whose assertion the Verb is the 
Sign, may, and does, think and express itself in 
Different Modifications with regard to Actions, 
— namely — as to Actions existing ;:— as to Our 
Command, or Desire, that they shall exist; — 
and, as to our Power, or, else, to Some Other 
Annexed Condition, that they shall, or may, 
exist. But these Modes of the Mind's thinking, 
with respect to Actions, are Not Modes of Actions 
themselves : And, therefore, there cannot be Any 
Such Things as Modes of the Signs of these Ac- 
tions. Accordingly, we find, in our own philosophi- 
cal Language, that all the So-called Modality of a 
Verb is expressed by Other Verbs, in the 'Declara- 
tive and Present Form, — the Only Form of which a 
Verb is logically susceptible. 

In this respect, the English Language possesses 
a great and beautiful superiority of reason, over 
all those Languages which pretend to express 
Modality by supposed integral parts of a Verb it- 
self. And the only fault in this Part of English 
Grammar consists in retaining the Denomination 
of Modes of k Verb, in imitation of those unphilo- 
sophical Languages from which its Structure thus 
advantageously differs. 

I believe the observations now stated, with re- 
gard to this part of the Structure of Language, 
are all that can be deemed necessary for the pur- 
pose of its elucidation. And, in point of fact, as 
the substance of them is involved in what has 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 251 

gone before, it is chiefly for the sake of form that 
I have been led to assign them a distinct article. 



SUBSECTION IV. 

Of Yoke. 

The matter which ought to form the Substance 
of the present article has, owing to the nature of 
the subject, been anticipated in the Third Section 
of this chapter: And little more requires to be 
said concerning it. In the place mentioned, it was 
shewn, (as a necessary consequence of the Gram- 
matical Principle therein laid down,) that a State 
of Passivity must always be expressed by an Ad- 
verb, signifying that the Nominative or Sufferer 
in question is actively inning a Suffering State. 
It follows, therefore, that there is but One Voice in 
Language ; and this the Active Voice. 

It appears, at the same time, that Voice is an 
Accident which cannot belong to a Verb; but 
must appertain to the Mind, which is the thing 
that affirms, or denies. The reason of its being 
attributed to the Verb is, manifestly, th^t the Form 
of the Verb or Sign of Action has been varied ac- 
cordingly as the Agent was assumed as being 
Active, or Passive. But in a Language in which 
No Alteration of Voice is admitted; and, conse- 
quently. No change in the Form of the Verb ; the 
illogical procedure of attributing the Accident of 
Voice to the Verb may certainly be avoided. At 
any rate, I apprehend, nothing can ever prevent 
its being a great and deplorable absurdity to an- 
nex Voice to the Sign of Action, 



252 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

SUBSECTION V. 

Of Number and Person, 

Number and Person are accidents certainly 
necessary in Language ; but they are not accidents 
of Verbs : On the contrary, they are affections 
exclusively belonging to Nouns, or Pronouns. 

The English Language, in identifying the Form 
of the First Person Singular of a Verb with the 
Common Form of All the Three Persons Plural, ex- 
hibits an indication of the Philosophicalness of 
making All the So-called Persons of Verbs of the 
Same Form, and leaving the accident of Person to 
be signified hy Pronouns Only, as is effected in some 
other Languages. 

In addition to this I may observe, that it ap- 
pears to have arisen from mere negligence, or 
slovenliness alone, that the So-called Second and 
Third Persons Singular of English Verbs now 
stand varied, in their Forms, from the Common 
Form of all the other Persons of Verbs. For it 
has been shewn by Dr. Murray, that the Termina- 
tions — eth and s — of the Second and Third Per- 
sons Singular, are in reality no other than the Old 
Pronouns of these Persons : which useless relics 
ought, of course, to have been discarded when 
the New Pronouns were first put before their Verbs, 
as is now the practice. 

With regard to Number ; it is an accident so 
manifestly belonging to Nouns, Or Pronouns, Only, 



SEC. 6.] OF VERBS. 253 

that it cannot be confounded with any other view 
of the subject. It is for the sake of the Person 
alone, that our English Verbs alter their Form in 
the First and Second Persons Singular : In other 
respects, the English Singular and Plural Number 
of Verbs is the same, as, in logical strictness, they 
ought to be. 



254 



SECTION SEVENTH. 

OF AUXILIARY VERBS. 

The Class of Auxiliary Verbs has shared, in a 
more than ordinary degree, in that general dark- 
ness under which the real nature of Language has 
hitherto lain buried. By English Grammarians 
themselves, who, above all Grammarians, ought 
best to have understood the Nature of these Verbs, 
they have always been considered not as complete 
Verbs, but merely as a sort of Verbal Accessary, or, 
in real fact, as a Non-descript Element of Speech. 
One author of an English Grammar alone (so 
far as I know) and this a very recent one, has the 
credit of broaching a different doctrine. The wri- 
ter to whom I now allude, is Mr. Grant : And, 
from justice to him, I shall transcribe what he has 
suggested on the Subject ; which matter appears 
in a Note, in page 116, in his book. I refer to his 
First Edition; not having seen his second. 

" To term, in the usual way, / have walked, I may walk, 
" I may he walking, I shall walk, &c. tenses, is not in reality 
" parsing, but phrasing; Such words as have, may, shall, 
** ought to be considered as Verbs, and leading or principal 
** Verbs too, rather than auxiliaries, in present time ; he and 
" walk, as infinitives depending on the Verbs ; walked, as a per- 
** feet Participle or a participle supplying the place of a Noun in 
" the objective case, and d^enoting a finished action ; and walk- 
** ing, as an imperfect Participle, referring to the Nominative 
** I. In I do murder, I do write ; I did murder, I did write ; 
** I can consider murder and write as nothing, else but Verbal 



SEC. 7.] OF VERBS. ^55 

" Nouns, merely the. specific Names of Action, governed by do 
** and did, and capable themselves of governing an Accusative."* 

With regard to the passage now quoted, I desire 
to express my opinion, that, compared with the 
prevailing doctrines of the Subject, it exhibits a 
light which is not a little remarkable. Mr. Grant 
has clearly discerned, that. Whatever Form of a 
Verbal Word follows an Auxiliary Verb, whether 
it be the Present or the Fast, as walking or walked, 
(which Words he, indeed, in the usual way calls 
Farticiples ; but which, I must urge, are the Fre- 
sent and Past Forms of the Verb,) such Verbal 
Word becomes, for the moment, a Mere Noun 
Substantive in the Objective Case. And the 
only cause which appears, to me, to have been suf- 
ficient to prevent the possibility of his carrying his 
views farther in this direction, was his not hav^ 
ing had a conception of the Real Structure of the 
Category of Relatives and Relation : Owing to which 
cause, he certainly could not discern that Every 
Noun of Action, in Any Sentence which admits of 
the Principle of Alternation, can, and must, serve 
ALTERNATELY, in that Sentence, (in Either of 
THE Cases,) as a Noun and at the next step as 
A Verb. 

It is owing to the Same Cause— namely — the 
vast misapprehension of Grammarians with respect 
to the Real Nature of the Category of Relatives 
and Relation — that that Anomalous Rule exists 
in accredited Grammar, which, in one case alone, 
gives, to a So-called Participle, alternately, the 

* I reserve an observation with regard to such phrases as 
" I do writer 



25(5 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

Office of a Noun and the Regimen of a Verb, as I 
have already remarked in a former place. And the 
total darkness of Grammarians in this case ; and 
the partial light let in by Mr. Grant ; furnish dis- 
tinct and striking proofs of the impossibility of 
ever arriving at the True Structure of Language, 
so long as the Real Nature of Relation remained 
undiscerned. 

With regard to the General Structure of Lan- 
guage, it will be manifest, I differ from Mr. Grant's 
Views, in common with those of other Gramma- 
rians. But I have great satisfaction ia adverting 
to the point of coincidence just now considered i 
and I feel it due to add, that I have been generally 
impressed by the sound sense and metaphysical 
acumen which pervades the English Grammar of 
this writer. 

The observations which have now been stated 
will serve to introduce the Real Nature of Auxi- 
liary Verbs to the conception of a reader. And 
I suppose that the following suggestions will be 
found indicative of the subject. 

1. The Definition of an Aua^iliary Verb, I con- 
ceive, is, that it is a Verb expressive of an Act of 
THE MiNDjOr of Any Grammatical Person, with 
a view to, or bearing upon. Some Adjective Act. 

2. In such case, the Mind, or Agent, represent- 
ed by a Noun, or Pronoun, is always the Sub- 
ject, or Nominative of the Aua^iliary Verb. And 
the Adjective Act, represented by Its Name toge- 
ther with the Prefix To and called the Infinitive 
Mode, is the Object or Co-Agent of the 4w.ri- 



SKC. 7.] OF VERBS. 257 

liary Verb, And thus, the Auxiliary Verb is a Verb 
only because (like Every Other Verb) it is a Name 

of Action PLACED BETWEEN TwO NoUNS SUB- 
STANTIVE OR Names of Co-Agents. 

As, for example, the expression, *' He will love 
" Her,'' is, (according to our way of expressing an 
Infinitive,) an elliptical expression ; and it means 
" He WILL to love Her." And, in this Sentence, 
the expression — " to love' — \^t first, an Objective 
Noun to the Auxiliary Verb Will; and, next, it is 
a Verb, whose Real Nominative is the Noun of 
Auxiliary Action — Will — and whose Accusative is 
manifestly the Pronoun — Her. 

According to this view of the Subject, it is 
plain that Every Auxiliary Verb is as Distinct, 
Complete, and Efficient a Verb, as any in Lan- 
guage ; and bears the Very Same Structure as 
Every Other Verb. 

As an illustration of the Alternating Prin- 
ciple, (here by the way and in order to render 
its operation gradually familiar to a reader,) I de- 
sire to repeat, as is just above expressed and is a 
Principle already established in Grammar, that 
although a Noun of Action called an Infinitive 
Mode serves, in the first instance, as an Objective 
Noun to an Auxiliary Verb, in the manner de- 
scribed ; yet, it is, by the Principle of Alternation, 
turned into a Verb, in that Same Sentence, merely 
by adding to it Any Noun whatever. Thus if we 
say " He shall love Her f (which, according to 
the English Idiom, is an elliptical expression and 
means " He shall to love Her," but which, after 
all, means only He shall act love Her) the Noun 
Anal, 2 k 



268 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

• — Love — becomes a Verb, and its Objective Case 
is the Pronoun — " Her ;" — while its Nominative 
is the Word — " Shall," — which last, when taken 
alone, is a mere Noun of Action, and serves in the 
present instance as a Noun Substantive. 



Not only do Grammarians labor under the error 
already explained with regard to the Nature of 
Auxiliary Verbs ; but they are also at fault in 
not adverting to the real existing Number of these 
Verbs. For, besides Am, — Do,— and Have, — 
the following is the utmost Number of Auxiliaries 
usually recognised in our Language : May y— Can, 
—Shall,— Will,— Ought,— Let y— Must. 

These Verbs, however, (that is to say Verbs 
when duly associated, each between Two Nouns) form 
but a very small portion of the Number of Auxilia- 
ries in Language. I shall venture, here, to suggest 
the following additional list ; which, also, does not 
exhaust the existing Number. And I shall intro- 
duce them, appropriately, between a Nominative 
and an Accusative Noun, in order to illustrate their 
real Nature along with their Number. 

/love to love, 

I HATE to love, 
I FEAR to love. 

/desire or wish to love. 
/hope to love. 
/expect to love. 
I forswear to love. 
/forego to love. 



SEC. 7.] OF VERBS. 259 

/endeavour, or try, to love. 

I REMEMBER tO loVC. 
J FORGET to love. 

I CHOOSE to love. 
/chance, or happen, to love. 
/neglect to love, 
I intend to love. 
/incline to love. 
/yield, or submit, to love. 

It would be vain, for a moment, to deny that 
Every One of these Verbs is as truly an Auxiliary, 
as Any One of the previous list, such as / can 
(i. e. I know) to love and / shall (owe) to love : Nor 
will it be denied that Every One of them is the Sign 
of a Primary Mental Act that differs, very material- 
ly, from all the Other Acts in question. And, if 
there be two, or three, of these Words which appear 
to approach to a synonyme ; let this be conceded, 
and it will not materially shorten the catalogue. 

And here we are to observe. Not to confound 
these Auxiliaries, with Another Class of Verbs 
which appears, at first sight, to carry the same 
Structure; as, for example, when we say "1 
read to learn ;"— " I eat to live ;"--^" I write to 
eat ;" For all these are elliptical expressions : 
and each of them imports Two different affirma- 
tions of External Principal Actions. Thus the 
full import of them is, " / read in order, or 
" for, to learn f — " / eat in order, or for, to 
"• live ; — I write in order, or for, to eat.'' 

In fine, therefore, I observe, that it was doing 
but little, in the learned or inflecting Languages^ 



260 OF VERBS. [chap. 2. 

to invent Termi?iations to signify the Mental Ac- 
tions Shall, Will, May, Can, and their Compounds ; 
since those Languages are not provided with an 
appropriate Termination for Every One of the 
Verbs in the latter list of Auxiliaries here laid 
down. And it will furnish a very striking exam- 
ple of the irrationality of the Structure of those 
Languages, if we only suppose the defect reme- 
died, and every Verb in a Latin Paradigm 
supplied with a Form of the Verb corresponding 
to each of the Auxiliaries in question. VTere the 
inflecting Languages furnished out to this extent, 
(which, in order to render them consistent with 
their own genius or Structure, they ought to be,) 
the aspect they would exhibit, and the additional 
labor attending their acquisition, would form 
considerations so cumbrous and repulsive, as could 
require no commentary to enable us to appreciate 
them. 

One thing, at all events, is perfectly manifest, 
— namely — that, since all the Verbs in the list 
which I have supplied are undeniably Auxilia- 
ries ; and are at the same time recognised, on all 
hands, as being Complete and Distinct Verbs, 
and NOT Mere Elements of a Verb ; it follows, 
by analogy of this reason, (even without referring 
io Necessary Pinnciples,) that the Words Shall, 
Will, May, Can, &c. must no less than they be 
recognised as Complete and Distinct Verbs. 

To what has been advanced, with regard to the 
Part of Speech now under consideration, I shall 
only add, as a fact which must appear curious and 
unexpected to every reader who is imbued with 



SEC. 7.] OF VERBS. 261 

the existing Doctrines of Grammar, that there is a 
Very Close Affinity {not to say an Actual Identity,) be- 
tween Auxiliary Verbs and So-called Pre- 
positions : the evidences and proofs of which, I 
apprehend, will appear in no way doubtful. 

Here closes what I proposed to offer, as form- 
ing the analysis of the Verb. I shall not, in this 
place, add any general commentary or recapitu- 
lation : but shall pass on, to the analysis of the 
Next Principal Part of Speech ; which has hither- 
to been viewed under a very different Denomina- 
tion, and as fulfilling a very different Office, from 
that which it imperatively and of necessity de- 
mands. 



262 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 



CHAPTER in 



OF MINOR VERBS, BY GRAMMARIANS CALLED 
PREPOSITIONS. 



SECTION FIRST, 

OF THE THEORY OF PREPOSITIONS FURNISHED BY Mr, 
TOOKE, STATED HERE AS PREPARATORY TO GOING INTO 
THE ANALYSIS OF THIS PART OF SPEECH. 



SUBSECTION I. 

Of Mr, Tooke's Theory in general, — Inconsistent in 
his Method, — Mistaken in asserting, the Use of 
Prepositions to be that of preventing a Multiplicity 
of Complex Terms in Language ; — and in assert- 
ing Prepositions to be Imperatives, 

The greatest individual field in Language left by 
Grammarians, down to the labors of Mr. Tooke 
inclusive, to be cultivated by those who should 
come after them, was certainly that of the Verb. 
It has appeared at large, that, in so far as regards 
the doctrine of the Essential Nature of the Verb, 
Mr. Tooke has left it as he found it, that is to say 
in the very same state in which it had remained 
since the earliest dawn of literature. To this 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 263 

remark is to be added, that the etymological 
researches of Dr. Murray, which have been so 
recently given to the public, have introduced no 
change in the views heretofore entertained of the 
Essential Nature of this Part of Speech. Now 
whether the aspect, or character, which the Verb 
has thus uniformly borne, approaches in any de- 
gree to that of its Real Nature ; or can, at all, be 
tolerated by a Nation pretending to logical ad- 
vancement ; is a question to be decided by the 
competent reader, after having duly examined the 
analysis which has been stated in the foregoing 
chapter. 

The Next Field to the above, in point of gram- 
matical magnitude or importance, is that which em- 
braces the Nature of those Various Classes of 
Words which have been by Grammarians called 
Particles. And, among these, by far the most 
important is that Class hitherto known by the 
Name of Prepositions. Accordingly, therefore, 
the analysis of Prepositions will form the subject 
of the present chapter. 

With regard to my having spoken, just now, of 
the— " greatest individual field in Language;" it 
may be proper to explain, that I consider the 
Principal Several Desiderata of Speech, as left by 
Mr. Tooke, (without at present descending to a 
number of very important though minor coiisidera- 
tions,)to comprehend at least Four Great Fields or 
Special Objects — namely — The Nature of Verbs; 
— The Nature of So-called Prepositions ; — 
The Nature of Conjunctions ; — and The Na- 
ture of Limited Silence, considered as an Ele- 



264 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

MENT OF Speech : — Not One of which Elements 
of Language do I conceive to possess that 
Nature which has been assigned to it by Gram- 
marians. Now, in point of fact, these Four 
Objects, including the Various Considerations 
which they involve ; together with the Field of 
Abbreviations, which last I have not enume- 
rated because it has been partly reaped by Mr. 
Tooke, and partly made ready for the reapers; 
make up the Whole Structmx of Language, with the 
exception of the Noun alone, including its Va- 
rious Modifications, or Appendages — namely— the 
Pronoun, — Adjective,— SLiid Article or Definitive. 

I would not however, by this statement, be un- 
derstood to imply that the doctrine of the Noun 
and its Departments is perfect ; or yet near being 
perfect : Nor, that the rectification of it is a matter 
of small importance in Grammar. On the con- 
trary, I contemplate a great deviation from the 
usual doctrine of the Subject^ in the chapter which 
will be offered in the sequel upon this Half of 
Language^ But I mean to signify, in this place, 
that the preceding considerations are of greater 
moment, in their logical and grammatical conse- 
quences, than those which are involved by the 
Half of Lan2:uaore last mentioned. 



In entering upon an analysis of that Part of 
Speech called Prepositions, it is indispensable that 
a very particular notice should be had of the Spe- 
culations, upon this subject, which have been pre- 
sented to the world by Mr, Tooke. In the intro- 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS; 265 

ductory part of this treatise, I was unavoidably 
led to hazard some strictures on the views of this 
acute and eminent Etymologist. And here, again, 
(besides various incidental instances,) I am under 
the necessity of animadverting, to a considerable 
extent, upon that Theory and those Assumptions 
which he has advanced, and which the great real 
merit of his researches has raised, in the general 
estimation, so as to make them pass universally for 
no less than a true genuine account of the Structure 
of Language. In yielding to this necessity, I feel 
it to be due to such a writer to remark, that, in 
the investigations requisite for the attainment of 
general knowledge, it too frequently happens that 
there is more occasion to criticise the errors and 
oversights of preceding inquirers, and to point out 
wherein they have failed of contributing to the 
stock of human knowledge, than there is room, or 
convenience, (even although there should be every 
inclination,) to dwell with adequate eulogium on 
what they have actually effected. This, moreover, 
is an evil the injustice of which is at least as much 
to be laid at the door of readers, as of a writer. 
For readers in Philosophy, like men in all other 
vocations, prefer to press forward ; and, in general, 
would not choose to be diverted by dwelling long 
on the praises due to those who have furnished 
them with past lights, when they are eagerly look- 
ing with expectation of light to come, 

I would have these reflections borne in remem- 
brance, at any moment when the interests of the 
Subject may force me to express myself with any ap- 
parent severity, with regard to the views entertained 
Anal. 2 l 



266 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chaf. 3, 

by the Philologer of Purley. And I have, purposely, 
reserved the mention of the thing, until 1 should 
(as is now the case) arrive at the reputed Princi- 
pal Hold or Citadel of all his Grammatical Specula- 
tions : because it is here that I shall be inevitably 
constrained to advance opinions, which miUtate in 
the last degree against the grammatical positions 
which he has asserted. With regard to that Prin- 
cipal Part of Speech or Half of Grammar called 
the Verb, Mr. Tooke had No Theory of his own, 
that is to say with regard to its Essential Nature 
or Structure : he only chimed in, with all preceding 
Grammarians on the Subject, in making it the Sign 
of an Attribute of Some Single Subject. That 
view of the Verb, therefore, which I have suggested 
in the foregoing chapter, is opposed to his doctrine 
ONLY IN COMMON with that of all other writers on 
the Subject. But, with regard to the Nature of Pre- 
positions, the case is very different: For Mr. 
Tooke HAD a Theory of these Words, — a Theory 
advanced by himself, and which is properly and con- 
clusively his own. In this theory, moreover, sacri- 
ficing his previous general doctrine that " the 
** Causes of Language have been, by the most 
** judicious Grammarians, left to shift for them- 
'* selves," — he has resorted to these Causes, that 
is to General reasoning from the Nature of Ideas; 
and has formed his Views of the Subject partly 
upon this method, and partly upon Etymological 
Research to procure examples in illustration of his 
reasoning. This was (in the solitary instance now in 
question) proceeding like a Philosopher : although 
it was certainly very inconsistent in him, as a 



SKC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 267 

writer ; since it amounted to a glaring virtual con- 
tradiction of his own previous judgment. It is 
in his Theory of Prepositions, thereforey that 
the real dimensions of his genius as a Philosopher 
are most advantageously exhibited. And along 
with this I may observe, that there is no Part of 
Speech, the true analysis of which involves more 
curious, more various, or more subtle considera- 
tions, than this one. In the whole Structure, 
however, of the fabric of Prepositions which Mr. 
Tooke has thus raised, I am laid under the neces- 
sity to differ from him. And as, (after the labor 
devoted to the subject,) I cannot help feeUng a 
considerable degree of reliance on the ground 
which I have been led to embrace, I shall some- 
times be urged, especially by the tone of decisive- 
ness which Mr. Tooke himself has usually adopted, 
to express my opinions with a proportionate de- 
gree of confidence, or conviction. 



It is not necessary, in this place, to resubstanti- 
ate the charge which I brought in the Introductory 
Chapter, against Mr. Tooke, of being inconsistent 
with himself with regard to the method which he 
thought should be prosecuted with a view to solve 
the Problem of Language : The general evidence 
of this inconsistency has already been stated, in 
the place wherein the objection was laid. But I 
must beg, however, to recall the matter to the recol- 
lection of the reader, or solicit him to refer back 
to it if necessary ; because it cannot fail to be of 
very material moment, in operating upon the judg- 



268^ OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3^ 

raent which he must form of Mr. Tooke's general 
procedure, in entering upon a particular examina- 
tion of his Theory of Prepositions. Having prefaced 
thus much, I shall proceed immediately to an ex- 
amination of Mr. Tooke's account of the Use or 
Office of the Part of Speech in question: which, 
the reader will observe, is a very different consi- 
deration from that of investigating his theory of 
its Etymological Character or Origin. 

In the First Volume of the Diversions of Pur- 
ley, page 318, Mr. Tooke makes his fellow Dia- 
logist — B — express himself in the following terms, 

" You assert, then, that what we call Preposi- 
** tions, and distinguish as a separate Part of 
** Speech, are not a species of words essentially, or 
" in any manner, different from the other Parts : 
*' but that they are in fact either Nouns or Verbs. 
** And that (like the Conjunctions) Prepositions 
" are only words which have been disguised by 
" corruption : and that Etymology will give us, in 
" all languages, what Philosophy has attempted 
" in vain. And yet I cannot but perceive that 
** such words as Prepositions are necessary in dis- 
" course." 

Now with regard to this passage, I have to ob- 
serve by the way, that, although I have thought it 
requisite to quote it here, as being introductory of 
the Subject, it is manifestly not of a ixasoning cha- 
racter, but is entirely of an etymological nature. 
With regard to the truth of its assumptions, how- 



SEC.l.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 269 

ever, I altogether assent to the general assertion 
of Mr. Tooke, as herein expressed — namely — that 
So-called Prepositions are not an Element of Speech 
of a different Nature from that of Evoy other in 
Language. And I admit that, in fact, many of 
THEM ARE ** words disguiscdby corruption '' To the 
discovery of this important light, as far as it goes, 
Mr. Tooke may justly lay almost an exclusive 
claim ; although, certainly, in the case of a few of 
these Words, the clue was found by others before 
bim. And as to his ascribing his success exclu- 
sively TO Etymology, after having expressly 
declared that Etymology had no hand informing his 
System, I have only to remark, upon this, that it 
strikes with deplorable force against his con- 
sistency. But along with this degree of assent I 
must object, that the mere discovery that So-called 
Prepositions are only certain Primary Parts of 
Speech disguised by corruption is a light which, 
though certainly very important is yet so vague, 
and void of steadiness for the requisite purpose of 
reducing the different Parts of Speech to ^ny thing 
like a definite character, that, in effect, it amount^ 
^ to no better than a mere twilight, or to the darkness 
of night itself; in which objects indeed appear, but 
appear in forms so shadowy and shapeless, that it 
is impossible to distinguish a reality from the crea- 
tures of imagination. And, in fact, I entertain 
a full reliance on being able to show, in the 
most satisfactory manner, that such has been the 
degree of obscurity in question, that Mr. Tooke has 
mistaken these Objects as being of the very oppo- 



^0 OF MINOR VERBS, b}^ Gramma- [ghap. 3. 

site Grammatical Character to that which they in 
reality possess. 

With regard to the other assumption contained 
in the passage now under consideration, I have to 
observe, that it is true, in fact, that if Etymology has 
not succeeded ; so, also, *' Philosophy has attempted 
*' in vain'' But it is quite manifest, that, in this as- 
sertion, is implied, as the meaning of Mr. Tooke, 
not only that Philosophy has failed in time past; but 
likezvise that it never can succeed in time to come : 
For this is conformable to the general tenor of Mr. 
Tooke's opinions, throughout ; although it is con- 
tradicted by occasional lapses in favour of reasoning. 
Now against this assumption I have uniformly ex- 
pressed my dissent : and I shall develop my 
farther objections to it, in the course of what is to 
follow. But, in the first place, it is necessary to 
state the answer which Mr. Tooke gives to his 
fellow Dialogist, with regard to the Necessity or 
Use of Prepositions. 

The Dialogist, H,'(Mr. Tooke'sown designation,) 
says, " I acknowledge them" (i. e. Prepositions) 
" to be undoubtedly necessary. For, as the ne- 
" cessity of the Article (or of some equivalent in- 
" vention) follows from the impossibility of having 
" in language a distinct name ov particular term for 
"each particular individual xV/e^; so does the ne* 
" cessity of the Preposition (or of some equivalent 
" invention) follow from the impossibility of having 
** in language a distinct complea: term for each dif- 
" ferent collection of ideas which we may have 
" occasion to put together in discourse. The ad- 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 271 

** dition or subtraction of any one idea to or from 
" a collection, makes it a different collection : and 
" (if there were degrees of impossibility) it is still 
" more impossible to use in language a different 
** and distinct complete term for each different and 
*^ distinct collection of ideas, than it is to use a dis- 
** tinct particular term for each particular and in- 
" dividual idea. To supply, therefore, the place 
*' of the complex terms which are wanting in a 
" language, is the Preposition employed : By 
" whose aid complex terms are prevented from 
" being infinite or too numerous, and are used 
" only for those collections of ideas which we 
" have most frequently occasion to mention in dis- 
*' course. And this end is obtained in the simplest 
" manner in the world. For having occasion in 
" communication to mention a collection of ideas 
" for which there is no one single complex term in 
" language, we either take that complex term 
".which includes the greatest number, though not 
*' All, of the ideas we would communicate ; or else 
*' we take that complex term which includes All, 
** and the fewest ideas more than those we would 
** communicate : and then by the help of the Pre- 
*' position, we either make up the deficiency in 
*' the one case, or retrench the superfluity in the 
" other.*' 

" For instance :" 

\, ' A House WITH a Party-walU 
2. * A House without a Roof.' 

" In the first instance, the complex term is de- 
** ficient ; The Preposition directs to add what is 



272 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

'* wanting. In the second instance, the complex 
** term is redundant : The Preposition directs to 
** take away what is superfluous." 

' The connected passages, which I have just 
quoted, contain the substance of Mr. Tookes 
Theory of the Necessity and Use of Prepositions. 
In the place whence these quotations are taken 
there are other remarks, with a view to illustrate 
and confirm the Theory ; and, to these illustrations 
I would refer the reader, for farther satisfaction : 
but the essential part, I apprehend, is here extract- 
ed, for every requisite purpose. 

*'-With regard to this Theory, therefore, I now 
observe, in the first place, that it has been hail- 
ed on all sides, as being a most luminous and 
beautiful exposition of the subject. The asserted 
Use or Office of Prepositions is laid out, to super- 
ficial observation, with all the aspect of a logical 
and enlightened discrimination of the Nature of 
our " Ideas," with regard to the various Modes of 
their " CoUtction,''—'' Addition^—'' Subtraction,''— 
S^c, ; notwithstanding the Preliminary Doctrine 
of the writer — that there are No Such Things in the 
Mind as these Composiiiofis and Decompositions. And 
the instances given, to illustrate the theory, ap- 
pear to furnish an elegant example of the Eti/- 
mology or Derivation of the Words in question, 
from their primitive forms in another Language. 
Such is the general estimate which has been made 
of the Doctrine of Mr. Tooke, with regard to the 
Use of Prepositions. 

After thus adverting to the aspect and repute 
of the thing; and to the universal consent and 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 273 

celebrity which have attended it; it will naturally 
excite great surprise that one should venture 
to express any material objection against it. 
Much more will it do so when I hazard a protest 
against the whole exposition which has been 
quoted above, as being a matter completely un- 
founded and visionary. 

As, however, I shall stake my judgment to the 
hazard of this opinion, it becomes requisite, here, 
to submit an assumed general outline of the Na- 
ture of Prepositions and Conjunctions, as founded 
upon the result of their respective analyses in 
the subsequent pages of this work : Which preli- 
minary position I conceive to be necessary, in 
order to enable a reader to apprehend the bearings 
of the observations which I have to offer, in this 
place, upon the above-mentioned Theory of Mr. 
Tooke. 

In laying down this general outline, it is neces- 
sary to premise, that, besides Mr. Tooke's theory 
of the Use of Prepositions, he has asserted that 
Prepositions and Conjunctions were originally, 
and still are, All One Same Class of Words. 
And it is sufficiently known that he has been fol- 
lowed, in this vi^w of the subject, by all subsequent 
writers. To this doctrine, also, as well as to that of 
the Use of Prepositions as asserted by him, I object 
in the strongest manner, as being to the last degree 
unfounded : And the following is what I humbly 
conceive to be the real Nature of the Subject ; 
the truth of which I propose to substantiate in the 
course of a very full analysis, in the sequel. 

1. Prepositions and Conjunctions form 
Ami, 2 m 



«74 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Grawzma- [chap. 3. 

Two Most Different Classes of Signs, or Parts of 
Speech ; insomuch, that it is, of itself alone, a 
proof of a very profound degree of general dark- 
ness in the Philosophy of Language, that these 
Two Classes have been confounded into one. 

2. All So-called Prepositions are Verbs, 
and Dependent Verbs, in Relatively Present Time, 
This is the invariable and the necessary grammati- 
cal character or import of Every Word that is en- 
titled to be called a Preposition. 

As for the Use of this Part of Speech ; it ap- 
pears to divide itself into Two Sorts: but both 
these, however, resolve themselves into one Kind, 
With regard to these Two Uses, in the j^r^^ place 
I observe. Prepositions serve most frequently to 
define the manner of beginning, or of terminating. 
Any Principal Action; which Principal Action 
is always signified by its own Sign or Verb : In 
which case, the Verb signifying the Principal 
Action is a Major Verb ; and the So-called 
Preposition, signifying the Manner of begin- 
ning, or of terminating the Principal Action, 
is a Depending or Minor Verb. Hence, there- 
fore, I have been led to assign to All So-called 
Preposjtions the denomination of Minor Verbs. 

As an example of the Use now in question ; If 
we say " He comes to London,'' — ** He resides in 
England ;' the Verbs ** comes" and " resides" are 
Major Verbs, as being the Signs of the Grammati- 
cally Principal Actions asserted in these two Sen- 
tences; and the So-called Prepositions, ** to" and 
" IN," are Minor Verbs, as being Signs of the 
dependent atid defining Actioits of ¥ wishing London 



SEC. IJ rians called PREPOSITIONS. 275 

and iNNiNoEngland. I shall shew, hereafter, that 
Actions in general require to have their ex- 
tremes defined ; and defined by this Principle. 
To which remark may be added, that, besides be- 
ginning and terminating Actions, innumerable 
Actions may be expressed as Dependent Ones. 

The Other most frequent Use of Prepositions is, 
to serve as the Sign of an Action between Some Noun 
in the Defoiitive Case and Some Other Noun which 
the first defines by means of this Action. As an ex- 
ample of this Use, when we say " Joan of Arc ;" 
the Preposition — " of," — which means offspring- 
ingy — is the Sign of an Action between Joan and 
the Place of her Designation ; by means of 
which Action the Noun — " Arc" — is placed in 
the Genitive, or rather in the Definitive Case, 
and it defines the Noun — '* Joan" — or tells us 
what Joan it is that is meant.' It only remains 
to observe, here, that, although the Word offspring- 
ing appears, in the present instance, to stand for a 
single or solitary Action, and not for a defining or 
dependent Action, depending upon any Principal 
Act ; yet, the Nature of Things resolves it into a 
Dependent and Defining Action, like those de- 
scribed in the first-mentioned Use of Prepositions : 
because Joan offspringing Arc, (whensoever she 
is mentioned,) must be *' Joan living offspring- 
ing Arc," — or "Joan dead offspringing Arc," 
or " Joan conquering offspringing Arc," or 
" Joan defeated, taken, or executed, off- 
*' springing Arc :"* — And, thus, we cannot conceive 

* The Definitive Case will be explained, in the sequel. 

* Here if any reader, who is versed in Etymology, should 



276 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

Any Noun put in Any Case, but we must involve 
the conception that such Case is dependent 
upon Some Action which is Grammatically Ma- 
jor OR Principal, with respect to the Action 
which forms the Case, 

I could not have stated this general sketch of 
the Use of Prepositions in less room than is here 
taken up. And it must remain for the sequel to 
shew what views of Language it will open, in its 
consequences. 

The General Nature of Conjunctions, upon 
the other hand, now remains to be suggested. A 
Conjunction, that is to say an Imperative 
Conjunction (which is the only Species of this 
Class of Words with which we have at present 
any thing to do,) is an Abbreviated Sign of a 
Whole Speech or Sentence ; and this, too, not 
of a Simple, but of a Compound Sentence. As such, 
therefore, a Conjunction can never be a Verb: 
And nothing could be more unfounded, or could 
create more confusion in Language, than the as- 
sumption or doctrine of Mr. Tooke which con- 
strues Some Prepositions as Imperatives, and 
then CALLS fhem Verbs ; — a doctrine scarcely less 
monstrous than his other assumption — namely — • 
that Some Prepositions are Nouns I 

In furnishing this statement, I have to notice 
the collateral fact, that the views of Mr. Tooke, 

happen to entertain a notion that " Offspringing" is not the real 
meaning of the word " Of;" I only solicit him to suspend 
this, or any other such objection, until I shall come to the pro- 
per place for his laying it, or for my discussion of it. 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 277 

which I confidently deem to be so profoundly 
objectionable and visionary, are altogether sub- 
scribed to by Dr. Murray ; I mean in so far as 
regards the doctrine that Prepositions may be 
Imperatives, Nouns, &c. Upon this, however, 
at present I shall only observe, that I entertain a 
full persuasion that the vast error of this doctrine 
is so completely demonstrable ; and the deplora- 
ble state of the Philosophy of Language resulting 
from it is a matter of such certain proof; that, not- 
Virithstanding my great respect for the judgment 
of Dr. Murray as an Etymologist, his views and 
his evidences have not given rise in my mind to 
any thing, except a more confirmed conviction of 
the unreality of the ground which he has asserted 
in common with his meritorious predecessor. 

At the same time, it is due to both these writers 
to observe, that it is Etymology, and not any 
visionary range of their own imaginations, that 
has forced them to the adoption of the views in 
question. For certain it is, that our Teutonic an- 
cestors have, by a preposterous violation of reason, 
made use of both Imperatives and Nouns to serve, 
in a way, for Prepositions ; and when we contem- 
plate the looseness of expression which has always 
prevailed in early Languages ; and the masses of 
absurdity which frequently occur in the specimens 
of early dialects which have been furnished in 
evidence ; we can never be surprised that even 
Nouns and Imperatives have been put in the 
place of Minor Verbs. It must be accorded to 
Tooke, and to Murray, that it was indeed the 
duty of an Etymologist faithfully to trace 



278 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

out, and to record, these facts : But it must at 
the same time be insisted that it is the Office of 
a Philosophical Grammarian to expose every 
existing absurdity in the Structure of Language, 
and to demonstrate what Part of Speech ought to 
occupy its place. It would have been a wonderful 
violation of the known lavvs of nature, and a real 
miracle, if the early Teutonic Savages, or the 
Barbarians of any Tribe, were endowed with a 
prescriptive judgment in the Science of Language, 
insomuch that all the expressions they had stum- 
bled upon, or hastily employed, in the necessities 
of their situation, ought for ever to be received as 
the 'pure legitimate offs'pring of i^eason, and to be 
made the models of verbal communication for 
civilised nations and philosophers : But it is suffi- 
ciently known to be no miracle, that civilised 
nations and philosophers have (from a variety of 
reasons and inducements) taken the ready-made 
absurdities of barbarians for models of verbal ex- 
pression. 

The preparatory outline, which I had proposed 
to sketch of the Subject, is now before the reader : 
And I proceed, therefore, to examine Mr. Tooke's 
account of the Use of Prepositions. 

With regard to the present view of Mr. Tooke's 
Theory, I observe. First, that, in the examples 
which he has given of 

" A House with a Party- Wall;" 
" A House without a Roof — ;" 
He has been ''misled by Etymology \io construe. 



SEC.l.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 279 

the Words with and without as Imperatives. 
And, by so doing, he has turned these Words fairly 
(or rather unfairly) out of the Class of Preposi- 
tions, and has made them Imperative Con- 
junctions. The consequence of this error is, 
that the Use he supposes them to have, in their 
respective sentences, is, in the first place, a most 
awkward and illogical Use; while the desired 
purpose would have been far better answered by 
construing them as Prepositions, i. e. as Minor 
Verbs in what is called the Progressive Participial 
Form, as in reality I affirm they are. This con- 
struction would reduce the phrases in question to 
the following form : 

" A House withing (i. e. ti/ing) a Party- Wall." 
^' A House WITHING OUT (i. e. tying out or tying 
the want of) a Roof." 

I shall leave it to the reader, for the present, 
without farther illustration, to judge whether this 
form of expression is not more natural and proba- 
ble, than to say, or even to mean, 

" A House, I direct you, that you add A 

Party-Wall." 
" A House, I DIRECT you that you take 

AWAY A Roof." 

The real truth, however, is, that, so far are Im- 
peratives from being necessary to express either 
the added ov the subtracted ** Idea," in the exam- 
ples in question, that we can express the very 
same addition, or subtraction, and this more con- 
cisely^ in Two Other Ways, without using the 



280 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

clumsy, and in fact the inadmissible, instrumen- 
tality of an Impei^ative, For, not only can we say, 
(as has already appeared) " A House joining a 
Party -Wall ;" but, besides this Verbal form of 
expression, we could express the very same 
" Collection of Ideas" by a Mere Adjective, 
thus: " A Party-wall House;" just as we say 
*' a Double-Barrel Gun," or a " Broad-wheel 
Waggon." What, then, becomes of Mr. Tooke*s 
doctrine, that Imperatives are necessary to pre- 
vent Complex Terms in Language from being 
infinite, or too numerous? 

If it should be observed, that Mr. Tooke has 
said, only, that " Prepositions, or Some Other 
equivalent invention ,' is necessary for the purpose 
in question. I answer : It is indisputable, Mr. 
Tooke has here expressly, and by name, assumed 
Prepositions to be Imperatives ; and he has 
furnished Examples of these Imperatives as serv- 
ing to prevent a multiplicity of Complex Terms : And, 
against this, I have shewn, in the little matter that 
is already advanced, that the Prepositions in 
question cannot, without a stretch amounting to 
little short of absurdity, be construed as Impera- 
tives ; and, that there are Two Other Modes of ex- 
pression in Language, which serve the purpose in a 
vastly superior manner. But I have now to sug- 
gest a fact which carries the matter much farther 
against the Use of Imperatives, in the present 
case. For the real truth is, that, so far are Impe- 
ratives from being necessary to save a multiplicity 
of Complex Terms, that there is a Certain Class of 
Words in Language necessary to save an intolera" 



j(h:c. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 281 

bl]/ numerous repetition of Imperatives, in those 
cases wherein Imperatives do, or could, enter into 
Complex Terms. The Class of Words I at pre- 
sent allude to, is that Species of Adjectives called 
Numeral Definitives. Thus for example, if we 
had no Numeral Definitive for the Number a 
Thousand, nor for any lower Number beyond One; 
and if we wanted to express a Thousand Men ; we 
should, in this case, in expressing a Thousand Men y 
be under the necessity of saying ** A Man And 
" A Man Join A Man And A Man Join A Man, 
and so on, until the End of the Thousand ; besides 
the fact that, for want of Names for Numbers, we 
could never tell when we had got to the Number 
in question. In this example, it is plain, that the 
Definitive—** a Thousand" — ^saves Nine Hun- 
dred and Ninety-Nine repetitions of the Impe- 
rative ** And," — or ** Join ;" besides saving 
the like Number of repetitions of the Noun Man, 
which the Imperative would otherwise have con- 
nected with the First Noun Man, 

In a word ; In so far as Mr. Tooke's account 
of the Use of Imperatives, in the present case, is 
true at all, the passage in which he lays it out so 
formally, and with so much fallacy intermixed, 
ought to have been expressed in the brief and 
usual terms employed by popular Grammar wri- 
ters — namely — that ** Conjunctions" (for the 
examples he has here given of Prepositions are in 
reality Nothing but Imperati'oe Conjunctions) ** con- 
" nect like Cases of Nouns and Modes of Verbs:'* 
For all that he has shewn on the subject, in his 
examples. In reality amounts to no more. And 
A7iaL % N 



282 OF MINOR VERBS, ly Gramma^ [chap. 0. 

if he had had the most distant conception of the 
Nature of Prepositions — or of the fact that Every 
So-called Preposition must be a Verb— a 
Proper Legitimate OperativeVerb — he never 
could have offered the account of the matter which 
he has done ; since it certainly never entered his 
mind, nor that of any other writer, that the Use 
OF Verbs is to save an infinity or multiplicity of 
Comple.v Terms in Language. 

In closing this preliminary objection, there is 
one consideration which I would particularly sug- 
gest for the attention of the reader ; as I think it 
cannot fail to strike him with its full moment. 
Mr.Tooke assumes that a Preposition directs US 
to add, or to take away. Now I leave it, without 
farther comment, to the judgment of any person. 
Whether a Prepositioji ever directs at all, — or 
possesses any thing like an Office of directing US. 
In the expressions, — He went to London, — She 
lives IN London, — They talk at random, — We 
came from England, — Man lives by Bread, — I 
ask. Is there a possibility of pretending, for a mo- 
ment, that any one of these Prepositions has an 
Office of directing Us to do any Act? On the 
contrary, Do not these Prepositions act them- 
selves, by connecting the Noun vi^hich goes be- 
fore them, with that which follows after them ; in ^ 
the very same manner in which a Verb acts, by 
connecting its Nominative with its Accusative 
Noun? And, assuredly, no person will pretend 
that a Verb directs US to add its Nominative 
to its Accusative; because this addition is effected 
before a Verb can be a Verb, An Imperative 



S£C.l.] rians called VUEFOSITIO^S, 283 

can ONLY DIRECT, it CANNOT FORCE Us, to 

add One Idea, or Word, to Another : And we may, 
(even though the grammatical consequence should 
be absurdity, or nonsense,) Not add any Idea, 
or Word, directed by an Imperative. But a Pre- 
position leaves us no such Power, or Option to 
rebel: For it connects One Idea, or Word, with 
Another BY Its Own Grammatically-intrin- 
sic Power. Most certainly, therefore, any man 
with a logical head will vastly distinguish between 
these Two Grammatical Principles. — An Im- 
perative can only connect Two Portions of 
Speech WHEN WE CHOOSE IT SHOULD : but 
a Preposition connects Two Nouns before it 
can be a Preposition: For Any Such Word as 
In, With, or By, is No Preposition until after 
it is iNTER-POSED between two Nouns, or Words. 
In fine ; An Imperative, I have already observed, 
is Not Any Part of Speech; because it is the 
Abbreviation of a Whole Speech: But a 
Preposition is a Part or Element of Speech, 
properly so called ; and the difference between 
these Two Things is grammatically infinite. 

To all persons, who are in the habit of logical 
disciminations, the distinction which I have now 
urged must be sufficiently manifest: But for the 
sake of the general reader I farther observe, that an 
Imperative Conjuncton is a Thing analogous 
to the Sentence of a Judge, or the Wari^ant of a 
Magistrate. The Sentence may be just: but it 
may never be carried into execution: and, if it 
should be executed ; this must be done through 
the Medium of an Act of Volition in Some Alind, 



284 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma'- [chap. S. 

But a Preposition is analogous to the Fetter, 
which LINKS a Culprit to his Prison Wall; or, to the 
Instrument of Death, which ties him to his Fate : 
Which Thing can he No Fetter, or No Instru- 
ment OF Death, except duriJig its Action in this 
Office ; but its Power of connecting is then in- 
trinsic TO ITSELF. I may safely venture to be- 
lieve, therefore, that it never will be deliberately 
affirmed, by any person of a competent knowledge 
of the Subject, that the Philosophy of Language 
has ever yet seen the light ; when it is confidently 
and dogmatically asserted, by our most luminous 
and approved Grammarians, that Imperatives 
and Prepositions are One and the Same 
Part or Element of Speech. What Persons 
(I might ask) are so low in logical pretension, that 
they would not blush for their understanding, if 
they were supposed to imagine that the Moral 
Principle which gives a Sort of Secondary 
Virtue to a Piece of Paper, or Parchment, and 
(which may, or may not, lead to the production 
of Death) is One Same Thing with the Physical 
Principle of the Iron, or the Hemp, which, in a 
logical se7ise, ties an Animal to its Fate ? Yet the 
confounding of these Two Principles is nothing 
less monstrous, or less deplorable, than the con- 
founding of Prepositions with Imperatives. 



SEC. 1.] riam called PREPOSITIONS. 5285 



SUBSECTION II. 

Prepositions if construed as Imperatives invert the 
Relative Situations of the Subjects, or Objects, in- 
tended to be compressed. 

Having thus far discussed the consideration of 
the Use of Prepositions ; I proceed now to ob- 
serve, as for the supposed Etymological authority 
produced by Mr. Tooke, by which he construes 
these Words as Imperatives, that if this construc- 
tion shall be irrefragably shewn to lead to absurd 
consequences, or a manifest perversion of common 
sense, it must be conclusively regarded as being 
altogether visionary. And, even, supposing Mr. 
Tooke to have been right in asserting that our 
Gothic, or Anglo-Saxon forefathers did actually in 
some instances force Imperatives, or did believe 
they had forced them, into the Office of Preposi- 
tions ; yet, I must insist, that very sufficient rea- 
sons may be assigned, why they may have done 
so through negligence alone, (not to mention va- 
rious other causes,) whereby they may have changed 
the So-called Participial Forms of a Verb to that of 
an Imperative; or, rather, may have taken the one 
for the other : For I shall shew, distinctly, that 
One Same Form has, at certain stages of our Lan- 
guage, served for Both these Nominal Parts of 
Speech. 

The truth is, that Ancient Language, i. e. the 
Dialects of the Ancient Teutonic, abounds with 
absurd forms of expression. And this truth will 
be denied by no one who impartially consults the 



286 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

labors of Etymologists. As examples of this, I 
shall, in the sequel, in an appropriate article, exhi- 
bit especially the case of Two remarkable So-call- 
ed Prepositions — -namely — the French. F reposition 
Chez and the English Preposition Through: both 
which, indeed, appear to be Nouns, as Mr.Tooke 
has called them. And the exposure of absurdity 
which will be exhibited in these examples, will, I 
have no doubt, carry with it all the weight and 
impression that could be desired. It is the Office 
of the Philosophical Grammarian, in such case, 
not to follow the absurdity of our ancestors ; but 
to detect and remove it. 

But, although I have admitted that Mr. Tooke 
is justified as an Etymologist, in some instances, 
in his Derivation of the Words now in question; 
yet, a very grave objection is to be laid against 
his Derivations in the case of a number of the most 
important Words, and especially in that of Impe- 
ratives. For it is unequivocally asserted by Dr. 
Murray, whose authority cannot fail to be consi- 
dered as higher than that of Mr. Tooke, that he 
'' differs widely from the latter in his account of 
" particular Words." This remarkable Schism 
between those two eminent Etymologists, if we 
were to suppose their authorities nearly equal, 
would exhibit another of those instances of error 
which have brought Etymology into disrepute. 
But if we allow that Dr. Murray has gone by far 
the deepest into the Nature of Early Dialects, the 
very least result, in this case, will be to oblige us 
to reject the Derivatiojis of Mr, Tooke, in the va-^ 
rious instances (and they appear to be equally nu- 



SEC. 1.3 rians called PREPOSITIONS. 287 

merous and important) in which he differs from 
his illustrious Successor. Much more, then, must 
we reject these Derivations of Mr. Tooke, if we 
find them not only differing from those of Dr. 
Murray, but at the same time involving the Sub- 
ject in gross and deplorable absurdity. 

As a single and curious example of this etymo- 
logical fallacy in Mr. Tooke, I am led to furnish 
the reader with the following one, previously i;o my 
going into the absurdity to which I here allude : 
Because, from all the attendant circumstances, 1 
think it cannot fail to impress his mind, and to 
caution him, as to the degree of ^rz/^^ which is 
sometimes due to even the most tinumphant or 
confident etymological assertions. In Mr. Tooke's 
First Volume, page 181, he has explained the Con- 
junction, — ** Else" — as an Imperative, import- 
ing Dismiss; and he has supplied a string of 
examples, in illustration of this theory. This deri- 
vation, however, was afterwards objected to, by 
a Critic on Mr. Tooke's writings ; and the latter 
was thereupon led to defend his derivation, farther 
on, in page 248. In this place, accordingly, he is 
more than usually positive and sarcastic. Among 
other examples of this, he says. 

" Nothing Else," 

" You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; 
" and Nothing Else." 

** You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; 
** and Nothing But a fool's cap." 

" You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; 
" and Nothing Except a fool's cap." 



288 OF MINOR VERBS, Jy Gramma' [chap. 3, 

** You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; 
" and IF NOT a fool's cap, Nothing'' 

" You shall have a fool's cap for your pains ; 
" and Dismiss the fool's cap, Nothing,'' 

** You have shewn impotence and malice 
" enough ; Dismiss them, What have you shewn ?" 

Thus he runs on, for the space of two, or 
three pages, in the same triumphant and cutting 
manner, and deals out the most unqualified con- 
tempt to his opponent : insomuch, that one would 
naturally conclude, that if there was any one of 
his Derivations more sacred or unassailable than 
all the others, it was this very exposition of the 
Word '' Else." 

In Dr. Murray's Second Volume, nevertheless, a 
vastly different account is given of the Word 
Else ; and an account which bears internal evi- 
dence of profound research and indubitable truth. 

In page 12, he says, "From Anel, by con- 
** tract, came Al, meaning other, different, foreign, 
" whence the adverb Els, Elles, else; and the 
** Latin Alius and Al-ter, other." — 

In farther explanation of this, (back in pages 5 
and 6) Dr. Murray says, that the Word—" else" 
— is the Genitive Case of El and Al, Other. 
And, in the same place, he has explained a whole 
tribe of other Adverbs, as being also Genitive 
Cases of Nouns, such as Ones, and Anis, 
Eftsones, Whenes, hWiles, &c. 

According to this exposition, therefore, (of the 
soundness of which I entertain not a doubt,) the 
Word Else, — instead of being an Imperative, is 



SEC. 1.] riaris called PREPOSITIONS. 289 

an Adverb compounded of a Noun and a Prepo- 
sition — namely — El-es, that is Of Other. 

Now, then, Mr. Tooke's opponent, if he had 
been possessed of the etymological light thrown 
upon the Subject by Dr. Murray, might have 
turned Mr. Tooke's examples upon himself, thus : 

** You shall have a fool's cap for your, pains ;" 
Of Other, Nothing. 

" You have shewn, &c. &c." — Of Other, 
" What have you shewn ?" 

" If a Nation's liberties cannot be secured by 
" a fair representation of the people," (Mr. Tooke 
says) " Dismiss it," — (but Dr. Murray would say) 
'* Of Other ;" " How can they be secured?" 

Independent of what I conceive to be the au- 
thority of Dr. Murray's Derivation, I may leave it 
here to the reader, which is the most natural, or 
rational, exposition of the last example — that of 
Mr. Tooke or that of his Successor. 

It may be proper to remark, however, that the 
import of the Word — Else— is not any matter of 
particular importance, to determine. And the sole 
purpose of my bringing this example is to shew 
how profoundly Mr. Tooke has been in error, with 
regard to some of his Assumed Imperatives, 
when he has so dogmatically asserted a Word 
to be an Imperative, which turns out to be a 
Noun in the Genitive Case with its Preposi- 
tion TAKEN together. 

With the exception of the Etymological illustra- 
tion of Prepositions, (when I shall come to them,) 
I can seldom afford room in the present work for 
such a complete exposure, with regard to Single 
Anal. ^ 2 o 



290 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [cHAP. 3. 

Words, as is lierein exhibited. But I trust the 
above example has furnished a very impressive 
proof of the fact, how easily the assumed ground 
may often be knocked from under the feet of the 
most confident Etymologist. Indeed I cannot 
quit the present instance without observing, how 
very questionable a thing it very often is, when 
Etymologists assert that they proceed upon In- 
ductive Ground. Can it be said that Mr. Tooke 
has proceeded upon Inductive Ground with regard 
to this Word Else ? 

I by no means intend, hereby, to underrate the 
real pretensions of Etymology. But the example 
now furnished cannot fail to put every reader upon 
his guard, how far he ought to put implicit faith in 
what Etymologists often call, and what they of 
course believe to be. Induction. 

The example and remarks which I have here 
offered are the more deserving of attention, be- 
cause it is to be observed, that even Dr. Mur- 
ray asserts (in Vol. 2, page 169) that " Every 
*' Conjunction and Preposition may also be trans- 
** lated by a Verb, Adjective, Noun, or Parti- 
" ciPLE." In page 11, also, he says, that Adverbs, 
Prepositions and Conjunctions, in the Teutonic 
Dialect, " may be in all cases," (i. e. Nouns in 
all cases.) And, that ** A few of them are Verbs 
" in the Imperative and Subjunctive Moods." 
Upon these assertions, therefore, I am urged to re- 
peat, that I feel the most perfect conviction of 
being enabled to shew, that if Dr. Murray w as 
quite sure of his ground ; (which, with regard 
to some of them, I have no wish to deny;) it 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS, 291 

follows, at least, that our Teutonic forefathers, in 
forcing either a Noun or an Imperative into 
what they supposed to be the Office of a Pre- 
position, only fell into the use of an expression, 
the real grammatical character of which they did 
not comprehend. And I shall so definitively 
show What is the Nature of this error; and, 
also, point out What the logical expression ought to 
have been ; that I apprehend it would be to the 
last decree discreditable to Philosophy, to continue 
to admit into Language any such jargon, as is 
made of the Subject according to the exposition 
of either Mr. Tooke or Dr. Murray; although it 
should ever so fully appear, that these writers have 
all the sanction for their doctrine, that can be afford- 
ed them by the Barbarians whose Forms of Speech , 
RIGHT and WRONG, they have equally embalmed 
in their writings. 

As a single and passing example of this, (al- 
though I cannot stop here to discuss the passages 
in question,) I observe, Dr. Murray, after con- 
founding " Prepositions''' with '' Conjunctions,'' 
says, they " may be in all cases." Now, according 
to the Languages he was quoting, a Noun in Any 
Case means a Noun and a Preposition taken 
together as One Word. Could any thing, 
then, (I would ask,) be a more manifest absurdity, 
than forcing a Noun and a Preposition to 
serve for a Preposition ? 

Having stated the foregoing remarks ; I have 
now to suggest a consideration of reason, as 
forming a striking objection to Mr. Tooke's Theory 



292 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

of Prepositions, in so far as he has construed these 
Words as Imperatives ; — an objection which, in 
as much as it is matter of reason, must be para- 
mount to every other argument ; although I ob- 
serve that it by no means stands alone, as an 
evidence against the doctrine in question. The 
matter to which I now allude, is the fact which is 
here immediately to be stated. 

When a So-called Preposition is construed as 
an Imperative ; it very remarkably inverts and 
FALSIFIES the Reciprocal State of Relativeness of 
Each of the Tzvo Objects whose Relativeness we in- 
tended to express ; or, as it were, turns Any Cluster of 
Related Objects Upside down, or the Hind Part 
BEFORE. The fact in question is equally remark- 
able and important in its logical consequences : 
and it is very surprising that it should have so 
long remained altogether unnoticed. 

In order to illustrate this matter, I have to ob- 
serve, in the first place, that Mr. Tooke has con- 
strued the following Prepositions as Imperatives : 
— Beneath,-— Behind, — Before, — Beyond, — Without, 
Within, — and various others. Now, Every One 
of these Words, if construed as an Imperative, 
inverts the meaning which the Word is meant and 
understood to convey; and Every Time we use it 
thus, we SAY One thing and mean the direct con- 
trary. 

Thus, for example. If we say, " The House be- 
" NEATH the Hill;" And, if *' beneath'' be an Im- 
perative ; then, the real import of the phrase is, 
" The House, I command or direct the Hill to 
*' be beneath it." 



SKC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. ^93 

Again. If we say, *^ I walk BEumD i/ou ;'' And 
if ** behind'' be an Imperative ; then, the real im- 
port of the sentence is, " I walk, I command or 
" direct you to be behind" that is to zvalk after me. 

That the real import is directly opposed to the 
reputed import, in each of these examples, is a 
truth which I think no ingenuity will ever attempt 
to deny. And this absurd result, as an objection of 
reason, would of itself alone be sufficient to explode 
Mr. Tooke's derivation of Prepositions as Impera- 
tives, without the aid of any other argument. 

There is, moreover, another consideration to 
be taken into the scale: Which, though it be 
not an objection in reason, is an Objection in Ver- 
nacular Grammar ; and which, therefore, as an 
objection in Etymology, must make no less mo- 
mentously against Mr. Tooke's derivation. The 
matter to which I now allude is this: When Mr, 
Tooke furnishes the examples of, 

** A House WITH a Party Wall,'' 

and 
" A House WITHOUT a Roof ;" 

these examples (supposing them to contain Impe- 
ratives) involve no grammatical solecism, because 
the real and full import of them is, " A House, I 
** direct Thee that Thou shalt join a Party Wall ;" 
' — " A House, I direct Thee that Thou take 
" away A Roof." But in other examples of the 
use of Prepositions, which continually occur, the 
case becomes very different ; and the most glar- 
ing solecism is the result. Thus if we say, '* Hk 
" stood behind Her ;" and, if " Behind" be an 



294 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

Imperative ; then the Pi^onoun Her ought to be 
She. We cannot say, " Be Her hind, Be Him 
" ki7id:'—We say, " Be Thou Whole ;" and Not 
" Be Thee Whole:' 



Havmg thus shewn what Absurdity in Reason, 
and Solecism in Vernacular Grammar, flows inevi- 
tably from Mr. Tooke's construction of Prepo- 
sitions as Imperatives ; 1 have now to suggest, 
that the Whole of this mixed mass of error is done 
away the moment we construe the same Preposi- 
tions as the Progressive Forms of Vei^bs, 

Thus, for example, if we say, " The House be- 
" NEATH the Hill f' This means, *' The House 
" NEDDERiNG the Hill ;" or, more strictly, " The 
" House ONNING the Nedder of the Hill:' Which 
finally means, The House actikg upon, or against, 
(i. e. RELATING To) the Lower Side of the Hill, 

I have already shewn, that Any Subject, or 
Noun, which is ever expressed as being in ^wj/ 
State of Relativeness to Any Other Subject, or Noun, 
is always expressed as acting upon or relating to, 
that Noun, or Subject: Because All Relating 
is ACTING ; and, accordingly, it is expressed by the 
Verb to relate. Hence Every Preposition, 
placed between Two Nouns, is the Sign of an 
Action between these Nouns : Which is a thing 
infinitely differing from the Sign of a Command to 
us to perform Any Action with regard to them ; as 
w^ould be the Office of an Imperative, — were it 
placed between these Nouns. 
The propriety, and force, of construing the Word 



SEC. 1.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 295 

— " Beneath" — as is done above, will appear 
more clearly if we vary the example. Thus, if we 
say, "The Trees seen over the Hill;' there is 
no one who will dispute that this carries the very 
same import as " The Trees seen overtopping the 
" Hilir — Here, then, we have the Preposition — 
** over" — expressed in its true Progressive Verbal 
Form, And this Word, overtopping, might cer- 
tainly be construed — overing ; — which (as well 
as many other Words of a similar Idiom) is pei'- 
fectly vernacular in our Language, and affords a 
conspicuous example of the rationality which 
must attend construing many disguised Prepositions 
upon this Principle. 

Thus it appears, from the above example, that 
there are, (fortunately,) still remaining a number of 
*' roots" (and trunks also) of Real Prepositions, in 
their proper Verbal or what are called Participial 
Forms ; — a number fully sufficient to answer all 
the demands of Etymology, when I shall come 
to put the question to Her, upon the score of 
Derivation : Which I shall certainly do, at large, 
in its proper place. At present ; or, indeed, in 
the result ; I am very indifferent although it should 
never appear that this, or that. Particular Prepo- 
sition has ever actually "carried the Form which 
I shall ascribe to it: It is the General Prin- 
ciple alone, and Not the History of Every 
Single Preposition, that it is important to establish 
upon certain and indubitable ground. 



296 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 



SECTION SECOND. 



OF THE GENERAL NATURE AND OFFICE OF MINOR VERBS. 



SUBSECTION I. 



General Remarks on the doctrine of Grammarians 
with regard to the Nature and Use of Prepositions 
— Mr. Tooke's Theory of Pre'positions more pre- 
judicial to Grammar than that advanced by Mr, 
Harris. 

To speak here, in the first place, of the doctrine 
entertained by Grammarians in general concerning 
the Nature and Use of Prepositions ; I observe, it 
has been usually understood, that Any of these 
Words denote Some " Relation" {cis it was and 
is absurdly called) of Things or of One Noun to 
Another. And it has been farther supposed, that 
Prepositions originally denoted only Relations of 
Space ; and, that they were subsequently applied, 
in a figurative or analogous sense, to signify 
Moral and Other Relations. 

Now the leading remark which it appears re- 
quisite to be offered, with regard to this general 
doctrine, is to observe, that there is a small 
approximation to truth in the assumptions it en- 
tertains : but, at the same time, to suggest that the 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 297 

whole comprehends so large and serious an 
extent of error, as has in effect buried the Nature 
of Language, with regard to this part of its Struc- 
ture, in the most profound darkness. 

First therefore, 1 state, that, although Preposi- 
tions certainly do signify Relations between 
Things; and though the Prepositions which 
were earliest in use (owing to the more immedi- 
ate demand for them) do, by their particular 
import, literally denote Relations in Space, and 
were afterwards employed analogically to signify 
also Moral and Intellectual Relations ; yet it is to 
be objected here, as a truth which has been rigor- 
ously had in evidence in the foregoing parts of this 
treatise, that, in employing the phrase — *' a Rela- 
" TiON " OF One Noun or Thing " to Another^''' 
Grammarians have had No Conception of Any 
Object except that o/ ^/ze RELATIVENESS of One 
Noun or Thing to Another, What they call a 
" RELATION" is Nothing but a RELATIVE SUB- 
JECT OR CO-AGENT, viewed with reference to 
SOME OTHER RELATIVE SUBJECT. And, as 
for Any Middle Thing or Bridge of Con- 
nection necessarily interposed between Every Two 
Relative Subjects^ they never so much as dream- 
ed either of the existence or the possibility of 
such Connectors. Hence, When Grammarians 
talk of Prepositions as denoting the Relations 
OF One Noun to Another ; and When I assert that 
Prepositions denote Relations between Two 
Nouns,They and I no more assert the Same Nature, 
or Office, of Prepositions, than if They had affirmed 
Prepositions to be LINES, and /had affirmed 
AnaL 2 p 



W8 OF MINOR VERBS, b^ Gramma^ [chap, a 

them to be ANGLES. And I may very safely 
affirm, that it could not produce a more profound 
Absurdity and Confusion in Geometry to assert 
that Lines are Angles, than it does in Grammar 
to assert that Related Subjects are Rela- 
tions. 

In point of fact I may observe, although it will 
at first sight appear, to the generality of readers, 
to be a most extravagant assertion, that Preposi- 
tions (inasmuch as they are Verbs) and Angles 
are Things of One Same General Nature : For 
Each of these Things is an Interposed Object, 
necessarily/ created between Two Related Sub- 
jects, IN their Logical Action with Each Other. 
The natural consequence of the grand logical 
mistake here again adverted to, with regard to 
the Structure of the Category of Relation, has 
been, that Grammarians in general have been 
altogether bewildered in their conjectures concern- 
ing the Sort of Objects which So-called Preposi- 
tions represent, and have fallen into the most 
ridiculous conceits with respect to the Nature of 
these Objects: Some writers having, even, sup- 
posed them to perform an Office of parade, and 
to serve as running footmen to the Nouns which 
they precede : While the Author of Hermes, on 
the other hand, has assumed these Words not to 
have any meaning of their own, or, in other words. 
Not to represent or be a Sign of Any Object; 
but to serve as Pegs or Nails, which make 
Jwo Words or Grammatical Signs of Objects 
" COALESCE," that otherwise zvould not ** unite:" 
in which supposed Office, the Preposition, or at 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 299 

least the Nail which it is feigned to represent, 
DISAPPEARS from our logical view, and is not 
supposed to exist as An2/ Distinct Object, of the 
Nature of a Bridge between the 7wo Related 
Nouns which it connects, such as I shall uniformly 
maintain it is. 

The doctrine of Prepositions taught by Mr. 
Harris is manifestly formed with a view, although 
a most erroneous view, to the Category of Relation: 
and, vast as is the fallacy which it involves, it 
was, perhaps, the nearest approach to truth that 
could have resulted from the Conception which 
all Logicians and Grammarians had invariably 
entertained of that Category. Its grand mistake 
consists in a confounding of the Connection 
of Two Grammatical Objects by the Medium of a 
Third One, into a mere Coalescence or Com- 
bination of the said Two Objects into a supposed 
UNITY without Any Third One appearing between 
them as their Logical Connector; than which, 
No Two Logical Conceptions can, or must, be 
more distinct, both in Logic and in Grammar ; 
nor any, the confounding of which could intro- 
duce more deplorable confusion into philosophy. 

The doctrine of Harris has been followed by that 
of Tooke ; which has been considered as having 
swept away the former, from all philosophical 
considerations. Instead of the No Objects re- 
presented by Prepositions according to Harris ; 
these Words possess an Absolute Intrinsic mean- 
ing according to Tooke. And we have been 
called upon, in the foregoing pages, to observe 
What is this meaning; Or, What are the Ob- 



300 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3 

JECTS which these Words represent. Now it 
has appeared, in the extracts ah'eady given, that 
Prepositions are asserted by Mr. Tooke to re- 
present, or rather to be themselves, Some of 
them Imperatives, and Others of them Nouns: 
And the Use assigned by him to these Words, 
is to save an infinity or multiplicity of 
Complex Terms in Language; the manner of 
doing which, moreover, we have seen described. 

I have deemed it, here, to be a matter of philoso- 
phical justice, to place the Substance of these two 
celebrated Grammatical Theories side by side ; for 
the purpose of comparing them together and of 
drawing a fair conclusion between their respec- 
tive merits. And in so doing, I have no he- 
sitation in expressing my opinion, that the 
Theory put forth by the Author of Hermes, 
is far less unphilosophical, or gratuitously vi- 
sionary, than that of the Philologer of Purley. 
Upon this subject, therefore, I must beg to 
observe, that the reading community has labored 
under a profound mistake with regard to the 
nature of that triumph, or at least that advantage, 
which is generally supposed to have been obtained 
by Mr. Tooke, over Mr. Harris. In the following 
general remarks, I shall state what appears to me 
to be the principal amount of the difference be- 
tween the Two Schemes, or Writers, in question ; 
in so far as regards their respective doctrines con- 
cerning Prepositions. 

Both of these writers were equally and utterly 
in the dark with regard to the Logical or Gram- 
matical Object which Any Preposition repre- 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 801 

sents ; which (I am to shew) is that of a Bridge, 
presenting to our Logical view its Fair and Dis- 
tinct Arch, or Volume, interposed between Any Two 
Nouns. 

Both of thetn were equally, though opposite- 
ly, mistaken with regard to Any Prepositions 
having a meaning or representation, or no meaning 
or representation, Mr. Harris assumed Any Word 
called a Preposition to signify No Object of 
Conception, even xvhen it was duly associated between 
Two Nouns and ivas thus performing the Office of a 
F reposition, Mr. Tooke, on the other hand, as- 
sumed Any Word called a Preposition to be a 
Preposition even when it was Not associated with Any 
Nouny or Word; that is, he asserted the Words 
called Prepositions to be Prepositions absolutely 
and intrinsically, without at all supposing that their 
Grammatical Import as Prepositions depend 
upon each of them being interposed between 
Some Two Words, operating for the moment as 
Nouns. Now I have shewn at large, in the Fourth 
Section of the foregoing Chapter, that Mr. Tooke's 
doctrine of the Absolute Grammatical Character of 
Words is altogether without foundation in reality, 
and is in the highest degree absurd : And, though 
Mr. Harris's Theory of Prepositions is manifestly 
false in this respect, it is certain that Mr. Tooke's 
is no less false and unphilosophical. 

As a third consideration ; Mr. Harris has not 
indulged in any visionary or gratuitous conceit 
concerning the USE of Prepositions, other than 
that of assuming them to be a Species of Con- 
nectives of Words ; Although he has vitiated and 



g02 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. X 

confounded these Connectives, into Conjunc- 
tives. Whereas Mr. Tooke has feigned a Utility 
for Prepositions which in reality is no better than 
a Drama — or what Lord Bacon has called, in 
Philosophy, an Idol of the Theatre. 

After stating this comparison, I am led to affirm, 
agreeably to what I before intimated, that I think 
the Theory of Prepositions furnished by Mr. 
Tooke is more prejudicial to the advancement of 
the Philosophy of Grammar, than that proposed 
by Mr. Harris. In other words I assert, that, 
much as Mr. Harris has carried Grammar out of the 
way of truth, the Theory of Mr. Tooke has carried 
it still farther. And, although the latter has cer- 
tainly let in a light of a certain kind from the 
regions of Etymology ; the change which he has 
thereby effected is only a change from dm^kness to 
illusion : The latter of which I apprehend to be 
much more bewildering than the former. The 
Etymological light let in by Mr. Tooke, I freely 
grant, has been calculated to awaken curiosity, 
and to extite inquiry : It is herein, and herein alone, 
that I deem the Philologer of Purley to have 
gained a great triumph, or advantage, over the Au- 
thor of Hermes. It has been justly observed, that 
every new and well founded doubt in Science is a 
negative discovery. Mr. Tooke's discovery, with 
regard to Prepositions, has been much more 
than negative: but, still, I affirm, it has been 
most indefinite and most illusory : and I may 
add, that it was rendered a much more diffi- 
cult labor to unveil the face of Grammar, from 
the illusive aspect which has been feigned for it 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 303 

by this eminent Etymologist ; than it would have 
been to have started from that Total Darkness in 
which Mr. Harris left the Subject, — if it be true 
that a traveller, who is staid from being benighted, 
is in a less trying and difficult case than one who 
has been misguided into a devious road, through 
which he has to retrace his steps. 

In fine ; I consider Mr. Harris to have proceed- 
ed, in his Theory, like a Philosopher, although 
like a mistaken Philosopher, who was endeavouring 
to erect the Structure of Grammar upon that false 
Foundation of Logic which had been handed 
down to him from the Ancients ; and to which, 
unhappily for his own literary fame, he had ever 
looked up with an implicit idolatry. While that 
of Mr. Tooke, elated by his successful excursion 
into the regions of Etymology, and by the appa- 
rent advantage he had gained over Harris as well 
as other Grammarians, has been that of a strong 
but too self-confident Mind, which at the same 
time was incumbered by the most inveterate pre- 
judices against " Philosophy," and neglected 
that due circumspection, or use of his great and 
undoubted powers, which was requisite for a com- 
plete rational investigation of his subject. 

I have thought it certainly due, both to the 
genius and merits of Mr. Harris and to a thorough 
understanding of Grammar, to state the above 
comparison and result ; with a view to correct the 
general opinion of the Subject, which has been 
greatly too much at that writer's expense. But I 
have carried this consideration as far as was re- 
quisite : And I shall proceed, now, to state what 



304 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [cukv. 3. 

I suppose to be an analysis of the Part of Speech 
called Prepositions. It remains, therefore, in great 
part, for the sequel to shew, Whether the Princi- 
ples of the Subject which I am going to hazard, 
are of a Nature that can entitle them to a better 
claim to the title of Scientific, or Philosophical, 
than is due to those celebrated but contending 
Theories which I have herein presumed to cri- 
ticise. 

SUBSECTION II. 

General Defaiitmi of the Nature of Minor Verbs, by 
Grammarians called Prepositions. — Suggestion of 
the Triplicate Structure of Action ; Upon which 
Structure is founded a Principal Class of Minor 
Verbs. 

As I have already been led, (for the requisite pur- 
pose of examining Mr. Tooke's Theory,) to lay 
down, antecedent to proof, aloose definition of that 
Part of Speech whose Analysis forms the Subject of 
the present Chapter ; I shall, in the outset of this 
article, restate its Definition, in more precise or ri- 
gorous terms ; and shall depend upon what is to 
follow, for the justification of it. 

Every Minor Verb or Legitimate So- 
called Preposition (for I have said there are So- 
called Prepositions, and those in high repute, that 
are Not legitimate, that is, are Not Preposi- 
tions AT all) is a Verb. And the Sole Specific 
Difference or Differential Circumstance, which 
distinguishes a Minor Verb from a Verb, or 
which can convert the One into the Other, is, 
that a Minor Verb is the Sign of An Action that 



SEC. 2.]' rians called PREPOSITIONS. 305 

is, in some way, Logically and Grajnmatically De- 
pendent upon Some Other Action that is Logi- 
cally and Grammatically a Principal with respect 
to the former. 

Before I proceed to offer an example, illustra- 
tive of this Definition, I merely observe, that not 
only is there almost a continual occasion, or ne- 
cessity, to express One Grammatically-dependent 
Action, along with its Principal ; but there is 
very frequently need to express More than One 
Such Action. Thus a Number of Actions, consist- 
ing of a Principal and Several Grammatically- 
dependent Ones, are often expressed in a Series ; 
in which. Every Succeeding Verb, or the Action 
of which it is the Sign, is More Grammatically-de- 
pendent than that which immediately precedes it. 

As an Example of Such a Series, I now observe, 
If we say, "He SPOKE concerning thwarting 
" the Enemy ;" We have, in this expression, a 
Series of Three Yei^bs, which are the Signs of Three 
Actions: And herein we are to note, that the 
Order of Logical and Grammatical Principality, of 
the Three concatenated Actions in question, is in- 
verse to the Order of their Physical and Moral 
Principality, or Consequence. For the Action of 
THWARTING may be supposed to have been the 
leading Act of a Battle, in which a hostile fleet 
was defeated, or destroyed, and the fate of an 
empire decided; Whereas, Any Thing that only 
concerned it, or Any Speech which a man could 
afterwards make with regard to it, must be of less 
consequence in a Moral, or a Physical view. But, 
in a Logical and Grammatical view of the Sen- 
Aml. 2 Q 



306 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

tence, the SPEAKING is the PRINCIPAL Action; 
the CONCERNING (of the speaking) is the Next 
Principal; and the thwarting (pHhe Enemy) is 
the Least Principal, or Most Dependent Action, of 
the Three. 

Now I have chosen the particular example in 
question, not only because it serves to illustrate 
the Principle under consideration, but also espe- 
cially because it is an instance which displays the 
co-operation of Two Prepositions, in their Office 
of Minor Verbs. For the Words — concerning and 
thwarting — are undeniably Prepositions: The 
Word — " concerning" — is an acknowledged Pre- 
position in our Language: And the Word — thwart' 
ing — is equally and indubitably a Preposition ; 
although it is rarely adverted to as such : It is an 
established and well known Term in Naval Tac- 
tics. Thus, they say, *'The Enemy stood thwart" 
" f 72^ our Course ;" — "The Enemy came thwart- 
** ing our Fore-foot ;" — " The Enemy fell a- 
** thwart — i. e. thwarting — our Hawse." 

In this initiatory example, therefore, I present 
the reader with indubitable evidence of the exist- 
cnce and operation of So-called Prepositions in their 
Real and Undisguised Verbal Forms. And 
this example alone may serve to carry the discern- 
ment of an acutely intuitive mind a considerable 
way into the true theory of the Subject. It is only 
requisite that he follow the same course, upon the 
logical basis of Necessary Principles : Which, if 
done, cannot fail to conduct him to satisfactory 
conclusions. 

As a corroboration, in the mean time, of what 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 307 

is now laid down or asserted, I merely remark, 
that the following String of English Prepositions 
has been duly recognised by Mr. Tooke him- 
self. And I confidently trust that their existence 
in our Language, in their Proper Verbal or 
WHAT IS called PARTICIPIAL FoRMS, must pre- 
sent, to the most diffident, or jealous, or prejudiced 
reader, an undeniable claim that he should ex- 
amine well the farther evidences of the Subject 
which will be brought before him. I furnish this 
string of Prepositions to the reader, however, Not 
as the Objects which led me to the conclusions 
that are to follow ; for they certainly did not do so. 
Far different, indeed, has been the road, and the 
labor, of deducing the Nature of Prepositions, 
than that of deriving it from any Etymological 
Source or Evidence. But, as an Etymological 
Evidence presented to his hand in the outset, it 
ought to impress Him, and urge him to investigate 
the Subject with all due attention and impartiality ; 
especially if he be a reader already imbued with the 
existing doctrines of Grammar, and, of course, 
biassed in his opinions of the subject. The Words 
in question are, 

*' Touching," — ** concerning," — " regard- 
" ing,"< — ** respecting," — ** relating to," — 

" SAVING,"— ''EXCEPTING,"— "according TO,"— 
" GRANTING,"—'* ALLOWING,"— '' CONSIDERING," 
" NOTWITHSTANDING," " NEIGHBOURING." 

Div. OF PuRLEY, VoL I, page 455. 

The only commentary which I shall at present 

offer upon this String of Minor Verbs, is to observe, 

that it furnishes several examples of these So-called 



SOS OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

Prepositions' being employed in a Series of Two, 
or More, depending upon Some Principal 
Verb. Thus, to SPEAK relating to Any Thing, 
is to SPEAK REJuATm G Jinishing or ending That 
Thing. And to ACT according to Any Thing, is 
to ACT ACCORBi s G /inishing That Thing. 



Having laid down the foregoing General De- 
scription of the Foundation and Nature of So- 
called Prepositions ; I shall now proceed to sug- 
gest What is the Basis of the Principal and Most 
Important or Requisite Class of these Words; 
and which Class forms, in fact, the Tribe of 
Minor Verbs that is of most frequent use, or 
recurrence. 

When we attend to the General Nature of 
Action we shall find, that, unless in the case of 
a very few Acts, (which, perhaps, may claim a 
distinct consideration,) it is impossible to conceive 
Any Out-and-out Action, without conceiving 
it to have a Three-fold Structure or Three 
Distinct Members ; Each One of which is in 
Itself an Action : For beginning an Action 
is One Action ; — and continuing an Action is 
Another Action ; — and ending an Action is a 
Third Action : And Each of these three conca- 
tenated Actions is marked by a Peculiarity of Na- 
ture, and followed by a Peculiarity of Consequence, 
which vastly distinguish it from Both the Others 
and will never admit of its being logically con- 
founded with either of them. 
Thus, when we say, '' I begin writing;"—** I 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 309 

" CONTINUE writing;" — " I end or finish writing;" 
— we express Three as Distinct Actions as can be : 
And it is certain that No Part of the Middle 
Action, of CONTINUING writing, can ever be con- 
founded with the Action of either finishing or 

BEGINNING tO Write. 

Moreover, Not only is the Three-fold Structure 
of Action, (now suggested,) a Real and Necessary 
General Truth, and a most serious consideration 
in Logic : but it is at the same time to be observed, 
that the marking and signifying of this Tri- 
plicate Structure is a matter of the highest utility, 
and necessity, in our intercourse with the World 
around us : It is a thing of continual and indis- 
pensable recurrence : We can hardly mention Any 
Thing, as acting with or upon Another, but we 
must Define the Manner in which this Action ter- 
minates, or commences ; and, often, define 
BOTH these extremes : And, if we do not thus ex- 
pressly define either of them, we must under- 
stand them as being silently and impliedly 
defined ; because, without such construction, 
Language would, in great part, be no better than 
a mere jargon. 

For the purpose of distinguishing, and reasoning 
upon. Any Action that comprehends the Whole 
Triplicate Structure in question, I have called 
this Kind by the Name of Out-and-out Actions. 
But I shall have no objection if any one, who 
may in future treat the Subject, should adopt some 
other denomination ; provided it be not one which 
will involve him in a tissue of absurdity, when it is 
too late to retract. 



310 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3* 

It can hardly be necessary to observe, that 
Every Beginning and Every Terminating Action 
must be Logically and Grammatically depend- 
ent upon the Middle or Continuing Action 
to which it is attached. Accordingly, therefore, 
Every Verb that expresses Either a Beginning or a 
Terminating Action is a Dependent or Minor 
Verb. It will be shewn, immediately, that our 
Most Ordinary So-called Prepositions are the 
Verbs which express, or signify, these Beginning 
and Terminating Actions. 

For the purpose of illustrating this by a leading 
example, I shall employ one which has been made 
use of, successively, by Mr. Harris and Mr. 
Tooke, and which is as well adapted to the pro- 
posed end as any that could be given. — It is the 
following — namely, 

*' Figs come from Turkey to England." 

Now in this example, it is manifest, that the Ac- 
tion of COMING is, in a Logical and Grammatical 
Sense, the Principal. And the So-called Pre- 
positions— jFrow and To — Ir affirm to be the 
Verbals — beginning and jinishing ; which, from 
their interposed situation, become herein Verbs. 

The true Logical and Grammatical analysis 
of this Sentence, therefore, I affirm to be, — Figs 
COME, Turkey beginning The Coming, — The Qom- 
m^ finishing or ending England. 

Widi regard to this exposition, I now rem ark, that, 
in it I do not contradict, or deviate from, the Etymo- 
logy or Derivation of the Words — To and From — 
furnished by Mr. Tooke himself; any farther than 
to affirm that what he asserts to be the MERE 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 311 

AGENT-NouNs — A Beginning and An Ending 
— and assumes that they are Nouns while they serve 
in a Sentence in the Office of Prepositions ; I, on 
the contrary, affirm to be VERBALS, necessarily 
CONVERTED INTO Verbs in Evcry instance in which 
they serve as P repositions ^ inasmuch as, in this Office, 
they must be inter-posed hetxveen a Nominative and 
an Objective Noun. I propose to shew, distinctly, 
farther on, by what Cause Mr. Tooke was led into 
the mistake of assuming the Two Words in 
question to be MERE-AGENT Nouns, instead of 
VERBALS— 2. e. NAMES OF ACTIONS. 

I here explain, that the reason of my se- 
lecting, for a leading example of the Subject, 
that one which is furnished above, is, that the 
Prepositions — From and To — importing begin- 
ning and FINISHING — are the Primary or Ab- 
solute Names of the Two Extreme Actions of 
Every Out-and-out Action. But now it is to 
be suggested, as being a ground of Other Ordi- 
nary Prepositions, that Any Beginning, or Any 
Terminating Action may, besides its Absolute 
Character, possess a Variety of Relative 
Characters or Offices ; in doing which, it must be 
signified by an Appropriate Relative Name. 
Thus, for example, if instead of saying " Figs 
" COME to England," we say Figs *' come by Sea;" 
— in this case, we observe, the finishing or ending 
of the Action of coming does not preserve its 
Absolute Name of finishing or ending ; which, if 
it did, would be signified by the Word ** to ;'* 
but it takes the Relative Name of touching ; 
which, I affirm, is herein signified by the Word 



312 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

*' by'' And thus, the true import of the Sentence 
— " Figs COME by Sea," — is Figs come toucJdng Sea. 
Now upon this Principle (of the signifying of 
the terminating, or the beginning Action, of Any 
Out-and-out Action, Not by its Primary or Ab- 
solute Name, but by a Secondary and Rela- 
tive Name^) I affirm it is that All our Ordinary 
So-called Prepositions, such as In, With, By, 
On, Over, Under, &c. &c. &c. &c. are found- 
ed. And, when the time comes for the illustration 
and proof of this by Etymological evidence, I 
propose to shew, in the case of a Number of the 
most usual and important of these Words, that they 
have at one time actually existed in our Language, 
in the Form of Verbals, and in the Actual 
Office of Verbs. 

In contemplating the operation of the Principle 
thus laid down, however, it is to be taken in, as an 
additional and dependent consideration, that many 
of the Minor Verbs or So-called Prepositions of 
this Class are not to be understood in a strict 
OR literal sense, as signifying the beginning, or 
the tei^minating Action, of Any Out-and-out Ac- 
tion : but they are to be understood in an analogi- 
cal, or a Jigiirative, or even a feigned, sense ; for 
which device and interpretation there is an indu- 
bitable rational ground. Thus, in the Example 
already furnished — namely — the coming by (i. e. 
COMING touching) Sea — the touching is an Action 
that in strictness is Not the terminating of the 
Principal Action of coming; because No Action 
can literally terminate the coming, except the 
Action of endijig orJi?jishing : It follows, therefore, 



SEC. 2.] riam called PREPOSITIONS. 313 

that the Action oi touching is signified, herein, only 
ill a figurative, and even a feigned sense, to stand 
Relatively in the stead of the Action oijinishing ; 
which last, if expressed, would be signified by the 
Preposition — to, — that h— ending or finishing. 

It does not follow from what is now asserted, 
that we are to found Any So-called Preposition 
thus analogically, figuratively, or feignedly, upon 
either the beginning or the terminating Action of 
Any Out-and-out Action, in any case except those 
that appear to demand, or admit of, such device ; 
the selection, or discrimination, of which cases must 
depend upon an exercise of our Judgment. Be* 
cause it has already been laid down, that the Sole 
Specific Difference or Differential Circumstance 
between a Minor Verb and a Verb is, that a 
Minor Verb expresses Some Action that is 
Grammatically DEPENDENT upon Some Other 
Action : And, therefore, it is Not Essential in 
the Nature of a Minor Verb that it should signify 
either a beginning or a terminating Action, taking 
these terms in their literal acceptation, by which 
they relate directly to the Principal Action 
itself upon which Every beginning and Every 
terminating Action depends, while they relate to 
Time collaterally. 

This appears to be the stage of analysis for my 
suggesting, that the Foundation of Prepositions 
(i.e. Minor Verbs) expressive of Relations of Place, 
or Space, have No Logical Priority in Lan- 
guage, 07^ in the Nature of Things. It merely hap- 
pens, that, (All the Objects of Language, including 
ourselves, being necessarily immersed in Time and 
Anal, 2 r 



31^ OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. U. 

Space ; and we, consequently, being continually 
and most seriously affected by the Situations and 
the Motions of Objects in Space ;) Mankind have, 
from the beginning of their existence, found it 
most useful and important to employ Words sig- 
nificant of these Relations. I may here add, that 
the Verb and the Noun are as Essentially found- 
ed in Relations and Relativeness in Space, as 
can be said of Any Preposition: And I finally 
observe, that when Any Preposition signifies a 
Relation in Space it does so by its Special, 
Individual, and peculiar import ; and does 
not do so by its Generic Nature or by the 
Sole Virtue of its Office as a Preposition. 
Every Preposition, indeed, presupposes the exist- 
ence of Both Time and Space : but so, also, does 
Every Verb, and Every Noun, and Every 
Adjective, and Every Adverb. And the rea- 
son of this is, that All the Objects of Lan- 
guage are founded in Time and Space, as being 
the Necessary Theatre of their Existence and of 
Any Supposition which we can form concerning 
them. 

It is at the same time true, that Prepositions 
literally significant of Relations of Space are 
employed analogically, or figuratively, to express 
Moral and Intellectual Relations. And out of this 
device has grown a very extensive use, and utility, 
of our Ordinary Prepositions. 

Previously to the farther discussion of the Sub- 
ject, it appears requisite, in order to its due illus- 
tration, that we should examine the views which 
have been entertained by Grammarians with regard 



SKC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 815 

to the Triplicate Structure of Action. I proceed 
therefore, to this consideration, in the next article. 



SUBSECTION III. 

The Triplicate Structure of Action not adverted to by 
Mr, Tooke, or by Other Grammarians. Hence 
One Cause of their not having discerned the Real 
Nature of Prepositions, 

It becomes necessary, in order to a complete 
illustration and understanding of the Structure of 
Language, to shew here, that the Triplicate Struc- 
ture of Action has not been adverted to by any 
Writer on Grammar. From which fact it will, 
in the first place, appear manifestly, (over and 
above the grand defect of Grammarians' not having 
taken up any thing like a right Conception of the 
Category of Relatives and Relation,) that it was 
impossible for any Grammarian to ground the 
Principal or Most Useful Class of Prepositions 
upon its Real Foundation. 

If there is any Writer in whose works we might 
expect, above every other, to meet with some 
notice, or hint, concerning this matter ; it should, 
certainly, be Mr. Tooke. I shall, therefore, princi- 
pally here examine, in what manner He has treat- 
ed this subject; or, whether he has made any 
approach to truth, concerning it. 

As preparatory to this, it is first requisite to 
observe, I by no means intend to assert that 
Grammarians have overlooked altogether the 
Commencement, the Continuation, and the Ter- 



316 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma' [chap. 3. 

mination or End, of Actions in General. On the 
contrary, these Three Stages, of Almost Every 
Out-and-out Action, are vastly too obvious to re- 
mark, and too important in their consequences, 
to admit of their having escaped observation. 
What, then, (it may be asked,) do I assert ; since I 
have already affirmed something which, to a hasty 
or superficial reader, may appear very like a 
contradiction ? I answer : There is no contra- 
diction in the case. But I have stated the sub- 
ject in this way, with a view to excite adequate 
attention to its nature, and to a very important 
Logical Distinction which it involves. The fact 
is, that Grammarians have discerned the Three 
Stages of Action in One Sense; but Not in 
Another : And they have discerned these Stages 
in that Sense which is unphilosophical, or in a 
great degree useless with respect to Grammar ; and 
have overlooked them in that Other Sense which 
alone forms the Foundation of the Principal Class 
of Prepositions, already described. It is requisite, 
therefore, that I should here point out the Distinc- 
tion which in reality exists between Any Out-and- 
out Action as consisting of One Action divided 
into Three Stages — namely — a Commence- 
ment, — a Continuation, — and an End ; — and, 
as consisting of a Triplicate Structure or form- 
m^ Three Distinct Actions — namely — an Act 
OF beginning,— an Act of continuing, — and 
an Act of ending. 

That the consequences, both to Logic and to 
Grammar, of laying down, and reasoning from, 
this Distinction must be very important; is a 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. S17 

truth which cannot fail to be manifest to every in- 
telligent person who reflects but for a moment 
upon the Subject. And the overlooking of it, 
hitherto, affords one, among a number of very 
remarkable examples, of Philosophical First Truths 
having been discerned in One Sense or Aspect, and 
Not in Another : The consequence of which has 
been the introduction of vast fallacy and confusion 
into Human Speculation. I proceed, therefore, to 
shew, that the matter in question has been alto- 
gether overlooked by Mr. Tooke — the most lu- 
minous Grammarian of latter times ; and, that 
the most profound darkness has at all times 
reigned with regard to it. 

First, with this view, I observe, as a negative 
evidence of the fact, that Mr. Tooke no where 
mentions the Three Actions of Any Out-and- 
out Action. 

Secondly, On the other hand, as a positive 
evidence of the matter, he employs himself in ad- 
verting to and discussing the nature of Action as 
consisting of Three Stages ; and in reasoning 
from this Principle. In or^er to put this in evi- 
dence, it is necessary to quote this Writer in the 
following passage. In his First Volume, (pages 347, 
8,) he makes his fellow Dialogist express himself 
thus : 

" If then you are right in your explanation of 
" From ; (and I will not deny that appearances 
** are hitherto in your favor;) since From means 



318 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

^^Commencement or Beginning, To must mean 
" End or Termination, — And since we have as 
"frequently occasion to mention the terminatioii, 
"as we have to mention the commencement of 
" motion or time, no doubt it was as likely that' 
" the word End should become a Particle or 
*' Preposition, as the word which signified Begin- 
" ning,'' 

Now the fact that the bes[innincr of Motion 
(which is a Species of Action) is expressed by 
a Noun — namely — " Commencement ;" — and 
the ending of it is expressed also by a Noun — 
namely — " End or Termination," — as is the 
case in the passage above quoted, is a decisive 
evidence that the Dialogist — B, — (who is indisput- 
ably in accordance with Mr. Tooke on this head,) 
viewed Action as consisting of a Beginning, a Con- 
tinuation, and an End, in the Same Sense that we 
talk of a Stick, or a Post-road, as having these 
Three Noteable Parts. And the sequel of the 
passage confirms what goes before it : for, we 
observe, he talks of " the terminaTiON' and 
" THE com?nenceMEi^T ;" — and not of ierminatiHG 
and commencii^o,—of Motion, or Action, as 
ought to have been the case if he had viewed 
Action as being of a Triplicate Structure. 

Mr. Tooke has other expressions which farther 
confirm this statement ; although I deem it quite 
unnecessary to quote them, at length, for the sake 
of obtaining their evidence to the fact. And I 
suppose there can remain no question, but he 
viewed the Beginning and the Termination, of 
Every Out-and-out Action, in that Sense alone 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 319 

in which we view the One End of a Staff and 
the Other End of it. 

I conceive we are now brought to a clear dis- 
cernment of the Cause Why Mr. Tooke, under 
hi^ views with regard to the Structure of Action, 
(altogether beside the influence of his Etymological 
views,) was led to conclude that the Prepositions 
— From and to — are NOUNS, importing Com- 
mencement and Termination; instead of 
discerning that they must be VERBS, as being 
significant of the ACTIONS of begin^mO and 
terminaTl^G, And hereupon I shall first proceed 
to shew how he has applied his Theory, or As- 
sumption, in the interpretation of Language : And 
shall afterwards explain, that his Derivation of the 
Word — From — is, in substance, contradicted by 
Dr. Murray ; who, on the other hand, in effect, 
bears out the Etymology or Grammatical import 
which I have ascribed to this Preposition. 

In his First Volume, page 342, Mr. Tooke says, 
'* From means Beginning, and nothing else. It 
*^ is simply the Anglo-saxon and Gothic Noun 
" From, Beginning, Origin, Source, Fountain, Au- 
" thor:' 

Again, in page 345, he says, 
** The Larum rang beginning Morning ;" 
" i. e. Morning being the time of its begin- 



*' ning to rmg. 



This, also, he explains, just before, upon the 
assumption that " From relates to every thing to 
** which a Beginning relates, and to nothing else. 



320 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

" and, therefore, is referable to Time as well as 
" motion." 

Farther back, he says, 
" Figs come — beginning Turkey ;" 

that is, , 
" Turkey the P/^ce of beginning to come." 

Now 1 affirm, that, in the Construction which 
Mr. Tooke has put upon each of these several 
examples, he has been misled by the joint influence 
of his darkness with regard to the Category of 
Relation, — his misconception of the Real Struc- 
ture of Action, — and his imperfect knowledge of 
the Dialects upon which he has built his Etymolo- 
gical Assumptions, — to ascribe a wrong Gram- 
matical Character to the Word From, and a 
wrong Logical import to the Sentences which 
contain it : Although, at the same time, I all along 
admit that From means beginning; i. e. the 
Word beginning, considered as a Verbal and 
convertible into a Verb, 

In order to illustrate this objection ; I observe, 
in the First place, that it is the constant practice 
of Mankind to express, Not only Mcn^ or Persons, 
but equally Inanimate Things, — and Times, — 
and Places, — and even Passions or Thoughts, — 
as being the AGENTS of Actions. Thus the 
Historian, in his appropriate phraseology, tells us 
that ** England began the War ;" Or, ** France 
" ended the Negociation." We say, " Youth be- 
** gins our Hopes :" and " Age ends the Delusion." 
— And, in this way. Every Object in Nature is occa- 
sionally and daily personified, as being Actors in 



SEC. 2] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 321 

the Great Theatre of the World. Now upon this 
Principle I affirm it is, that the Sentences, furnished 
as examples by Mr. Tooke, must be construed : 
For, (beside the Necessary Principles which rigorous^ 
ly demonstrate that Every Preposition must be a 
Verb,) nothing can be more natm^al than this 
mode of interpretation. 

Thus, in the case of " Figs coming ;" we might, 
with the greatest fitness, say, either Antonio — the 
Merchant — begin-ing the Coming, or Turkey 
begin-ing the Coming : And thus, I conclude, the 
Analysis of the Sentence must run as follows ; aS 
I have already once before suggested : 

" Figs COME from Turkey to England ;" 

i. e. Figs come, — ^Turkey beginning the Coming, 
— ^The Coming ending England. 

In offering this exposition of the matter, I must 
request of my readers, (as Mr. Tooke, in a similar 
case, has done before me,) not to suffer the novelty, 
or strangeness of appearance, to operate against 
the reason of the thing. And, indeed, I may 
safely assert that the appearance of it, while it is 
strictly founded in reason, is far less strange than 
is exhibited in very many of the Etymological 
Expositions of our best Philologists. This cau- 
tion, perhaps, is more than was necessary: but 
I trust, at least, that it must prove effectual, 
and fully sufficient. 

It may not be supei-fluous, here, to remind the rea- 
der, that, in the Construction of the Sentence which 
is now offered, the Principle of the Alterna- 
tion OFA Verb IN A SeKtenCe operates, and must 
AnaL 2 s 



322 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

• 

be followed in the interpretation of it ; as it must 
also, in Every Other Sentence, in All Language, 
that happens to be Sufficiently Complex to admit of 
this Law. For the Principle of Alternation 
is the Greatest Principle in the Whole Struc- 
ture of Language; and, as I have already said, 
it forms, as it were, the Axis upon which the 
Entire Fabric revolves. I may, perhaps, put it 
here again in the recollection of the reader, that 
this Principle gives to the Structure of Language 
a Specific Difference, by which it deviates, in 
a very remarkable manner, from The Generic 
Structure of an Architectural Bridge ; — 
which specialty consists in the fact, that Every 
Arch in a Complex Bridge of Language must 
serve, alternately^ as an Arch and as a Pier; 
whereas, the Arches of an Ordinary Bridge, (Any 
More than the Piers,) can never change their Name, 
or Character, 

I next proceed to shew, that there is a palpable 
absurdity in Mr. Tooke's exposition of the exam- 
ples in question, even upon his own shewing ; and 
such a one as would completely explode his 
Theory, although no other could be offered in its 
stead. We have seen that he says, 

** Figs come, beginning Turkey ; that is Tur- 
" key the Place of beginning to come." 

and, 

** The Larum rang beginning morning, i. e. 
" Morning being the Time of its beginning to 
"ring.*' 

The criticisms which I shall here offer upon the 



SEC. 2.] rlans called PREPOSITIONS. 323 

First of these examples, will apply also to the Se- 
cond and to Every Other such case. 

And, certainly, it is to be admitted, in the first 
place, that Turkey is the Place where the 
COMING of the Figs begins. But, for this very rea- 
son, the Word — " from" — cannot possibly mean this 
Place ; because Turkey is the Name of this 
Place, and this Name is here expressly put 
FOR this Place ; and, hence, the Word — " from" — 
must necessarily mean Something Else, and 
Not this Place. 

Collaterally with this, I observe, that, when the 
assumed Author, or Source, of any coming, 
happens to be Itself a Place, (and Mr. Tooke 
asserts that " From" means ** Author," or 
" Source,") it must, then, be a manifest exhibition 
of Jargon to talk of the Place of the Source ; 
because, in the assumed case, the Place IS the 
Source. 

As a still farther consideration, I remark, that 
even the absurd mention of the Place under the 
Two Different Names, of Turkey and of Source 
OR Place, is not sufficient to make out Mr. Tooke's 
exposition : but he is obliged to extend the Speech, 
by introducing Another Preposition, — " Tur- 
" key the Place OF beginning to come." And 
liere we are to take notice, that, according to Mr. 
Tooke, the Word OF is a Noun, as well as the 
word From ; — and, in point of fact, he asserts that 
it means the Fen/ Same Thing ^^ the Word From — 
namely — Author, or Source : And thus, we 
have " Turkey" for One Source ; and From 
and Of for Two Other Sources; and all these 



^?4 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma^ [chap. 3. 

Three Names expressed in order to signify the 
Source of Figs coming. 

Here I must not be understood as intending to 
deny, that Several Prepositions may, logically, 
succeed each other in a connected Series : I have 
already shewn, that this is a very frequent case. 
But, along with this it must always be taken, that 
a Series o/' Prepositions is a Series o/" Alter- 
nate VfiRBS. As for a Series of connected 
Nouns, (unless they form One Continued Noun, 
as being All explanatory of One Same Identical 
Thing,) put as pretending to form, or even to be 
employed in, Any Speech, or Sentence ; it is an 
absurdity so thick, and palpable in its aspect, that 
JLoGic, — Philosophy, — Common Sense,— must 
equally wash their hands of it. Now, assuredly, 
Mr. Tooke, or any Grammarian for him, would 
not for a moment pretend that the Three Dis- 
tinct Names or Words — " Turkey" — " Place" 
—and ** Of" — are all requisite for the mere pur- 
pose of signifying that Turkey is the Source of 
Figs coming. 

I trust that the bare statement of the foregoing 
considerations is much more than sufficient to 
explode the exposition of the Word — '* From,"— 
as given by Mr. Tooke : but I will now conclude 
the argument by citing the account of this Word 
which has been given by Dr. Murray ; in which, 
it will be seen that he, in effect, offers a De- 
rivation of it that agrees with the view of the 
Subject which I have here deduced from Ne- 
cessary Principles. At the same time, however. 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 025 

I give notice, that this is not the part of my work 
wherein I propose to enter appropriately upon 
Etymological Ground : but I merely indulge this 
incidental citation, owing to the importance of its 
bearing upon Mr. Tooke's example, now under 
discussion. 

" In Teutonic, Fragm or Fram means originaU 
" ing, running, proceeding, Frogma, which is the 
" derivative of Frag, run, through the medium of 
** the preterite, is in use for a root, or beginning. 
" The reader must here recollect that to begin is 
" itself from bi, upon, and gan, to go ; bigin 
** and Bi-GANG, to set a going." 

" Hist, of the Eur. Lang. Vol. 2, page 24." 

Here, then, we have the full Etymological His- 
tory of the Word — From. — And here it is express- 
ly evident, that, although this Word naturally 
came to be in use for " A Root,'' or Begin- 
'* ning ;" (in which use it is, certainly, an Agent- 
Noun, as Mr. Tooke asserts it is, and Not a 
Verbal Noun) yet, it was in its origin a Ver- 
bal, as I affirm it was. Dr. Murray begins his 
account by saying, that From means the Parti- 
ciples "originating, running, proceeding." 
Now these are all Verbals ; which want nothing 
but inter-position between Two Other Words (ope- 
rating at the moment as Nouns) to convert theni 
into Verbs: Whereas the AGENT-Noun — "An 
" Origin," " A Source," or *' An Author,"— 
(which is Mr. Tooke's assumption of the matter,) 
CANNOT IN Any Situation be converted into a 
Verb, 

In fine; It is conclusive, here, that the Word 



826 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

From, according to the Derivation given of it by 
Dr. Murray, is the Progressive or So-called Partici- 
pial Form of the Verb to begin, as I confidently 
affirm it is. 

To this amount of evidence I shall only add, 
that the assumption of Any Preposition's being a 
Mere AoENT-Noun, — (by which I mean Any 
Noun that is Not the Name of Some Action, 
and therefore is not in any case convertible into 
a Verb,) — is an absurdity of the grossest kind in 
Language, and is precisely analogous to asserting 
that a BANK OR SUPPORTING PRINCIPLE is 
One Same Logical Object, or Subject, as a 
BRIDGE OR CONNECTING PRINCIPLE. 



Although the citation of Tooke's views, with 
regard to the Structure of Action, might alone 
be sufficient for the purpose here intended ; 
yet, it would not be doing strict justice to the 
Subject, were I to conclude it without at all ad- 
verting to what has been laid down on this head 
by Mr. Harris ; because it will be seen that his 
account involves the views of the Ancient Gram- 
marians, with regard to it. For this purpose, 
therefore, I quote the following passage from his 
Hermes. 

In Chap. 4, Book 2d, (which I believe is the on- 
ly place wherein he approaches the subject at all,) 
he says, " Among the various Relations of Sub- 
" stantives denoted by Prepositions, there appear 
" to be two principal ones ; and these are, the 
" Term or Point which something commences 



SEC. 2] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 327 

" FROM, and the Term or Point which something 
*' tends TO. These Relations the Gi^eeks and 
" Latins thought of so great importance, as to dis- 
" tinguish them, when they occurred, hy peculiar 
** Terminations of their oxvn, which exprest their 
*^ force without the help of a Preposition. Now it 
" is here we behold the Rise of the ancient Geni- 
" tive, and Dative ; the Genitive being formed to 
" express all Relations commencing From itself ; 
" The Dative, all Relations tending to itself. 
*' Of this there can be no stronger proof, than the 
'^ Analysis of these Cases in the modern Lan- 
** guages, which we have mentioned already." 

Now, this " Term or Point which something 
" commences from ;" and this " Term or Point 
" which something tends to," as asserted by Mr. 
Harris and the Ancient Grammarians, are Two 
Points, either of Space or of Time, put by them 
instead of "the CommenceuEiiT'' and "the Te?^- 
" minaTiom" of Any Action according to Mr. 
Tooke. And it is always to be admitted, that to 
mark, and to signify, the Action that occupies 
each of these Points, under Some Aspect 
or Another, is a matter of the first importance 
to Language ; insomuch, that, as I have already 
said, these Two Extremes of Every Out-and- 
out Action, (when they are duly viewed as 
BEING themselves Actions depending upon their 
Principal,) form the Objects represented by 
what may be called the Two Fundamental 
Prepositions or Minor Verbs in Language — namely 
— FROM and TO ; since these Two Words are the 
Absolute Names of Any beginning and Any ter- 



3-28 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

minating Action, and a large Proportion of All 
Other Minor Verbs may be said, in One Sense 
OR Another, to be a Sort of beginning or ter- 
minating Actions, or, at least, may be figured as 
being such, in the Stmcture of any Sentence in 
which they appear. It is plain, therefore, that I 
entirely concur with Mr. Harris and his Greek 
and Latin Authorities, in the importance of mark- 
mg and signifying Something that co-incides 
with the Points in question. And it only remains 
that I should here, first point out and clear up 
a serious error and confusion which are inter- 
woven with the view of Mr. Harris and the An- 
cient Grammarians, as above quoted : and then 
conclude, by offering a general observation with 
regard to the Cause of their not having discerned 
that Prepositions are Signs of Actions. 

In the First place, then, I observe, that " The 
'* Point or Term which Some Thing," (i. e. Some 
Action) " commences from," and " The Point 
"or Term which Some Thing," (i.e. Some Ac- 
*^ tion) tends to, never is, and never can bCy the Ob- 
" ject of Any Preposition :" Because the Object 
signified by Any Preposition {except only Any 
Preposition that signifies a Relation between Some 
Two Parts of Space itself, or Time itself) 
must be a Relation (that is a Link of Connection) 
between Some Two Subjects that OCCUPY or 
MEASURE Some Portion^ or Point, of Space, or 
Time. Thus, in the example given by both Tooke 
and Harris — namely — 

** The Larum RANo/ro/w Morn till night," — 
The Preposition — *' from"— does not signify 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 329 

the Point of Time when the singing began : Be- 
cause, agreeably to what I have already laid down 
with regard to Mr. Tooke's example of ** Figs 
*' coming,'' I affirm that it is the Noun — *^ Morn" 
—that signifies this Point of Time : And the 
P Imposition — ** From" — signifies the beginning of 
the RINGING ; which Action, of beginning, is 
co-EVAL or co-incident with that Point of 
Time called " Morn." And here, I observe, 
it is a self-evident truth, that Every Action be- 
tween Any Two Subjects in Time, or in Space, 
must be as Different a Thing from either 
Time or Space, as a Man, or a Horse, is Different 
from the Time, ov the Space, which he occupies or 
measures. 

Now, the consequence of the important distinc- 
tion which I have here last pointed out, is, that, 
whenever w^e desire to signify in One Same Speech 
or Sentence Both a BEGINNING ACTION 
AND the PLACE, or TIME, of its beginning ; if we 
wish to do this in the strictest and simplest manner, 
we must consider the Place, or Time, as being 
an Agent, — that is as being the Beginner. The 
Mode of effecting this purpose, in the case of 
Space, or Place, I have already shewn, in the 
exposition which I offered of the Sentence — " Figs 
*• come from Turkey to England." And the 
Mode of effecting the same in the case of Time 
OR Season, I conceive to be the following — name- 
ly — When it is said, 

** The Larum rang/to/t? Morn //// Night:" 

This means, 

Anal, 2 t 



^m OF MINOR VERBS, bi/ Gramma^ [chap. 3. 

The Lamm rang, Morn beginning the Ring- 
ing, The Ringing ending or finishing Night, 

This proceeding is founded in Necessity : Be- 
cause Every Beginning and Every Endi^ig Action are 
related to their Principal Action DIRECTLY; 
so that the Whole Three Actions, of Any Out-and- 
out Action, form a Logical Chain of Three Links^ 
e.rtended onward as it were in a Right Line : Where- 
as, this Whole Chain, and Every One of its Links, 
relate to Space, or to Tirie, ONLY COLLATE- 
RALLY; since this Chain of Action exists side by 
SIDE with the Parts, or Points, of the Space, and 
the Time, which it measures, as any Ordinary 
Chain lies measuring the ground, or any other 
such thing. 

Hence it follows, that, if we desire to mark 
or signify Both the ringing of a Larum and the 
Time when it begins to ring, we must do this by 
One of Two Ways ; That is, we must either consi- 
der the Time (say the Morning) as being the 
I^eading Agent or Beginner of the ringing ; and 
then we say, " Morn beginning the ringing :" Or 
else, we must express the Time by the introduc- 
tion of an Additional Phrase — thus, — The 
Larum began ringing AT Day-break. In like 
manner, in the case of a finishing Action, we say 
*' the Battle continued the Whole Day ; — Night 
** cndiiig the fighting :" Which is of the same 
import as " the fighting ending AT Night." 

In fine, therefore, I observe, that the Object of 
certain Prepositions assumed by Mr. Harris and 
the Ancient Grammarians — namely — a Point or 
Term where Any Thing commences from, or 



SKC.2J rians called PREPOSITIONS. 3Sl 

leads to — (whether this be meant of Space, or of 
Tibie) is STILL MORE UNREAL than that as- 
sumed by Mr. Tooke : Because the latter at least 
supposed THESE Prepositions to liave, for their 
Object, a THING IN Space, or Time,— nnmeiy — 
The commencement, or The Termination of 
Motion or Action; and Not a Point of Space, 
or of Time, itself ; although he did not discern that 
the Words — Comme7icement and Termination, when 
they regard Motion or Action, — are Nothing hut 
Abstract Names employed for commenci'SG and 
terminati^G ; both which last are the Real Con-* 
CRETE Names of Actions, and therefore are 
Verbals, convertible into Verbs. 

Of course, I do not here advert to Mr. Tooke's 
General doctrine of the Use of Prepositions; 
which asserts that these Words are employed to 
save a multiplicitif of Complex Terms in Language. 

It remains, then, that I should advert, (as I pro- 
posed,) to the Cause Why the Grammarians, who 
have treated the Subject prior to the Speculations 
of Mr. Tooke, did not discern that Prepositions 
are Signs of Actions. And, in what has been ad- 
vanced, it is conclusively evident that the reason 
of the oversight has been of a two-fold nature — 
TidiXneXy— First, their not having viewed Actions, 
in general, as consisting each of Three Concateriated 
Actions /—and, — Secondly, — Their never having 
discerned that An Action is a Logical Link 
(i. e. a Relation) between Some Two Subjects, 
and is Not an " Attribute" of Any One 
*' Subject or Nominative.'' 



332 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

Having thus animadverted upon the different 
Views of the Philologer of Purley and of the Au- 
thor of Hermes, respectively, with regard to the 
Nature of Prepositions ; including also the refe- 
rence which the last mentioned Writer has made to 
the Greek and Latin Grammarians ; I shall now 
drop this consideration, and proceed, in the next 
article, with the sequel of the analysis. 

The only observation which I shall add, in this 
place, is to remind my readers, that, although the 
greater part of this Subsection appears to be taken 
up in demonstrating the Nature of Onxy Two 
So-called Prepositions — namely — To and From — 
yet, the Nature of these Two Minor Verbs involves, 
in fact, the Basis of what may, in one sense or 
another, be considered as a great part of the 
Whole Denomination of Minor Verbs ; and con- 
tains, at least, the Basis of All the Most Useful 
AND REQUISITE of tlicsc Verbs. 



SUBSECTION IV. 

1. Continuation of the Analysis of So-called Preposi- 
tions, as founded in Necessary Principles, — 2. Re- 
ma7^ks on the View of Prepositions eiitertained by 
Dr. Murray, 

From the whole of what has been advanced in 
the foregoing pages, in demonstrating that Part of 
Speech heretofore called Prepositions, it is plain 
that the following statement comprises the Gene- 
ral Laws of their Nature. 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 833 

First. The Sole Differential Circum- 
stance which constitutes a So-called Preposi- 
tion OR Minor Verb, as distinguished specifi- 
cally from Any Other Verb, is the MERE 
CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEPENDENCE: The 
various manner of expressing which has already 
been described. 

Secondly. But, owing to the Triplicate 
Structure of Actions in general; and, to the continual 
occurrence and importance of Actions between All 
the Objects, or Subjects, in the World around us ; 
it HAPPENS, that the Most Useful or Requisite 
Class or Tribe of Minor Verbs we have, is that 
Sort which signifies (either by an Absolute Name or 
a Relative Name) the Beginning and the Termi- 
nating Acts of Out-and-mt Actions, 

Thus, for example, we may say either, *' He 
" goes to London," that is " He goes ending 
** London ;" Or, " He goes by the Coach ;" that 
is " He goes touching the Coach :" In which case 
we observe, that, in the First of these examples, 
the Action of ending is signified by its Primary and 
Absolute Name ; whereas, in i\\e Second y the Actio?i 
of ending is signified by only a Relative Name — that 
is by the Word " touching'' And here, if instead 
of either of these expressions, we had said, ** He 
" GOES with Despatches;" this would have meant 
— '* He GOES tying Despatches :" which Word — 
''tying'' — is only Another Relative Name for the 
Action oi ending. 

Thirdly. Although it is true, in logical 
strictness, that those Most Requisite Minor Verbs 
which signify Beginning and Terminating Actions, 



mi OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. eS. 

(whether it be by their Absolute or by their Relative 
Names,) amount only to a very Limited Number, 
and, in fact, form but a small proportion of All the 
Mifior Verbs in Language; yet, in the Ordinary 
and Natural Structure of Speech, there appears 
a Logical Ground for viewing a Very Large 
Proportion of All the Other Minor Verbs in 
Language, as being, either in a figurative seme, or 
at least in the Place which they occupy in a 
Sentence, significant of Beginning or Terminating 
Actions. 

Thus, for example, If we say, " He stood 
** supporting Her :" In this case, we observe, that 
the Minor Verb — '' supporting f although it ex- 
presses an Action which, from its beginning to its 
end, must have been contemporaneous with, and 
certainly was in No Sense eyiding, the Action of 
STANDING ; appears, in this Sentence, to terminate 
the Action of Standing; and is, indeed, over 
and above its Syntactical Appearance, the Moral 
End of ** His standing." Along with this con- 
sidei-ation, however, it is always to be remembered, 
that it is the CIRCUMSTANCE OF DEPENDENCE; 
and NOT necessarily the Circumstance of being, in 
Any Sense, either a Beginning or a Terminat- 
ing Action; that ESSENTIALLY constitutes a 
MINOR VERB, as distinguished from a VERB. 

Having laid down these Grammatical Laws of the 
Part of Speech now under discussion, as deduced 
by reasoning from Necessary Truths ; and to be 
yet collaterally evidence upon Distinct Appropriate 
Etymological G?vund ; I shall, in the present 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 335 

Subsection, conclude the Rational Analysis 
of this Element of Language, by stating such Sub- 
ordinate Principles and Illustrations as appear to 
be requisite in this part of my work. 

First, therefore, I observe, that, according to 
the Laws of Minor Verbs thus delineated, it fol- 
lows, that Almost Every Name of Action in 
All Language may serve, occasionally/, for a Minor 
Verb : Because Every Name of Action in Lan- 
guage, whatever, may serve as a Verb ; in order 
to do which, it is only necessary that Such Name 
be inlerposed between Any Two Other Words, serv- 
ing at that moment in the office of Syntactical 
Nouns: And Any Verb whatever must be 
either a VERB or a MINOR VERB, accordingly 
as it stands for the Sign of a Principal Action 
or of a Dependent One, meived entirely in a 
Logical and Grammatical Sense, 

The Vast Field, as well as Number, of So- 
called Prepositions which this General Corollary 
presents to our view, will, doubtless, strike every 
reader who is embued in the existing doctrines of 
Grammar with great surprise. And much, indeed, 
does it militate against the noteable assertion of 
Mr. Tooke, (in page 299 of his First Volume^ 
*' that of different languages, the least corrupt will 
" have the fewest Prepositions : and, in the same 
** language, the best Etymologist will acknowledge 
*' the fewest." While at the same time, it puts an 
end to all the difficulties and differences of opinion 
which have hitherto subsisted between Gramma- 
rians, as to the Number of Prepositions that are 
Requisite in Language ; For the Number of So- 



336 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gmmmfl- [chap. 3. 

called Prepositions in Language must be just the 
Number of Actions which we ever signify as being, 
in Any Sense, Grabimatically Dependent upon 
Any Principal Act. Here, then, I redeem the 
implied pledge, which was given in the Introduc- 
tory Chapter of this work, when I affirmed, in 
opposition to the views of Mr. Tooke, that the 
Most Perfect Language and the Most enlightened 
People, will have the Greatest Number of Pre- 
positions. The real truth of the matter is, that No 
Language, and No People, can exist without oc- 
casionally expressing a Very Great Number and 
Variety of Minor or Dependent Verbs : Every One 
of which has as good a Title to the Name of 
Preposition, as Any So-called Preposition in 
Any Tonofue. 

It is plain that, in the View which Mr. Tooke 
has taken of the Subject, he has supposed Cor- 
ruption of Form to be an Essential Feature 
in the Character of a Preposition : Hence alone he 
could have supposed, that the Most Perfect Lan- 
guage must have the fewest Prepositions : And 
hence, alone, he could have imagined that a Cor- 
rupted Noun makes a Preposition, as well as a 
Corrupted Verb. But, against this, in the first 
place, is to be objected the Participial Preposi- 
tions which Mr. Tooke himself has recognised in 
our own Language ; And, to this, (without search- 
ing farther at present,) may be added the remark- 
able Tribe of French Participial Prepositions — 
namely — Devant, — Avant, — Durant, — Pen- 
dant, — SuiVANT, — TOUCHANT, — MoYENNANT, 

&C.,-— a Number, most certainly, sufficient to ex- 
plode any supposition that Corruption is a Neces- 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 337 

sari/ Element in the Character of this Part of Speech. 
Besides this, moreover, it may be asked, Is it not 
a manifest and glaring inconsistency, to suppose, 
Fi7^sty that No Word can be a Preposition until 
it be corrupted or disguised ; and. Secondly, along 
with this, to affirm that Prepositions are Necessary 
to Language, and are employed therein to 'prevent 
Complex Terms from being too numerous: both 
which Principles, or Assumptions, together, have 
been asserted by Mr. Tooke. 

At this stage of the Subject, (for the credit of 
Philosophy or Human Understanding,) I humbly 
conceive there is a manifest necessity for dropping, 
once and for ever, the NAME—PREPOSITION,— 
in Language; — a Name which, whensoever it 
may be mentioned, must exhibit a monument of 
that profound darkness under which the Inventors 
of this Name, and all succeeding Speakers and 
Teachers of Language, have deplorably labored, 
if the Principles herein laid down be deemed 
founded in Necessary Truth. For it is certain 
that the Sign called a Preposition can be No 
More a PRE-position, than it can be a PosT-posi- 
tion: And it certainly can be Neither of these, 
that is to say, not even in its Place in a Phrase^ 
or Sentence; because Every So-called Preposition 
can be the Sign in question in No Case or Situa- 
tion — except only while it is supported at its 
Back by Some Noun or Word serving immedi- 
ately as its Nominative, as it is supported in 
its front by Some Noun or Word serving as its 
Accusative Case. 

I trust, therefore, that the Monstrous Fallacy 
Anal, 2 u 



338 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chAp. 8. 

as well as Monstrous Barbarism, which is implied 
in the Name — Preposition — is herein rendered 
sufficiently palpable and conspicuous, to cause its 
being discarded from the page of Philosophical 
Grammar, after so much use shall be made of the 
mention of it as may be requisite for bringing 
about a change of views : in doing which, we 
cannot avoid mentioning the Sign in question 
under Each of its Titles — namely— of Preposi- 
tion and of Minor Verb, — as I have been 
obliged to do throughout. 



And here, although this is not the place for my 
entering into the Etymological Evidence of the 
Nature of Single or Particular Prepositions, I 
shall, (as being preparatory to the observations that 
are now immediately to follow) advert particularly 
to that valuable, or inestimable Army of Preposi- 
tions, which has already been cited from Mr. 
Tooke, arrayed in its Proper Participial Garb. 
These Words, we have seen, are the following, 

" Touching," — " Concerning," — '' Regard- 
" ING,"^ — " Respecting," — " Relating to," — 
" saving, excepting," — " According to,"— 
" Granting,"— " Allowing," — " Consider- 
** ing," — " Notwithstanding," — " Neigh- 

" BOURING." 

The First observation to be made in this place, 
with regard to these Prepositions, is, to remark, 
that they are, all, not only Verbals, but tliey 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 339. 

are Verbals in the Present or Progressive 
Form. 

Upon this fact, accordingly, I have now to 
point out, that it is not merely matter of acci- 
dent, or a Variety of Form which admits, in Any 
Case, of a change: On the contrary, it is a Ne- 
cessary Result of the Nature of Things; and, 
especially, of Tibie — the Great Theatre of Speech 
and of Action, upon the Nature of which All 
Language is founded. I therefore here lay it 
down, as a Necessary Principle of Grammar ; 
that is, as a Special Principle, Subordinate to those 
General Principles of the Subject delineated in the 
beginning of this article; that Every So-called 
Preposition or Minor Verb must be in the Pro- 
gressive Form : And the following are the Ne- 
cessary Truths upon which this Law is founded. 

Every Verb, expressive of Any Dependent Ac- 
tion, must be expressed in the Present Time of 
that Action upon which it is Dependent ; because 
a Manifest Absurdity is involved in signifying 
Any Dependent Action in the Form of the Fu- 
ture, or the Past, whatever may be the Form in 
which the Principal Action is expressed. The 
Principle now laid down is self-evident, and only 
requires to be viewed in the Examples which ex- 
emplify it. Thus we say, with strict logical pro- 
priety. 

He speaks regarding them. 

He SPOKE resardm^ih^v£\. 

He WILL SPEAK remrdin^ them. 

But, upon the other hand, we should only utter 
a gross absurdity if we were to say. 



340 OF MINOR VERBS, % Qramma' [chap. 3. 

He SPEAKS regardET) them, 
He SPOKE regardED them, 

or, 
He WILL SPEAK regardEjy them. 

For it is self-evident, that, whether He speaks ; 
or whether He spoke ; or whether He shall, or 
WILL SPEAK ; the Actmi 0/ regarding, which is 
here expressed as being Dependent upon the Ac- 
tion OF Speaking, must be in the Present Time 
of the Action of speaking. 



The Next consideration for notice, here, is one 
to which I have already adverted ; but which 
requires being farther exemplified in this place. 
It is the Fact, that Minor Verbs are very fre- 
quently expressed in Series of Two, or More^ 
together : All of them being Dependent npon One 
Same Principal Verb. 

Thus, as Examples of Two Minor Verbs in a 
Series, we say, 

He came riding upon A Charger. 
He talked of repairing His House. 
He WENT about learning His Lesson. 

Again, as Examples of Three in a Series, we 
say. 

He fell in scrambling up the Rocks. 

He fainted in retreating over the Plain. 

He -DiEjy infighting at The Head of His People. 

He gloried in thinking o/'His Achievements. 

He blushed in alluding to His Services. 



SRC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 341 

He IMPROVED by serving under A Great General. 
He SUCCEEDED bi/ acting with His Companions. 
He 8VVFEREi> from sleeping upon Wet Ground. 
He jyiEjy from living upon Bad Provision. 

In each of these last examples, I have introdu- 
ced a So-called Progyxssive Participle, (to serve as a 
Preposition,) between Two of our Acknowledged but 
Mutilated and Disguised Prepositions, such as In, 
WITH, From, By, &c. And here I would ask 
of any person, If he can assign a reason, why any 
such Word as, scrambling, — retreating,— fightings 
thinking, — alludirig, — serving, — acting, — &c. {when 
thus interposed or associated^ is not as much a Prepo- 
sition, as the Word — up, or o'cer, or at, or in, or 
to, or Any Other such Word ; between Two of 
WHICH, (the reader will observe,) each of the above 
mentioned Verbals is placed ? 

As for the assumption which has been set up 
by some writers, with regard to Two, or More, of 
our acknowledged Prepositions, which, fortunately, 
happen still to exist in our Language in their 
Proper So-called Participial Forms — namely— that 
they are to be considered as Prepositions be- 
cause the Verbs to which they once belonged are 
now lost ; which assumption manifestly involves 
the consequence, that No So-called Participial, 
belonging to Any Verb that still exists in our 
Language, can be considered as a Preposition ; 
I hesitate not to ajffirm it is void of the smallest 
degree of logical pretension. In a Word, it is an 
assumption worthy, only, of going along with Mr. 
Tooke's assertion, that Prepositions are the 

OFFSPRING OF CORRUPTION. 



342 OF MINO R VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

And here I would have any one, for a moment, 
reflect upon this last mentioned doctrine of Mr. 
Tooke. — Prepositions, that is Minor Verbs, 
(which have herein been demonstrated to be a 
Principal and a Necessary Element and 
Link in that Structure or Fabric which is shewn 
to Form the Complex Bridge of Language,) are 
the Product of Corruption ; insomuch, that, if 
there had been such a Thing among P^ankind as 
a Perfect Language, this Bridge could not have 
contained that Link or Element of Speech which 
Grammarians have known, and have been obliged 
to employ, under the Barbarous and Unmeaning 
Name of Preposition ! 

Without deeming it necessary to offer another 
comment upon this doctrine ; I affirm, in direct 
opposition to it, that Every One of our known Or- 
dinary Prepositions are Nothing but Mutilated 
AND Disguised Verbals; — Verbals which have 
become Mutilated and Disguised in consequence of 
having been hacknied AS PREPOSITIONS, by 
which process of repetition and atti^ition they have 
been worn down to the last stump, from their ORIGI- 
NAL PREPOSITIONAL Size and Shape. Thus 
the Ordinary Prepositions — Up, — Over, — At, — 
Of, — To, — Under, — &c. — employed in the last 
string of Examples, I affirm to be Verbals, import- 
ing — lipping, — Oveinng or Topping , — Joining or 
Touching, — Off springing, — Tending, — On-neddeiing 
or One-neddering, &c. 

If I wished here to offer, in a single sentence, a 
Summary Confirmation of this truth, drawn from 
Etymology itself: I should have only to re- 



SEC. 2.] ricins called PREPOSITIONS. 343 

mind my readers of the United Suffrages of all 
our first-rate Etymologists, as to the fact that, 
in the Earliest Stages of Language, All Nouns 
WHATEVER weveVerbais or Names of Actions ; and, 
consequently, they were all in a Shape or Form 
to be employed as Prepositions, without Any 
corrupting, or Mutilation : While the pro- 
cess of their Corruption, under the continual at- 
trition of their use AS PREPOSITIONS,— and as 
EVERY-DAY Prepositions of incessant occurrence 
or employme72t, — is a consequence so jiatural, and 
so certain to follozv in such a case, that it cannot 
leave a doubt as to the Reason Why the Words 
in question are More Mutilated than Ani/ Other 
Words. 

One fact is quite certain and indisputable — 
namely — that, if these So-called Ordinary and 
Mutilated Prepositions be construed, or parsed, as 
the Verbals last mentioned, they exhibit a most 
perfect and rational sense, and certainly explode the 
use of any Other Words which could be substi- 
tuted for them, unless it were some Words of a 
similar import. 

In a Word, There can be no question, but the 
employment of Verbals, instead of All the So- 
called Prepositions in our Language, would com- 
pletely do away with the use of these Mutilated and 
Disguised Expressions. 

At the same time, it is proper to observe, I do 
not suppose it would be a perfection ; but, on the 
the contrary, a fault or defect in our Language, to 
change the Form, or Expression, of our Ordinary 
So-called Prepositions from their present Mutilated 



344 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

Shapes. I only conceive it to be requisite, that Every 
learner, and Every Speaker of our Language, 
should be taught to understand these Disguised 
Words as being All Verbals ; and to know, that 
they serve as Minor or Dependent Verbs, in serv- 
ing as Prepositions. 



It may be mentioned, here, among the Subordi- 
nate Considerations belonging to Minor or De- 
fining Verbs, that there appears, in point of fact, to 
be occasion for only a very small variety of them 
in signifying Beginning Actions. Thus, for 
example, While the variety of Modes of Termi- 
nating Actions (as has been seen,) is, in the Strict- 
est Sense, very considerable ; and is, perhaps, in 
One Sense or Another, almost as extensive as 
the Variety of Verbs in Language; we have 
only Some Such Changes or Relative Names 
for Beginning Actions as are contained in the 
following expressions: and even some of these 
are now become only vulgar expressions, although 
they are^ undeniably. Pure Grammatical English. 

Thus, Instead of saying " I am coming ;"— it 
is a usual expression to say, *' I am a coming." 

Instead of " He is working ;" it is said, " He 
** is a working." 

Instead of, " They are going, or intending, to 
*' ride ;" it is said, and said with great propriety, 
especially in the Scottish Dialect, " They are for 
"riding;" — In like manner, they say, "He is 
"/or his Dinner;" that is, " He is for Dining." 



SEC. 2.] rians called PEEPOSITIONS. 345 

In a similar idiom it is said, " He is upon quar- 
" RELiNG." And, ** He is about building." 

By the way, it may not be superfluous to 
remind the reader, once more, that, in the above 
Examples, or in Any Examples whatever of 
employing the Substantive Verb in signifying 
Any Adjective Act^ this Verb has Nothing to do 
with the Adjective Act : It merely signifies the 
Existence (i. e. existing) of the Agent. Thus, 
" I am dz coming," — means, " I exist in space — I 
on-ing (one-ing) coming : In which instance, as in 
every other, the Pronoun, (or Noun,) which is the 
Sign of the Grammatical Agent of the Adjective 
Action is, or ought to be, repeated to form the 
Nominative or Agent of that Action. 

In the small variety of Names for Beginning 
Actions which thus appears, there is perhaps not 
one that is more logical, although at the same time 
none more vulgar, or debased, than the Phrases, 
*' I am i? coming;" — " I am « going." — Thus, 
when Children, or Servants, or Other dilatory 
Persons, are called upon to do any thing which 
they must commence forthwith, but which they 
have not yet begun, and proceed to do with hesi- 
tation or reluctance ; the ordinary reply is, " I am 
"« coming;" — I am « GOING to do it. Now it 
is agreed among Etymologists, that a means on, 
and ON means One. Hence, the real import of 
the Phrase, " I am « coming," is — I am on 
--(onning) — (pne-ing)-— the Act of coming, — 
that is (figuratively, and feignedly also,) I am mak- 
ing Myself One with the Act of coming, — 
AnaL 2 x 



346 OF MINOil VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

which amounts to feigning, " I am coming This 
" Moment,"' 

It is equally usual, likewise, to say, " He is a 
** FISHING," — He is a riding ;-— He is a fight- 
ing ; even during the continuation of either of these 
Actions : In which case, it is plain, the expression 
is less Jigurative^ or feigned ; because the Agent is 
actually at the moment doing the Action although 
he cannot be literally One with it. 

The Idiom now under discussion brings to 
mind, and remarkably justifies, the assertion of 
Dr. Murray, that, " It is fortunate for this inquiry 
^' that of all illustrations, those drawn from old, 
** common, or even vulgar English, are particu- 
" larly suitable^" And " that the mysteries of Ian- 
** guage in its ruder slate, can be explained by the 
" words of our own tongue to better purpose than 
'* by those of any other speech." 

Along with these considerations it is to be ob- 
served, as a very Essential Principle, and one which 
is necessary to be attended to in order to prevent 
misapprehension of the Subject, that Any Begin- 
ning and Any Terminating Action may be 
signified as a Principal Action. Thus, When 
we say, 

" He BEGAN by teaching Them the Principles of 
** Religion;" — the intention in this case is to express 
PRINCIPALLY the Act, or Manner, of His begin- 
ning; and to express only subordinately the Act 
teaching. 

Again, When we say, 

" He ENDED with giving Them Good Advice;" 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 347 

the intention, here, is, evidently, to draw our notice 
PRINCIPALLY to the Act or Manner of his con- 
cluding. 

It follows, manifestly, from this, that when ei- 
ther a Beginning* or a Terminating Action is sig- 
nified as being a Grammatically Principal 
Act, the Verb which is its Sign may take either 
the Present or the Past Form, like Any Other 
Principal Verb. 

In fine. Having thus shewn the Requisiteness, 
and the Manner, of employing Minor Verbs in 
Series, of TwOj or More of them, depending upon 
One Same Major ; it remains to point out, more 
particularly than I have yet done, the Requisite- 
ness or Utility of Single Minor Verbs, in their 
Office of Defining Major Verbs. The Nature, 
and Extent, of this Requisiteness, indeed, may be 
pretty well gathered from all that has gone before : 
but I shall illustrate it, however, in this place, by 
furnishing One, or Two examples of its opera- 
tion. 

I have proposed in a former place to point out 
the fact, that Actions in general — that is Ma- 
jor Actions in general — *' require" to be defined 
by Minor Verbs. The following examples, then, 
are to serve for a proof of this Principle : which 
proof every person may, without farther aid, apply 
to innumerable other Sorts of Action. 

If we say, — " He writes English;" 
Or, — -*' He writes a Book:" 

Each of these Expressions, although it is a 



g48 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma^ [chap. 3. 

certain Idiom of our Language, is in reality an 
ELLIPTICAL Expression: for it means, "He writes 
** in English ;" — Or, " He writes in a Book." 

At the same time we are to observe, that the 
above mentioned affirmations, concerning the Ac- 
tion of writing, amount Only to a Very Small 
Part of the possible Variety of this Action, 
which we have almost a continual occasion, or 
necessity, to signify : And All the Remaining 
Special Modifications of this General Action must 
be signified by Other and Appropriate Minor 
Verbs or So-called Prepositions, which, in such 
case, must serve the Necessary Office of defin- 
ing the Major, — that is the Act of writing. 
For I lay it down, as Necessary and a Primary 
Principle in Language, deduced from strict 
demonstration, that ACTIONS (jn general) MUST 
BE DEFINED by NOUNS OF LESSER ACTIONS, 
in like manner as AGENTS OR GENERAL 
NAMES MUST BE DEFINED either by the Name 
OF Some Quality or the Name of Some Ac- 
tion. 

Thus, for example, the Efficiency of Language 
to signify the General Action called writing 
would be altogether inadequate to the wants of even 
the most Ordinary or Unenlightened Nation, if we 
could only say, — " He writes English ;" — " He 
" writes a Book ;" — " He writes Letters :" For we 
have continually occasion to signify such Special 
Modes as the following ; viz. 

" He writes to His Friends.*' 
*^ He WRITES c?/His Health." 



SEC. 2.] riam called PREPOSITIONS. 349 

" He WRITES about His Affairs." 

** He WRITES on Philosophy." 

" He WROTE in Trouble/' 

" He WROTE against Irreligion." 

" He WROTE with Sincerity." 

" He M^ROTE beyond his Strength/ 

" He WROTE under Affliction," 

** He WROT^ from Principle." 

" He WROTE before Dinner/' 

" He WROTE after Supper." 

" He WROTE bt/ Night." 

^* He WROTE at All Hours." 

" He WROTE beside His family." 

" He WROTE over His Meat." 

" He WROTE through Life." 

" He WROTE between the Lines." 

" He WROTE over the Other Writing.'* 

" He WROTE across the Pages." 

" He WROTE round the Margin," 

" He WROTE beneath The Text." 

It is plain that the existing or possible Ymety, of 
these Special Modes of the General Action of 
WRITING, is much greater than is here exemplified. 
And I affirm, that Every One of the Prepositions 
in this String of Examples is a Disguised Verbal 
in ING,and is turned into a VERB^ — that is into 
a MINOR VERB—by virtue of its being inter- 
posed between the Verbal Noun Writing and 
a Noun in the Objective Case : While its 
Office is to define, or determine, the Spe- 
cialty of the GENERAL ACTION. 



350 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma^ [chap. a. 

Such, then;— (AND NOT ANY THING LIKE 

" TO SAVE, OR PREVENT, A MULTIPLICITY OF 

" Complex Terms in Language ;" — ) do I affirm 
to be the USE, and the NECESSITY,— of Those 
Words, or that Part of Speech which has hither- 
to been called Prepositions, unless VERBS 
are made to prevent such multiplicity. 



2. 



Having, in the foregoing part of this article, 
stated the Subordinate Consideration and Remarks 
which appeared to be requisite, in order to com- 
plete the Analysis of the General Nature of So- 
called Prepositions, as founded in the Necessary 
Principles and Structure of Language ; altogether 
collateral to, and independent upon, Etymologi- 
cal Evidence, or authority ; which last, however, 
I have herein quoted and appealed to, in an ex- 
tent fully sufficient to satisfy any doubt that could 
have arisen with regard to it ; I conceive it must 
be impressive upon the judgment of a reader, that 
I should contrast the result of the whole, with 
that View of the Nature and Use of Prepositions 
which has been taken up by the latest and (unless 
with one co-equal exception) by far the most il- 
lustrious Etymologist whose labors have yet been 
given to the public. The several Views of this 
Part of Grammar which have been entertained by 
the Author of Hermes and by the Philologer of 
PuRLEY, respectively, have already been placed 
in a concise form before the reader. It remains 



SEC. 2.] nans called PREPOSITIONS. 351 

only, therefore, in order to complete the task I 
had proposed for the present part of my work, that 
I should here subjoin the estimate of the Subject 
which has been made by the " Historian of 
" THE European Languages.'* 

In the analysis which is now before the reader, 
it will be observed, that a Necessary and Reci- 
procal Dependence of the Noun, the Verb, and 
the Minor Verb or so-called Preposition, 
has been demonstrated, as forming the Essential 
Principles of that Chain of Signs called Grammar 
OR Language. This Necessity, moreover, is seif- 
evidently founded, upon a Similar Necessary and Re- 
ciprocal Dependence of Human Ideas upon Each 
Other concerning the Things of the Universe : 
Of which Ideas or Thoughts Language or Words 
are Nothing but a Type and Shadow; possessing 
no meaning, or virtue, any farther than they are 
construed, or considered, as the Shadows in ques- 
tion. It is for every man to judge, by his own in- 
tuitive faculty, whether, or not, his Ideas, and the 
Signs which are here demonstrated as represent- 
ing them in Grammar, are constructed in the man- 
ner herein asserted ; and, whether there can be any 
option, or latitude, for any People or Nation to 
INSTITUTE a Form or Structure of Language in 
violation of these Principles ; or, in any manner 
to deviate from them, without thereby incurring the 
just imputation of expressing themselves illogically 
and in a mere jargon, so far as any snch deviation 
extends. 

Now, toward a solution of this Part of Gram- 
mar, we have seen, upon the one hand, Mr. Har- 



aS2 OF MINOR VERBS, by Gramma- [chap. 3. 

ris, aiming indeed at Philosophy, but unfortu- 
nately taking, for his Basis, that Assumed Structure 
of the Category of Relation which the Logicians 
had built to his hand^ failed in his purpose, through 
the utter insolidity of his Foundation : While, upon 
the other, Mr. Tooke, laboring in the same darkness 
with regard to the Category above-mentioned ; and 
being, at the same time, as he himself very inge- 
nuously and laudably acknowledges, but partially 
enlightened by Etymological research; has put forth 
a Visionary conceit of the Use of Prepositions, and 
has mistaken these Signs for Imperatives in 
order to suit his conception with regard to this Use. 
We are now called to contemplate a Third 
Scheme of the Subject — namely — that view of it 
which is, at least with a great degree of probability, 
the result of tracing out, through the rough and pain- 
ful road of Etymology, the Very Manner in which 
OUR Teutonic Forefathers actually thought and 
SPOKE. And the purpose for which I shall bring 
this Scheme forward, is in order that the reader 
may judge, for himself. Whether those Tribes or 
Nations Spoke, or thought, philosophically ; 
or, Whether their thinking and speaking can be 
considered as Models, for Logicians and Philoso- 
phers to form their Theories of Language upon ? 

In the Seeond Volume of the " History of the 
European Languages," /^fl^e 11, Dr. Murray has 
expressed himself as follows : 

*' Having explained those original classes, I pro- 
" ceed to the easy task of enumerating the princi- 
^* pal adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, in 
** the Teutonic dialects. The reader must recollect, 



8EC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 353 

** that such words may be in all cases and in all 
** the participial terminations. A few of them are 
" verbs in the imperative and subjunctive moods. 
" The radical being known, all is clear." 

" No verb has produced more of these words 
"than Ag, and its derivatives Auk and Eac, to 
**join, continue, begin, persevere. These secon- 
" dary series all rose from the original idea of 
"motion. Undivided action is the primary sense; 
" that which is undivided is one ; to unite one 
" thing with another is to join ; to preserve in an 
" undivided or united state is to continue ; to con- 
" tinue action is to persevere. The place or part 
"in which an object joins with another is its limit, 
" its beginning or end ; for in ancient language the 
" same word denoted either. In another very or- 
" dinary acceptation, continued and intermitted 
" action are contrasted. Continual is viewed as 
" close, incessant, unpausing, quick, speedy, mo- 
" mentary. Applied to Time^ this is called im- 
" mediate; to place, strait ; to various actions, si- 
" muUaneous, When applied to several places or 
" things, it means together ; to a surface plain or 
" level, even ; to the qualities of objects concor- 
** dant, similar, like ; to the agreement of a ques- 
" tion with its answer, union of sense." 

Now taking this entire passage of Dr. Murray, 
as the Assumed Common Ground whereon he 
has erected this supposed One Indiscriminated 
HoMOGENEAL Mass, which he asserts to compose 
the Nature of Adverbs, the Nature of Pre- 
positions, and the Nature of Conjunctions ; 
I would ask, Could any imagined confusion of 
AnaL 2 y 



354 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3, 

Elements be more manifestly in violation of the 
First Principles of Reason ? I hardly need ask, 
Whether any man could, upon the surface of this 
Assumed Ground, discover the Distinct Points of 
Foundation, whereupon, under guidance of reason, 
must be erected those Purely and Vastly Dis- 
tinct Elements of Speech, an Adverb, — a Prepo- 
sition, — and a Conjunction : Because it does 
not appear to me that, in the aspect of this surface^ 
it is possible to discriminate any Points, or Posi- 
tions, from which Any Orderly Structure 
could be erected. 

Upon the other hand, however, the Confounih 
ING o^ Adverbs, Prepositions, and Conjunctions to- 
gether, is the manifestation of a darkness so de- 
plorable in the knowledge of Signs ; and, of course, 
of darkness with regard to the Structure of Human 
Ideas, upon which these Verbal Signs are founded ; 
— (the assertion, for example, that ^' such words may 
he in all Cases ; and in all the Participial 
Terminations ;" — " a few of them Verbs in the 
Imperative and Subjunctive Moods;") that, 
whatever degree of sanction Dr. Murray may have 
from the Teutonic Dialects, to warrant his asser- 
tion that our Early Forefathers thought and spoke 
in this manner, (and I here make no question that 
he was well warranted in what he has advanced,) 
it is altogether indisputable that the whole mass is 
an exhibition of a barbarous jargon, which has not 
the smallest pretension to be followed, or approved. 

To insist upon this by means of any farther illus- 
trations, after the statement of analysis which has 
gone before, would be a proceeding wholly and use- 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 355 

lessly redundant. I shall, therefore, in this place, 
only remark, that a Square, a Circle, and a Tri- 
angle, are Subjects Not More Disthict, or More 
Necessarily and Eternally Distinct, in their Diiferent 
Natures; than are an Adverb, a Preposition, 
and a Conjunction, And I confidently affirm, 
that it could not be a more irrational confounding 
of Logical Objects, for the Geometer to assume 
that A few Circles are triangles, than it is for 
the Grammarian to assert that " a few Preposi- 
tions ARE Imperatives." Nor could it be more 
monstrous to insist, that Triangles and Circles 
may be in All shapes ; than it is to affirm that 
*' Prepositions may be" (Nouns) " in x4ll Cases," 
If the Ground and the Superstructure which Dr. 
Murray has, as one of the results of his meritorious 
researches, cited from the Teutonic Nations, be 
esteemed as forming the Science of Language, 
or the True Theory of Signs; — then, that state- 
ment which I have thus far presumed to offer, as an 
Analysis of the Subject, or as a Fabric of Demon- 
strable Science resulting therefrom ; and which I 
confidently apprehend to possess the Very Same 
Sort of evidence and Necessity as the Deductions 
of Euler and the Conclusions of EucUd ; must be 
regarded as no better than Sick Dreams, or Visions 
of the Night. But if what I have ventured to lay 
down, as forming the Structure of Language, 
founded in the Principles of a Rational Logic, 
shall be admitted as valid ; in this case, the Phi- 
losopher WILL BE bound to recognisc it, and to 
shake off the Etymological biases and fascinations 
which have misled him. 



356 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

One consequence of this result must be immedi- 
ate ; and the necessity of it manifesto The Subject, 
from this time, must be divided into Two Distinct 
Departments ; which have hitherto been consi- 
dered as One and the Same. The Profession, 
Province, and Labor, of the Philosophical 
Grammarian, and those of the Inductive Ety- 
mologist, must, henceforth, be recognised as being 
as different from each other, as that of tbe Mathe- 
matical Architect is from the Operative House- 
builder, or Shipwright, who works from a prece- 
dent, the Principles of which, whether good or 
bad, he receives with implicit obedience and with 
little or no understanding (unless extra-official,) of 
either their perfections or defects. 

I have once before observed, that it would be a 
violation of the Laws of Human Nature — a real 
miracle — if our Teutonic Forefathers had been 
endowed with a prescriptive knowledge of the 
Rational Principles of Language. The bare 
supposition of the thing (and, of course, the search 
after the Logical Principles of Language among 
any such Barbarous Tribes of men,) is at war 
with all the History of Philosophy, or of the Hu- 
man Mind. The Human Species, at any such 
stage of its advancement, must have thought and 
spoken sometimes rationally, and sometimes 
irrationally. To doubt this, were to think in 
the face of all our experience of mankind, from 
the merest savage, up to the most cultivated and 
intellectural of our race. And if, from any acci- 
dent, we have been led to Logical Principles of 
Speech ; Can it then be imagined, that Philosophy 



SKC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 357 

will longer truckle to the fabrications of barba- 
rism ; or take up with the Jargon which necessity 
and haste had wrenched from the brain of the un- 
clothed savage ? 



But I am not here to part with so truly illustri- 
ous a Linguist as Dr. Murray ; whose genius and 
attainments, at all events, will claim admiration 
and reverence so long as language shall be a sub- 
ject of research. Neither do I in the least consi- 
der the Dialects, which he has traced, as being of 
small account in the present case. On the con- 
trary, 1 shall seize, with peculiar satisfaction, upon 
some very remarkable Points of Co-incidence be- 
tween those Early Dialects and the Structure of 
Language, such as I have laid it down. I do not 
intend it as arrogating unduly in favor of my own 
labors, when I humbly venture to believe, that, had 
Dr. Murray prosecuted his Etymological Course 
with the foregoing analysis of Language in his 
hand, it might have had some occasional influence 
upon his conclusions with regard to the real import 
of early terms or phraseology. I shall only add 
here, that, as it is, many very curious co-inciden- 
ces have occurred to my own observation, in what 
he has actually recorded of those Dialects : One 
alone of which I shall cite here, from a supposi- 
tion that it cannot fail to impress every reader. 

As Preparatory to this, 1 beg to remind my 
readers, that I have usually asserted such expres- 
sions as the following, as being the real Structure 
of Prepositions, in their proper office in a Sentence. 



358 OF MINOR VERBS, hy Gramma- [chap. 3. 

" He STOOD supporting Her." 
" He SPOKE regarding them." 
" The Larimi rang, Morn beginning The Ring- 
ing." 
"Figs COME, the Coming eijdijig England." 

Now therefore, I would sohcit attention, to mark 
how curiously it turns out, that our Teutonic An- 
cestors, with regard to this Part of Language, did 
actually express themselves agreeably to the Struc- 
ture which I have delineated. 

In page 10, of his Second Volume, Dr. Murray 
says, ** Another race of Adverbs sprung from the 
" use of the Present Participle, or at least from one 
*'of its terminations. Callunga, Dearnunga, Ae- 
"ninga, Unceapunga, Arwunga, Faeringa, Sen- 
** nunga, which signify entirely, or by all means ; 
" dernely, or in a secret manner ; singly, one by 
" one ; in an unbought manner ; by way of honor, 
" gratis ; hastily, in a body, or together. The A 
** at the end is, Ag, possessing or having. The 
" Adjective or Noun is made a Verb : Instead of 
"saying, they came Man by Man, or Individually, 
** not in a Body, our ancestors chose to say, they 
'* came mantling ; and, instead of th^y came wholly, 
" they preferred ailing,'' i. e. He means, they came 
ailing. 

It is true, Dr. Murray is here speaking of Ad- 
verbs : But I have formerly observed, and every 
person knows, that All our Prepositiotis become those 
Abbreviations called Adverbs whenever they 
terminate a Phrase or Sentence. Thus, in the ex- 
ample. They came over, i. e. They came overing. 
The Word Over, (overing,) which is otherwise 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 359 

a Preposition, becomes an Adverb by virtue of its 
place at the end of the phrase. 

The explanation given in the above passage, that 
"■ The A at the end is ag, possessing or having," 
is most valuable : because it proves, indisputably, 
that the Preposition involved in Every One q/* 
the Advet^bs in question, is the Verbal " having 
or possessing;" as, upon general principles, 
I affirm it must be. 

And here I cannot refrain from observing, that 
if, in the course of illustrating my own views of the 
subject, I had at any time employed such a Phrase 
as **They came manning;'' "They came ailing;'' 
it is more than probable that, had there been no 
authority to back such a procedure, some etymolo- 
gical readers might have demurred, and this indeed 
with good shew of reason, against it, as being at 
least a strained phraseology, and perhaps but a visi- 
onary conceit. I apprehend, therefore, that the pre- 
sent co-incidence cannot fail to be impressive upon 
the judgment of even the most prejudiced person. 
At the same time it is certain, as I have remarked in 
a former part of this work, that, in the elaboration of 
my own views, my judgment or imagination could 
not have been influenced by any co-incidence, 
or evidence, in the writings of Dr. Murray ; be- 
cause I had already, in my "First Lines of the Hu- 
man Mind," (a work published a considerable time 
antecedent to the appearance of Dr. Murray's post- 
humous labors,) expressed my affirmation, that 
Prepositions are altogether of the Nature of 
Verbs WHICH define Other Verbs. 
t iOther co-incidences, such as that which has just 



860 OF MINOK VERBS, by Gramma^ [chap. 3. 

been adverted to, occur very frequently in Dr. 
Murray's work; although I cannot lake up room 
to cite or observe upon them at present. The 
one vi^hich I shall presently quote may alon^ claim 
admittance, in this placCc The Real Etymolo- 
gical truth is, (and the following example affords 
us an instance of it,) that although it may be 
very true, indeed, as Dr. Murray has asserted, 
that our Teutonic Ancestors made Nouns and 
Imperatives serve, i?2 a way, for Prepositions, 
yet the General Tenor of their Language very 
remarkably accords with that Analysis of Speech 
which I have stated in the foregoing pages ; and it 
is, in point of fact, highly deserving of notice, how 
very eMensive, and essential, this accordance is ex- 
hibited to our view, the moment our attention is 
called to contemplate the phraseology and expres- 
sions which Dr. Murray has recorded, with a due 
and collateral regard to the Principles of the Sub- 
ject which I have suggested. I mention this, 
chiefly, to induce every reader of my own work to 
consult the details of expression which Dr. Mur- 
ray has quoted as Specimens of Early Language : 
in which, although he will find many very un- 
tenable Forms of Speech, — Forms which Philo- 
sophy, certainly, never can think of approving, — 
yet he will throughout discover, though for most 
part in a half smothered or disguised state, the 
Germ of a general agreement with the Principles 
which I have laid down. 

In page 26 of the Same Volume, Dr. Murray 
says, " The Verb ag, go, produced the oldest of the 
" Prepositions. It is found in Gaelic and British 



SEC. 2.] rians called PREPOSITIONS. 361 

^' in its radical active sense of moving, touching, 
'* effecting. Its derivatives are agd, and act, 
" moved, touched, at; and agana, or ana, on. 
*' With Ba, the second consignative ag, formed 
" AGBA, by contraction aba, moving, touching, 
** going at or on ; hence it is synonymous with 
**ad; for AF TAIHSWORN siTAN, at the right 
" hand to sit, is the same with ad dextram se- 
" DERE* The idea is to sit adjoining or touching 
*Uhe right hand." 

I would beg of the reader, here to take notice, 

HOW REMARKABLY AINU PRECISELY the ExprCS" 

sions now quoted are identical with those 
Forms which I have all along laid down, as being 
the Real Structure of Prepositions. 

*' To SIT adjoining or touching the Right hand." 
That the Preposition at is, in real fact, the Mi- 
nor Verb *^ adjoining or touching ;'' and, that this 
Minor Verb must be dependent, (either immediately 
or mediately) upon Some Major Verb, as it does 
in the example which I have last quoted ; is a 
Point of Grammar which is here settled and 
fixed, upon the double basis of Necessary Truth 
and Etymological Authority. And when I come 
to enter appropriately upon Distinct Etymological 
ground, I shall have occasion to cite the testimony 
of Dr. Murray to a sufficient number and variety 
of other facts, which, I have no fear, will form a 
mass of evidence of this kind, of a nature and 
extent which may satisfy the most reluctant be- 
liever, in a Structure founded on Necessary I^rin= 
ciples. 

Anal, 2 z 



362 OF MINOR VERBS, S^c. [chap. 3. 

As for the Strict Scientific Reader — the 
Rational Logician or Philosopher, — so far as 
regards Prepositions or Minor Verbs, I shall not, in 
the remaining Sections of this analysis, have to ad- 
vance any thing with a view to convince Him : be- 
cause I can neither desire, nor conceive, any kind, or 
extent, of proof, or evidence, that could be more 
demonstrative, or imperative, than that which is 
already before him ; although I beg to affirm this 
with submission, and a full sense of my liability to 
be deceived. The Principal intention of the Se- 
quel of this Chapter, therefore, will be to satisfy a 
liberal curiosity ; and to reconcile Philosophy 
WITH Etymology, in the case of certain Single 
Prepositions which have, by Mr. Tooke and 
other Writers, been considered as the most dark 
in their Origin and Nature ; but have, notwith' 
standing, been referred with much confidence to the 
Class of Nouns. 



Notice. 

The state of my health, (after a continued suc- 
cession of serious interruptions,) has compelled me 
here, however reluctantly, to stop in my task, and 
publish that part of it which is already printed. 
Having, more than twelve months back, announ- 
ced the work as being nearly ready for the press ; 



363 

I do not choose any longer to delay its appear- 
ance, lest it might possibly be thought that I had 
met with some serious or insuperable obstacle in 
the nature of the subject itself, at least in that of 
my own views with regard to it. I hope that what 
has been done will prove the best evidence, that I 
have not been retarded by any discouragement of 
THIS nature: Although I own that the develop- 
ment of the Principles in question, (simple as they 
may now appear,) have cost me an intensity of 
application, far beyond what 1 had contemplated 
in the outset. 

Finding it thus unavoidable that I should divide 
the Publication into Two Volumes ; I have deemed 
it the most logical procedure, to stop at that Point 
of investigation of the Nature of Prepositions, at 
which the labor must put on a change of character 
— that is, from being of a nature purely analyti- 
cal in the strict sense of that term ; to become an 
Etymological inquiry, in which the Evidence must 
be mere Matter of Fact or a Species of History ; 
and not, except by accidental co-incidence, a Matter 
of Science or Philosophy. 

After the conclusion of the present Chapter, (the 
sequel of which will form the opening of the Second 
Volume) I shall resume the Analysis ; and shall 
therein treat of the remaining Parts of Speech, in- 
cluding Conjunctions and Adverbs orBrieves, 
together with the Whole of that half of Grammar 
which is properly to be comprehended under the 
Denomination of the Noun ; which Part includes 
All so-called Pronouns, Adjectives, and Ar- 



364 

TicLEs OR Definitives. To this I propose to 
add a Distinct Summary, or Syntactical View 
of Speech ; in which will be introduced (as was 
hinted in an early part of the Work) a Diagram of a 
Complex Bridge of Language. And, along with 
this, in order to leave nothing to misapprehension, 
will be furnished some Specimens of Parsing, upon 
the Principles laid down. These considerations, 
together with a suggestion and investigation of the 
Nature of Limited Silence and Grammati- 
cal Contact considered as an Element of 
Speech, will form the bulk of the concluding 
Volume. 

The intimation, now given, may afford some 
conjecture of the actual state of the materials which 
I contemplate, as forming the completion of my 
intended labor on this subject ; and may serve to 
inform the reader, that what is already before the 
Public has not gone forth, without my having pre- 
viously embraced what has appeared to me to be 
its whole extent. 

To this intimation I shall only add, that, in the 
Analysis of the Verb afid the Minor Verb, in- 
cluding the incidental notice which has been al- 
ready had of the Nature of Nouns as being the 
Necessary Piers or Supporters of theVerb, I 
conceive the Main Part of the Structure of Lan- 
guage is determined and concluded. And we 
have seen, that the investigation of it has involved 
the suggestion of a Most Useful and Principal 
Class of Abbreviated Signs or Adverbs; which 
occur in Every Instance wherein Any Name of 



365 

Action is annexed to a Noun or Nominative, 
WITHOUT Any Accusative Noun coming af- 
ter it; such, for example, as when we say, — '* / 
WRITE," — " I Read," — " / think;" which 
means, " / mning a Writing State," — *' / 
inning A Reading State," — *' / inning a 
Thinking State" or Habit, — a construction 
which manifestly consigns All our So-called 
Conjugated Verbs, in their Supposed Para- 
digms, over to the Order of Abbreviated 
Signs. In other words ; I conceive the Principal 
Part of the Structure of Language to be erected, 
when we can Signify All General Actions 
between the Related Agents of the Uni- 
verse ; and, in addition to this, can express the 
Manner of these General Actions, by their Es- 
sential Definitives — the Names of Depend- 
ing Actions ; — by doing which, we signify All 
the Various Modes in which they affect 
THE Agents concerned. 

For the Subject of the proposed Specimens of 
Parsing, I shall take the same passages of Scrip- 
ture that were selected by Bishop Lowth, in his 
" Introduction :" Which will be done with a 
view to contrast the operation of my own Scheme 
with that which now passes current. And my 
immediate object, in furnishing these examples, is to 
prevent the possible consequences of leaving the 
machine to the chance of being set in action by a 
careless or negligent hand. I trust this may be 
found of some service ; because, if there be any 
tolerable proportion of truth, or utility, in the 



366 

Principles thus hazarded, it will he impossible for 
writers to persevere in promulgating the Rules 
of that Idol, or Drama, which is now taught every 
where under the name of grammar. 



END OF THE FIRST VOLUME, 



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